1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — With this Court’s ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our considered view that the petitioners can not raise anew the question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the de la Cruz case. Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that: "When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate." The Court’s ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago. This declaration must be respected and followed in the instant case applying the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).

2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT REVIEW A CASE ALREADY PASSED UPON BY IT; CASE AT BAR. — It is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra, pp. 697-698) This is a finding which can not be disturbed. "We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest." (Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, supra.).

3. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION ACT; REGISTRATION; CONSTITUTES A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD. — The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent registration thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253 [1987]; People v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597 [1989]).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF "HE WHO IS FIRST IN TIME IS PREFERRED IN RIGHT" ; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of the land sold (Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244 [1989]), Lot 671 was already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as early as 1943. Amando Clemente’s alleged title meanwhile which was issued on August 9, 1951 was very much later. Thus, the petitioners, who merely stepped into the shoes of Amando Clemente cannot claim a better right over said land. "Prior est temporae, prior est in jura" (he who is first in time is preferred in right) (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380 [1980]). The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a certificate of title does not necessarily make him the true owner. And not being the owner, he cannot transmit any right to nor transfer any title or interest over the land conveyed (Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario de Molo v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 459 [1985]; Treasurer of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 359 [1987]).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, CONSIDERED PROCEEDING IN REM; EFFECT THEREOF. — Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which the court held to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such as land registration constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners cannot now claim that they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said lot. Under the facts of the case, the title in the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58) has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; TORRENS TITLE; CONSTITUTES A CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND REFERRED THEREIN. — The INK was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 [1990]) It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK’s title over Lot 671 at this time.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; ONCE ISSUED, CAN ONLY BE ALTERED, MODIFIED OR CANCELLED BY DIRECT PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. — In challenging the validity of the reconstitution of Lucia dela Cruz’s title, the petitioners are now alleging fraud, collusion and illegality in the procurement of the certificate of title of Lucia dela Cruz. It must be recalled that G. R. No. 76265 stemmed merely from a consulta case with the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration. Undeniably, the arguments and issues raised by the petitioner require adjudication of facts which, under the circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to do as this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the present petition is not the proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action required is a direct and not a collateral attack. (Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 [1989]). The Court had this to say: "We note with approval the lower court’s patient explanation that, inter alia, the certificate of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for review of the decree must be presented within one year after its entry as described and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings . . . "Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be challenged, the present case does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is a direct, and not a collateral attack. In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

The subject of controversy in these two consolidated petitions is a parcel of land — Lot 671-A of the Piedad Estate located in Barrio Culiat, Diliman.

The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to have bought their respective portions from Amando Clemente in the 1950’s.

Amando Clemente is alleged to be the registered owner of said land evidenced by Transfer of Certificate Title No. 16212 covering about 81,160 square meters who converted it into a subdivision known as Clemville Subdivision.

Lot 671-A is actually part of a bigger parcel known as Lot 671 which is claimed by respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), which bought said property from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Dela Cruz was adjudged the rightful owner of Lot 671 in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666 [1984]). INK began fencing the whole area and placed the following sign "NO TRESPASSING — IGLESIA NI KRISTO PROPERTY SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984."cralaw virtua1aw library

Briefly, the dela Cruz v. dela Cruz case is an action for reconveyance founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina dela Cruz, Et. Al. against Lucia dela Cruz and INK. Augustina and her co-plaintiffs charged that the parcel of land purchased by the INK from Lucia dela Cruz was actually a part of their inheritance share in the estate of their late grandfather, Policarpio dela Cruz but which, in breach of trust known to the INK, Lucia sold to the latter.

Augustina’s suit was originally decided in her favor by the trial court. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment was reversed and the questioned sale by Lucia dela Cruz to the INK was upheld. Consequently, Augustina went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 61969.

On July 25, 1984, the Court rendered a decision in G. R. No. 61969 affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The validity of the sale of Lucia to the INK was thereby upheld and the title of INK to the subject realty — (Lot 671) was validated as well.

This Supreme Court decision spawned the two (2) petitions now before us assailing the validity of Lucia dela Cruz’s title over Lot 671 which in turn was sold to INK.

