EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22794. January 16, 1968.]
RUFO QUEMUEL, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Manglapus Law Office for Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL; APPELLATE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO REVIEW WHOLE CASE, PENALTY INCLUDED; PENALTY MAY BE INCREASED IN AN APPEAL FROM CRIMINAL JUDGMENT, DESPITE ABSENCE OF APPEAL BY OFFENDED PARTY. — The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the judgment of conviction of the trial court and imposing, instead of the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00 and an indemnity of P2,000.00 to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not exceeding 6 months in case of insolvency. This is because, when an appeal is taken from a decision of the trial court in a criminal case, the whole case is open for review and this includes the penalty which may be increased, and hence, indemnity is part of the penalty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES AWARD BY LOWER COURT MAY BE INCREASED EVEN IF OFFENDED PARTY DID NOT APPEAL. — Although the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court, which may increase the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party did not appeal from said award and only the party who sought the review of the trial court’s decision was the accused.
3. LIBEL; WHERE ARTICLE IS LIBELOUS "PER SE," DAMAGES IS IMPLIED; PROOF OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, UNNECESSARY. — Even in the absence of proof that the offended party suffered mental anguish as a result of the libel, recovery of damages is possible because libel causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit and the injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases. When the article is "libelous per se," as in the present case, "the law implies damages" and the complainant is not required to adduce evidence of actual damages, at least when the award is more or less nominal.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF DEBT; "DEBT," MEANING OF; CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM LIBEL NOT "DEBT." — The civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt," within the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non- payment of debt. "Debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract." Apart from being part of the penalty, the civil liability in this case arises from a tort or crime, and hence, from law. Consequently, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of such civil liability does not violate the constitutional injunction against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES AWARD BY LOWER COURT MAY BE INCREASED EVEN IF OFFENDED PARTY DID NOT APPEAL. — Although the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court, which may increase the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party did not appeal from said award and only the party who sought the review of the trial court’s decision was the accused.
3. LIBEL; WHERE ARTICLE IS LIBELOUS "PER SE," DAMAGES IS IMPLIED; PROOF OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, UNNECESSARY. — Even in the absence of proof that the offended party suffered mental anguish as a result of the libel, recovery of damages is possible because libel causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit and the injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases. When the article is "libelous per se," as in the present case, "the law implies damages" and the complainant is not required to adduce evidence of actual damages, at least when the award is more or less nominal.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF DEBT; "DEBT," MEANING OF; CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM LIBEL NOT "DEBT." — The civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt," within the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non- payment of debt. "Debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract." Apart from being part of the penalty, the civil liability in this case arises from a tort or crime, and hence, from law. Consequently, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of such civil liability does not violate the constitutional injunction against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of libel 1 with which he is charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but imposed, instead of the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six (6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs.
Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because: 1) it awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from the decision of the trial court, which made no award of such nature; 2) the assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts (and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof that damages had been sustained by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased 2 and the indemnity is part of the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 3 this Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that every person criminally liable is civilly liable."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has, in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the accused. 4
As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered mental anguish, lost sleep, or could not look his neighbor straight in the eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very nature, libel causes dishonor. disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases; that "where the article is libelous per se" — as it is in the case at bar — "the law implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases is not "required to introduce evidence of actual damages," at least, when the amount of the award is more or less nominal, as it is in the case at bar. 5
Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt," within the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of "debt." Insofar as said injunction is concerned, "debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract", express or implied, In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the case at bar arises, however, from a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not violate the constitutional injunction. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Rufo Quemuel.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of libel 1 with which he is charged, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of conviction, but imposed, instead of the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six (6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs.
Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because: 1) it awarded said indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from the decision of the trial court, which made no award of such nature; 2) the assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts (and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof that damages had been sustained by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased 2 and the indemnity is part of the penalty. Hence, in Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 3 this Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code that every person criminally liable is civilly liable."cralaw virtua1aw library
Although the authority to assess damages or indemnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has, in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the accused. 4
As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered mental anguish, lost sleep, or could not look his neighbor straight in the eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very nature, libel causes dishonor. disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases; that "where the article is libelous per se" — as it is in the case at bar — "the law implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases is not "required to introduce evidence of actual damages," at least, when the amount of the award is more or less nominal, as it is in the case at bar. 5
Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt," within the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of "debt." Insofar as said injunction is concerned, "debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract", express or implied, In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the case at bar arises, however, from a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not violate the constitutional injunction. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Rufo Quemuel.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Consisting of the imputation of bribery to a public officer.
2. U.S. v. Trono, 199 U.S. 521; People v. Carreon, L-17920, May 30, 1962; Lontok v. People, 74 Phil. 513; People v. Fresco, 63 Phil. 526; People v. Olfindo, Et Al., 47 Phil., 1; Pendleton v. U.S., 40 Phil., 1033; U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil., 74.
3. 84 Phil., 692; See, also, Erlinda v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 47326, March 18, 1940.
4. People v. Licerio, 61 Phil., 361; People v. Raquel, L-17401, November 28, 1964, Catuiza v. People, L-20455, March 31, 1965; People v. Berdida, L-20183, June 30, 1966.
5. Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil., 52; Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil., 211; Fentstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah 532, 35 L.R.A. 611.
6. U.S. v. Cara 41 Phil., 828; Freeman v. U.S., 40 Phil., 1039.
