FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-43663. August 17, 1983.]
NORENA TORTAL, Petitioner, v. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and RODOLFO GAMBOA, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; LAW APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The late Eduardo Tonal died in 1973. Benefits based on his death are, therefore, governed by the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, or Act 3428 as amended.
2. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — Based on Supreme Court decisions interpreting the old compensation law (Workmen’s Compensation Act), where an illness supervened during the employment of an employee, his claim for compensation benefits is disputably presumed compensable. Unfortunately for the employer In the instant case, the records are bereft of evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. The allegation that Tonal had -a drinking spree the evening before his death does not preclude his hypertension having been caused or aggravated by or having resulted from the nature of his farm work.
3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS; EFFECT OF NON- CONTROVERSION; NO TIMELY CONTROVERSION IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, if an employer overlooks or neglects to controvert the right to compensation within fourteen (14) lays from the death of the employee or ten (10) days from knowledge thereof, the employer is considered as having waived or renounced his defenses. This was the applicable law in the case at bar. However, the records are bereft of proof to support timely controversion apart from a self-service allegation that the employer learned of the death only when asked to accomplish Workmen’s Compensation Commission Form No. 3. The fact that Tortal died on the hacienda , that in the normal course of events, such a tragedy is immediately reported to the employer, and that his daily wage must have been stricken off from the payroll, and considering further the presumption of the old law, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no timely and valid controversion.
2. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — Based on Supreme Court decisions interpreting the old compensation law (Workmen’s Compensation Act), where an illness supervened during the employment of an employee, his claim for compensation benefits is disputably presumed compensable. Unfortunately for the employer In the instant case, the records are bereft of evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. The allegation that Tonal had -a drinking spree the evening before his death does not preclude his hypertension having been caused or aggravated by or having resulted from the nature of his farm work.
3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS; EFFECT OF NON- CONTROVERSION; NO TIMELY CONTROVERSION IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, if an employer overlooks or neglects to controvert the right to compensation within fourteen (14) lays from the death of the employee or ten (10) days from knowledge thereof, the employer is considered as having waived or renounced his defenses. This was the applicable law in the case at bar. However, the records are bereft of proof to support timely controversion apart from a self-service allegation that the employer learned of the death only when asked to accomplish Workmen’s Compensation Commission Form No. 3. The fact that Tortal died on the hacienda , that in the normal course of events, such a tragedy is immediately reported to the employer, and that his daily wage must have been stricken off from the payroll, and considering further the presumption of the old law, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no timely and valid controversion.
D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In this petition for review, the petitioner seeks the reversal of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission decision which affirmed the dismissal by the labor referee of her claim for death compensation.
The petitioner’s son, Eduardo Tortal, was a farm laborer of Hacienda Celina at E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental since 1972 up to the time of his death on August 2, 1973. At the time of his death, he was earning a daily wage of P8.00. The cause of death is stated in the death certificate as "hypertension cerebral."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 12, 1973, the petitioner filed a notice and claim for death compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Sub-Regional Office No. VII at Bacolod City.
On September 18, 1973, the sub-regional office furnished the private respondent, by registered mail, a copy of the notice and claim for death compensation as well as a blank form of the employer’s report of accident or sickness for him to accomplish but these were returned to the sender as "unclaimed." However, on March 8, 1974, the private respondent submitted his employer’s report controverting the cause of death as neither service incurred nor service aggravated.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The case was set for hearing on July 16, 1974, but on the day of the hearing both parties failed to appear.
