FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 9291. March 2, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CAMILA CUNANAN, Defendant-Appellant.
John Haussermann for Appellant.
Solicitor-Generator Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE; TREACHERY. — The circumstance of treachery in connection with the crime of frustrated parricide is a generic aggravating circumstance and not a qualifying circumstance.
D E C I S I O N
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant, Camila Cunanan, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, condemning her to fifteen years imprisonment in Bilibid, to indemnify the injured party, and to pay the costs of the case, for the crime of frustrated parricide.
The evidence of record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged. The penalty imposed is not in accordance with the law and the facts in the case. The information charges that the crime was committed with treachery. Treachery not being an element of the crime of frustrated parricide it must be taken as a generic aggravating circumstance. (U. S. v. Villanueva, 2 Phil. Rep., 61.) There being no extenuating circumstance the maximum degree of the penalty must be imposed in accordance with articles 65 and 95 of the Penal Code.
The judgment is therefore modified by substituting seventeen years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, for the fifteen years imposed by the court. The appellant is also condemned to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law. In all respects the judgment is affirmed.
Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.
The evidence of record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged. The penalty imposed is not in accordance with the law and the facts in the case. The information charges that the crime was committed with treachery. Treachery not being an element of the crime of frustrated parricide it must be taken as a generic aggravating circumstance. (U. S. v. Villanueva, 2 Phil. Rep., 61.) There being no extenuating circumstance the maximum degree of the penalty must be imposed in accordance with articles 65 and 95 of the Penal Code.
The judgment is therefore modified by substituting seventeen years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, for the fifteen years imposed by the court. The appellant is also condemned to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law. In all respects the judgment is affirmed.
Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.
