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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19118. January 30, 1965.]

MARIANO A. ALBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Uy & Artiaga and Antonio M. Molina, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates, for Defendant-Appellee.


D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.P., J.:


No less than three times have the parties here appealed to this Court.

In Albert v. University Publishing Co., Inc., L-9300, April 18, 1958, we found plaintiff entitled to damages(for breach of contract) but reduced the amount from P23,000.00 to P15,000.00.

Then in Albert v. University Publishing Co., Inc., L-15275, October 24, 1960, we held that the judgment for P15,000.00 which had become final and executory, should be executed to its full amount, since in fixing it, payment already made had been considered.

Now we are asked whether the judgment may be executed against Jose M. Aruego, supposed President of University Publishing Co., Inc., as the real defendant.

Fifteen years ago, on September 24, 1949, Mariano A. Albert sued University Publishing Co., Inc. Plaintiff alleged inter alia that defendant was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; that on July 19, 1948, defendant, through Jose M. Aruego, its President, entered into a contract with plaintiff; that defendant had thereby agreed to pay plaintiff P30,000.00 for the exclusive right to publish his revised Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code and for his share in previous sales of the book’s first edition; that defendant had undertaken to pay in eight quarterly installments of P3,750.00 starting July 15, 1948; that per contract failure to pay one installment would render the rest due; and that defendant had failed to pay the second installment.

Defendant admitted plaintiff’s allegation of defendant’s corporate existence; admitted the execution and terms of the contract dated July 19, 1948; but alleged that it was plaintiff who breached their contract by failing to deliver his manuscript. Furthermore, defendant counterclaimed for damages.

Plaintiff died before trial and Justo R. Albert, his estate’s administrator, was substituted for him.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, after trial, rendered decision on April 26, 1954, stating in the dispositive portion —

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant the University Publishing Co., Inc., ordering the defendant to pay the administrator Justo R. Albert, the sum of P23,000.00 with legal [rate] of interest from the date of the filing of this complaint until the whole amount shall have been fully paid. The defendant shall also pay the costs. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

As aforesaid, we reduced the amount of damages to P15,000.00, to be executed in full. Thereafter, on July 22, 1961, the court a quo ordered issuance of an execution writ against University Publishing Co., Inc. Plaintiff, however, on August 10, 1961, petitioned for a writ of execution against Jose M. Aruego, as the real defendant, stating, "plaintiff’s counsel and the Sheriff of Manila discovered that there is no such entity as University Publishing Co., Inc." Plaintiff annexed to his petition a certification from the Securities and Exchange Commission dated July 31,1961, attesting: "The records of this Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or partnership." "University Publishing Co., Inc." countered by filing, through counsel (Jose M. Aruego’s own law firm), a "manifestation" stating that "Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this case," and that, therefore, plaintiff’s petition should be denied.

Parenthetically, it is not hard to decipher why "University Publishing Co., Inc.," through counsel, would not want Jose M Aruego to be considered a party to the present case: should a separate action be now instituted against Jose M. Aruego, the plaintiff will have to reckon with the statute of limitations.

The court a quo, denied the petition by order of September 9, 1961, and from this, plaintiff has appealed.

The fact of non-registration of University Publishing Co., Inc. in the Securities and Exchange Commission has not been disputed. Defendant would only raise the point that "University Publishing Co., Inc.," and not Jose M. Aruego, is the party defendant; thereby assuming that "University Publishing Co., Inc." is an existing corporation with an independent juridical personality. Precisely, however, on account of the non-registration it cannot be considered a corporation, not even a corporation de facto (Hall v. Piccio, 86 Phil. 603). It has therefore no personality separate from Jose M. Aruego; it cannot be sued independently.

The corporation-by-estoppel doctrine has not been invoked. At any rate, the same is inapplicable here. Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced not only the plaintiff but even the court to believe in such representation. He signed the contract as "President" of "University Publishing Co., Inc.," stating that this was "a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines," and obviously misled plaintiff (Mariano A. Albert) into believing the same. One who has induced another to act upon his wilful misrepresentation that a corporation was duly organized and existing under the law, cannot thereafter set up against his victim the principle of corporation by estoppel (Salvatiera v. Garlitos, 56 O.G. 3069).

"University Publishing Co., Inc." purported to come to court, answering the complaint and litigating upon the merits. But as stated, "University Publishing Co., Inc." has no independent personality; it is just a name. Jose M. Aruego was, in reality, the one who answered and litigated, through his own law firm as counsel. He was in fact, if not in name, the defendant.

Even with regard to corporations duly organized and existing under the law, we have in many a case pierced the veil of corporate fiction to administer the ends of justice. * And in Salvatiera v. Garlitos, supra, p. 3073, we ruled: "A person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which has no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes personally liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such agent." Had Jose M. Aruego been named as party defendant instead of, or together with, "University Publishing Co., Inc.," there would be no room for debate as to his personal liability. Since he was not so named, the matters of "day in court" and "due process" have arisen.

In this connection, it must be realized that parties to a suit are "persons who have a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from a decision" (67 C.J.S. 887) — and Aruego was, in reality, the person who had and exercised these rights. Clearly, then, Aruego had his day in court as the real defendant; and due process of law has been substantially observed.

"By ’due process of law’ we mean ’ "a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . ." (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581.)’; or, as this Court has said, ’ "Due process of law" contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one’s person or property’ (Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32)." (Sicat v. Reyes, L-11023, Dec. 14, 1956.) And it may not be amiss to mention here also that the "due process" clause of the Constitution is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 316, 321-322:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities."cralaw virtua1aw library

The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial payments of the consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility under the judgment falls on him.

We need hardly state that should there be persons who under the law are liable to Aruego for reimbursement or contribution with respect to the payment he makes under the judgment in question, he may, of course, proceed against them through proper remedial measures.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

Endnotes:



* Arnold v. Willits & Patterson, Ltd., 44 Phil. 634; Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496; La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. v. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, 93 Phil. 160; Marvel Building Corporation v. David, 94 Phil. 376; Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. v. Ogilvie, L-843l, Oct. 30, 1958; Laguna Transportation Co., Inc. v. S.S.S., L-14606, April 28, 1960; McConnel v. C. A ., L-10510, Mar. 17, 1961; Liddell & Co. Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-9687, June 30, 1961; Palacio v. Fely Transportation Co., L-15121, August 31, 1962.

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