EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18722. September 14, 1967.]
CATALINA M. DE LEON and ELEUTERIO LIMCACO, Petitioners, v. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, and PETRONILO CASTAÑEDA, Respondents.
Leonin, Balatbat & Yap and Sixto T. Antonio & Associates, for Petitioners.
M. Farol and C. De Dios for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; RESCISSION; EFFECT. — Where a parcel of land has been sold to two different vendees, the first, in turn, having sold one-half of it to another person who constructed a house thereon; and where the sale to the first vendee has been rescinded or resolved by final court judgment, the basis for petitioner (vendee of the first vendee) Catalina de Leon’s claims disappeared when the right of her vendor was annihilated by the final decision of the CFI of Manila. While she was not directly bound by that judgment, the fact remains that her right to the disputed property cannot rise higher than that of her "causantes" who were ousted by such judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. — A builder, who alleges good faith but is belied by a court decision finding her to be in bad faith is not entitled to retain possession until indemnified (Art. 448, Civil Code of the Philippines), said judgment being presumably correct until reversed.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. — Where the plaintiff possesses registered title to the land but has been deprived of possession since 1949, and there is likelihood of plaintiff being unable to collect in full what would be due him, the order of execution pending appeal, unless a counterbond is filed, now under attack, appears fully justified.
2. ID.; ID.; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. — A builder, who alleges good faith but is belied by a court decision finding her to be in bad faith is not entitled to retain possession until indemnified (Art. 448, Civil Code of the Philippines), said judgment being presumably correct until reversed.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. — Where the plaintiff possesses registered title to the land but has been deprived of possession since 1949, and there is likelihood of plaintiff being unable to collect in full what would be due him, the order of execution pending appeal, unless a counterbond is filed, now under attack, appears fully justified.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On July 11, 1949, Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista sold a piece of land (Lot No. 11, Block K-19 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision) purchased on installment basis from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, to the spouses Rosario B. de Leon and Francisco de Leon for P2,000.00 of which P900.00 was received by them and the balance to be paid within sixty days When the rest of the price was tendered, the vendors refused to accept it on the ground that it was not offered within the stipulated period of sixty days. Thereupon, Rosario B. de Leon and Francisco de Leon filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 9366) for specific performance to compel the vendors Roque and Bautista to receive the balance of the purchase price. The defendant vendors countered with a plea for rescission (or rather resolution of the sale,) averring that the entirety of the price had not been paid within the time agreed upon. The Court declared the contract rescinded and ordered the vendors to return the P900.00 they had originally received.
As it turned out, as early as October 3, 1949, Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista had sold the same land to Petronilo Castañeda, respondent herein, while on October 5, 1949, Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon sold one-half of the land which they had acquired from Perfecta Roque for P2,000.00 to Catalina de Leon, petitioner herein, who paid the price in full and built houses and made improvements on the land, all assessed at P12,900.00.
On October 17, 1949, respondent Petronilo Castañeda brought an action to restrain Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon from fencing and making constructions on the lot in question. Judgment was rendered in favor of Castañeda and a writ of execution was issued on February 6, 1952, directing Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon to demolish the house and other improvements erected on the land. The writ was served on Catalina de Leon who claimed to be the owner of the house and improvements. On appeal (Castañeda v. De Leon, 102 Phil. 689), however, the order of demolition was set aside and an entirely new action was directed.
"The problem that has arisen proceeds from the fact that Perfecta Roque had sold the residential land to two vendees, first to Rosario B. de Leon and later to Petronilo Castañeda. If justice is to be done to the rights of Rosario B. de Leon’s vendee, Catalina de Leon, who had constructed two houses and a fence on one-half of the residential lot in question, complicated questions of fact and good faith will have to be investigated and decided and certainly this can not be done in the proceedings for execution. The question can be decided fairly and justly only in an ordinary suit between the parties, as the correlative rights and obligations of owner and builder were never at issue in civil case No. Q-64 because Catalina de Leon was not allowed to be a party to the suit.
"For the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed insofar as it sets aside the order of demolition issued by respondent judge, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, on August 30, 1952, but that portion thereof which directs the case to be remanded to the trial court for determination if Catalina de Leon may be considered a privy to Rosario de Leon, is hereby set aside; and it is hereby declared and ordered that the correlative rights of Petronilo Castañeda and Catalina de Leon to the land and the improvements thereon be decided in a separate action. No costs in the appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
In 1950, Catalina de Leon in turn sued the spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon, Petronilo Castañeda, Perfecta Roque and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to make effective the purchase she made of the one- half of the subject parcel of land from spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon. Petronilo Castañeda filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that in Civil Case No. 9366, a judgment was rendered on December 22, 1950 whereby the transfer of the land made by Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista to spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon was rescinded and, therefore, the spouses could not have transferred any right to Catalina de Leon. The court dismissed the case but, on appeal (De Leon v. De Leon, 98 Phil. 589), this Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, ruling that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila rescinding the sale by Roque and Bautista to the De Leons (Francisco and Rosario) was not binding on Catalina de Leon, who purchased one-half of the land from Francisco and Rosario de Leon prior to the institution of the rescission suit.
