FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39677. July 22, 1975.]
INTER-REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO CABALLERO, Respondents.
Raquiza, Esparraqo, Amante, Pacificador, Ozamis & Adaza for Petitioner.
German M. Lopez for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
A controversy led to the filing of two civil cases in two different branches of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. In Branch III, the issue involved land ownership; crop allegedly planted in good faith by the herein petitioner corporation. In the first case, Civil Case 8195, Judge Veloso dismissed the complaint, ordered the corporation thru its officers to "immediately vacate and surrender possession" of the property to Estrata (Caballero’s lessor), and issued a partial writ of execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to enjoin Judge Veloso from enforcing the partial writ of execution. In the second case Civil Case 9562, Judge Inserto issued an order enjoining defendant Caballero from cutting, and milling the sugar cane crop which plaintiff corporation asserts to have planted in good faith. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the preliminary injunction on the ground that said order interfered with the partial writ of execution issued in Civil Case no. 8195. Hence, this present action.
The Supreme Court held that the two orders of the two judges do not interfere with, but complement, each other since the partial writ of execution refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue on appeal, while the injunction order refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. The doctrine that a court is without power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction does not apply.
Judgment set aside.
The Supreme Court held that the two orders of the two judges do not interfere with, but complement, each other since the partial writ of execution refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue on appeal, while the injunction order refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. The doctrine that a court is without power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction does not apply.
Judgment set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT; POWER TO ISSUE INJUNCTION; LIMITATION. — No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having power to grant relief.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ORDERS ISSUED BY THE JUDGES CASE AT BAR. — Where the two orders issued by the judges of the two courts do not interfere with, but complement, each other, because one refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal, while the other refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon, the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant relief, does not apply.
3. PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP OF CROPS PLANTED ON LAND BELONGING TO ANOTHER; SOWER IN GOOD FAITH TO BE INDEMNIFIED BY LANDOWNER BEFORE APPROPRIATION OF THE GROWING FRUITS. — True it is that under Article 440 of the Civil Code ownership of property includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under Article 415, trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property, it is equally true that under Article 448, when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same.
4. ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW WHERE ISSUE INVOLVES CONFLICT OF RIGHTS BETWEEN LANDOWNER AND PLANTER. — Where the plaintiff had alleged good faith in planting sugar cane, thus giving rise to a conflict of right which poses the issue of protection of alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner, the applicable provision is Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not Article 440 and 415.
5. CERTIORARI; APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT RULE ON ISSUES PENDING BEFORE LOWER COURT. — In a special civil action for certiorari to set aside a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court to enjoin the landowner from "cutting, milling sugar cane" in a case involving ownership of the sugar crop, the Court of Appeals, in declaring that the gathering of crops existing on the land is part of landowner’s right of ownership and possession, in effect, prematurely held that the planter is a planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in the case which is yet pending before the trial court.
6. ID.; RIPENESS OF REMEDY; CERTIORARI MAY BE ENTERTAINED EVEN IF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY LOWER COURT, DEFINITIVE RULING IS URGENT. — The Court of Appeals may entertain a petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance where there is an urgency of securing a definitive ruling, as when the subject involved matter involved is sugar cane crop, which is perishable.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ORDERS ISSUED BY THE JUDGES CASE AT BAR. — Where the two orders issued by the judges of the two courts do not interfere with, but complement, each other, because one refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal, while the other refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon, the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant relief, does not apply.
3. PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP OF CROPS PLANTED ON LAND BELONGING TO ANOTHER; SOWER IN GOOD FAITH TO BE INDEMNIFIED BY LANDOWNER BEFORE APPROPRIATION OF THE GROWING FRUITS. — True it is that under Article 440 of the Civil Code ownership of property includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under Article 415, trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property, it is equally true that under Article 448, when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same.
4. ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW WHERE ISSUE INVOLVES CONFLICT OF RIGHTS BETWEEN LANDOWNER AND PLANTER. — Where the plaintiff had alleged good faith in planting sugar cane, thus giving rise to a conflict of right which poses the issue of protection of alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner, the applicable provision is Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not Article 440 and 415.
5. CERTIORARI; APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT RULE ON ISSUES PENDING BEFORE LOWER COURT. — In a special civil action for certiorari to set aside a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court to enjoin the landowner from "cutting, milling sugar cane" in a case involving ownership of the sugar crop, the Court of Appeals, in declaring that the gathering of crops existing on the land is part of landowner’s right of ownership and possession, in effect, prematurely held that the planter is a planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in the case which is yet pending before the trial court.
