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[G.R. No. L-4188. January 18, 1908. ]

EMILE H. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANCHO BALANTACBO, Defendant-Appellant.

Crispin Oben, for Appellant.

Florencio Manalo, for Appellee.


1. SHERIFF’S SALE; ESTOPPEL OF HOLDER OF ADVERSE TITLE. — The object a sheriff’s notice of sale is not to warn adverse claimants to present their claims to the property advertised, but rather to invite bidders to the sale. The true owner is not estopped from thereafter asserting his title because of omission to present it or to appear at the sale.



The defendant bought the three parcels of land in question at a sale under an execution on a judgment in his favor against Perfecto and Buenaventura Dimaguila, in January, 1906. The plaintiff brought this action to recover possession of them as having been his property at the time of the execution sale, and it is proved that on April 8, 1905, he bought the land from the two Dimaguilas with a pacto de retro that the vendors might redeem the property within seven months, on the payment of the purchase price of P3,015.47. The redemption period having expires, the vendors and the vendee signed a memorandum on the 17th of November, 1905, recognizing the possession of the vendee as final, but leaving the administration of the land to the vendors as his agents, and they were in occupation as such agents at the time of the levy under the execution.

In his judgment the judge of First Instance says that the only point made before him by the defendant was that the land had not been sufficiently identified and in overruling this point we think he committed no error.

Upon this appeal counsel for the defendant has presented an ingenious argument, contending that by having omitted to present his claim to the sheriff at the time of the sale, plaintiff lost his right to assert it, or, in other words, is estopped by his omission. This argument mistakes the purpose of the publication of the sheriff’s notice of sale, which is not made in order to induce adverse claimants to assert their title, but rather to attract bidders to the sale. There are circumstances under which the acquiescence or participation of a claimant to property, present at a sale and in that manner encouraging a bidder or purchaser, may estop him on the ground of bad faith, but none such exist in the present case.

The judgment is affirmed with the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

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