1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; CORRELATIVE DUTY OF ARRESTING OFFICER. — At the time a person is arrested it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS ACCORDED THE PERSON ARRESTED. — The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the Jail or any other place of custody.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT. — No custodial investigation shall be conducted ,unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4. ID.; EVIDENCE; STATEMENT OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, INADMISSIBLE. — Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; DEFINITION; HOW AND BY WHOM ISSUED. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." It also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue.

6. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL ARREST AND COMMITMENT ORDER; BEING A WARRANT OF ARREST MUST COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. — A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the President of the Philippines. Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7. ID.; ID.; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; INSTANCES. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable wound to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has scaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNJUSTIFIABLE ARREST LIABILITY. — Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention or unlawful arrest or for some other offense.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLOWED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly Justified.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

10. ID.; ID.; PROPER COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION; FILING; REQUIRED AFTER THE ARREST. — After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, the proper complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law, to wit: six hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, that the President may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize by Executive Order longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or for as long as the conspiracy to commit the crime against national security and public order continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of persons arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined in Title III, Book II of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138,139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No, 1700 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to national security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a public calamity or other emergency situation preventing the early investigation of the cases and the filing of the corresponding information before the civil courts. "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate relatives." VOL. 206 p. 468.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISFEASANCE UNDER ARTICLE 125, R.P.C.; DETAINEE ENTITLED GENERALLY TO A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. — Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation of Article 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court.

12. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; PRIVILEGE MAY BE SUSPENDED; NOT THE WRIT ITSELF. — The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of itself.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

13. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; LANSANG DOCTRINE; REITERATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — In Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 473. We stated that `a majority of the court’ had ‘tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamation Nos. 889 and 889-A . . . and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, Sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, Sec. 10, par. 2 of the Philippine Constitution . . . .’The members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. We reiterate this doctrine.

14. ID.; COURT; JUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW; AUTHORITY TO INQUIRE INTO EVERY ASPECT OF DETENTION IN ALL PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS. — We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioners detention — from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court lasses upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied, The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

15. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BAIL SUSPENDED EVEN AFTER CHARGES ARE FILED IN COURT BECAUSE THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS REMAIN SUSPENDED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CRIMES. — Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to ball for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individuals has a right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State’s very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.

16. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PUNITIVE DETENTION; PROTRACTED FILING OF CHARGES IN COURT OR TRIAL WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE REASON; AMOUNTS TO PUNITIVE IMPRISONMENT. — There is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charge already filed become a protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

17. ID.; SUPREME COURT NOT BEING AN INVESTIGATING BODY NOR A TRIER OF FACTS; CHARGES OF TORTURE OF DETAINEE SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE PROPER BODY. — When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and maltreated, the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear the charges and to receive the evidence. Not because We are investigating body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But because petitioners’ charges are material and relevant to the petitions before Us. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of the proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the torture charges. However, they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them as provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1822, 1822-A and 1850.

18. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FORM AND NATURE OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT. — The present form of our government, with all intents and purposes, merged the executive and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at the same time cabinet ministers. Under the System of checks and balances ordained by the Constitution, the judiciary serves as the check and balance to the merged executive and legislative branches. The judiciary is therefore called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the traditional and narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we may explore the free market of ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our people.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; DISMISSAL OF PETITION UPON SHOWING OF LAWFUL DETENTION. — The authoritative doctrine followed by this Court in accordance with well- settled jurisprudence is that the moment it can be shown that the persons detained are being held in lawful custody by virtue of a judicial process, then an application of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot succeed.