6. ID.; RIPENESS OF REMEDY; CERTIORARI MAY BE ENTERTAINED EVEN IF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY LOWER COURT, DEFINITIVE RULING IS URGENT. — The Court of Appeals may entertain a petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance where there is an urgency of securing a definitive ruling, as when the subject involved matter involved is sugar cane crop, which is perishable.
D E C I S I O N
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. 02794-SP. Upon consideration of the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the respondent’s comment thereon, the Court resolved to treat this case as a special civil action. 1 The challenged decision declares null and void an order dated January 16, 1974 of Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Branch I) which enjoined the defendant in its civil case 9562, entitled "Inter-Regional Development Corporation v. Ricardo Caballero," from cutting and milling the sugar cane crop which the therein plaintiff company (herein petitioner) asserts to have planted in good faith.
On December 13, 1974 we issued a temporary restraining order which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"You (respondent Court of Appeals) are hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing and/or implementing your decision in CA-GR No. 02794-SP entitled ’Ricardo Caballero versus Hon. Sancho Inserto, etc., Et. Al.’ and you (respondent Caballero), your agents, representatives, assigns, successors-in-interest and/or any person or persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are likewise RESTRAINED from collecting and/or negotiating the quedans representing the milled sugar canes homestead from Lots No. 1 and 6, Psn-118496 in Batad, Iloilo for the crop year 1973-74."cralaw virtua1aw library
In civil case 8195 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled "Inter-Regional Development Corporation v. Isidro Estrada, Et. Al." for annulment of sales and damages and involving land ownership, the court, thru Judge Castrence Veloso of Branch III, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and, among others, ordering the spouses Jose Bañez and Isabel Bañez (president and treasurer, respectively, of the Inter-Regional Development Corporation) or their privies —
"to immediately vacate and surrender the possession of Lots 1 and 6, Plan Psu-118496 to the third-party plaintiff (Isidro A. Estrada) and not to molest, disturb or in any manner interfere with his possession thereof . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The corporation appealed; nonetheless, Judge Veloso issued, on May 7, 1973, a partial writ of execution pending appeal, and possession of the two lots was delivered to Estrada, following which the latter, on May 25, 1973, leased the lots to now respondent Ricardo Caballero for a term of ten years, starting with the crop year 1973-74.
On July 6, 1973 the corporation filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying that Judge Veloso be enjoined from enforcing the partial writ of execution. Holding that the said Judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering partial execution, the Court of Appeals, on October 16, 1973, dismissed the petition. This decision became final.
However, five days before entry of judgment, or on November 15, 1973, the corporation filed civil case 9562, for injunction and damages, against the lessee Caballero to settle the question of ownership of the sugar crop for 1973-74 which the corporation alleged to have planted in good faith on the lands litigated in civil case 8195. Judge Sancho Inserto, to whom the case was assigned, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Caballero "from cutting, milling the growing sugar cane . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Caballero moved for reconsideration, but before the court could act on his motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On September 30, 1974 the appellate court promulgated its decision setting aside Judge Inserto’s preliminary injunction.
Hence, the present recourse by the corporation.
On the issue of whether the preliminary injunction issued in case 9562 by Judge Inserto enjoining Caballero from cutting and milling the sugar cane constitutes an interference with the partial writ of execution pending appeal issued in case 8195 by Judge Veloso ordering the Bañez spouses to vacate and surrender possession of the parcels of land and not to molest or disturb Estrada’s (Caballero’s lessor) possession thereof, we find that neither order interferes with the other; as a matter of fact the order of Judge Inserto complements that of Judge Veloso. The latter refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal, while the former refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under article 415, trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is equally true that when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same. And so provides article 448:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548 . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforequoted article, not those relied upon by the respondent, applies in the present case, because the petitioner has alleged good faith in planting the sugar cane, thus giving rise to a conflict of rights which poses the issue of the protection of the alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner. 2
Absent any incompatibility between the orders issued by Judges Inserto and Veloso, the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant the relief, 3 does not apply.
