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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-42713. May 31, 1978.]

NORBERTA MARTILLO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (National Library) and THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents.

Domingo M. Ballon for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Republic of the Philippines.

Ernesto H. Cruz & Emilia E. Andres for respondent WCC.

SYNOPSIS


During her employment as provincial librarian, petitioner underwent gall-bladder and appendectomy operation, was hospitalized for cholecystitis acute with colelithiasis and myocardial ischemia, upon advise of a government physician, she retired from the government after 39 years of service. Thereafter, she filed a claim for compensation which the Hearing Officer granted, but which the Workmen’s Compensation denied on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and of the fact that petitioner had already retired from her employment when she filed the claim.

The Supreme Court reversed the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and held that the fact that the claim was filed after petitioner had been separated from the service, did not affect the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and that petitioner’s illness having occurred during her employment is presumed to have arisen out of or at least aggravated by her employment.


SYLLABUS


1. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION; CLAIM FILED AFTER EMPLOYEE WAS SEPARATED FROM SERVICE; JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION NOT AFFECTED. — The fact that petitioner filed her claim for compensation when she was already separated from the service does not affect the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

2. ID.; ID.; DELAY IN FILING CLAIM IS NON-JURISDICTIONAL. — The failure or delay in giving notice of claim is not a bar to the proceeding in the claim for compensation if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the injury, sickness or death, or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure. Moreover, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the duty of the employer to provide medical assistance subsists even if the employee is separated from the service as long as the illness which occurred during his employment is shown to be compensable and such medical attendance or services are required to cure or relieve him of such illness.

3. ID.; ILLNESS CONTRACTED DURING EMPLOYMENT; PRESUMED TO HAVE ARISEN OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. — Where it is admitted that during claimant’s employment she underwent gall-bladder and appendectomy operations, was hospitalized for Cholocystitis Acute with Cholelithiasis and Myocardial Ischemia, and upon advise by a government physical she retired from the service, it shall be presumed from these facts that her illness supervened in the course of her employment, arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and the burden to overthrow said presumption shifts to the employer.

4. ID.; APPEAL; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF COMMISSION MAY BE REVIEWED. — The findings of fact of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are not conclusive and may be reviewed on appeal, if it appears that the Commission ignored or failed to consider facts or circumstances of weight which, if considered would alter the result.

5. ID.; OPTIONAL RETIREMENT; EMPLOYEE DEEMED PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED. — The approval of the optional retirement of claimant, pursuant to Republic Acts No. 166 and No. 4968, shows that claimant was physically incapacitated to render further efficient service, and should thus be entitled to disability benefits allowed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, since memorandum Circular No. 133, dated October 16, 1967, provides that applications for retirement under said acts shall not be recommended for approval unless the applicant "is physically incapacitate to render further efficient service."


D E C I S I O N


GUERRERO, J.:


Petition for review 1 of the decision dated December 30, 1975 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in R09-WC No. 14583 reversing the sward made by the Hearing Officer in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner was an employee of the National Library of the Philippine Government for thirty-nine (39) years, the last day of which was on December 31, 1972 when she retired from the government service as provincial librarian for the province of Samar at the age of 62 years. During her employment as provincial librarian, she underwent gall-bladder and appendectomy operations at the GSIS General Hospital, East Avenue, Quezon City from May 22, 1972 to June 1, 1972 as evidenced by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Jose Caedo, Jr. On July 11, 1972, petitioner was again admitted to the GSIS General Hospital for Cholecystitis Acute With Cholelithiasis and Myocardial Ischemia as shown by the medical certificate attached to the records of this case and the summary discharge from the GSIS General Hospital. In 1975, she filed a claim for compensation with Regional Office No. 9, Workmen’s Compensation Unit at Tacloban City.

On October 8, 1975, Alfonso E. Paa, Hearing Officer of said office, issued an award directing the respondent Republic of the Philippines (National Library) to pay claimant the sum of P6,000.00 as compensation and the further sum of P1,430.82 as reimbursement of duly receipted and evaluated medical expenses pursuant to Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of said award having been denied by the Hearing Officer in the order dated December 2, 1975, the record of the case was elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission at Quezon City. The Commission in its decision dated December 30, 1975 reversed the award on the Found that: "the oral testimonies of the claimant and the supporting papers she had submitted in connection with her claim does not show even by mere substantial evidence that her illnesses which were coronary insufficiency, rheumatic arthritis, hypertension essential, frequency of urination, cholelithiasis and PTB were contracted during the period of her employment," and that "the claimant had already retired from her employment and by the time she filed her claim, she was no longer connected with the government."cralaw virtua1aw library

The sole issue to be resolved is whether petitioner’s illnesses arose out of and in the course of her employment as provincial librarian.