2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY’S RESPECT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT, A GUARANTOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BOTH IN NORMAL TIMES AS WELL AS UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. — This Court in normal times as well as under emergency conditions has displayed fealty to human rights, as protected and safeguarded by the Constitution. It is a matter of legitimate pride that even under the 1933 Charter, the Philippines has accorded full recognition not only to the traditional civil and political rights but to social and economic rights. The autonomy of the human personality and the assurance of his dignity are a matter of deep public concern. It is equally; matter of legitimate pride that during the period of martial law, with full recognition of the power of the government to maintain peace and order and preserve its authority, the judiciary, was not recreant to such a trust. For the entire judiciary, not only this Court, stands as a guarantor of those rights. It does so when it has to act in a proper case submitted to it. The political branches are equally guarantors of human rights; the Batasan Pambansa in the enactment of laws and the President in their enforcement whether through executive orders implementing them or the issuance of decrees having the force and effect of law. In the sense, however, that decisions coming from this Court have not merely an inter partes but an erga omnes effect, binding not only the litigants but also others finding themselves similarly situated, it is quite accurate to state that "this Court stands as a guarantor of those rights." chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPECT ACCORDED TO DETAINEE IN CASE AT BAR. — It is by virtue of the respect for constitutional rights that in the resolutions of this Court in both application for the writ, it was made clear that counsel of petitioners can visit them and confer with them in an atmosphere of confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures to be imposed by respondents. Again, it is by virtue of deference to the Constitution that in succeeding resolutions; their allegations as to other Instances of violation of their rights were referred for investigation to the City Fiscal of Quezon City.

4. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, A JUDICIAL QUESTION. — Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando is in complete agreement in the opinion of Justice Concepcion, Jr., paragraph 21 which explicitly states: "We reiterate this doctrine," reaffirming the ruling in Lansang cited in paragraph 20 to the effect that the suspension of the privilege of the writ raises a judicial rather than a political question. That was the point of his dissent in the recently decided case of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.

5. ID.; ID.; COURT MUST INQUIRE INTO EVERY ASPECT OF PETITIONER’S DETENTION. — Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando conforms with the view set forth in paragraph 22 that "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGES BEING FILED; PREVENTIVE DETENTION RECOGNIZED. — Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando is in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 23 that there can be no indefinite detention without charges being filed. It must be recognized, however, that in cases of invasion, rebellion and insurrection, or imminent danger thereof, the power of preventive detention is recognized by the Constitution, considering that when public safety requires, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended or martial law, as a last resort, declared.chanrobles lawlibrary : red

7. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT DOES NOT CARRY WITHOUT THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL. — Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando is usable to agree to the proposition that the suspension of the privilege of the writ carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. It is perception of the matter traces itself to what was said in the landmark Milligan decision where the American Supreme Court said that only one great right may be suspended "leaving all the rest forever inviolable." (4 Walt 2, 123 [1866]).

8. ID.; GOVERNMENT; SEPARATION OF POWERS; NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IN VIEW OF FUSION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. — Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando does not fully agree with the characterization in paragraph 33 of the main opinion of a "merged executive and legislative branches," when viewed as a matter of legal theory. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment, L-58184, October 30, 1981, expressly held: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. There is therefore no repudiation of the theory of separation of powers. Through the exercise of vigorous presidential leadership, however, made manifest in party caucuses, there is attained both unity of purpose and action. In that sense, it could be assisted with truth that there is to all intents and purposes fusion of the executive and legislative branches. Hence the need for the maintenance of the concept of an independent judiciary.

9. ID.; DUE PROCESS; EFFECT OF A CRISIS SITUATION ON RESPECT ACCORDED TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT; ONLY WHEN THERE MAY BE PUBLIC DANGER CAN THE SAME BE STIGMATIZED. — Doctrines have to be assessed in terms of its effect on the governmental process. The rationale cannot be dissociated from the texture of the times. They cannot ignore the forces at work which may either solidify or rent asunder the political community. A crisis situation has a compulsion all its own. There may then be a conflict between the traditional formulations and the coercion of events. That may render even more unavoidable the intrusion of the demands of the hour into the domain of law. Adherence to what has been all along the accepted basic approach to human rights calls for fealty. There must be also, however, recognition of a more fluid standard in the assessment of governmental action to protect the security of the state. However, only when there may be grave public danger should reliance on the high estate accorded constitutional rights be stigmatized as being in the grip of the suffocation orthodoxies of the law.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

TEEHANKEE, J.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; GREAT RIGHTS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION. — These are the great rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the Constitution: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and arbitrary arrest; (b) the right to due process and equal protection of law; (c) the right of free association; (d) freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition; (e) the great writ of liberty; (f) the right to bail; (g) presumption of innocence and rights of speedy and impartial trial and confrontation; and (h) the right to counsel and silence.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE AND EXTENT. — The arresting officers, upon making the arrest, must inform the subject of the reason for the arrest and show him the warrant of arrest, if any. They must inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. They must respect his fight to communicate with his lawyer. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of his counsel. The right to counsel may be waived knowingly and intelligently and for such reason the waiver should be recognized only if made with the assistance of counsel. The detainee’s right to confer with counsel at any hour of the day, alone and privately, should be respected.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; UNJUSTIFIED ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT;. LIABILITY OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER. — Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention (under Article 124, Revised Penal Code) or unlawful arrest (under Article 269, idem) or for some other offense.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW; INQUIRY INTO EVERY PHASE AND ASPECT OF DETENTION; IN ALL PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS; NECESSARY. — We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and is contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

5. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DETENTION; PROTRACTED FILING OF CHARGES IN COURT OR TRIAL OF THOSE ALREADY FILED WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE REASON; AMOUNTS TO PUNITIVE IMPRISONMENT. — There is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court of the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF A DETAINED PERSON IN ANY CUSTODIAL INQUEST. — The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in maintaining in his dissenting opinion in Magtoto v. Manguera that the 1973 constitutional ban on uncounselled confessions should operate retrospectively to June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 (amending Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code) was enacted recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any custodial inquest, and not prospectively only as to such confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, stressed anew that it is "the obligation on the part of any detaining officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before the very inception of custodial inquest." He enjoined us eloquently that" (I) hold no brief against custodial interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases in the annals of adjudication where this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is a verity in the life of our nation that people without influence and without stature in society have, more often than not, been subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many police agencies in this country.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BAIL; PERSONS ACCUSED OF REBELLION OR INSURRECTION AFTER FORMAL INDICTMENT IN COURT; ENTITLED TO BAIL DESPITE THE PROCLAMATION OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. — Justice Teehankee joins Mr. Justice Abad Santos’ stand that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) constitutes authority to keep the subject person under detention "until ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative," the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor dismissed nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances." The argument that otherwise the purpose of suspension of the privilege would he defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the courts’ imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical areas. In my dissenting opinion in Buscayno v. Military Commission, I reiterated my adherence to the majority holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava v. Gatmaitan and Henandez v. Montesa (although it failed one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jogo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc., Accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail.cralawnad

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF INVASION, REBELLION, INSURRECTION OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF; FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW; DETERMINATION BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, A POLITICAL QUESTION. — I join Justices de Castro and Abad Santos in their opinion to abandon the Lansang doctrine and to adhere to the doctrine in the Montenegro and Barcelon cases that determination by the Chief Executive of the existence of invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent danger thereof and that public safety requires it, for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus and for the proclamation of martial law, is a political question and therefore beyond the sphere of judicial inquiry. In addition to the reasons advanced by Justices de Castro and Abad Santos, it should be stressed that the prime responsibility for the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic as well as its security, rests on the commander-in-chief and not on the Judiciary. To repeat, only the Chief Executive is well-equipped with the intelligence services as commander-in-chief to secure the desired information as to the existence of the requirements for the proclamation of martial law or for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court is bereft of such aids. This was clearly demonstrated at the executive session during one of the hearings in the Lansang case where the lawyers for the petitioners were present. Counsel for the petitioner had no means of rebutting the evidence and information gathered by the military organization presented in said Lansang case before this Court, which had to rely on such evidence and information submitted by the Armed Forces. It was clearly an exercise in futility.

2. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW; AUTOMATICALLY SUSPENDS THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BAIL. — Corollary to the doctrine in the case of Aquino v. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), which was re-affirmed in Gumaua v. Espino (96 SCRA 402, 412), that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must necessarily include the suspension of the right to bail for crimes which are grounds for the suspension of the privilege. This should be the ruling principle because, as well-stated by Mr. Justice de Castro, to release on bail persons indicted for rebellion or insurrection would be to nullify the very purpose of the suspension of the privilege, which is precisely to prevent them from continuing with the rebellion or insurrection or abetting the same The suspension of the privilege is precisely to restore tranquility and prevent the shedding of blood by our own people, more than just insuring the safety of public and private properties.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PRESIDENT’S DETERMINATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. — Justice Abad Santos concurs in the result, i.e. in the dismissal of the petitions. He rejects the doctrine laid down in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 [1971] that this Court "has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [for the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof." In so doing, this Court did a complete turnabout from Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 [1905] and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952) which enunciated the doctrine that the President’s determination in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is final and conclusive upon the courts. He submits that Barcelon and Montenegro laid down the correct doctrine. The Lansang doctrine is based on naivete; it demonstrates a lack of contact with reality. How can this Court determine the factual bases in order that it can ascertain whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truthful words of Montenegro, "with its very limited machinery [it] cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch) to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago?" (At p.887.) The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which bad to be used in Lansang. This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained.

