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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-57477-78. November 19, 1982.]

HEIRS OF WILLIAM SEVILLA, namely, DIONESIA PONCE VDA. DE SEVILLA and children ROSALYN, WILFREDO, WILSON, WILMA, WILINA, WILLINGTON and WILLIAM, JR., all surnamed SEVILLA, Petitioners, v. JUDGE DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Dipolog City Branch III; JUAN CASTILLON and Spouses SALVADOR CRUZ and GUADALUPE YAP, Respondents.

Edgardo Z. Baguio for Petitioner.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for Private Respondent.

SYNOPSIS


From an adverse decision of the Court of First Instance affirming the two decisions of the city court in two ejectment cases, William Sevilla, herein represented by his heirs upon his demise, seasonably filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals categorically stating that their petition was filed pursuant to the resolution of the Court of Appeals en banc dated August 12, 1971 which prescribes a uniform procedure for the reviews by that Appellate Court of the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by interior courts where the factual findings of the Court of First Instance are assailed for not being supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are claimed to be clearly against the law and evidence. The Court of Appeals, in a resolution, certified the petition to this Court on the ground that it raises a purely legal question.

On review, the Supreme Court held that (a) the subject cases fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals because petitioners raise factual issues which require an examination and evaluation of the evidence; and (b) the Court of Appeals correctly implemented the provisions of Republic Act No. 6031 in its 1971 resolution.

Cases remanded to the Court of Appeals for adjudication.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDICIARY ACT; EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OVER PETITIONS THAT RAISE FACTUAL ISSUES; CASE AT BAR. — Where a petition for review of the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts does not deal with purely legal questions but raises factual issues which require an examination and evaluation of the evidence, the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the petition in the cases at bar.

2. ID.; JUDICIARY ACT AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6031; AMENDATORY STATUTE CORRECTLY IMPLEMENTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS 1971 RESOLUTION. — The Court of Appeals correctly implemented the provisions of Republic Act No. 6031 in its en banc resolution dated August 12, 1971 which prescribes a uniform procedure for the review by that Appellate Court of the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts where the factual findings of the Court of First Instance are assailed for not being supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are claimed to be clearly against the law and jurisprudence.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

REMEDIAL LAW; JUDICIARY ACT, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT No, 6031; JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ON APPEALED DECISION OF THE CITY COURT, FINAL. — Justice Teehankee concurs with the main opinion, subject to the qualification that under the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6031, the judgment of the Zamboanga Court of First Instance, passing upon (and affirming) the appealed judgment of the City Court in two ejectment cases, is "final." Hence, appeal to a higher court is no longer a matter of right. The Court of Appeals, if satisfied that the "findings of fact contained in the decision" of the CFI sought to be reviewed "are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusion are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence," may summarily turn down and deny due course to the petition for review.


R E S O L U T I O N


AQUINO, J.:


These cases involve the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No. 6031 to review the decision of the Court of First Instance in two ejectment cases decided by a city court.

The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its decision dated March 10, 1981 affirmed the two judgments of the city court of Dipolog City dated September 5, 1980, ordering William Sevilla to vacate the lots of Juan Castillon and Guadalupe Yap, to remove his improvement thereon and to pay certain amounts a month as compensation for the use of the said lots.

Counsel for the heirs of William Sevilla (he died while the cases were pending in the Court of First Instance) received a copy of that decision on March 19, 1981. Twenty-six days later, or on April 14, 1981, counsel mailed to the Court of Appeals a petition for review. He contends that the factual findings of the Court of First Instance are not supported by substantial evidence and that its conclusions are clearly against the law and jurisprudence.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Those are the grounds for the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases, like ejectment cases, exclusively cognizable by inferior courts, as indicated in the following provisions of section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031.

"SEC. 45. Appellate jurisdiction. — . . .

"In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance, the decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the view and jurisprudence: . . . Provided, however, that the Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under roles and conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal." (The second proviso is a verbatim reproduction of the proviso in section 29 of the Judiciary Law.)

The Sevilla heirs categorically stated that their petition for review was filed pursuant to the resolution of the Court of Appeals en banc dated August 12, 1971 (67 O. G. 6715) which prescribes a uniform procedure for the review by that Appellate Court of the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts where the factual findings of the Court of First Instance are assailed for not being supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are claimed to be clearly against the law and jurisprudence.

The Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, acting on its honest conviction that the petition for review raises a purely legal question, certified the case to this Court in its resolution of May 4, 1981.

We are of the opinion that these cases fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals because the petitioners raise factual issues which require an examination and evaluation of the evidence. The petition does not deal with purely legal issues.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We further hold that the Court of Appeals correctly implemented the provisions of Republic Act No. 6031 in its aforementioned 1971 resolution.

WHEREFORE, these cases are returned to the Court of Appeals for adjudication. It should resolve the pending motion for execution dated September 15, 1982 filed by respondents Yap and Castillon.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Escolin, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions


TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur, subject to the qualification that under the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6031, the judgment of the Zamboanga CFI, passing upon (and affirming) the appealed judgment of the City Court in the two ejectment cases, is "final." Hence, appeal to a higher court is no longer a matter of right. The Court of Appeals, if satisfied that the "findings of facts contained in the decision" of the CFI sought to be reviewed "are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence," may summarily turn down and deny due course to the petition for review.

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