After the case was remanded in 1956, however, the plaintiff Catalina de Leon remained quiescent for more than four years, until on September 30, 1960, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed her complaint for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal became final.
In 1958, Petronilo Castañeda obtained a certificate of title covering the land in question, upon full payment to the PHHC of all the amounts due thereon. On the strength of this certificate, Petronilo Castañeda instituted another action on August 7, 1958 for "Reivindicacion de possession y cobro de daños perjuicios." In their answer, petitioners claimed ownership of the land in question and the improvements thereon erected.
On September 12, 1960, the trial court rendered judgment for Petronilo Castañeda:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado dicta sentencia declarando que el demandante Petronilo Castameda es el legitimo dueño del terreno descrito en el parrafo 1
On July 11, 1949, Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista sold a piece of land (Lot No. 11, Block K-19 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision) purchased on installment basis from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, to the spouses Rosario B. de Leon and Francisco de Leon for P2,000.00 of which P900.00 was received by them and the balance to be paid within sixty days When the rest of the price was tendered, the vendors refused to accept it on the ground that it was not offered within the stipulated period of sixty days. Thereupon, Rosario B. de Leon and Francisco de Leon filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 9366) for specific performance to compel the vendors Roque and Bautista to receive the balance of the purchase price. The defendant vendors countered with a plea for rescission (or rather resolution of the sale,) averring that the entirety of the price had not been paid within the time agreed upon. The Court declared the contract rescinded and ordered the vendors to return the P900.00 they had originally received.
As it turned out, as early as October 3, 1949, Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista had sold the same land to Petronilo Castañeda, respondent herein, while on October 5, 1949, Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon sold one-half of the land which they had acquired from Perfecta Roque for P2,000.00 to Catalina de Leon, petitioner herein, who paid the price in full and built houses and made improvements on the land, all assessed at P12,900.00.
On October 17, 1949, respondent Petronilo Castañeda brought an action to restrain Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon from fencing and making constructions on the lot in question. Judgment was rendered in favor of Castañeda and a writ of execution was issued on February 6, 1952, directing Rosario de Leon and Francisco de Leon to demolish the house and other improvements erected on the land. The writ was served on Catalina de Leon who claimed to be the owner of the house and improvements. On appeal (Castañeda v. De Leon, 102 Phil. 689), however, the order of demolition was set aside and an entirely new action was directed.
"The problem that has arisen proceeds from the fact that Perfecta Roque had sold the residential land to two vendees, first to Rosario B. de Leon and later to Petronilo Castañeda. If justice is to be done to the rights of Rosario B. de Leon’s vendee, Catalina de Leon, who had constructed two houses and a fence on one-half of the residential lot in question, complicated questions of fact and good faith will have to be investigated and decided and certainly this can not be done in the proceedings for execution. The question can be decided fairly and justly only in an ordinary suit between the parties, as the correlative rights and obligations of owner and builder were never at issue in civil case No. Q-64 because Catalina de Leon was not allowed to be a party to the suit.
"For the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed insofar as it sets aside the order of demolition issued by respondent judge, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, on August 30, 1952, but that portion thereof which directs the case to be remanded to the trial court for determination if Catalina de Leon may be considered a privy to Rosario de Leon, is hereby set aside; and it is hereby declared and ordered that the correlative rights of Petronilo Castañeda and Catalina de Leon to the land and the improvements thereon be decided in a separate action. No costs in the appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
In 1950, Catalina de Leon in turn sued the spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon, Petronilo Castañeda, Perfecta Roque and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to make effective the purchase she made of the one- half of the subject parcel of land from spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon. Petronilo Castañeda filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that in Civil Case No. 9366, a judgment was rendered on December 22, 1950 whereby the transfer of the land made by Perfecta Roque and Aurelio Bautista to spouses Rosario and Francisco de Leon was rescinded and, therefore, the spouses could not have transferred any right to Catalina de Leon. The court dismissed the case but, on appeal (De Leon v. De Leon, 98 Phil. 589), this Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, ruling that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila rescinding the sale by Roque and Bautista to the De Leons (Francisco and Rosario) was not binding on Catalina de Leon, who purchased one-half of the land from Francisco and Rosario de Leon prior to the institution of the rescission suit.
After the case was remanded in 1956, however, the plaintiff Catalina de Leon remained quiescent for more than four years, until on September 30, 1960, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed her complaint for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal became final.
In 1958, Petronilo Castañeda obtained a certificate of title covering the land in question, upon full payment to the PHHC of all the amounts due thereon. On the strength of this certificate, Petronilo Castañeda instituted another action on August 7, 1958 for "Reivindicacion de possession y cobro de daños perjuicios." In their answer, petitioners claimed ownership of the land in question and the improvements thereon erected.
On September 12, 1960, the trial court rendered judgment for Petronilo Castañeda:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado dicta sentencia declarando que el demandante Petronilo Castameda es el legitimo dueño del terreno descrito en el parrafo 1
