1. EMINENT DOMAIN; VIEW BY THE COMMISSIONERS; ITS PURPOSE AND EFFECT. — The view of the premises made by the commissioners is for the purpose of better enabling them to determine upon the weight of conflicting evidence. Being disinterested land owners, selected for their ability to arrive at a judicious decision in the assessment of damages, and being allowed to view the property, their report is entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary trier of facts.

2. ID.; COMPENSATION; ESTIMATE OF VALUE CONFINED TO EVIDENCE OF RECORD. — Notwithstanding the respect due the report of the commissioners, their valuation of the property must be supported by competent evidence of record, and in those cases where the evidence as to value and damages is conflicting, they should always set forth in full their reasons for accepting certain evidence, especially in those cases where a view of the premises has been made.

3. ID.; ID.; REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS; POWER OF COURT TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF VALUE. — A Court of First Instance or, on appeal under sections 496 and 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of value as gathered from the record submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award; provided always that the evidence be clear and convincing and the amount allowed by the commissioners is grossly inadequate or excessive.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court and of courts of other jurisdictions having similar procedure reviewed and found to support the power of the court to thus modify the report of the commissioners.

5. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF SALES OF NEARBY LAND; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. — Evidence of bona fide sales of other nearby parcels is competent if the character of such parcels, as sites for business purposes, dwellings, or for whatever use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned land, is sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably assumed that the price of the condemned land would be approximately near the price paid for the parcels sold. But to be admissible, the property thus sold must be in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in the zone of commercial activity with which the condemned property is identified. The sales must also be sufficiently near in point of time with the date of the condemnation proceedings to exclude general increases or decreases in property values due to changed commercial conditions in the vicinity, and must be made by one who is desirous but not obliged to sell, and to one who is desirous but not obliged to buy.

6. ID.; JUST COMPENSATION. — "Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. The word "just" is used merely to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. ID.; ID.; MARKET VALUE. — The market value of the condemned land is all that the owner is entitled to. Evidence that the locality may become a business or choice residential district, when its history over a period of years shows that there are large tracts of agricultural land in the vicinity, including the condemned land, which have never been appropriated for any of those purposes, does not justify appraising such land at figures which it would be worth if such development were an actual fact. Such evidence amounts to a mere expectancy, the market value of which is comparatively insignificant.

8. ID.; IMPROVEMENTS UNDERTAKEN WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS ARE CONTEMPLATED. — The owner of property cannot be divested of his title until compensation is made or security given. Act NO. 1258 as amended affords a method whereby a railroad company may, by the exercise of due diligence, protect itself from the payment of damages for such improvements; and until it takes a decisive step towards appropriating the land, the owner cannot be estopped from claiming damages for such improvements.

This action was instituted by the Manila Railroad Company for the purpose of expropriating twelve small parcels of land for a railroad station site at Lucena, Province of Tayabas.

The original defendants were Romana Velasquez, Melecio Allarey, and Deogracias Maligalig. After the filing of the complaint Simeon Perez, Filemon Perez, and Francisco Ino, having bought Romana Velasquez’ interest, were included as defendants. The commissioners fixed the value of the twelve parcels at P81,412.75, and awarded P600 to Simeon Perez as damages for the removal of an uncompleted camarin. Upon hearing, the commissioners’ report was approved and the plaintiff directed to pay to the "Tayabas Land Company" the total amount awarded, with interest and costs. The plaintiff company alleges that that amount is grossly excessive, pointing out that the land has never been used except for rice culture.

Upon this appeal we are asked to review the evidence and reduce the appraised value of the condemned land in accordance with our findings rendering judgment accordingly. Has this court, under the law, authority to take such action? And along with this question it must be decided whether the Courts of First Instance have such power over the reports of commissioners. Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Action of Court Upon Commissioners’ Report. — Upon the filing of such report in court, the court shall, upon hearing, accept the same and render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part, and may make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall require payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section, before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the public use."cralaw virtua1aw library

From this section it clearly appears that the report of the commissioners on the value of the condemned land is not final. The judgment of the court is necessary to give effect to their estimated valuation. (Crawford v. Valley R. R. Co., 25 Grat., 467.) Nor is the report of the commissioners conclusive, under any circumstances, so that the judgment of the court is a mere detail or formality requisite to the proceedings. The judgment of the court on the question of the value of the land sought to be condemned is rendered after a consideration of the evidence submitted to the commissioners, their report, and the exceptions thereto submitted upon the hearing of the report. By this judgment the court may accept the commissioners’ report unreservedly; it may return the report for additional facts; or it may set the report aside and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part or reject it in part, and "make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken." Any one of these methods of disposing of the report is available to and may be adopted by the court according as they are deemed suited to secure to the plaintiff the necessary property and to the defendant just compensation therefor. But can the latter method produce a different result in reference to any part of the report from that recommended by the commissioner?