The first ground for the reversal of the award is without merit. The fact that petitioner filed her claim for compensation when she was already separated from the service does not affect the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

The first ground for the reversal of the award is without merit. The fact that petitioner filed her claim for compensation when she was already separated from the service does not affect the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

In a long, long line of cases, 2 one of the most recent of which is the case of Guevara v. Republic, L-43099, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 292, the Supreme Court has held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . failure on the part of the employee or claimant to comply with the requirements of Section 24 of Act No. 3824 is non-jurisdictional and that failure or delay in giving said notice is not a bar to the proceeding in the claim for compensation if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative has knowledge of the injury, sickness or death or that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure."cralaw virtua1aw library

There being no showing in the record that the employer suffered injury or prejudice by reason of the delay, the ruling above-cited holds in the case at bar. Moreover, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the duty of the employer to provide medical attendance subsists even if the employee is separated from the service as long as the illness incurred during his employment is shown to be compensable and such medical attendance or services are required to cure or relieve him of such illness. (Centino v. WCC, Et Al., 72 SCRA 115).chanrobles law library

It is admitted that during the employment of petitioner as provincial librarian, she underwent gall-bladder and appendectomy operations from May 22, 1972 to June 1, 1972 and was hospitalized for Cholecystitis and Myocardial Ischemia starting July 11, 1972. Upon the advice of Dr. Jose Caedo, Jr. of the GSIS General Hospital, she retired from the government service on December 31, 1972 at the age of 62-1/2 years old. From these undisputed facts, the presumption at once arises that her illness having supervened in the course of her employment, arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and the burden to overthrow said presumption shifts to the employer. This also Our ruling in very numerous cases 3 which the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission had failed to apply in many meritorious cases.

We find nothing in the record to indicate the rebuttal of the employer, the National Library, to overthrow the presumption referred to previously, for the employer failed to appear at the hearing before the Hearing Officer. Hence, the presumption stands unrebutted.

The contention of the Solicitor General that it was incumbent on the petitioner to show by satisfactory evidence that the illness she suffered while in the government service were the result of her employment or that they were aggravated thereby more so when said illnesses are not occupational diseases, considering her work as a librarian and the fact that her claim was filed three years after her retirement from the service, is without merit. As we have pointed out, the burden to prove that the illness complained of is not work-connected and therefore not compensable, lies with the employer the moment it is shown that said illness supervened during her employment.

We also reject respondent’s contention that the findings of fact of the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission are conclusive and not reviewable on appeal, alleging that there was no showing that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission ignored or failed to consider any fact or circumstance of weight which, if it did, would alter the result. Precisely, We have noted from the records that the respondent Commission failed to consider the weight of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Jose Caedo, Jr., attending physician, GSIS General Hospital, attesting to the confinement of petitioner at the hospital from May 22-25, 1972 for Cholehthiasis and from July 11-25, 1972 for Cholecystitis with Cholethiasis and Myocardial Ischemia, as well as the Discharge Summary in each confinement.

The second ground on which the respondent Commission reversed the order of award is also unmeritorious. The record shows that petitioner was forced to retire at the age of 62 upon the advice of Dr. Jose Caedo, Jr. of the GSIS General Hospital. Her retirement at the age of 62 after having rendered long years of government service would not have been approved if she had not complied with the conditions prescribed for optional retirement. Memorandum Circular No. 133 dated October 16, 1967, issued by the Office of the President provides that "all applications for optional retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616 and No. 4968 shall not be recommended for approval unless funds are available in the bureau or office concerned for the payment of applicant’s retirement gratuity over and above the fund requirement of its programmed projects and activities and provided any of the following circumstances or conditions is present: (1) . . .; (2) The employee is below 65 years of age, is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." (Emphasis supplied). The approval of her retirement at the age of 62 shows that petitioner was physically incapacitated to render further efficient service, and should thus be entitled to disability benefits allowed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Guevarra v. Republic, 77 SCRA 292).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of respondent Commission dated December 30, 1975 is set aside and the award made by the Hearing Officer in favor of the petitioner is hereby reinstated and restored.

The respondent employer, Republic of the Philippines (National Library) is hereby ordered to pay:cralawnad

1. To the petitioner, the sum of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as compensation;

2. Sixty-One (P61.00) Pesos as administrative fee;

3. Six Hundred (P600.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees; and

4. To the petitioner, the sum of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Pesos and Eighty Two Centavos (P1,430.82) as reimbursement of duly receipted and evaluated medical expenses pursuant to Sec. 13 of the Act.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:



1. Treated as special civil action per resolution of May 10, 1976.

2. Manila Railroad Co. v. Perez and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 14 SCRA 504; National Development Company v. Galamgam, 38 SCRA 495; Snow White Ice Cream and Ice Drop Factory v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 295; Manlapat v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 51 SCRA 390; Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 60 SCRA 263; Cabinta v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission and City of Manila, 72 SCRA 266; Vallo v. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 73 SCRA 623, Caling v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 309.

3. Naria v. WCC, L-18066, October 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 361; Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. WCC. L-16490, June 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 352; Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co. v. WCC, L-17283, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 765; A.D. Santos, Inc. v. De Sapon, L-22220, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 791; National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. WCC, L-226628, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 254; Talip v. WCC, L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218; Mercado v. WCC and Riverside Mills Corporation, L-42451, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 260; Galang v. WCC and San Miguel Corp., L-41893, Aug. 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 454; Jacob v. WCC and Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools), L-43302, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 575; Vda. de Loerna v. WCC, L-42543, Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 228; Ayuso v. WCC and White Ways, Inc., L-42893, Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 233; Camarillo v. WCC, Hon. Eugenio I. Sagmit, Jr., Associate Com. and Firestone and Rubber Co. of the Philippines, L-42831, Oct. 21, 1976, 73 SCRA 497; Guevarra v. Republic, L-43099, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 292; Ybañez v. WCC, L-44123, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 501.

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