EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]
RODOLFO T. GANZON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.]
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, Petitioner, v. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR., Respondents.
[G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.]
RODOLFO T. GANZON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, Respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY, NATURE OF; LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. — Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggests — is to wean local government units from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter , "local autonomy" is not instantly self executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggests that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. — As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more that to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. — The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that" [T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that" [T]he President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation — to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from Congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President’s alter ego, in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. — "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon v. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. — While the respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to suspend the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative cases have been successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the former for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayor’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. — As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more that to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE REGULATION. — The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that" [T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that" [T]he President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation — to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from Congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt local governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President’s alter ego, in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code, can suspend petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (G.R. No. 93746).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. — "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon v. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. — While the respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power to suspend the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative cases have been successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the former for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the duration of his third suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayor’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualification are best suited and assigned her to e work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant’s duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner’s act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Peña Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner’s actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charge} filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He was released only the following day. 3
The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner’s counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue — Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.cralawnad
On December 14, 1988, petitioner’s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals’ two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon’s) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing — and meted out two more suspension orders — of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on ‘valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17
Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon’s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so’s that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them, 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so’s were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon’s contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon’s above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos’ actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," 21 to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.chanrobles law library
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the Respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25cralaw:red
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest — is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is true that in the case of Mondano v. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. . . . 35
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties." 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering."
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court’s pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45
In Hebron, we stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary — which does not exist with respect to municipal officers. . . . 46
In Mondano, the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of mal administration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution." 47
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President’s powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not power — to the local levels. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. 55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension — which is not a remote possibility — on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor’s guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor — without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code) — which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the sever pertaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualification are best suited and assigned her to e work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant’s duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner’s act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Peña Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner’s actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charge} filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He was released only the following day. 3
The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner’s counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue — Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.cralawnad
On December 14, 1988, petitioner’s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals’ two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon’s) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing — and meted out two more suspension orders — of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on ‘valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17
Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon’s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so’s that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them, 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so’s were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon’s contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon’s above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos’ actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," 21 to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.chanrobles law library
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the Respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25cralaw:red
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest — is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
It is true that in the case of Mondano v. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. . . . 35
x x x
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties." 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering."
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court’s pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45
In Hebron, we stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary — which does not exist with respect to municipal officers. . . . 46
In Mondano, the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of mal administration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution." 47
x x x
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President’s powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not power — to the local levels. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. 55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension — which is not a remote possibility — on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor’s guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor — without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code) — which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the sever pertaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon’s usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.
2. Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.
3. Rollo, id., 76-77.
4. Id., 77.
5. Id., 77-78.
6. Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza complaints. CA-G.R. No. 1.6417 was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No. 20736 was a challenge on the designation of Vica-Mayor Malabor.
7. Id., 21.
8. Id.
9. Id., 27.
10. Id., 28.
11. Id., 30.
12. Id., 31-32.
13. Id., 34-35.
14. Id., 36.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., 38.
18. Id.
19. By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on June 26, 1990.
20. CONST., art. X, sec. 4.
21. CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained no similar provision, but see art. VII, sec. 18.
22. CONST. (1987), supra.
23. CONST. (1935), supra.
24. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.
25. Supra, sec. 63.
26. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.).
27. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
28. Supra, secs. 5, 6.
29. Supra, sec. 7.
30. Supra, sec. 9.
31. See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be organized by the President.
32. Supra, sec. 3.
33. G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
34. Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id., 48-61), Justice Mendoza cited this case.
35. Supra, 489-490.
36. Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
37. Supra, 147.
38. Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39. 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
40. 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
41. Supra.
42. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
43. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.
44. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
45. Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.
46. Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.
47. Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.
48. Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
49. G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
50. Id., 23.
51. Id., 53.
52. Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
53. CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
54. Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
55. Supra., 794-795.
56. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.
57. Supra, 541.
58. See supra.
59. Lacson v. Roque, supra.
60. Supra, 469.
61. Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.
62. Supra.
63. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