After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the referee of the sub-regional office dismissed the claim for lack of merit. After denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the referee elevated the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review. The affirmance of the decision by the latter office prompted the petitioner to file the present petitioner.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission in affirming the dismissal of the claim ruled that" (t)here is no dispute that Eduardo Tortal died due to ‘Hypertension, Cerebral’ on September 25, 1975 (should be August 2, 1973). However, the herein claimant failed to establish (sic) by substantial evidence the causal connection between the deceased’s illness and his work as laborer of Respondent."cralaw virtua1aw library
The late Eduardo Tortal died in 1973. Benefits based on his death are, therefore, governed by the former Workmen’s Compensation Act or Act 3428 as amended. Because of the decisions interpreting the provisions of the old law on presumption of compensability and the effects of non-controversion, we are constrained to grant the petition and to reverse the questioned decision. In the case of Salanguit v. Workmen’s Compensation (90 SCRA 228) we ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The record discloses that the illness of Juan Salanguit, petitioner herein, supervened during his employment with the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways). Hence, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to prove causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. To the employer is shifted the burden of proof to establish that the illness is non-compensable." (Balanga v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 721) [Emphasis supplied]
This rule was reiterated in the case of Enrique, Sr. v. Republic, 93 SCRA 836) where this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . it can be correctly said that petitioner’s hypertension supervened in the course of his employment, and in accordance with the aforequoted Section 44(1) in relation to Section 2.’SECTION 2. Ground for Compensation. — When an employee suffers personal injury, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.’ It is presumed that petitioner’s hypertension was service-connected, and therefore compensable. This, We have consistently held in a number of cases (Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Agno and WCC, 12 SCRA 178; Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278; Legason v. WCC, 75 SCRA 213; Baterna v. WCC, 75 SCRA 409; Vda. de Galang v. WCC, 75 SCRA 679; Guevara v. Republic, 77 SCRA 292; Caling v. WCC, 77 SCRA 311; Evangelista v. WCC, 77 SCRA 497; Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc. v. Murillo, 81 SCRA 307; Lamco v. WCC, L-4375, July 31, 1978; Saril v. WCC, L-43204, July 31, 1978) and the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that while the illness subject of the claim supervenes in the course of employment, it does not necessarily follow that it also arose from such employment or was at least aggravated by it. (Lizardo v. WEE, L-42995, March 14, 1979. See also Justiniano v. WCC, 18 SCRA 677; Magalona v. WCC, 21 SCRA 1199; Belmonte v. WCC, 58 SCRA 138; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. v. WCC, 60 SCRA 228; Ruelan v. RP, 70 SCRA 615) . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Unfortunately for the employer, the records are bereft of evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. The allegation that Tortal had a drinking spree the evening before his death does not preclude his hypertension having been caused or aggravated by or having resulted from the nature of his farm work.
The jurisprudence explaining the effect of non-controversion is similarly emphatic in favoring the deceased worker. Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, if an employer somehow overlooks or neglects to controvert the right to compensation within fourteen (14) days from the death of the employee or ten (10) days from knowledge thereof, the employer is considered, with an effect approaching conclusiveness, as having waived or renounced his defenses. This was the applicable law. We are constrained to apply it. In the case of Jesalva v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, (95 SCRA 597) this Court declared:cralawnad
". . . Moreover, the records of the case reveal that respondent employer never complied with its obligations under Sections 37 and 54 of the Act of reporting to the Commission within fourteen days from occurrence of the injury or death of its employee or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof; which non-compliance generates [a] the loss of the right to controvert the claim on jurisdictional grounds, and the employer cannot be subsequently heard to complain that the law was strictly construed against him (Victory Shipping Lines, Inc. v. WCC, 106 Phil. 550 [1059]); [b] the renunciation of the right to controvert the claim, barring all defenses available without exception [National Development Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 696 [1964]), thereby constructively admitting that it is compensable; and [c] the waiver of the defense that the claim for compensation was not filed within the statutory period (Vda. de Calado v. WCC, 38 SCRA 567, 575-576 [1971]; Manila Railroad Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 41 [1964]. Consequently, herein respondent employer is barred from raising any defense to defeat petitioner’s claim."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the afore-quoted ruling, the controversion of the claim is neither service incurred nor service aggravated filed by the private respondent only on March 8, 1974, was a sadly belated act.
Again the records are bereft of proof to support timely controversion, apart from a self-serving allegation that the employer learned of the death only when asked to accomplish WCC Form No. 3. The fact that Tortal died on the hacienda, that it is in the normal course of events to immediately report such a tragedy to the employer and that his daily wage of P8.00 must have been stricken off the payroll and considering further the presumptions under the former law, we rule that there was no timely and valid controversion.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated December 30, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as death compensation;
2. The sum of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS for burial expenses; and
3. The sum of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees; and to pay
4. The sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative fee to successor of the defunct commission.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
The petitioner’s son, Eduardo Tortal, was a farm laborer of Hacienda Celina at E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental since 1972 up to the time of his death on August 2, 1973. At the time of his death, he was earning a daily wage of P8.00. The cause of death is stated in the death certificate as "hypertension cerebral."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 12, 1973, the petitioner filed a notice and claim for death compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Sub-Regional Office No. VII at Bacolod City.
On September 18, 1973, the sub-regional office furnished the private respondent, by registered mail, a copy of the notice and claim for death compensation as well as a blank form of the employer’s report of accident or sickness for him to accomplish but these were returned to the sender as "unclaimed." However, on March 8, 1974, the private respondent submitted his employer’s report controverting the cause of death as neither service incurred nor service aggravated.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The case was set for hearing on July 16, 1974, but on the day of the hearing both parties failed to appear.
After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the referee of the sub-regional office dismissed the claim for lack of merit. After denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the referee elevated the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review. The affirmance of the decision by the latter office prompted the petitioner to file the present petitioner.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission in affirming the dismissal of the claim ruled that" (t)here is no dispute that Eduardo Tortal died due to ‘Hypertension, Cerebral’ on September 25, 1975 (should be August 2, 1973). However, the herein claimant failed to establish (sic) by substantial evidence the causal connection between the deceased’s illness and his work as laborer of Respondent."cralaw virtua1aw library
The late Eduardo Tortal died in 1973. Benefits based on his death are, therefore, governed by the former Workmen’s Compensation Act or Act 3428 as amended. Because of the decisions interpreting the provisions of the old law on presumption of compensability and the effects of non-controversion, we are constrained to grant the petition and to reverse the questioned decision. In the case of Salanguit v. Workmen’s Compensation (90 SCRA 228) we ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The record discloses that the illness of Juan Salanguit, petitioner herein, supervened during his employment with the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways). Hence, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to prove causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. To the employer is shifted the burden of proof to establish that the illness is non-compensable." (Balanga v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 721) [Emphasis supplied]
This rule was reiterated in the case of Enrique, Sr. v. Republic, 93 SCRA 836) where this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . it can be correctly said that petitioner’s hypertension supervened in the course of his employment, and in accordance with the aforequoted Section 44(1) in relation to Section 2.’SECTION 2. Ground for Compensation. — When an employee suffers personal injury, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.’ It is presumed that petitioner’s hypertension was service-connected, and therefore compensable. This, We have consistently held in a number of cases (Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Agno and WCC, 12 SCRA 178; Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278; Legason v. WCC, 75 SCRA 213; Baterna v. WCC, 75 SCRA 409; Vda. de Galang v. WCC, 75 SCRA 679; Guevara v. Republic, 77 SCRA 292; Caling v. WCC, 77 SCRA 311; Evangelista v. WCC, 77 SCRA 497; Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc. v. Murillo, 81 SCRA 307; Lamco v. WCC, L-4375, July 31, 1978; Saril v. WCC, L-43204, July 31, 1978) and the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that while the illness subject of the claim supervenes in the course of employment, it does not necessarily follow that it also arose from such employment or was at least aggravated by it. (Lizardo v. WEE, L-42995, March 14, 1979. See also Justiniano v. WCC, 18 SCRA 677; Magalona v. WCC, 21 SCRA 1199; Belmonte v. WCC, 58 SCRA 138; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. v. WCC, 60 SCRA 228; Ruelan v. RP, 70 SCRA 615) . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Unfortunately for the employer, the records are bereft of evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. The allegation that Tortal had a drinking spree the evening before his death does not preclude his hypertension having been caused or aggravated by or having resulted from the nature of his farm work.
The jurisprudence explaining the effect of non-controversion is similarly emphatic in favoring the deceased worker. Under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, if an employer somehow overlooks or neglects to controvert the right to compensation within fourteen (14) days from the death of the employee or ten (10) days from knowledge thereof, the employer is considered, with an effect approaching conclusiveness, as having waived or renounced his defenses. This was the applicable law. We are constrained to apply it. In the case of Jesalva v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, (95 SCRA 597) this Court declared:cralawnad
". . . Moreover, the records of the case reveal that respondent employer never complied with its obligations under Sections 37 and 54 of the Act of reporting to the Commission within fourteen days from occurrence of the injury or death of its employee or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof; which non-compliance generates [a] the loss of the right to controvert the claim on jurisdictional grounds, and the employer cannot be subsequently heard to complain that the law was strictly construed against him (Victory Shipping Lines, Inc. v. WCC, 106 Phil. 550 [1059]); [b] the renunciation of the right to controvert the claim, barring all defenses available without exception [National Development Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 696 [1964]), thereby constructively admitting that it is compensable; and [c] the waiver of the defense that the claim for compensation was not filed within the statutory period (Vda. de Calado v. WCC, 38 SCRA 567, 575-576 [1971]; Manila Railroad Co. v. WCC, 10 SCRA 41 [1964]. Consequently, herein respondent employer is barred from raising any defense to defeat petitioner’s claim."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x
Under the afore-quoted ruling, the controversion of the claim is neither service incurred nor service aggravated filed by the private respondent only on March 8, 1974, was a sadly belated act.
Again the records are bereft of proof to support timely controversion, apart from a self-serving allegation that the employer learned of the death only when asked to accomplish WCC Form No. 3. The fact that Tortal died on the hacienda, that it is in the normal course of events to immediately report such a tragedy to the employer and that his daily wage of P8.00 must have been stricken off the payroll and considering further the presumptions under the former law, we rule that there was no timely and valid controversion.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated December 30, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as death compensation;
2. The sum of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS for burial expenses; and
3. The sum of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as attorney’s fees; and to pay
4. The sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative fee to successor of the defunct commission.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