Section 246 expressly authorizes the court to "accept the report in part and reject it in part." If this phrase stood alone, it might be said that the court is only empowered to accept as a whole certain parts of the report and reject as a whole other parts. That is, if the commissioners fixed the value of the land taken at P5,000, the improvements at P1,000, and the consequential damages at P500, the court could accept the report in full as to any one item and reject it as to any other item, but could not accept or reject a part of the report in such a way as to change any one of the amounts. But the court is also empowered "to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken." The court is thereby expressly authorized to issue such orders and render such judgment as will produce these results. If individual items which make up the total amount of the award in the commissioners’ report could only be accepted or rejected in their entirety, it would be necessary to return the case, so far as the rejected portions of the report were concerned, for further consideration before the same or new commissioners, and the court could not make a "final order and judgment" in the cause until the rejected portions of the report had been rereported to it. Thus, in order to give the quotation from 246 its proper meaning, it is obvious that the court may, in its discretion correct the commissioners’ report in any manner deemed suitable to the occasion so that final judgment may be rendered and thus end the litigation. The "final order and judgment" are reviewable by this court by means of a bill of exceptions in the same way as any other "action." Section 496 provides that the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, or modify any final judgment, order, or decree of the Court of First Instance, and section 497, as amended by Act No. 1596, provides that if the excepting party filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for a new trial upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision and the judge overruled such motion and due exception was taken to his ruling, the Supreme Court may review the evidence and make such findings upon the facts by a preponderance of the evidence and render such final judgment as justice and equity may require. So it is clear from these provisions that this court, in those cases where the right of eminent domain has been exercised and where the provisions of the above section have been complied with, may examine the testimony and decide the case by a preponderance of the evidence; or, in other words, retry the case upon the merits and render such order or judgment as justice and equity may require. The result is that, in our opinion, there is ample authority in the statute to authorize the courts to change or modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or decreasing the amount of the award, if the facts of the case will justify such change or modification. As it has been suggested that this conclusion is in conflict with some of the former holdings of this court upon the same question, it might be well to briefly review the decisions to ascertain whether or not, as a matter of fact, such conflict exists.

In City of Manila v. Tuason (R. G. No. 3367, decided March 23, 1907, unreported), the Court of First Instance modified the report of the commissioners as to some of the items and confirmed it as to others. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause, apparently for the reason that the evidence taken by the commissioners and the lower court was not before it, and perhaps also because the commissioners adopted a wrong principle of assessing damages.