In holding that the gathering of the crops existing on the land is part of Estrada’s right of ownership and possession, the Court of Appeals in effect prematurely held that the petitioner is a planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in case 9562, which is yet pending.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance, in view of the urgency of securing a definitive ruling on the sugar cane crop, which is perishable. 4
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. O2794-SP is set aside, and the restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent, without prejudice, however, to the final outcome in case 9562 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz, Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
On December 13, 1974 we issued a temporary restraining order which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"You (respondent Court of Appeals) are hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing and/or implementing your decision in CA-GR No. 02794-SP entitled ’Ricardo Caballero versus Hon. Sancho Inserto, etc., Et. Al.’ and you (respondent Caballero), your agents, representatives, assigns, successors-in-interest and/or any person or persons acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are likewise RESTRAINED from collecting and/or negotiating the quedans representing the milled sugar canes homestead from Lots No. 1 and 6, Psn-118496 in Batad, Iloilo for the crop year 1973-74."cralaw virtua1aw library
In civil case 8195 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled "Inter-Regional Development Corporation v. Isidro Estrada, Et. Al." for annulment of sales and damages and involving land ownership, the court, thru Judge Castrence Veloso of Branch III, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and, among others, ordering the spouses Jose Bañez and Isabel Bañez (president and treasurer, respectively, of the Inter-Regional Development Corporation) or their privies —
"to immediately vacate and surrender the possession of Lots 1 and 6, Plan Psu-118496 to the third-party plaintiff (Isidro A. Estrada) and not to molest, disturb or in any manner interfere with his possession thereof . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The corporation appealed; nonetheless, Judge Veloso issued, on May 7, 1973, a partial writ of execution pending appeal, and possession of the two lots was delivered to Estrada, following which the latter, on May 25, 1973, leased the lots to now respondent Ricardo Caballero for a term of ten years, starting with the crop year 1973-74.
On July 6, 1973 the corporation filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying that Judge Veloso be enjoined from enforcing the partial writ of execution. Holding that the said Judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering partial execution, the Court of Appeals, on October 16, 1973, dismissed the petition. This decision became final.
However, five days before entry of judgment, or on November 15, 1973, the corporation filed civil case 9562, for injunction and damages, against the lessee Caballero to settle the question of ownership of the sugar crop for 1973-74 which the corporation alleged to have planted in good faith on the lands litigated in civil case 8195. Judge Sancho Inserto, to whom the case was assigned, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Caballero "from cutting, milling the growing sugar cane . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Caballero moved for reconsideration, but before the court could act on his motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On September 30, 1974 the appellate court promulgated its decision setting aside Judge Inserto’s preliminary injunction.
Hence, the present recourse by the corporation.
On the issue of whether the preliminary injunction issued in case 9562 by Judge Inserto enjoining Caballero from cutting and milling the sugar cane constitutes an interference with the partial writ of execution pending appeal issued in case 8195 by Judge Veloso ordering the Bañez spouses to vacate and surrender possession of the parcels of land and not to molest or disturb Estrada’s (Caballero’s lessor) possession thereof, we find that neither order interferes with the other; as a matter of fact the order of Judge Inserto complements that of Judge Veloso. The latter refers to the land itself, the ownership of which was the only issue adjudged in the decision pending appeal, while the former refers to the sugar cane crop standing thereon. True it is that under article 440 of the Civil Code the ownership of property includes the right of accession to everything attached thereto either naturally or artificially, and that under article 415, trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land, are immovable property; it is equally true that when a person plants in good faith on land belonging to another, the landowner does not ipso facto acquire ownership of what has been planted; he must first indemnify the planter before he can appropriate the same. And so provides article 448:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548 . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforequoted article, not those relied upon by the respondent, applies in the present case, because the petitioner has alleged good faith in planting the sugar cane, thus giving rise to a conflict of rights which poses the issue of the protection of the alleged planter in good faith without causing injustice to the landowner. 2
Absent any incompatibility between the orders issued by Judges Inserto and Veloso, the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant the relief, 3 does not apply.
In holding that the gathering of the crops existing on the land is part of Estrada’s right of ownership and possession, the Court of Appeals in effect prematurely held that the petitioner is a planter in bad faith; this is error since the issues as to who planted and whether the planter planted in good faith are the very issues posed in case 9562, which is yet pending.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari even if a motion for reconsideration had not yet been resolved by the Court of First Instance, in view of the urgency of securing a definitive ruling on the sugar cane crop, which is perishable. 4
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. O2794-SP is set aside, and the restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent, without prejudice, however, to the final outcome in case 9562 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz, Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1. Resolution, March 19, 1975, rollo, p. 266.
2. Bernardo v. Baltazar, 66 Phil. 598.
3. See Cabigao and Izquierdo v. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182; Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., 64 Phil. 119; Templo v. De la Cruz, L-37393-94, Oct. 23, 1974, 60 SCRA 295.
4. Matute v. Bullecer, L-26085, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768.
