1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE; RULE APPLIES ONLY IF THE JUSTICE TAKING PART IN SUPREME COURT DECISION PENNED THE DECISION OR ORDER SUBJECT OF REVIEW; CASE AT BAR. — The courts finds no factual nor legal justification for disqualifying Mr. Justice Vasquez from participating in its decision of May 19, 1983 in the case at the bar nor’ to set aside and nullify the said decision for insufficiency of votes in view of the legal disqualification of Mr. Justice Vasquez." As is evident from Sec. 1 of role 137, cited by the movants themselves, a member of this court would be disqualified from taking part in its decision only in case "in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review ." The transcript of the hearing of the motion of February 24, 1968 before respondent Judge Bautista (Annex "B" of the alternative motion) makes it clear that then Judge Vasquez had not resolved anything in the case, particularly with regard to the "sale and who will be the buyer" and that "there has been no decision [by him] as to whom the bid will be awarded." His only participation was due to the pairing system adopted in the Court of First Instance of Manila whereby as then regular presiding Judge of Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Manila, then Judge Vasquez took cognizance of the case which was assigned to Branch VI of the same court merely to attend to and take care of interlocutory matters that came up in the absence of an incumbent judge of Branch VI, its regular incumbent judge having been suspended from office.

VASQUEZ, J., Separate Opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; A JUDGE MAY IN HIS SOUND DISCRETION DISQUALIFIES HIMSELF. — The laws does not limit the disqualification of a judge to the causes expressly provided for. Wisely, it also explicitly allows a judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned" therein (2nd par., Section 1, Rule 137). Applicable jurisprudence dictates that, in such instances, the matter of disqualification is addressed primarily, if not solely, to the discretion of the judge concerned.

R E S O L U T I O N

Submitted for the Court’s resolution is respondents-plaintiffs’ "Alternative Motion to Nullify and/or to Set Aside Decision and Affirm Orders of the Trial Court or to Refer the Case to the Honorable Court en banc and to Suspend Time to File Motion for Reconsideration "filed through counsel on May 31, 1983 with the following prayer:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court set aside and nullify the decision rendered on May 19, 1983 and, instead, enter an affirmance of the orders of the trial court sought to be reviewed or, in the alternative, set aside and nullify the said decision for insufficiency of votes in view of the legal disqualification of Mr. Justice Vasquez and, instead, refer the proceedings to this Honorable Court en banc for decision.

"In the meantime that the matters raised herein are not yet resolved, it is also respectfully prayed that if the decision be not annulled, the period within which reconsideration of the decision can be sought, be suspended."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent Continental Bank, in a Manifestation dated June 1, 1983 and filed on the same date through counsel, Atty. Vicente P. Fernando, adopted the aforesaid alternative motion and prayer of respondents-plaintiffs Alfredo Limsico, Et. Al. In still another Manifestation and Motion dated June 3, 1983 and filed on June 7, 1983, respondent Continental Bank through another counsel, Barrera & Syquia Law Offices, making reference to the earlier Manifestation filed by said bank through Atty. Vicente P. Fernando, likewise adopted the aforesaid alternative motion and prayer of respondents-plaintiffs Alfredo Limsico, Et. Al.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Respondent Saint Rico Investment Corporation, through its counsel Capistrano Law Offices, filed its "Manifestations and Motion to Declare Decision Null and Void and/or Motion for Suspension of Period to file Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Case to Court en banc with Notice of Change of Address and Firm Name" dated June 2, 1983 likewise adopting the aforesaid alternative motion and prayer of respondents-plaintiffs Alfredo Limsico, Et Al., "particularly the motion therein for the nullification of the signature (vote) of Mr. Justice Conrado Vasquez," and substantially making the same prayer.

On June 17, 1983, petitioners through counsel, Atty. Celso A. Fernandez, filed their Opposition dated June 10, 1983 to the aforesaid alternative motion and prayer and prayed of the Court to deny the same for lack of merit and to consider the decision of May 19, 1983 as final.

The main submittal of the aforesaid alternative motion and prayer of respondents plaintiffs is that.

". . . Mr. Justice Vasquez is disqualified from participating in the above-entitled case because while he was still the Presiding Judge of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila, he sat in judgment on the case and, it was to him that respondent Manuel Limsico submitted his proposals (Annexes ‘A’ and ‘A-1’).

"Indeed, petitioners in open court said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘ATTY. UBIADAS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

All the arguments and pleadings had been heard by Judge Vasquez.’ (t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1968, p. 3, Annex ‘B’ hereof).

"Under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,.

‘No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case . . . in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.’

"With Mr. Justice Vasquez legally disqualified to participate in the instant proceedings, the requisite number of votes for a valid judgment for a division in the above-entitled case has not been attained, such that the instant proceedings should be referred to this Honorable Court en banc for decision . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

1. The Court finds no factual nor legal justification for disqualifying Mr. Justice Vasquez from participating in its decision of May 19, 1983 in the case at bar nor "to set aside and nullify the said decision for insufficiency of votes in view of the legal disqualification of Mr. Justice Vasquez." As is evident from Sec. 1 of Rule 137, cited by the movants themselves, a member of this Court would be disqualified from taking part in its decision only in a case "in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review." None of the motions or manifestations filed by respondents nor of the annexes of respondents-plaintiffs’ alternative motion cites any decision, ruling or order of Mr. Justice Vasquez when he was judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila that is the subject of review in this case. On the contrary, the transcript of the hearing of the motion of February 24, 1968 before respondent Judge Bautista (Annex "B" of the alternative motion) makes it clear that then Judge Vasquez had not resolved anything in the case, particularly with regard to the "sale and who will be the buyer" and that "there has been no decision [by him] as to whom the bid will be awarded." His only participation was due to the pairing system adopted in the Court of First Instance of Manila whereby as then regular presiding judge of Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Manila, then Judge Vasquez took cognizance of the case which was assigned to Branch VI of the same court merely to attend to and take care of interlocutory matters that came up in the absence of an incumbent judge of Branch VI, its regular incumbent judge having been suspended from office. The said transcript shows quite clearly that upon Judge Bautista having been designated to preside over Branch VI, then Judge Vasquez immediately sent him the records of the case for proper determination in due course.cralawnad

Counsels for respondents-movants have shown themselves less than candid in alleging Mr. Justice Vasquez’ disqualification because he "sat in judgment" in the case below. The records of the case as well as the decision at bar show the contrary and quite plainly that the orders that were passed upon and set aside by this Court were the Orders dated March 20, 1968 and May 7, 1968 (Annexes "A" and "B", petition) issued by respondent Judge Bautista and four other questioned Orders dated December 22, 1966, April 29, 1967, May 23, 1967 and July 19, 1967 (Annexes "D", "E", "F" and "G", respectively, petition) issued by his predecessor Judge Gaudencio Cloribel. There being no order or ruling whatsoever of Mr. Justice Vasquez as judge of the Court of First Instance that has been questioned or passed upon in the case, there is patently no factual nor legal basis to annul his participation or vote in the decision of May 19, 1983 nor to refer the case to the Court en banc for lack of the requisite number of votes.

The alternative submittal in respondents plaintiffs’ motion that the annulled orders of respondent court "should have been considered affirmed as the case was not decided by the Court within 18 months from the period of its submission" deserves scant consideration. Without need of going into the applicability or non-applicability of the cited provision, the question has been raised only now after the rendition of the decision of May 19, 1983 and respondents-plaintiffs themselves had before then moved the Court to render its decision (Manifestation and Motion dated June 7, 1978 and Motion for Resolution dated June 4, 1979).

2. Respondent Continental Bank, through still another counsel, N.J. Quisumbing & Associates, filed its motions dated May 30, 1983 and June 14, 1983, praying for an extension of fifteen days each, totalling thirty days from June 3, 1983 within which to file its motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 19, 1983. No action is taken thereon since they have been manifestly superseded by said bank’s adoption of respondents-plaintiffs’ aforesaid alternative motion and prayer.

