FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-30637. July 16, 1987.]
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Agusan and AGO TIMBER CORPORATION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; BUREAU OF FORESTRY; VESTED WITH THE JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OVER DEMARCATION OF ALL PUBLIC FOREST AND FOREST RESERVES. — Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS OF JUSTICE DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. — In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SHALL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DRAFT OF DECISION DOES NOT OPERATE AS A JUDGMENT ON A CASE UNTIL THE SAME IS DULY SIGNED AND DELIVERED TO THE CLERK FOR FILING AND PROMULGATION. — It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation. Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals, (where herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION; SUSPICION AND CONJECTURES CAN NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND LEGALITY OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS. — The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido "decision" allegedly denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of official actions. It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties regularly. It should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case history in the Office of the President, Ago’s motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by himself).
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ORDINARY TIMBER LICENSE; OPERATES AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GRANTEE; TERMS AND STIPULATIONS THEREOF, NOT SUBJECT TO QUESTIONING BY GRANTEE. — The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-’60 [New] which approved the transfer to respondent Ago of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry as to the exact location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision that may be rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to expire at an earlier date. Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, upon granting any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions, and limitations, not inconsistent with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest. The license operates as a contract between the government and Respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from questioning the terms and stipulation thereof.
7. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE THEREOF BY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE LIMITED TO ACTS COMMITTED WITHIN ITS TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES. — Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places, if the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, within their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces or districts except where the sole issue is the legality of the decision of the administrative officials.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a determination of a question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally correct or not. We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz: "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went further and said that when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions the legal correctness of the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the officials sought to be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its territory.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, VOID. — The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void, since it appears that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not licensed to respondent Ago. The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 584-52. Only a portion of this area was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-’60(New).
10. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; REFUSAL TO DISMISS A CASE ON APPARENT LACK OF JURISDICTION AND ISSUING WRIT OF INJUNCTION. — It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made. Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9, 1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS OF JUSTICE DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. — In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SHALL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DRAFT OF DECISION DOES NOT OPERATE AS A JUDGMENT ON A CASE UNTIL THE SAME IS DULY SIGNED AND DELIVERED TO THE CLERK FOR FILING AND PROMULGATION. — It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation. Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals, (where herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION; SUSPICION AND CONJECTURES CAN NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND LEGALITY OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS. — The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido "decision" allegedly denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of official actions. It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties regularly. It should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case history in the Office of the President, Ago’s motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by himself).
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ORDINARY TIMBER LICENSE; OPERATES AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GRANTEE; TERMS AND STIPULATIONS THEREOF, NOT SUBJECT TO QUESTIONING BY GRANTEE. — The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-’60 [New] which approved the transfer to respondent Ago of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry as to the exact location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision that may be rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to expire at an earlier date. Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, upon granting any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions, and limitations, not inconsistent with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest. The license operates as a contract between the government and Respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from questioning the terms and stipulation thereof.
7. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE THEREOF BY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE LIMITED TO ACTS COMMITTED WITHIN ITS TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES. — Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places, if the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, within their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces or districts except where the sole issue is the legality of the decision of the administrative officials.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a determination of a question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally correct or not. We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz: "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went further and said that when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions the legal correctness of the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the officials sought to be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its territory.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, VOID. — The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void, since it appears that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not licensed to respondent Ago. The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 584-52. Only a portion of this area was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-’60(New).
10. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; REFUSAL TO DISMISS A CASE ON APPARENT LACK OF JURISDICTION AND ISSUING WRIT OF INJUNCTION. — It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made. Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9, 1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.
D E C I S I O N
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000 hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-’52.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary — the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary — whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is petitioner Lianga’s western boundary. The western boundary of petitioner Lianga is described as." . . Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao Creek . . ." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is described as." . . point 4, along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao boundary in a general southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-Lianga Road; . . ." 1
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other’s concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the common boundary as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging Company at Km. 10.2 instead of Km. 9.7 on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N90
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of 110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000 hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-’52.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary — the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary — whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is petitioner Lianga’s western boundary. The western boundary of petitioner Lianga is described as." . . Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao Creek . . ." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago’s concession is described as." . . point 4, along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following Agusan-Surigao boundary in a general southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-Lianga Road; . . ." 1
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other’s concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the common boundary as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging Company at Km. 10.2 instead of Km. 9.7 on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N90
