Lots 8-A, 8-B and 8-C are the component portions of Lot 8, Block 27 of the subdivision operated by Rita Legarda, Inc. It is not disputed that Laxamana was the prewar lessee of Lot 8 and that he subleased to Mallari a portion thereof, now known as Lot 8-B with an area of 98.5 square meters. The rental for the sublease was "nominal" "due to the close affinity" of Mallari to Laxamana (p. 291, Rollo).
When Laxamana decided to buy Lot 8, Mallari expressed the desire to become a co-purchaser to the extent of the portion he was "occupying." So, Mallari and Laxamana on November 14, 1946 entered into an agreement as to how they would divide Lot 8. It was stipulated therein that Laxamana’s share would be the portion with an area of 75 square meters actually occupied by him and the rest would be Mallari’s share.
As correctly found by the trial court, that agreement to divide Lot 8 is dated December 9, 1946 but it was signed on November 14, 1946 (p. 1, Respondents’ reply memorandum, p. 446, Rollo; pp. 1-2, Lower court’s decision, p. 294 Rollo; See p. 309, Rollo. December 9, 1946 was the date when the agreement was notarized. The original date, November 14, as typed in the agreement, was changed to December 9, 1946 (pp. 408-409, Rollo).
This clarification is important in interpreting that agreement because on November 15, 1946 a contract to sell Lot 8 was executed between Rita Legarda, Inc. as seller and Laxamana and Mallari as buyers. In that contract to sell, the area of Lot 8 is specified to be 173 square meters and it was sold on the installment plan at P30 a square meter or for the total price of P5,190. The area of 173 square meters is the combined area of the portions occupied by Mallari and Laxamana, or 98 square meters and 75 square meters, respectively, now represented by Lots 8-B and 8-C in the subdivision plan.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It is likewise undisputed that on September 1, 1947, or nine and a half months after the signing of the contract to sell, Rita Legarda, Inc. executed a final deed of sale for Lot 8 in favor only of Laxamana who paid the balance of the price amounting to P4,777.19. In that final deed of sale, the area of Lot 8 is 193.8 square meters (not 173 square meters only). As a result of that sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9258 was issued to Laxamana on September 2, 1947 (p. 2, Lower Court’s decision, p. 294, Rollo, See p. 424, Rollo).
In a unilateral conveyance dated December 2, 1954, Laxamana ceded to Mallari the portion (now Lot 8-B), with an area of 98 square meters, occupied by the latter, in consideration of the sum of P3,745.04 which was paid by Mallari to Laxamana as follows: P1,000 on December 9, 1946; P1,000 on August 2, 1950, and P1,745.04 on November 29, 1954 (p. 415, Rollo; p. 2, Lower court’s decision, p. 294, Rollo).
Then, on September 19, 1959, Jose Y. Valenton, a private land surveyor, made a subdivision plan for Lot 8 at Laxamana’s instance. The plan, reproduced in the sketch included herein, shows that, aside from the 98 and 74 square-meter portions allocated to Mallari and Laxamana as Lots 8-B and 8-C, respectively, there is a portion, Lot 8-A, with an area of 21.2 square meters, which is the disputed area in this case (p. 414, Rollo; p. 3, Lower court’s decision, p. 295, Rollo).
According to Mallari, in December, 1959, Laxamana made on Lot 8-A, over Mallari’s opposition, a construction which has been used as a store. That probably triggered the 1960 action of Mallari against Laxamana to establish his (Mallari’s) ownership over the twenty-one-square-meter strip of land. The latest episode in that protracted litigation is this certiorari case.
The trial court incorrectly found that the 74-square-meter portion occupied by Laxamana was near Estero Balic-balic. As shown in the sketch, it is Mallari’s 98-square-meter portion that is near the estero. The trial court adjudicated to Mallari the 21-square-meter portion (Lot 8-A) on the basis of "the principle of accretion" since it was allegedly "formerly a part of Estero Balic-balic" adjoining Mallari’s Lot 8-B.