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BAIL; DETAINEE ENTITLED TO BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT ONCE APPLICATION FOR IT IS MADE. — He submits that the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right if they should apply for it. The nature of LOI No. 1211 has been raised. Does it have the force of law or is it a mere directive to officers named therein, namely: The Mister of National Defense; The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; The Chief, Philippine Constabulary; The Chief, Criminal Investigation Service; The Director-General, NISA; The Minister of Justice, The Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and The solicitor General. To me the nature of LOI No. 1211 is irrelevant for the right to bail is guaranteed by a higher law — the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees that "All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required." (Art. IV, Sec. 18.) The penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal, hence rebellion is a non-capital offense and the petitioners should be granted bail by the court where their case is pending if they ask for it. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that they are covered by a Presidential Commitment Order are of no consequence. Since the respondents have elected to bring the case of the petitioners to court, the court acquired complete jurisdiction over them. To say that the court cannot grant them bail is to diminish the court’s jurisdiction.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT RETAINED UNLESS CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE AND EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. — It is also said that the view "if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out," will tend to induce the executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be possible. (See opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, op. cit. on p. 494.) The answer has long been given by this Court in Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1954) as follows: "This constitutional mandate (on the right to bail) refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty, will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charge with criminal offense (Constitution. Article III, Section, l [17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged, although already arrested or detained." What he has said above about the right of an accused to bail in non-capital cases applies mutatis mutandis to a person accused of a capital offense if the evidence of his guilt is not strong to be determined after a hearing as provided in the Rules of Court, Sec. 7, Rule 114. hil

DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BAIL; DETENTION UNDER A PCO; ONE WITHOUT RIGHT TO BAIL THOUGH CHARGES ARE ALREADY FILED IN COURT. — Justice De Castro concurs in the dismissal of the petition. It is his considered opinion, as set forth in his ponencia in the case for habeas Corpus- Josefina Garcia, Petitioner, G.R. No. 61388, hereafter referred to as the Parong case, that when a person is arrested by virtue of a PCO, or a PCO is issued after his arrest effected without warrant or with one issued by court, his detention becomes one without right to bail, even after charges have been filed against him in court. This is so because, under the circumstance that the rebellion is still continuing, perhaps with greater intensity, a captured or arrested rebel, or one in conspiracy with the rebels by acts in pursuance or in furtherance of the rebellion, is not arrested and detained with a view to his immediate prosecution. It is more for the purpose of detaining him as a military measure to suppress the rebellion. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has the effect of deferring trial for certain specified crimes during the existence of the emergency, as he stated, citing legal writers and publicists,(in the aforecited case of Parong, Et. Al.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE VIEW. — The reason is that a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime the commission of which has not yet come to an end as in the case of the existing rebellion. A person who kill another can and should immediately be prosecuted, because the killing itself constitutes the termination of the commission of the crime, as is generally true with the common statutory offenses. But a rebel, even when already captured or arrested and placed under detention, by reason of conspiracy with the rebels and their co-conspirators who are free, continues in a state of committing the crime of rebellion which is a continuing offense. If immediately prosecuted and by virtue thereof, allowed to be released on bail, the crime of rebellion being bailable, the detainee would certainly join his comrades in the field to the jeopardy of government efforts to suppress the rebellion, which is the rationale for the President being constitutionally empowered to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, even mere imminent danger thereof, when public safety so requires. The President, however, may order the filing of charges in court and trial thereof forthwith held, or even release on bail, as his best judgment will dictate to him. But this is for the President alone to decide, without interference from the courts, he being in the exercise of his military power.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; NOT JUSTICIABLE UNDER THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO RULING MORE PRACTICAL AND REALISTIC. — Justice De Castro dissents from the majority opinion insofar as it would reiterate the doctrine of the Lansang case, being of the view that the earlier doctrine in the case of Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castañeda which was superseded by the Lansang doctrine should be reverted to, as the more practical and realistic ruling, and more in consonance with the grant by the Constitution to the President of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of the contingencies mentioned in the Constitution. Such power could be easily rendered nugatory if interference by the Supreme Court were allowed as when it is given the power of judicial review over the exercise of this particular presidential power. The doctrine of "political question" comes in to make it improper for the power of judicial review to be exercised by the said Court, which doctrine renders the exercise of the presidential power referred to non-justiciable. Justiciability of the controversy is the basic requirement for the exercise of the power of judicial review. Moreover, the Lansang doctrine could easily be viewed as discriminatory against our incumbent President whose proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was held subject to judicial review, where similar proclamations of former Chiefs Executive, Governor General Wright and President Quirino, were held binding and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons. If this is so, as it can be safely surmised that the incumbent President cannot but feel discriminated against with the pronouncement of the Lansang doctrine, rectification is called for.