In Manila Railway Co. v. Fabie (17 Phil. Rep., 206) the majority report of the commissioners appraised the land at P56,337.18, while a dissenting commissioner estimated it at P27,415.92. The Court of First Instance, after taking additional evidence upon the consequential benefits to the remainder of defendants’ land by the construction of the railroad, and also as to the rental value of various pieces of land in the locality, fixed the value of the land at the sum estimated by the dissenting commissioner. The defendants appealed to this court. This court remarked that the only evidence tending to support the majority report of the commissioners consisted of deeds of transfer of real estate between parties in that community showing the prices paid by the vendees in such conveyances. It was held that without its being shown that such transfers had been made in the ordinary course of business and competition, and that the parties therein stated were not fictitious, such deeds were incompetent as evidence of the value of the condemned land. As to the action of the court in fixing the price of the land at P27,415.92, the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Conceding, without deciding, that he also had the right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question, nevertheless, if he formulate such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence. The difficulty with the case is that it affirmatively appears from the record on appeal that there is an entire absence of competent evidence to support the finding either of the commissioners or of the court, even if the court had a right to make a finding of his own at all under the circumstances."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General (22 Phil. Rep., 192) the only question raised was the value of certain improvements on the condemned portion of a hacienda, such improvements consisting mainly of plants and trees and belonging to a lessee of the premises. The total damages claimed were P24,126.50. The majority report of the commission allowed P19,478, which amount was reduced by the Court of First Instance to P16,778. The plaintiff company, upon appeal to this court, alleged that the damages allowed were grossly excessive and that the amount allowed by the commissioners should have been reduced by at least P17,000; while the defendant urged that the damages as shown by the record were much greater than those allowed, either by the commissioners or by the court. In disposing of the case this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The only ground upon which the plaintiff company bases its contention that the valuations are excessive is the minority report of one of the commissioners. The values assigned to some of the improvements may be excessive but we are not prepared to say that such is the case. Certainly there is no evidence in the record which would justify us in holding these values to be grossly excessive. The commissioners in their report go into rather minute detail as to the reasons for the conclusions reached and the valuations fixed for the various items included therein. There was sufficient evidence before the commissioners to support the valuations fixed by them except only those later modified by the court below. The trial court was of opinion that the price of P2 each which was fixed for the orange trees (naranjitos) was excessive, and this was reduced to P1.50 for each tree; this on the ground that the evidence discloses that these trees were comparatively young at the time of the expropriation, and that the value fixed by the majority report of the commissioners was that of full-grown or nearly full-grown trees. We are of opinion that this reduction was just and reasonable. Aside from the evidence taken into consideration by the trial judge we find no evidence in the record in support of the contention of the railroad plaintiff that the valuations fixed in the majority report of the commissioners and by the trial court are grossly excessive, and plaintiff company having wholly failed to offer evidence in support of its allegations in this regard when the opportunity so to do was provided in accordance with law, it has no standing in this court to demand a new trial based on its unsupported allegations of grossly excessive valuation of the property by the commissioners and the court below."cralaw virtua1aw library

This court affirmed the finding of damages made by the trial court with the exception of an item for damages caused by fire to improvements on lands adjoining those condemned, which was held not to be a proper matter to be considered in condemnation proceedings. The court here approved of the action of the Court of First Instance in reducing the amount of damages fixed by the commissioners as to the value of the young orange trees on the strength of the evidence of record.

In Manila Railroad Company v. Caligsihan (R. G. No. 7932, decided March 25, 1913, unreported), it appears that the lower court approved in toto the report of the commissioners. On appeal, this Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded the case with orders to appoint new commissioners, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Under the evidence in this case the award is excessive. Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure giving to the court the power to ’make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the party the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken,’ we exercise that right in this case for the purpose of preventing the defendants from obtaining that which would be more than ’just compensation’ under all the evidence of the case.

"The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the lower court to appoint a new commission and to proceed from that point de novo."cralaw virtua1aw library

We will now examine the case (Philippine Railway Co. v. Solon, 13 Phil. Rep., 34) relied upon to support the proposition that the courts should not interfere with the report of the commissioners to correct the amount of damages except in cases of gross error, showing prejudice or corruption.

In that case the property belonging to the appellant which the company sought to appropriate was his interest as tenant in a tract of land belonging to the Government, together with a house standing thereon and other property belonging to him. He asked that he be awarded for all the property taken P19,398.42. The commissioners allowed him P10,745.25. At the hearing had upon the report, the court reduced this amount and allowed the appellant P9,637.75. The commissioners took a large amount of evidence relative to the amount of damages. The testimony was conflicting as to the value of the house, two witnesses fixing it at over P12,000; another at over P14,000; one at P8,750; another at P6,250; and another at P7,050.95. The commissioners fixed the value of the house alone at P9,500, and the court at P8,792.50. This court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nor do we decide whether, in a case where the damages awarded by the commissioners are grossly excessive or grossly insufficient, the court can, upon the same evidence presented before the commissioners, itself change the award. We restrict ourselves to deciding the precise question presented by this case, in which it is apparent that, in the opinion of the court below, the damages were not grossly excessive, for its own allowance was only P1,000 less than the amount allowed by the commissioners, and the question is whether in such a case the court can substitute its own opinion upon the evidence presented before the commissioners for the opinion which the commissioners themselves formed, not only from that evidence but also from a view of the premises which by law they were required to make."cralaw virtua1aw library

Referring to the manner in which the trial court arrived at its valuation of the various items, including the house, this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Without considering the correctness of the rule adopted by the court for determining the value of the property it is sufficient to say that the evidence before the commissioners as to the value of the property taken was contradictory and that their award was not palpably excessive or inadequate. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the court had no right to interfere with it."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the foregoing it is clear that (1) the testimony was conflicting; (2) that the award as allowed by the commissioners was well within the amounts fixed by the witnesses; and (3) that the award was not grossly excessive. That it was not grossly excessive is shown by the difference between the amount fixed by the commissioners and that fixed by the court, this difference being P1,117.50, a reduction of a little over 10 per cent.