In G.R. No. 76265, petitioner Virginia Calalang alleged that she is the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A (subdivision plan — PSD 32221) as evidenced by TCT Nos. 17566, 17564 and 17562. She allegedly came to know of INK’s claim only when a prospective buyer inspected the land on August 1986 and saw the "no trespassing" sign.

Petitioner Calalang lost no time in inquiring into the status of the land and learned about the pending consulta case (LRC 1978) filed before the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta came about when the Register of Deeds doubted the registrability of the documents presented before it in the light of his findings that the land affected was covered by two (2) sets of titles issued in the names of different owners.

On September 9, 1986, the petitioner filed a Motion to Intervene requesting the Administrator to conduct an investigation of the supposed anomaly committed in connection with the reconstitution of TCT No. RT-58 in the name of Lucia dela Cruz. This was denied by the Administrator invoking our ruling in dela Cruz v. dela Cruz to the effect that TCT RT-58 in the name of respondent Lucia dela Cruz is the valid title. (Rollo, pp. 44-47).

Consequently, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by herein petitioner but this was likewise denied by the Administrator on October 20, 1986 on the ground that the issues raised therein have already been passed upon and that the issues being litigious in nature can not be decided in a consulta case "where the only question to be determined is the registrability of the document presented for registration." cralawnad

Hence, on October 27, 1986, the petitioner filed the instant Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 76265 against the Administrator of the NLTDRA, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and private respondents Lucia dela Cruz, Constancio Simangan and Iglesia ni Kristo. Lucia dela Cruz and Constancio Simangan were impleaded as they were predecessors-interest of INK.

INK and the Administrator filed their comments on January 5, 1987 and June 29, 1987 respectively. For failure to locate Constancio Simangan’s whereabouts despite diligent efforts and considering further that INK is the indispensable party and the one interested in upholding the validity of the reconstituted title of respondent Lucia dela Cruz, the petitioner moved to drop him as Respondent. This was granted by the Court in a resolution dated April 13, 1988. (Rollo, p. 189)

Taking the cue from the Administrator that present certificates of title must be cancelled to avoid duplication, the Register of Deeds, instead of filing its comment initiated cancellation proceedings of more than 100 titles against 81 defendants which included herein petitioner on the basis of this Court’s declaration in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz that the reconstituted title of respondent Lucia dela Cruz is the valid title. This petition was filed by the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) on January 5, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-49900.

Consequently, the petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature and maliciously filed with knowledge of the instant petition with this Court. INK, on the other hand filed a Motion to Intervene in said case. Claiming ownership over Lot 671, it prayed for damages against some of the defendants namely Augusto de Leon, Jose M. Panlilio and Felicidad Vda. de Pineda who filed an injunction suit against it (Civil Case No. Q-45767) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on September 12, 1985.

Despite opposition of the petitioner to respondent INK’s Motion to Intervene, presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw granted the motion of INK and denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the issues raised in the instant petition (G. R. No. 76265) will not substantially affect said civil case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration file by the petitioner was likewise denied considering that no restraining order has been issued. (Rollo, pp. 198-216).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

However, instead of filing an answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-49900, the petitioners filed on July 15, 1988 a supplemental petition before this Court to include as additional respondent, the Honorable Judge Benigno T. Dayaw and petitioner’s children who were named as defendants in said Civil Case, as additional petitioners. At the same time the petitioner prayed for a restraining order (Rollo, p. 197).

To this supplemental petition, the OSG in behalf of the Republic filed its comment pursuant to the Court’s resolution granting the petitioner’s motion for leave to include additional parties and to admit supplemental petition (Rollo, p. 228).

In the meantime, fire gutted the records of the Register of Deeds in Quezon City, so respondent Judge required the parties to agree to a stipulation of facts instead of trial.

In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they and/or their predecessors in interest were issued their corresponding titles to the lots purchased from Amando Clemente in the 1950’s yet.

They alleged that they took physical possession of their lots in Clemville Subdivision by actually occupying the same, declaring them in their names for tax purposes, fencing or marking them off and entrusting their care to "katiwalas." From the time they acquired their Torrens Title they and they alone to the exclusion of INK exercised all acts of undisturbed, peaceful and uninterrupted ownership and possession including the payment of their realty taxes.

