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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-20813. November 29, 1966.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JACINTO UY TIAN HUA, JR. TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, JACINTO UY TIAN HUA, JR., Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Noli M. Sagadraca for Petitioner-Appellee.

Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.


SYLLABUS


1. NATURALIZATION; QUALIFICATIONS OF PETITIONER, WHEN TO BE DETERMINED. — Petitioner’s qualifications to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.

2. ID.; ID.; LUCRATIVE INCOME REQUIREMENT, INCREASE IN INCOME, EFFECT OF. — At the time of the filing of his application, petitioner had no other income than P250.00 a month, which is insufficient to be "lucrative" within the purview of the Naturalization Law. His allegedly increased income thereafter cannot cure his lack of qualification when he commenced the action.

3. ID.; FAILURE TO MENTION PREVIOUS RESIDENCES, EFFECT OF. — Failure to mention in the application previous places of residences is fatal to the allowance of said application.

4. ID.; CHARACTER WITNESSES; QUALIFICATIONS. — Character witnesses must enjoy such a high reputation for probity in the community in which they live, that their word can be taken on its face value. They must be credible persons within the purview of the Naturalization Law.


D E C I S I O N


CONCEPCION, C.J.:


The Republic of the Philippines seeks the reversal of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, granting the petition for naturalization, as citizen of the Philippines, of appellee Jacinto Uy Tian, Jr.

The Solicitor General maintains that petitioner has no lucrative trade. Indeed, it is alleged in his petition that his income is P250 a month or P3,000 a year, and, among the documentary evidence introduced by him is an affidavit of Uy Tiong — assistant manager of the North Auto Supply, for which he works as a salesman — to the effect that petitioner "receives a monthly income of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P250.00) from" said enterprise.

Soon after the Solicitor General had filed notice of appeal from the aforementioned decision of the lower court, upon the ground that petitioner had no lucrative trade or occupation, the latter moved to reopen the case for the purpose of proving that he had a gross income of P7,410.62 in the year 1961, and "an investment in the form of shares of stock worth FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)" in the Philippine Hygenic * Servicing, Inc., which had been assigned to him on February 1, 1962. This motion having been granted, despite the objection thereto of the Government, petitioner later introduced evidence in support of his claim, whereupon the lower court rendered a Supplemental Decision finding that said claim had been established and reiterating the original decision adverted to above.

It is, at once, apparent that the motion to reopen was prompted by a realization, on the part of petitioner herein, that — on the basis of the allegation in his petition to the effect that his income was limited to the meager sum of P250 a month, and the evidence introduced by him in support thereof — the Government stood a good chance of securing a reversal of the original decision in his favor, for lack of a lucrative trade or occupation on his part, in the light of the decisions of this Court for the last decade (Leonides Tan v. Republic, L-19694, March 30, 1965; Alexander Lim Uy v. Republic, L- 19916, June 23, 1965; Jose Uy v. Republic, L-20799, November 29, 1965; Antonio Dy v. Republic, L-20348, December 24, 1965; Antonio Po v. Republic, L-21019, December 24, 1965; Andronico Augusto Dy v. Republic, L-20709, April 29, 1966; Kock Tee Yap v. Republic, L-20992, May 14, 1966).

It is, likewise, obvious that the lower court has committed a grave error in granting said motion to reopen and that, in any event, the additional evidence for the petitioner does not justify the decision appealed from. Indeed, petitioner’s qualification to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition (Pablo Lee Alias Eng Jio v. Republic, L-20148, April 30, 1965; Pantaleon Sia v. Republic, L-20290, August 31, 1965), which took place on September 14, 1960. At that time he had no other income, than P250 a month, which is insufficient to be "lucrative", within the purview of Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473. His allegedly increased income in 1961 and the shares of stock he claims to have acquired on February 1, 1962, cannot cure his lack of qualification when he commenced this case in 1960 (Saturnino Dy v. Republic, L-20482, August 31, 1965; Senecio Dy Ong v. Republic, L-21017, November 29, 1965).

It may not be amiss to note that petitioner’s income tax return, Exhibit V, upon which his alleged income for 1961 is based, was filed on April 1, 1962, or several months after the submission of this case in the lower court for decision. Hence, it is not unlikely that the entries in said return may have been influenced by the pendency of this naturalization case. Then, again, the alleged assignor of the shares of stock which petitioner claims to own since February 1, 1962, is petitioner’s elder sister, who has not taken the witness stand.

Independently of the foregoing, it appears that, before establishing himself in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, where petitioner is now domiciled, he had resided in different parts of Manila, namely: 906 Int. 2, Alvarado Street, 1032-1036 Reina Regente Street and 240 Int. Pennsylvania Street, and that none of these previous residences in Manila was mentioned in petitioner’s application and, consequently, in the notice published in connection therewith. Such omission is fatal to the allowance of said application (Chieng Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January 31, 1964; Pio de Lara v. Republic, L-18204, May 29, 1964; Manuel de Lara v. Republic, L-18203, May 29, 1964; Dy Pek Long v. Republic, L-18758, May 30, 1964; Gaw Ching v. Republic, L-19419, September 30, 1964; Qua v. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964; Ong Tai v. Republic, L-19418, December 23, 1964; Ong Ping Seng v. Republic, L-19575, February 26, 1965; Agueda Go v. Republic, L-21895, April 29, 1966; Wayne Cheng v. Republic, L-20713, April 29, 1966).

Lastly, petitioner’s attesting witnesses were Francisca Gatchalian and Maria J. Lago, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that these persons enjoy such a high reputation for probity in the community in which they live, that their word can be taken on its face value. Otherwise stated, it has not been proven that said witnesses are credible persons, within the purview of the Naturalization Law (Sy Shin v. Republic, 107 Phil. 718, Albert Ong Ling Chuan v. Republic, L-18550, February 28, 1964, Paul Teh v. Republic, L-19830, September 30, 1964; Saw Cen v. Republic, L-20310, April 30, 1965; Ong Kim Kong v. Republic L-20505, February 28, 1966).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, reversed and another one shall be entered, dismissing the petition herein, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:



* Editor’s Note: Should read Hygienic.

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