SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-56772-84. July 9, 1981.]
EUFEMIO P. CAPARAS and HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, represented by AMBROCIO DE LEON, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE CATACUTAN, PABLO FAJARDO, RITA VIVAR FAJARDO, JULIAN DE LA CRUZ, ONOFRE HERMOSA, MIGUEL MANABAT, LINO BAUTISTA, ARCADIO CANDELARIA, GORGONIO CAYSIDO, ALFREDO CATACUTAN, EUFRONIO NEPOMUCENO, ONESINO MESINA, GABRIEL BAUTISTA, BENIGNO ALABASO, LAUREANO CANDELARIA, MARIA TUAZON, ISAIAS EDUCACION, JUAN TUAZON, PROTACIO GREGORIO, NESTOR GREGORIO, MAGNO LAPUZ, LEANDRO RAMOS, RUSTICO CRUZ, FLORENCIO DE LA CRUZ, CIPRIANO LUCAS, PROTACIO LUCAS, TOMAS FELIPE, CIRILO LAYUGAN, BARTOLOME BAUTO, EULOGIO ROMERO, SAMAHANG NAYON NG CARMEN, Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija, SAMAHANG NAYON NG H. ROMERO, Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija, SAMAHANG NAYON NG STO. TOMAS, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and SAMAHANG NAYON NG MALABON, KAINGIN, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, Respondents-Appellees.
Jose R. Cabatuando for Private Respondents.
Eufemio P. Caparas and Heirs of Honorato de Leon, etc., for Petitioners.
Jose Cabatuando for Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The decision of the Court of Appeals in these thirteen agrarian cases which was promulgated on March 25, 1981 was served upon the petitioners on March 31, 1981. On the last day of the reglementary period of thirty days or on April 30, 1981 petitioners filed a motion for an extension of thirty days within which to file a petition for review which was granted by this Court. When the petition for certiorari was filed, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the thirty-day period is non-extendible under Sec. 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946.
The Supreme Court held that in view of the peremptory nature of the provision of Section 18 of said decree and the manifest legislative intention not to prolong the period for appealing to the Supreme Court, petitioners herein were not entitled to an extension of time within which to file said petition. Dura lex, sed lex. Private respondents’ motion to dismiss is well-taken and the resolution of this Court of May 13, 1981 granting extension of time is hereby set aside.
Petition denied.
The Supreme Court held that in view of the peremptory nature of the provision of Section 18 of said decree and the manifest legislative intention not to prolong the period for appealing to the Supreme Court, petitioners herein were not entitled to an extension of time within which to file said petition. Dura lex, sed lex. Private respondents’ motion to dismiss is well-taken and the resolution of this Court of May 13, 1981 granting extension of time is hereby set aside.
Petition denied.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946; DISPOSITION OF AGRARIAN CASES; PERIOD TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT, NON-EXTENDIBLE. — In view of the peremptory nature of the provision of section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 and which superseded section 1 of Republic Act 5434, that the thirty-day reglementary period is non-extendible and of the manifest legislative intention not to prolong the period for appealing to the Supreme Court, it follows that petitioners were not entitled to an extension of time within which to file their petition for review. Dura lex, sed lex. The obvious intention of the lawmaking body is to avoid delays in the disposition of agrarian cases, a policy adopted also with respect to labor cases. Such delays are detrimental to both tenants and landlords.
D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
The decision of the Court of Appeals in these thirteen agrarian cases, which was promulgated on March 25, 1981, was served upon the petitioners on March 31, 1981. They had the reglementary period of thirty days or up to April 30, 1981 within which to appeal to this Court from that decision.
On April 30 or the last day of that period, the petitioners filed a motion for an extension of thirty days within which to file their petition for review. That motion was granted in this Court’s resolution of May 13, 1981.
The petition for certiorari was filed on May 29. The private respondents filed on June 17 a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the thirty-day period is non-extendible and, therefore, the petition was filed late. They cited the following provisions of Presidential Decree No. 946 which reorganized the Courts of Agrarian Relations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 18. Appeals. — . . .