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT AS GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION; MAY NOT JUDICIALLY REVIEW ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION. — Indeed, while the Supreme Court is said to be the Guardian of the Constitution, not all questions arising therefrom may be brought to it for judicial review as to whether a constitutional violation has been committed. The power of the President as the defender of the State has to be granted by the Constitution, for how else could such power be granted except by the instrument which is the repository of the sovereign will of the people. But certainly, the exercise of such power of defending the Nation is not to be subordinated to that of the Supreme Court acting as Guardian of the Constitution. For what use is it to preserve the Constitution if We lose the Nation?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDY; PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; CASE AT BAR. — In a Supplemental Return to the Writ, respondents informed the Court that petitioner, on July 20, 1982, had been charged with Rebellion in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and they asked that the petition for habeas corpus be denied for the reason that "with the pendency of the case against petitioner before the Court below for trial and before the City Fiscal for reinvestigation, there is all the more reason to dismiss the petition." Under the foregoing facts, justice Melencio-Herrera is of the opinion that these cases have become moot. There is no longer any cause of action against respondents who must be deemed to have lost custody of petitioner (In re Lasam v. Enrile, 67 SCRA 43 (1975]).

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST, ACQUIRED IF PRESENTLY BEING TRIED. — Justice Melencio-Herrera does not agree with the view that petitioner is still not within the jurisdiction of the Court below. If that were a correct proposition, the Court below would be without jurisdiction to try the rebellion case. In criminal law, "the Court must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is, jurisdiction of the offense, and must have jurisdiction of the person of the accused", (U.S. - U.S. v. Simon, D.C. Pa., 248, cited in 22 C.J.S. 300). Even if there has been no warrant of arrest issued by the Court below, the person of petitioner, who is now being titiad, must be deemed as already within its jurisdiction (Carrington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 [1905]).

3. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDY; QUESTION RELATED TO THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; RENDERED IRRELEVANT UPON ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION BY TRIAL COURT OVER THE DETAINEE. — As petitioner is now within the jurisdiction of the Court below, the question in regards to the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus has become irrelevant. Considering that the Writ is never issuable to a Court (Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172 [1951]), there should be no justification in these cases to assail whatever has been said or resolved in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971). That particular matter could have been raised, procedurally, if petitioner had not been charged with Rebellion before the Court below. Of course, it would then be for this Court to give or not to give due course to the question. After all, habeas corpus is a discretionary Writ (Engels v. Amrine, 155 Kan 385, 125 P2d 379, cited in 39 Am. Jur. 2d, 269).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

4. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION FOR BAIL; PROPER PROCEDURE. — On the other hand, in reference to whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail in the rebellion case, Justice Melencio-Herrera believes that the proper procedure should be for petitioner to apply for bail before the Court below, and after his motion is granted or denied, the matter can thereafter be elevated to appellate consideration.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT T0 BAIL; A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT EXCEPT WHEN CHARGED WITH CAPITAL OFFENSES AND THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. — Once prosecuted in Court the position should not be taken that petitioner cannot be bailed, the right to bail being a fundamental right except for those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The Constitution limited the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to only one great right leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable (Ex parte Milligan, 13 U.S. Law ed., 281, 297). The power of the Courts to grant bail cannot be curtailed if the supremacy of the Judiciary within its own sphere is to be preserved (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]; Fernandez- Subido v. Lacson, 2 SCRA 1054 [1961).