In City of Manila v. Estrada (25 Phil. Rep., 208), the city sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements for use in connection with a public market. The commissioners, after viewing the premises and receiving evidence, being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court. In the majority report the value of the land was fixed at P20 per square meter and in the minority report at P10. The Court of First Instance fixed the value at P15 per square meter. Upon appeal this court, after re- viewing the evidence, held that P10 per square meter was a just compensation for the land taken and rendered judgment accordingly, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to the questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just compensation for the land taken."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the above review of the cases it will be seen that this court has not only not decided that the courts cannot interfere with the report of the commissioners unless prejudice or fraud has been shown, but the decisions, aside from the case of the City of Manila v. Estrada, tend to show the contrary; that is, an award which is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient in the opinion of the court can be increased or decreased, although there be nothing which tends to indicate prejudice or fraud on the part of the commissioners. The case of the City of Manila v. Estrada is direct authority supporting the conclusions which we have reached in the case at bar. And we are not without authority outside of this jurisdiction which supports the view we have taken in the case under consideration. In Morgan’s Louisiana & Texas R. R. Co. v. Barton (51 La. Ann., 1338), the court, in considering a procedural law similar to our own, stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the question of the value of the land, 8.34 acres, the commissioners have allowed $2,500, or $300 per acre. The defendant has put in the record the testimony of witnesses claimed to support the allowance. Without disregarding this testimony, it is sufficient to say that the opinions of the witnesses do not seem to be based on any fact calculated to show the value of the land. . . . On the other hand the plaintiff has placed before us the titles of defendant of recent date showing the price paid by him (the defendant) for the entire body of land of which the 8 acres are part; the acts of sale of land in the same neighborhood, and of the same quality; the assessment of defendant’s property, and other testimony on this issue of value. . . . Giving all possible weight, or rather restricting the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses to its due influence, and giving, we think, necessary effect to the acts by which defendant purchased, the acts of sale of other land, the assessment of value, with due allowance for under assessment, and the other testimony of record, we reach the conclusion that the award gives two-thirds more than the value of the land. We fix the value of the land at $833.33."cralaw virtua1aw library

See also T. & P. R. R. Co. v. Southern Develop. Co. (52 La. Ann., 535), where the court held the appraisement too low and after discussing the evidence, increased the amount of the award accordingly. A similar case is Abney v. Railroad Co. (105 La., 446). See also T. & P. R. R. Co. v. Wilson (108 La., 1; 32 So., 173); and Louisiana Western R. Co. v. Crossman’s Heirs (111 La., 611; 35 So., 784), where the point is touched upon.

In Missouri the statute (1 Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 1268) directs that "the court shall make such order therein as right and justice may require, and may order a new appraisement, upon good cause shown." Owing to a constitutional restriction, this provision has been construed to apply only to damages and benefits resulting to land owners in consequence of proposed improvements, the cash value of property expropriated being an issue triable, at the instance of either party by a jury subsequent to the findings of the commissioners. Subject to this restriction, however, it has been held that the above provision of law gives the court the right to increase or decrease the amount awarded by the commissioners. In the late case of Tarkio Drainage District v. Richardson (237 Mo., 49), the court presents a lengthy review of its decisions on this subject.

The question now arises, when may the courts, with propriety, overrule the award of the commissioners in whole or in part, and substitute their own valuation of the condemned property? We shall consider this question in two ways: first, as one of procedure under section 246, above quoted; and second, as to the evidence which must appear in the record in order to justify such action.