On or about the second week of August, 1985, INK started to enclose the entire Clemville Subdivision with "sawali" fences with billboards randomly posted which read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

NO TRESPASSING

I.N.C. PROPERTY

SC DECISION

2ND DIVISION

G. R. NO. L. 61969

JULY 25, 1984

INK also destroyed the concrete/hollow block fence surrounding the lot of petitioner de Castro and started the construction of housing structures therein. At the same time, it commenced the delivery of construction materials to the former premises of petitioner Panlilio to erect a permanent structure of strong materials on it.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thus, on August 22, 1985, the petitioners filed with the RTC-Branch 101 a petition for injunction with damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 45767. Later, this petition was amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners.

On August 25, 1985, presiding Judge Santiago issued a restraining order and set the case for hearing the writ for preliminary injunction on September 5, 1985.

The September 5 hearing was however, reset to September 19, 1985 with respondent Eraño Manalo volunteering to maintain the status quo until then or until the matter had been resolved by the trial court.

On September 19, by agreement of the parties and in open court, the Judge issued an order granting the parties motion to enter into a stipulation of facts instead of going on with the hearing and to maintain the status quo.

In the course of the exchange of pleadings between the parties, the trial judge issued an Order on December 6, 1985 denying the petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the exchange of written arguments and the authorities cited, it appears that the petitioners titles which were issued some ten years earlier than that of respondent’s emanated from a reconstituted TCT No. RT-52, which covered portion of Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate of Quezon City. Petitioners’ parcels of land are within that estate. This reconstituted TCT No. RT-52 was the subject of a case, `De la Cruz v. De la Cruz", 130 SCRA 66 [1984], wherein the Honorable Supreme Court declared the said reconstituted title null and void.

"The principal argument of petitioners that they were not parties thereto can not be given serious extended discussion as they could acquire no more rights than the source of their titles. For brevity, at this initial stage, suffice it to say that under the foregoing discussed circumstances, the petitioners have not shown a clear and positive right to a temporary relief." (Emphasis supplied)." (Rollo, p. 35).

Assailing this order, the petitioners by way of certiorari elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08146.

On April 9, 1986, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision with the following dispositive portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and is hereby RESOLVED by setting aside the Order dated December 6, 1985 in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and directing that the application for preliminary injunctive relief therein be properly heard and evidence for or against the same be adduced in due course." (Rollo, p. 39).

On February 12, 1987, respondent INK filed with the lower court a motion to dismiss the petitioners’ complaint for injunction on the ground that it does not state a cause of action.

On August 7, 1987, the lower court issued an Order with the following dispositive portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding respondent’s Motion to Dismiss justified, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against petitioners." (Rollo, p. 48).

Seeking relief from the dismissal, the petitioners filed the two pleadings, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) "Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam" dated September 18, 1987 filed with the RTC, NCR, Branch 101 Quezon City; and

2) "Omnibus Motion Incident to Execution of the Decision dated April 9, 1986" dated September 29, 1987 filed with the Court of Appeals.

On December 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied Petitioners’ Omnibus Motion. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution by the RTC dated May 4, 1988.

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors.

"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ITS DECEMBER 10, 1987 RESOLUTION, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDERS OF DECEMBER 12, 1986 AND AUGUST 7, 1986 RELATE TO INCIDENTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 45767 TOTALLY ALIEN TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 08146."cralaw virtua1aw library

"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN VALIDATING THE ORDER OF AUGUST 7, 1986." (Rollo, p. 16).

In a resolution dated August 30, 1989, G. R. No. 83280 was consolidated with G.R. No. 76265.

Although other minor issues are involved in these consolidated cases, the principal and crucial issue that alone needs to be resolved is the applicability of this Court’s decision in the dela Cruz case to these cases now before us.

The petitioners argue that the dela Cruz case could not be applied to them since they were not parties in that case nor were they ever notified of such case pending between the parties. The petitioners explained that the de la Cruz case was a case among the heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz. Since they acquired their properties from an entirely different person, Amando Clemente and not from any of the heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz, they could not be considered privies to any of them.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In denying applicability, however, the petitioners assail the Court’s ruling that "the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 (TCT No. RT 58) was valid. As the registered and rightful owner, Lucia de la Cruz had the perfect and legal right to sell, assign, and convert the property to respondent INK who as purchaser for value in good faith holds the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate."cralaw virtua1aw library

With this Court’s ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our considered view that the petitioners can not raise anew the question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the de la Cruz case. Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court’s ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot 671 finally disposed of several years ago. This declaration must be respected and followed in the instant case applying the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).

Inevitably, the dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the present petitions since the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before us now (See Rivas v. SEC, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]). Even the petitioners substantially adopt the same findings of facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the history of Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed. We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undisputed facts indicate that the parcel of land in question is Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate, GLRO Rec. No. 5975, with an area of 184, 268 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City; that the totality of the Piedad Estate consists of a vast tract of land, registered on March 12, 1912, in the name of the Philippine Government, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal; that when the Piedad Estate was subdivided (with Lot No. 671 as one of the resulting parcels) whoever was in possession of a particular lot was given priority and/or preference in the acquisition thereof provided that the price and the cost of titling would be paid; that upon such payment, the government would issue the corresponding certificate of title; that Policarpio de la Cruz and his wife Luciana Rafael were originally in possession of the land; that they had three children, namely:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(1) Maximo de la Cruz (married to Feliza Yabut);

(2) Filomeno de la Cruz (married to Narcisa Santiago); and

(3) defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz (a widow);

that the plaintiffs-appellees herein are the descendants of the two sons (Maximo and Filomeno) of Policarpio; that on April 25, 1940, Lot No. 671 was segregated from the totality of the Piedad Estate, covered by OCT No. 614 and a separate title was issued in the name of

‘Eugenia de la Paz, soltera’ and ‘Dorotea de la Cruz, viuda’

(this was Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40355 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal); that on November 29, 1941, a deed of sale over Lot No. 671 was executed by Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz (the registered owners) in favor of defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz; that said deed of sale was registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on July 17, 1943 and the corresponding certificate of title was issued to Lucia de la Cruz; that in 1971, Lucia de la Cruz obtained from the land registration court a reconstituted title (TCT No. RT-59 over Lot No. 671), the transfer certificate of title previously issued to her in 1943 having been lost; that subsequently, Lot No. 671 (this time, already covered by TCT No. RT-58) was subdivided into three (3) lots, each of which was issued a separate title, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Lot No. 671-A containing an area of 30,000 square meters and covered by TCT No. 168320;

(b) Lot No. 671-B, containing an area of 4,268 square meters and covered by TCT No. 168321; and

(c) Lot No. 671-C, containing an area of 150,000 square meters and covered by TCT No. 168322’;

that meanwhile TCT No. 40355 (already previously issued to and in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz) continued to exist; that when the title was transferred from the Rizal Registry to the Quezon City Registry, from the latter Registry assigned to this TCT a new number, RT-52; that this same lot (No. 671) was later subdivided into two lots, each with a title;

(a) Lot No. 671-A (TCT No. 16212)

(b) Lot No. 671-B (TCT No. 16213).

both in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz; that the second lot (lot No. 671-B, with an area of 103,108 square meters) was sold on December 17, 1952 to one Narcisa Vda. de Leon (to whom TCT No. 2009 was later issued); that on May 6, 1964, Narcisa Vda. de Leon transferred the same lot 671-B to Nieves Paz Eraña (who was later issued in her own TCT No. 79971).

The undisputed facts further show that in 1971, Nieves Paz Eraña filed before the Court of First instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-16125 for `quieting of title’ against Lucia de la Cruz, Et Al., praying that TCT No. RT-58. (the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz), as well as all titles derived therefrom, be declared null and void; that the case ended with the parties submitting a compromise agreement with Lucia de la Cruz, among other things, paying plaintiff Eraña the amount of P250,000.00 to cover the acquisitive cost of the 103,108 square meters of land included in the certificate of title of defendant Lucia de la Cruz; that on July 17, 1975, Lucia de la Cruz sold a portion of Lot No. 671-C (one of the three portions to which the lot included in RT-58 had been subdivided, and which portion was covered by TCT No. 168322), consisting of 103,108 square meters to defendant-appellant Iglesia Ni Cristo, for the amount of P2,108,850.00; that this sale was later registered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, with a new title, TCT no. 209554 being issued in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo; that another deed of absolute sale was executed for the remaining 84,356 square meters in favor also of the Iglesia and said sale was annotated on TCT No. 168322. In view of said sales and the fact that registration of the involved parcels is now in the name (separately) of Lucia de la Cruz and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, the present action for reconveyance with damages was instituted." (Emphasis supplied).