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; SUBSTITUTION OF EXECUTIVE PROCESS FOR JUDICIAL PROCESS; WARRANTED WHEN PUBLIC DANGER EXISTS. — The reason for the objection to bail poses the same risk should the Court acquit petitioner. The risk need not be taken by continuing the detention under the Presidential Commitment Order, for a reasonable period, in the exercise of executive discretion by way of precaution essential for the public safety. "Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process" (Moyer v. Peabody, 53 Law, Ed., US 211-214, p. 411).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL ARREST AND COMMITMENT ORDER (PCO); EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY A JUDGE; NOT POSSIBLE UNLESS ISSUE PLACED SQUARELY IN A MORE APPROPRIATE CASE. — Justice Gutierrez agrees that the issuance of a presidential arrest and commitment order (PCO) must comply with the requirements of the Constitution. However, until the issue is placed squarely before us in a more appropriate case, he hesitates to concur in a categorical statement that a PCO may be equated with a warrant of arrest issued by a judge under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution.

2. ID.; ID.; CONCEPT AND PROCEDURE FOR ITS ISSUANCE. — An examination of Letters of Instructions Nos. 1125-A and 1211 indicates that the PCO is issued by the President, not as "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" under Section 3 of the Bill of Rights but as Commander-in-chief exercising exclusively executive powers under the Constitution to meet problems of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. Precisely, the letters of instructions call for preliminary examination or investigation by a judge as the regular procedure. Only when resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public order and safety and when the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger and public order and safety may the military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency apply to the President, through the Minister of National Defense, for a presidential commitment order. The fact that the stated procedure in the issuance of a PCO is an exception to and differs from the regular procedure before a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest shows that a PCO may not be equated completely with a warrant of arrest.

3. ID.; ID.; RULES IN AMARGA CASE ON PROBABLE CAUSE; APPLICABLE TO PCO’s. — He also adds that the President does not personally examine the complainant and the witnesses the latter may produce as the multifarious affairs of state prevent him from doing so. But as in the case of judges relying on investigations conducted by the fiscal, the President may rely on his Minister of National Defense or the recommending military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency to conduct what would be the equivalent of the judicial examination for probable cause. Of course, the rules in Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739) which impose on the judge issuing the warrant of arrest the legal duty to first satisfy himself that there is probable cause without relying completely or ministerially upon the findings of the fiscal, should also apply and I believe are in fact applied to PCO’s.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

4. ID.; ID.; COMMANDER IN CHIEF POWER; BROADER AND LESS SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION WHEN THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR MARTIAL LAW DECLARED. — In (Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27), the issue was raised that the President, having been given the power to deport undesirable aliens, may not be denied power which is essential to carry into effect the deportation. This Court did not categorically rule that the President himself may order the arrest of an alien for deportation purposes, but neither did it rule that he may not do so. The fact is the President has on various occasions, such as those involving among others, Mr. Harry Stonehill and some associates and perhaps the Yuyiteng brothers, ordered the arrest of aliens without having to secure a warrant of arrest from a judge at a time when under the Constitution only a judge could issue such a warrant. The commander-in-chief’s power in a situation where the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended or martial law has been proclaimed is certainly broader and less subject to constitutional restrictions than the power of deportation.

5. ID.; JUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW; BEYOND THE APPROPRIATE RANGE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. — He also hesitates to give concurrence to an unqualified reiteration of the Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448) doctrine on the Court’s inquiring into the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law to determine their constitutional sufficiency. While the Court has not been very receptive lately to the invocation of the political question doctrine by State lawyers, I believe that the doctrine does not apply in cases where a political department — either the President or the Batasang Pambansa — exercises powers expressly granted in an exclusive manner by the Constitution and which are of a clearly political nature not proper for judicial determination. If the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ is so patently arbitrary and as Justice Abad Santos says, lacking in popular support, there will always be constitutional foundation for Supreme Court action to rule against arbitrariness. However, as a general principle, whenever the President exercise his powers under the Constitution to meet the supreme dangers of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, we should not assume a power, upon the mere filing of a petition, to render a judicial interpretation of an exclusively constitutionally granted power of the President. Paraphrasing Coleman v. Miller (307 US 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385), the question of the sufficiency of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law would involve an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions involving national security which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would he an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice, which after all is what we would be asserting in most cases involving the exercise of this extraordinary presidential power.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary