EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18899. February 29, 1964.]
IN RE SEARCH WARRANT: SEIZURE OF SLOT MACHINES WITH OTHER PARAPHERNALIA IN PASAY CITY. OWNERS OF 51 OF THE JACKPOT SLOT MACHINES, Petitioners-Appellees, v. THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Oppositor-Appellant.
Paterno R. Canlas for Petitioners-Appellees.
Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; GAMBLING; SLOT MACHINES; NOT ILLEGAL WHEN DULY LICENSED BY LAW AND CITY ORDINANCE; CASE AT BAR. — Facts: By virtue of the Charter of Pasay City (Rep. Act No. 183, section 16 [a]) which expressly authorizes its Municipal Board to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for slot machines, said board passed Municipal Ordinance No. 106 fixing the amount of said license fees which the owners of the slot machines in the case at bar paid, thereby securing the corresponding licenses. Held: The operation of said slot machines is neither illegal nor constitute a nuisance.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM PHILIPS CASE. — The doctrine laid down by the Court in the case of Philips v. Municipal Mayor (G.R. No. L-9183, May 30, 1959) where it was held that an ordinance of the Municipality of Caloocan authorizing the operation of slot machines was illegal, is not in point in the case at bar, where the charter of Pasay City (Rep. Act No. 183) expressly authorizes its Municipal Board to regulate and fix the license fees for slot machines, a power not granted to the Municipal Council of Caloocan.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; GAMBLING; SLOT MACHINES NOT ILLEGAL "PER SE" ; NO REVERSAL OF RULING IN UY HA CASE. — The ruling in the case at bar that slot machines are not illegal per se does not reverse the ruling in the case of Uy Ha v. City of Manila (108 Phil. 400) because in the latter case there was an ordinance prohibiting the operation of slot machines, whereas in the case at bar, the ordinance expressly authorizes the operation of the slot machines in question. Moreover, in the Uy Ha case, the Court quoted with approval the view that a slot machines is not per se a gambling device.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDING TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL USE OF ARTICLE. — Articles, like slot machines in the case at bar, which may or may not be used for legal purposes, cannot be seized until it was first been established that the articles were procured, held or used for an illegal purpose, and in order to establish that the article was designed to be put, or has been put, to an illegal use, there must be a proceeding in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
5. ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF SLOT MACHINES ONLY ILLEGAL WHEN PROHIBITED BY STATUTE; NO LAW PUNISHES POSSESSION OF SLOT MACHINES. — The operation of slot machines is illegal not per se, but only if and when prohibited by statute. However, neither the Revised Penal Code nor any other law punishes the possession of slot machines of any kind whatsoever.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM PHILIPS CASE. — The doctrine laid down by the Court in the case of Philips v. Municipal Mayor (G.R. No. L-9183, May 30, 1959) where it was held that an ordinance of the Municipality of Caloocan authorizing the operation of slot machines was illegal, is not in point in the case at bar, where the charter of Pasay City (Rep. Act No. 183) expressly authorizes its Municipal Board to regulate and fix the license fees for slot machines, a power not granted to the Municipal Council of Caloocan.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; GAMBLING; SLOT MACHINES NOT ILLEGAL "PER SE" ; NO REVERSAL OF RULING IN UY HA CASE. — The ruling in the case at bar that slot machines are not illegal per se does not reverse the ruling in the case of Uy Ha v. City of Manila (108 Phil. 400) because in the latter case there was an ordinance prohibiting the operation of slot machines, whereas in the case at bar, the ordinance expressly authorizes the operation of the slot machines in question. Moreover, in the Uy Ha case, the Court quoted with approval the view that a slot machines is not per se a gambling device.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDING TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL USE OF ARTICLE. — Articles, like slot machines in the case at bar, which may or may not be used for legal purposes, cannot be seized until it was first been established that the articles were procured, held or used for an illegal purpose, and in order to establish that the article was designed to be put, or has been put, to an illegal use, there must be a proceeding in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
5. ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF SLOT MACHINES ONLY ILLEGAL WHEN PROHIBITED BY STATUTE; NO LAW PUNISHES POSSESSION OF SLOT MACHINES. — The operation of slot machines is illegal not per se, but only if and when prohibited by statute. However, neither the Revised Penal Code nor any other law punishes the possession of slot machines of any kind whatsoever.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation — hereinafter referred to as the Director — seeks the review of an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal directing the return of fifty-one (51) slot machines, and the paraphernalia thereof, to the owners thereof. The appeal is before us only questions of law being raised therein.