That ruling is disputed by Laxamana because accretion or alluvion takes place only with respect to lands adjoining the banks of rivers as a result of the effects of the current of the waters (Art. 457, Civil Code). There is no proof that Estero Balic-balic is a river or creek and has a regular and continuous current. (See Guison v. City of Manila, 72 Phil. 437.) Laxamana alleged that he made fillings on Lot 8-A (p. 115, Record of Lower Court).
It was Laxamana’s theory that the contract to sell dated November 15, 1946 executed between Rita Legarda, Inc. and Laxamana and Mallari for Lot 8 and the contemporaneous agreement to divide the same lot, executed between Laxamana and Mallari on November 14, 1946, refer only to Lot 8, with an area of 173 square meters. Laxamana also contended that, when on September 1, 1947, he purchased Lot 8, with an area of 193.8 square meters, he made a separate and additional payment of P624 for that Lot 8-A and, therefore, that portion should belong to him and not to Mallari who paid only for the 98 square meters actually occupied by him.chanrobles law library
Laxamana was not able to prove his contentions because his lawyer allegedly did not notify him of the trial and did not appear at the trial. The lower court decided the case only on the basis of Mallari’s evidence offered at an ex-parte hearing. It steadfastly refused to grant relief to Laxamana. Laxamana’s lawyer did not seasonably file a motion for new trial and did not appeal from the adverse decision.
The issue is whether at this late hour Laxamana’s heirs should still be given a chance to prove their contentions which apparently have some semblance of merit.
Laxamana had directly charged his lawyer with having deliberately failed to appear at the trial after having received P1,500 from Mallari. He introduced evidence in support of that charge. His lawyer, although subpoenaed by the Mallari plaintiffs, did not testify to deny that charged (p. 241, Rollo).
After a searching and judicious examination of the records, we find that extrinsic or collateral fraud was employed to prevent Laxamana from presenting his evidence at the trial and from interposing a timely appeal from the trial court’s adverse decision. That was the reason why he could not reconcile himself to a verdict which divested him of his claim for the twenty-one-square-meter strip of land and which was rendered without taking into consideration his evidence. That was also the reason why this Court set aside the resolution dismissing Laxamana’s petition and gave due course to it.
Laxamana in his letters dated November 29, 1973 to the President of the Philippines and the Chief Justice vehemently insisted that he be given his day in court. He repeatedly declared that he was denied due process due to the skullduggery of his lawyer who was allegedly suborned by the opposing party.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Lack of due process of law and extrinsic or collateral fraud vitiate a final and executory judgment and are valid grounds for setting it aside (2 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 245). In an adversary litigation, fundamental fairness requires that as much as possible both parties should be heard so that a just and impartial verdict may be promulgated.
The extrinsic or collateral fraud which invalidates a final judgment, "must be such as prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense; it must be such as prevented the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue." Thus, the act of the successful party in inducing the lawyer of the losing party to commit professional delinquency or infidelity constitutes extrinsic or collateral fraud (49 C.J.S. 74-3).
In other words, there is extrinsic fraud when a party was prevented from having presented all of his case to the court as when the lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client’s interest (46 Am Jur 2nd 983; 49 C.J.S. 860-1; Crouch v. McGaw, 138 S.W. 2d 94, 134 Tex. 633; Brady v. Beams, 132 F. 2nd 985; Soriano v. Asi, 100 Phil 785, 788; Heirs of Celestino v. Court of Appeals, L-38690, September 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 22, 29; Olego v. Rebueno, L-39350, October 29, 1975, 67 SCRA 446, 455; 2 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 249-7).
WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the trial court’s decision dated February 22, 1962 in Civil Case No. 42486, its resolution of November 7, 1972 and the writ of execution in the same case as well as the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-01739 promulgated on February 14 and July 11, 1973. If a last effort to settle the case amicably is not fruitful, then the trial court is directed to allow the petitioners to cross-examined Mallari’s witnesses, who had already testified, and to receive any additional evidence of the plaintiffs and the evidence of Laxamana’s heirs. No costs.chanrobles law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.