G.R. No. 138777 - JOY G. TAN v. SALIC B. DUMARPA
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 138777 : September 22, 2004]
JOY G. TAN, Petitioner, v. SALIC B. DUMARPA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often admonished courts to be liberal as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to petitioner and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which petitioner asks that it be set aside.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 assailing the Judgment by Default3 dated January 28, 1999 and the Order4 dated May 3, 1999, both rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No. 1474-97, "Salic B. Dumarpa v. Joy Tan, doing business under the name and style of Casa Blanca Restaurant."
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On May 30, 1995, Prosecutor Ortillano D. Tan and other prosecutors of Region XII filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao a criminal complaint for malversation of public funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 30195 against then Regional State Prosecutor Salic B. Dumarpa, respondent herein, docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-95-0506.
The complaint alleges that sometime in October 1992, Prosecutor Tan engaged the services of Joy G. Tan, petitioner, as caterer for the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program seminar conducted on October 16, 1992 at Marawi City. After the seminar, Prosecutor Tan paid petitioner, through Wilfredo C. Sotto, P11,632.00 in cash and P10,000.00 in PNB Check No. 33060 for her catering services. In turn, petitioner issued to Tan the corresponding receipt dated October 16, 1992 (cash invoice no. 10931). Later, Prosecutor Tan found that Regional Prosecutor Dumarpa, respondent, to cover his cash advance of P30,000.00 from the Department of Justice, obtained surreptitiously from petitioner another receipt (cash invoice no. 10887) showing his payment for the latter's catering services for two seminars conducted purportedly in Cotabato City and Marawi City. In support of the above criminal complaint were affidavits of petitioner and Wilfredo C. Sotto.
Meantime, petitioner's affidavit denouncing respondent for malversation of government funds was published in the Manila Standard, Manila Times, Bandera, and other newspapers of general circulation. Respondent claimed that such malicious publication discredited his honor and reputation. Thus, he filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marawi City a criminal complaint for libel against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. 97D-0110. The City Prosecutor found probable cause and recommended that petitioner be charged with libel in court. Respondent also filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Marawi City Civil Case No. 1474-97 against her for damages with prayer for issuance of a writ of attachment.
Subsequently, petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 1474-97 her answer with motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. She alleged that her affidavit against respondent was executed in good faith and without malice. Being merely a supporting affidavit to a criminal complaint for malversation filed by Prosecutor Tan against respondent, the same is absolutely privileged and, therefore, not actionable.
On March 26, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint and set the pre-trial conference on July 30, 1998. But during the pre-trial, petitioner and counsel did not appear. According to the trial court, they were duly notified. Thus, petitioner was declared as in default and respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. After he rested his case, the trial court rendered the assailed Judgment by Default dated January 28, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"The plaintiff, having proven his claim preponderantly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Salic B. Dumarpa and against defendant Joy Tan, ordering said defendant:
1. To pay unto plaintiff Salic Dumarpa the sum of Seven Hundred Thousand (
P700,000.00) Pesos as actual and compensatory damages;2. To pay unto plaintiff the sum of One Million (
P1,000,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; and the further sum ofP100,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.SO ORDERED."
On February 26, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Judgment by Default on the ground that her counsel did not receive a copy of the Order denying her motion to dismiss and setting the pre-trial conference on July 30, 1998. On March 11, 1999, respondent filed a motion for execution and opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On May 3, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving petitioner's motion for reconsideration and respondent's motion for execution. In this Order, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that it does not allege specifically the findings of fact which are not supported by evidence or conclusion contrary to law. The trial court then ruled that the motion is pro forma and does not toll the running of the period to appeal. Thus, the Judgment by Default has become final and executory. The trial court then granted respondent's motion for execution.
Hence, petitioner, on June 1, 1999, directly filed with this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing -
"1. THE PROPRIETY OF FILING RESPONDENT'S CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (BASED ON AN ALLEGED LIBELOUS ACT COMMITTED BY PETITIONER WHEN SHE EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR) EVEN BEFORE THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL.
"2. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW ON PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION ON PETITIONER'S AFFIDAVIT."
Respondent, in his comment, contends that the instant petition should be denied, not being the proper remedy.
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,6 we held:
"The remedies available to a defendant declared in default are as follows: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to."
Here, petitioner came to know of the Judgment by Default after it was promulgated by the trial court while appeal was still available. In fact, she filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, what she should have done pursuant to the Rules, was to file with the trial court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal7 with the Court of Appeals. Instead, she came directly to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari .
However, in the interest of justice, we consider the instant petition, pro hac vice, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It appears prima faciefrom petitioner's allegations that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Judgment by Default. If such allegations are true and the trial court's fatal error remains uncorrected, then petitioner will suffer great injustice.
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.8
In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz,9 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better."
In fact, "procedural rules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It is far better to dispose of the case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case that may result in injustice."10
In Paras v. Baldado11 and Alberto v. Court of Appeals,12 we ruled that "(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. x x x (T)he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
We thus resolve the basic issue of whether or not the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Judgment by Default.
It may be recalled that in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Judgment by Default, the trial court held that petitioner failed to specify (a) its findings not supported by evidence and (b) its erroneous conclusion of law. Actually, the issue being raised by petitioner in her motion is that she and her counsel were not duly notified of the pre-trial on July 30, 1998. But the trial court did not resolve this issue and denied outright petitioner's motion.
Had the trial court set the motion for hearing and gave petitioner a chance to prove her allegation, it could have determined whether she was indeed notified or not of the pre-trial set on July 30, 1998. Then the trial court could have resolved whether or not to reconsider the Judgment by Default.
Verily, by denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the wrong ground that it is pro forma and by declaring her as in default and allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte, the trial court deprived petitioner of her right to due process, i.e., the fundamental rule that a person be accorded an opportunity to be heard.13 To allow a trial to proceed against petitioner who could not present her defenses apparently for lack of notice, is a denial of her right to be heard, our most basic understanding of due process. We stress that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling, such as the trial court's Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and its Judgment by Default. The trial court denied petitioner this opportunity.
We, therefore, hold that the said Order and Judgment by Default are tainted with a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. Clearly, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition, considered as one for certiorari , is GRANTED. The Judgment by Default dated January 28, 1999 and the Order dated May 3, 1999 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur is ordered to hear Civil Case No. 1474-97 on the merits with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 See Diaz v. Diaz, G.R. No. 135885, April 28, 2000, 331 SCRA 302, 322-323, citing Gerales v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 638 (1993) and Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 161 SCRA 45 (1988).
2 Pursuant to Section 2 (c), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. - x x x
x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari . - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari in accordance with Rule 45."
3 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo at 28-34.
4 Annex "H", id. at 13-14.
5 Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
6 G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 367, 379, citing Lina v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637 (1985).
7 See Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 243, 252.
8Coronel v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 149022, April 8, 2003 at 9, citing People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58 (1997).
9 G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 113, 120, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 243 (1998).
10AFP Mutual Benefit Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126745, July 26, 1999, 311 SCRA 143, 157, citing Udan v. Amon, 23 SCRA 837 (1968) and Medrano & Associates, Inc. v. Roxas & Co., 183 SCRA 580 (1990).
11 G.R. No. 140713, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 141, 145.
12 G.R. No. 119088, June 30, 2000, 334 SCRA 756.
13City Government of Makati City v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131392, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 248.