"The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a copy of the decision or order."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, which took effect on June 14, 1955 and which created the agrarian courts, originally provided that "the Supreme Court, in any civil case involving questions of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by an order or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and under the rules and conditions that it may prescribe, may require by certiorari that said case be certified to it for review and determination." No period was fixed for the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Republic Act No. 1409, which took effect on September 9, 1955, amended section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, by providing that the petition for the review of the decision or order of the CAR may be filed with this Court within fifteen days from receipt of the notice of such decision or order. This provision is included in Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Section 156 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Code of Agrarian Reforms, Republic Act No. 3844), which took effect on August 8, 1963, provides that "appeals from an order or decision of the Courts of Agrarian Relations may be taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact and of fact and law or to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law, as the case may be, in accordance with rules governing appeals from the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court." (See Rule 42, Rules of Court.)
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5434, which took effect on September 9, 1968, provides that from a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an agrarian case, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, or within a fifteen-day period which is extendible.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5434 was superseded by the last paragraph of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 quoted above. That decree took effect on June 17, 1976.
In view of the peremptory nature of the provision of Section 18 that the thirty-day reglementary period is non-extendible and of the manifest legislative intention not to prolong the period for appealing to the Supreme Court, it follows that the petitioners herein were not entitled to an extension of time within which to file their petition for review. Dura lex, sed lex.
The thirty-day extension was granted to them through oversight in this Court’s resolution of May 13 which is hereby set aside. Private respondent’s motion to dismiss is well-taken.
The obvious intention of the lawmaking body is to void delays in the disposition of agrarian cases, a policy adopted also with respect to labor cases. Such delays are detrimental to both tenants and landlords.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
On April 30 or the last day of that period, the petitioners filed a motion for an extension of thirty days within which to file their petition for review. That motion was granted in this Court’s resolution of May 13, 1981.
The petition for certiorari was filed on May 29. The private respondents filed on June 17 a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the thirty-day period is non-extendible and, therefore, the petition was filed late. They cited the following provisions of Presidential Decree No. 946 which reorganized the Courts of Agrarian Relations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 18. Appeals. — . . .
"The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a copy of the decision or order."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, which took effect on June 14, 1955 and which created the agrarian courts, originally provided that "the Supreme Court, in any civil case involving questions of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by an order or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, and under the rules and conditions that it may prescribe, may require by certiorari that said case be certified to it for review and determination." No period was fixed for the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Republic Act No. 1409, which took effect on September 9, 1955, amended section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, by providing that the petition for the review of the decision or order of the CAR may be filed with this Court within fifteen days from receipt of the notice of such decision or order. This provision is included in Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Section 156 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Code of Agrarian Reforms, Republic Act No. 3844), which took effect on August 8, 1963, provides that "appeals from an order or decision of the Courts of Agrarian Relations may be taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact and of fact and law or to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law, as the case may be, in accordance with rules governing appeals from the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court." (See Rule 42, Rules of Court.)
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5434, which took effect on September 9, 1968, provides that from a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an agrarian case, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, or within a fifteen-day period which is extendible.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5434 was superseded by the last paragraph of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 quoted above. That decree took effect on June 17, 1976.
In view of the peremptory nature of the provision of Section 18 that the thirty-day reglementary period is non-extendible and of the manifest legislative intention not to prolong the period for appealing to the Supreme Court, it follows that the petitioners herein were not entitled to an extension of time within which to file their petition for review. Dura lex, sed lex.
The thirty-day extension was granted to them through oversight in this Court’s resolution of May 13 which is hereby set aside. Private respondent’s motion to dismiss is well-taken.
The obvious intention of the lawmaking body is to void delays in the disposition of agrarian cases, a policy adopted also with respect to labor cases. Such delays are detrimental to both tenants and landlords.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