From a mere reading of section 246 and the remarks just made, it should be clear that the court is permitted to act upon the commissioners’ report in one of several ways, at its own discretion. The whole duty of the court in considering the commissioners’ report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its duty in this respect the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case may require. But generally speaking, when the commissioners’ report cannot with justice be approved by the court, one of three or four circumstances will usually present itself, each of which has for its antidote one of the methods of dealing with the report placed at the disposal of the court by section 246. Thus, if it be successfully established that the commissioners refused to hear competent evidence material to the case, then all the evidence in the case would not be before the court. The court could not, with reason, attempt to either approve or change the report, as it stood, for the reason that all the evidence of the case would not have been considered by the commissioners nor have been presented to the court; and the remedy would be to "recommit the report of the commissioners for further report of facts." Again, if improper conduct, fraud, or prejudice be charged against the commissioners and this charge be sustained it would be safer to set aside the award thus vitiated and "appoint new commissioners" who could render a report not tainted by these things. But when the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award, then, in such a case, if the evidence be clear and convincing, the court should ordinarily be able, by the use of those correct legal principles which govern the case, to determine upon the amount which should be awarded without returning the report to the commissioners. When the matter stands in this light, it becomes the duty of the court to make "final order and judgment" in which the proper award will be made and thus end the litigation between the parties.

Now, what evidence as to value must the record contain in order to justify the court in disregarding the valuation fixed upon the condemned property by the commissioners and substituting therefor its own finding of value? It is almost a universal practice in the United States to submit the question of value in expropriation cases to a jury or commission, usually of local property owners, and one of the things they are specially instructed to do is to view or inspect the condemned property. The purpose of this view and the additional weight which should be given to the award of the appraisers because of the view are questions often discussed. After a careful examination of a number of adjudicated cases, we have concluded that the following cases, all agreeing in principle, correctly state the purpose of the view.

In Denver Co. v. Howe (49 Colo., 256; 112 P., 779), it was said: "The jury viewed the premises and were better able to judge of the number of acres in each, as well as other conditions affecting the land. The facts ascertained by the view of the premises are not in the record, whether they were regarded as so much additional evidence, or were used to better understand and apply the evidence adduced at the trial. Keeping in view the evidence relating to the special value of the building site, the value of improvements and of the ground, it will be found that the verdict is within and supported by the values as testified to, and these values, as fixed by the several witnesses, represented to each the market value, as conceded by appellants. The verdict is supported by the evidence of market value and on that ground would have to be sustained if the matter complained of in the instruction had been entirely omitted."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Gorgas v. Railroad Co. (114 Pa., 1; 22 Atl., 715), it was said: "A view may sometimes be of the highest importance, where there is a conflict of testimony. It may enable the jurors to see on which side the truth lies. And if the witnesses on the one side or the other have testified to a state of facts which exists only in their imagination, as to the location of the property, the manner in which it is cut by the road, the character of the improvements, or any other physical fact bearing upon the case, they surely cannot be expected to ignore the evidence of their senses and give weight to testimony which their view shows to be false. . . . The true rule in such cases is believed to be that the jury in estimating the damages shall consider the testimony as given by the witnesses, in connection with the facts as they appear upon the view; and upon the whole case, as thus presented, ascertain the difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the land was taken. This difference is the proper measure of damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Close v. Samm (27 Iowa, 503), subsequently approved in Guinn v. Railway Co. (131 Iowa, 680, 683; 109 N. W., 209), it was said: "The question then arises as to the purposes and intent of this statute. It seems to us that it was to enable the jury, by the view of the premises or place to better understand and comprehend the testimony of the witnesses respecting the same, and thereby the more intelligently to apply the testimony to the issues on trial before them, and not to make them silent witnesses in the case, burdened with testimony unknown to both parties, and in respect to which no opportunity for cross-examination or correction of error, if any, could be afforded either party. If they are thus permitted to include their personal examination, how could a court ever properly set aside their verdict as being against the evidence, or even refuse to set it aside without knowing the facts ascertained by such personal examination by the jury? It is a general rule certainly, if not universal, that the jury must base their verdict upon the evidence delivered to them in open court, and they may not take into consideration facts known to them personally, but outside of the evidence produced before them in court. If a party would avail himself of the facts known to a juror. he must have him sworn and examined as other witnesses."cralaw virtua1aw library