Apparently, there is no mention of Amando Clemente in the above recital of facts. A closer perusal of the records in G. R. 76265 would, however, reveal that TCT No. 16212 was issued for Lot 671-A in the name of Amando Clemente on August 9, 1951 per report of the Acting Administrator of the NLTDRA (Rollo, p. 92). Amando Clemente’s TCT No. 16212 emanated from TCT No. 40355 in the name of Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz. Thus, Amando Clemente’s predecessors-in-interest are Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz whom the Court found to have lost their rights over Lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to Lucia dela Cruz.

The Register of Deeds correctly observed that this is a clear case where there is a duplication or overlapping of titles issued to different names over the same land which thereby compelled him to file the consulta case with the NLTDRA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Lucia dela Cruz’s reconstituted title (RT-58) which was divided into 3 lots, Lot 671-A, Lot 671-B and Lot 671-C and was subsequently sold to INK;

(2) Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz’s reconstituted title (RT-52) which was divided into 2 lots, Lot 671-A and Lot 671-B.

Notwithstanding, it is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra, pp. 697-698) This is a finding which can not be disturbed.

"We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest." (Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, supra.)

The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent registration thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253 [1987]; People v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597 [1989]).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of the land sold (Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244 [1989]), Lot 671 was already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as early as 1943. Amando Clemente’s alleged title meanwhile which was issued on August 9, 1951 was very much later. Thus, the petitioners, who merely stepped into the shoes of Amando Clemente cannot claim a better right over said land. "Prior est temporae, prior est in jura" (he who is first in time is preferred in right) (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380 [1980]). The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a certificate of title does not necessarily make him the true owner. And not being the owner, he cannot transmit any right to nor transfer any title or interest over the land conveyed (Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario de Molo v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 459 [1985]; Treasurer of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 359 [1987]).

Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which the court held to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established that in rem proceedings such as land registration constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners cannot now claim that they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said lot. Under the facts of the case, the title in the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58) has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

Likewise, the INK was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 [1990]) It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK’s title over Lot 671 at this time.

The petitioners also contend that what INK purchased from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975 was Lot 671-C-4 LRC 322534 which corresponds roughly to Lot 671-B (Psd-32221) and did not affect Lot 671-A of Amando Clemente at all. This is, however, belied by the fact that the sale made by Dorotea dela Cruz to Lucia dela Cruz (as indicated in Entry No. 258) was Lot 671 which was later on conveyed to INK.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In challenging the validity of the reconstitution of Lucia dela Cruz’s title, the petitioners are now alleging fraud, collusion and illegality in the procurement of the certificate of title of Lucia dela Cruz. It must be recalled that G. R. No. 76265 stemmed merely from a consulta case with the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration. Undeniably, the arguments and issues raised by the petitioner require adjudication of facts which, under the circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to do as this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the present petition is not the proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since the judicial action required is a direct and not a collateral attack. (Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 [1989]). The Court had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We note with approval the lower court’s patient explanation that, inter alia, the certificate of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for review of the decree must be presented within one year after its entry as described and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings . . .

"Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be challenged, the present case does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is a direct, and not a collateral attack. In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." (at p. 542).

In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try to convince us to look or inquire into the validity of the reconstitution proceedings initiated by Lucia dela Cruz, contending that the implementation of dela Cruz ruling would deprive them of their properties without due process of law. We have looked long and hard into the records of the case but the facts and circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on the matter do not warrant such action from the Court. INK’s title over Lot 671 which necessarily included Lot 671-A had already become incontrovertible and indefeasible. To reopen or to question the legality of INK’s title would defeat the purpose of our Torrens system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and putting to a stop forever any question of the legality of the registration in the certificate or questions which may arise therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK, as registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and the maintenance of the integrity and stability of the Torrens system of land registration that all transfer certificates of title derived from the reconstituted title of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz be annulled in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which are null and void. The legality or validity of INK’s title over Lot 671 has been settled. The Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]).

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. Nos. 76265 and 83280 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.