FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56133. September 30, 1981.]
ANTONIO ESTABAYA, Petitioner, v. HON. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, City Judge of Manila, Branch VII and ROSITA L. GARCIA, Respondents.
Estratonico S. Añano for Petitioner.
Leonardo S. Victoria for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Defendant in an ejectment suit requested for deferment of a scheduled hearing on the ground of illness and confinement of his counsel in the hospital. Respondent Court denied postponement because defendant counsel’s Certificate of Confinement was unsworn, and forthwith considered the case submitted for decision. Defendant’s motion to lift or set aside said denial to which was attached a duly sworn Certificate of Confinement, as well as a subsequent "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Set Aside Order Considering Case, Submitted for Decision" which was supported by a notarized Medical Certificate, were likewise denied. Hence, this petition. Private respondent commented, among others, that all postponements of the hearing of the case were at the instance of petitioner.
The Supreme Court held that it was grave abuse of discretion to deny petitioner’s request for deferment of hearing based on his counsel’s illness and confinement in the hospital, which fact was shown with sufficient proof; and, that previous postponement of hearings, at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason since speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice.
The Supreme Court held that it was grave abuse of discretion to deny petitioner’s request for deferment of hearing based on his counsel’s illness and confinement in the hospital, which fact was shown with sufficient proof; and, that previous postponement of hearings, at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason since speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO POSTPONE; ILLNESS OF COUNSEL, A VALID GROUND THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. — It was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to deny petitioner’s request for deferment of hearing based on a valid ground. The sworn certificate of confinement, the deposit slip showing initial deposit of money upon admission to the hospital of petitioner’s counsel, and the medical certificate, also under oath, which were all submitted by petitioner together with his motion to lift or set aside the denial order and his "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Set Aside Order Considering Case Submitted for Decision", prove that counsel was still confined at St. Agnes General Hospital until the morning of July 29, 1980, the scheduled date of hearing, which was the reason for his non-attendance in Court on that date.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVIOUS POSTPONEMENTS NOT BAR TO GRANT OF SUBSEQUENT POSTPONEMENT FOR VALID REASON. — The previous postponement of the hearings at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason. Justice is better served by a brief continuance with the end in view of an ultimate reckoning between the parties. Speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice. It is in the balancing of these factors that a magistrate must exercise judicious discretion.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT THEREOF IS SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AFFECTED. — "Postponement and continuance are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice, and when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them" (Rexwell Corporation v. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875 (1961); also cited in Perez v. Perez, 73 SCRA 517 (1976).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVIOUS POSTPONEMENTS NOT BAR TO GRANT OF SUBSEQUENT POSTPONEMENT FOR VALID REASON. — The previous postponement of the hearings at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason. Justice is better served by a brief continuance with the end in view of an ultimate reckoning between the parties. Speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice. It is in the balancing of these factors that a magistrate must exercise judicious discretion.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT THEREOF IS SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AFFECTED. — "Postponement and continuance are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice, and when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them" (Rexwell Corporation v. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875 (1961); also cited in Perez v. Perez, 73 SCRA 517 (1976).
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Antonio Estabaya seeks to set aside the Orders dated September 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the City Court of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 045438 for Ejectment, entitled "Rosita L. Garcia v. Antonio Estabaya."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the hearing of July 29, 1980 for continuation of the reception of petitioner’s evidence (as defendant in the case below), the latter requested for deferment for the reason that his counsel was ill and confined at the hospital, presenting as proof thereof, a Certificate of Confinement issued by the attending physician of his counsel. The Court denied postponement on the ground that the said certificate was not under oath and forthwith considered the case submitted for decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner moved to lift or set aside said Order on August 7, 1980 explaining that the certificate was unsworn because the attending physician of his counsel became available only in the evening of July 28, 1980 and he (the physician) had no time to appear before a Notary Public. Petitioner then submitted a duly notarized certificate of confinement. Respondent Court in its Order of September 30, 1980 denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Set Aside Order Considering Case Submitted for Decision," attaching therewith a notarized Medical Certificate. Opposed by private respondent, the Court again denied the Motion for lack of merit in its Order of December 8, 1980.