In C. K. & W. R. Co. v. Mouriquand (45 Kan., 170), the court approved of the practice of instructing the jury that their view of the premises was to be used in deter-mining the value of conflicting testimony, saying: "Had the jury disregarded all the sworn evidence, and returned a verdict upon their own view of the premises, then it might be said that the evidence which the jurors acquired from making the view had been elevated to the character of exclusive and predominating evidence. This is not allowable. The evidence of the witnesses introduced in the court on the part of the landowner supports fully the verdict. If the verdict was not supported by substantial testimony given by witnesses sworn upon the trial, we would set it aside, but as the jury only took into consideration the result of their view of the premises, in connection with the sworn evidence produced before them, to determine between conflicting evidence, the instruction was not so erroneous as to require a new trial."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Peyton (124 Ga., 746; 52 S. E., 803; 3 L. R. A., N. S., 333), it was said: "A jury cannot be left to roam without any evidence in the ascertainment and assessment of damages. The damages which the law allows to be assessed in favor of a landowner whose property has been taken or damaged under the right of eminent domain are purely compensatory. The land actually appropriated by the telegraph company amounted to only a fraction of an acre; and while it appeared that the construction and maintenance of the telegraph line would cause consequential damages to the plaintiff, no proof was offered from which any fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages thereby sustained could be made. The jury should have been supplied with the data necessary in arriving at such an estimate. In the absence of this essential proof, a verdict many times in excess of the highest proved value of the land actually taken must necessarily be deemed excessive. Judgment reversed."cralaw virtua1aw library

In New York, where the question has doubtless been raised more often than anywhere else, the late cases illustrate the rule, perhaps the most clearly. The appellate division, supreme court, in In re Titus Street in City of New York (123 N. Y. S., 1018), where it appeared that the city’s witnesses testified that the property was worth $9,531 and the commissioners awarded $2,000 less, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We do not think that this is meeting the requirements of the law; we do not believe that it is within the province of commissioners to arbitrarily set up their own opinion against that of the witnesses called by the city, and to ward damages largely below the figure to which the moving party is committed, without something appearing in the record to justify such action. When a party comes into court and makes an admission against his interest, no court or judicial tribunal is justified in assuming that the admission is not true without at least pointing out the reason for discrediting it; it carries with it the presumption of truth, and this presumption is not to be overcome by the mere fact that the commissioners might themselves have reached a different conclusion upon the viewing of the premises. . . . This view of the commissioners, it seems to us, is for the purpose of enabling the commissioners to give proper weight and effect to the evidence before them, and it might justify them in giving larger damages than some of the witnesses thought proper, or even less than some of them declared to be sustained, but where the evidence produced by the moving party in a proceeding for taking property for public purposes fixes a sum, without any disagreement in the testimony on that side, we are of the opinion that the cases do not justify a holding that the commissioners are authorized to ignore such testimony and to substitute their own opinion, in such a manner as to preclude the supreme court from reviewing the determination. That is not in harmony with that due process of law which is always demanded where rights of property are involved, and would make it possible for a corrupt commission to entirely disregard the rights of the individual to the undisturbed enjoyment of his property, or its equivalent."cralaw virtua1aw library

From these authorities and keeping in mind the local law on the subject, we think the correct rule to be that, if the testimony of value and damages is conflicting, the commissioners may resort to their knowledge of the elements which affect the assessment and which were obtained from a view of the premises, in order to determine the relative weight of conflicting testimony, but their award must be supported by the evidence adduced at their hearings and made of record, or it cannot stand; or, in other words, the view is intended solely for the purpose of better understanding the evidence submitted. To allow the commissioners to make up their judgment on their own individual knowledge of disputed facts material to the case, or upon their private opinions, would be most dangerous and unjust. It would deprive the losing party of the right of cross-examination and the benefit of all the tests of credibility which the law affords. It would make each commissioner the absolute judge of the accuracy and value of his own knowledge or opinions and compel the court to affirm the report on the facts when all of such facts were not before it. The evidence of such knowledge or of the grounds of such opinions could not be preserved in a bill of exceptions or questioned upon appeal. It is no hardship upon any of the parties to require that the award must be based upon the evidence. It is the duty of each party to submit what evidence of value he has and if he fails to do so he can not complain if the appraisement is kept within the bounds of the evidence presented to the commissioners.

In those cases where the testimony as to value and damages is conflicting the commissioners should always set forth in full their reasons for accepting the testimony of certain witnesses and rejecting that of others, especially in those cases where a view of the premises has been made.

The commissioners are required by law to be disinterested landowners of the province, selected by the court with a view to their ability to arrive at a judicious decision in the assessment of damages. The judgment of men with these qualifications upon the price of real property is entitled to some considerable weight. Being local men, it may be assumed that they are familiar with the local land values, the needs of the community in that line, and the adaptability of particular sites to commercial purposes. Then, too, their view of the premises enables commissioners to better understand the evidence submitted to them, as we have said above. The declarations o