3. The one-page Manifestation and Motion dated May 31, 1983 filed by Atty. Augusto D. Hidalgo, Jr. "for himself and on his own behalf" praying for nullification of the decision "not only because of the death of the receiver prior to its rendition but also because of the disqualification of Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez" is noted without action. The death of the receiver had previously been noted by the Court per its Resolution of June 26, 1981 and in no way affects the Court’s decision. The alleged disqualification of Mr. Justice Vasquez has no basis whatever. Finally, Atty. Hidalgo, Jr. apparently has no personality and does not represent any party in the case.

4. Mr. Justice Vasquez, however, in his self explanatory separate opinion has found himself "constrained to voluntarily disqualify myself to act in this case, and to withdraw my signature signifying my concurrence to the decision promulgated on May 19, 1983." In deference thereto, the Court resolved to set aside the promulgation of its decision of May 19, 1983 and to re-promulgate the same with the presence of the two members, namely, Mme. Justice Herrera and Mr. Justice Relova who were on leave at that time (with Mr. Justice Relova taking no part).

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SET ASIDE the promulgation of its decision of May 19, 1983 and to direct the Clerk of Court to promulgate the decision anew on this date with the presence of its two members who were then on leave (with Mr. Justice Relova taking no part).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Respondent Continental Bank is hereby further directed to designate its principal counsel who alone will be entitled to be served with notices of the Court’s processes and to inform the Court thereof within three (3) days from date hereof, since in accordance with established and orderly procedure, the Court will not entertain separate and multiple motions from its counsels but only that filed by its designated principal counsel.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin ** and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., took no part.



VASQUEZ, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It may be true that none of the orders in Civil Case No. 67943 which are being questioned in the instant proceeding was issued by me as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is also a facet, however, that in my capacity as the "pairing Judge" of Branch VI of the Manila CFI to which Civil Case No. 67943 pertained, I presided over several incidents in said case. Although the extent and nature of my participation in handling said case now escape me, it has been represented in the annexes to the motion of private respondent Saint Rico Investment Corporation that "all the arguments and pleadings had been heard by" me; that "all matters, recommendations, bids and arguments relative thereto were submitted to and heard by" me; that I issued an order in the case dated November 6, 1968; and that petitioner Manuel Limsico addressed to me two letters dated February 10, 1968 and February 18, 1968 regarding his bid to buy all the assets of the company.

I agree with the main opinion that there appears to be no reason to disqualify me on the ground that I "presided in any inferior court when (his) my ruling or decision is the subject of review" (Sec. 1, Rule 137), none of the questioned orders having been issued by me. However, my actuations in the case (the nature of which, as I have said, I can no longer remember they having occurred more than 15 years ago) could have led to, or influenced, one way or the other, the issuance of anyone of the orders herein subject of review.

The law does not limit the disqualification of a judge to the causes expressly provided for. Wisely, it also explicitly allows a judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned" therein (2nd par., Section 1, Rule 137). Applicable jurisprudence dictates that, in such instances, the matter of disqualification is addressed primarily, if not solely, to the discretion of the judge concerned.

I wish to apologize for my having participated in the decision promulgated on May 19, 1983 when the propriety of my having taken part therein could be open to question. Fact is, my having acted in the main case as a trial judge has escaped my memory, the same having transpired, since quite some time past, and no reminder of the same having been brought to my attention until the motion presently under consideration was filed by private respondent Saint Rico Investment Corporation.

I am deeply concerned with the legal effect of my voluntary inhibition to participate in this case on the decision already promulgated thereon wherein my vote was necessary to comply with the constitutional requirement of five votes for a decision rendered by a division of this Court. I feel relieved, however, by the thought that, there being enough members of the division, excluding myself, who may act on the case, the situation is not beyond remedy, and the difficulty created by my inhibition may readily be overcome.

With deep regret, therefore, I am constrained to voluntarily disqualify myself to act in this case, and to withdraw my signature signifying my concurrence to the decision promulgated on May 19, 1983.

Endnotes:

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** Mr. Justice Escolin was designated to sit with the First Division under Special Order No. 241 dated April 28, 1983.