Hence, this Petition assailing respondent Court’s foregoing Orders of September 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980.chanrobles law library : red
Required to comment, private respondent Rosita L. Garcia alleged that all postponements of the hearing of this case were at the instance of petitioner, who moved for deferment on the date of hearing itself, without his counsel appearing in Court; that petitioner cannot invoke procedural due process as he was notified of all the scheduled hearings; that there is no ground nor justification to set aside the questioned Orders; and that the instant Petition is not the proper remedy. It should be noted that private respondent does not refute the fact of confinement of petitioner’s counsel.
We resolved to give due course to the Petition.
The sworn certificate of confinement, the deposit slip showing initial deposit of money upon admission to the hospital of petitioner’s counsel, and the medical certificate, also under oath, prove that counsel was still confined at St. Agnes General Hospital until the morning of July 29, 1980, the scheduled date of hearing, which was the reason for his non-attendance in Court on that date. There being a valid ground for petitioner’s request for deferment of hearing, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same. The previous postponement of the hearings at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason. Justice is better served by a brief continuance with the end in view of an ultimate reckoning between the parties. Speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice. It is in the balancing of these factors that a magistrate must exercise judicious discretion.
"Postponement and continuance are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice, and when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them" (Rexwell Corporation v. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875 [1961]); also cited in Perez v. Perez, 73 SCRA 517 [1976]).
WHEREFORE, respondent Court is hereby ordered to continue hearing Civil Case No. 045438 until its termination, with no petitions for postponement to be entertained provided ample notice of hearing is given, and to render judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Acting Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, *, JJ., concur.
During the hearing of July 29, 1980 for continuation of the reception of petitioner’s evidence (as defendant in the case below), the latter requested for deferment for the reason that his counsel was ill and confined at the hospital, presenting as proof thereof, a Certificate of Confinement issued by the attending physician of his counsel. The Court denied postponement on the ground that the said certificate was not under oath and forthwith considered the case submitted for decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner moved to lift or set aside said Order on August 7, 1980 explaining that the certificate was unsworn because the attending physician of his counsel became available only in the evening of July 28, 1980 and he (the physician) had no time to appear before a Notary Public. Petitioner then submitted a duly notarized certificate of confinement. Respondent Court in its Order of September 30, 1980 denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Set Aside Order Considering Case Submitted for Decision," attaching therewith a notarized Medical Certificate. Opposed by private respondent, the Court again denied the Motion for lack of merit in its Order of December 8, 1980.
Hence, this Petition assailing respondent Court’s foregoing Orders of September 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980.chanrobles law library : red
Required to comment, private respondent Rosita L. Garcia alleged that all postponements of the hearing of this case were at the instance of petitioner, who moved for deferment on the date of hearing itself, without his counsel appearing in Court; that petitioner cannot invoke procedural due process as he was notified of all the scheduled hearings; that there is no ground nor justification to set aside the questioned Orders; and that the instant Petition is not the proper remedy. It should be noted that private respondent does not refute the fact of confinement of petitioner’s counsel.
We resolved to give due course to the Petition.
The sworn certificate of confinement, the deposit slip showing initial deposit of money upon admission to the hospital of petitioner’s counsel, and the medical certificate, also under oath, prove that counsel was still confined at St. Agnes General Hospital until the morning of July 29, 1980, the scheduled date of hearing, which was the reason for his non-attendance in Court on that date. There being a valid ground for petitioner’s request for deferment of hearing, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same. The previous postponement of the hearings at the instance of petitioner’s counsel should not bar the grant of a subsequent postponement for a valid reason. Justice is better served by a brief continuance with the end in view of an ultimate reckoning between the parties. Speed in judicial administration must yield to the cause of justice. It is in the balancing of these factors that a magistrate must exercise judicious discretion.
"Postponement and continuance are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice, and when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them" (Rexwell Corporation v. Canlas, 3 SCRA 875 [1961]); also cited in Perez v. Perez, 73 SCRA 517 [1976]).
WHEREFORE, respondent Court is hereby ordered to continue hearing Civil Case No. 045438 until its termination, with no petitions for postponement to be entertained provided ample notice of hearing is given, and to render judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Acting Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, *, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Justice Pacifico P. de Castro was designated to sit in the First Division, Justice Claudio Teehankee being on official leave.