It appears that sometime before September 1, 1959, said slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners thereof in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by said City in conformity with its Ordinance No. 106. On the date adverted to above, the aforementioned machines and paraphernalia, together with slot machines operated without said license, were seized under and by virtue of search warrants issued by a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Said unlicensed slot machines were the subject matter of criminal case Nos. 9571-1 and 9569-I of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. However, the special prosecutor in charge of said cases opined that no criminal cases should be filed against the owners of the fifty-one (51) slot machines involved in the case at bar, and, accordingly, recommended that said machines and its paraphernalia be released and returned to the owners thereof. As a consequence, on September 2, 1959, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Director to release said slot machines to their respective owners. However, this order was subsequently suspended, the Director having invited attention to the fact that the court which issued the search warrants adverted to above might punish him for contempt if he released the machines without judicial authority therefor. This led to the filing of a motion by the owners of said machines praying that the same be ordered released and returned to them.
The Director objected to the motion upon the ground that the machines in question are intended to be used for the commission of an offense (gambling), and are a public nuisance, as well as illegal per se. After due hearing, the lower court overruled this opposition and granted said motion. Hence this appeal.
The main issue therein is whether or not the aforementioned slot machines constitute a nuisance per se or will be devoted, if released, to some unlawful use. Appellant maintains that the answer should be in the affirmative, relying mainly upon the decision of this Court in Philips v. Municipal Mayor (G. R. No. L-9183, promulgated May 30, 1959), in which we held that an ordinance of the municipality of Caloocan authorizing the operation of slot machines was illegal it being violative of section 2242 (j) of the Revised Administrative Code imposing upon municipal councils the duty "to prohibit and penalize gambling."cralaw virtua1aw library
The doctrine laid down in the Philips case is not in point, for Republic Act No. 183, which is the Charter of Pasay City (Section 16[n]), expressly authorized its municipal board "to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for" inter alia "slot machines" a power not granted to the municipal council of Caloocan. It being conceded that the municipal board of Pasay City has passed Municipal Ordinance No. 106 (approved on June 26, 1957), fixing the amount of the license fees for the operation of slot machines, and that the owners of the slot machines in question have paid said fees and secured the corresponding licenses, it follows that the operation of said machines is neither illegal nor constitutes a nuisance. Needless to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The mere possession of slot machines or even its operation for amusement and not for profit does not constitute a crime." (38 CJS. 159, footnote 99 [1]).
"A slot machine is not a `gambling device’ per se, because it can be operated legally as well as illegally." (Gen. Code No. 13066, Nader v. State, Ohio Supp. 287)
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L. J., did not take part.
It appears that sometime before September 1, 1959, said slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners thereof in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by said City in conformity with its Ordinance No. 106. On the date adverted to above, the aforementioned machines and paraphernalia, together with slot machines operated without said license, were seized under and by virtue of search warrants issued by a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Said unlicensed slot machines were the subject matter of criminal case Nos. 9571-1 and 9569-I of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. However, the special prosecutor in charge of said cases opined that no criminal cases should be filed against the owners of the fifty-one (51) slot machines involved in the case at bar, and, accordingly, recommended that said machines and its paraphernalia be released and returned to the owners thereof. As a consequence, on September 2, 1959, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Director to release said slot machines to their respective owners. However, this order was subsequently suspended, the Director having invited attention to the fact that the court which issued the search warrants adverted to above might punish him for contempt if he released the machines without judicial authority therefor. This led to the filing of a motion by the owners of said machines praying that the same be ordered released and returned to them.
The Director objected to the motion upon the ground that the machines in question are intended to be used for the commission of an offense (gambling), and are a public nuisance, as well as illegal per se. After due hearing, the lower court overruled this opposition and granted said motion. Hence this appeal.
The main issue therein is whether or not the aforementioned slot machines constitute a nuisance per se or will be devoted, if released, to some unlawful use. Appellant maintains that the answer should be in the affirmative, relying mainly upon the decision of this Court in Philips v. Municipal Mayor (G. R. No. L-9183, promulgated May 30, 1959), in which we held that an ordinance of the municipality of Caloocan authorizing the operation of slot machines was illegal it being violative of section 2242 (j) of the Revised Administrative Code imposing upon municipal councils the duty "to prohibit and penalize gambling."cralaw virtua1aw library
The doctrine laid down in the Philips case is not in point, for Republic Act No. 183, which is the Charter of Pasay City (Section 16[n]), expressly authorized its municipal board "to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for" inter alia "slot machines" a power not granted to the municipal council of Caloocan. It being conceded that the municipal board of Pasay City has passed Municipal Ordinance No. 106 (approved on June 26, 1957), fixing the amount of the license fees for the operation of slot machines, and that the owners of the slot machines in question have paid said fees and secured the corresponding licenses, it follows that the operation of said machines is neither illegal nor constitutes a nuisance. Needless to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The mere possession of slot machines or even its operation for amusement and not for profit does not constitute a crime." (38 CJS. 159, footnote 99 [1]).
"A slot machine is not a `gambling device’ per se, because it can be operated legally as well as illegally." (Gen. Code No. 13066, Nader v. State, Ohio Supp. 287)
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L. J., did not take part.
