SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-00-1361 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-319-P), July 29, 2005]
JEANIFER BUENVIAJE AND BLESILDA RECUENCO, Complainants, v. ARTURO ANATALIO, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC) OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 58, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On July 26, 2000, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pasig for investigation, report and recommendation.5
- this instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter; and
- respondent Deputy Sheriff Arturo Anatalio be REPRIMANDED for failure to observe the rules and regulations regarding the enforcement of orders issued by the court with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more SEVERELY.4
. . . Since the writ was received by Respondent Sheriff on April 23, 1997, he had sixty (60) days, or up to June 23, 1997, within which to implement the same. However, the record shows that he was able to do so only on June 30, 1997. The fact that Respondent Sheriff was not able to implement the writ due to extensions requested by the Complainants does not justify his actions. His admission that he implemented the writ only on June 30, 1997 is proof of his not having complied with the rules then regarding the enforcement of a writ. Respondent Sheriff's duty was purely ministerial, that is, he had to execute the writ within the period provided.Judge Villasor then recommended that respondent Deputy Sheriff Arturo Anatalio be REPRIMANDED for failing to observe the rules on the enforcement of orders issued by the Court with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.7
Considering that, from the records received by the undersigned, the Complainants failed to appear during the hearing scheduled by the former Executive Judge, and Respondent Sheriff did not present any testimonial evidence, aside from his Comment, the undersigned Executive Judge based his evaluation on the pleadings attached to the record.6
After study of the records, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of Executive Judge Edwin Villasor. In fact, the same conforms to the evaluation and recommendation of this Office dated 12 January 2000. Indeed, the writ of execution was not timely enforced within the mandated 60-day period pursuant to Section 11, Rule 39, Rules of Court which is the pertinent rule then prevailing. That the delay was allegedly caused by the two extensions granted does not excuse respondent. His duty is purely ministerial, and he has no discretion whether or not to enforce the writ of execution, much less to delay its enforcement beyond the period fixed under the rules within which to implement the same. Time and again, this Honorable Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility that Sheriffs are saddled with, minding the important role they play in the administration of justice. It behooves upon them to make due compliance.We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.
We only stress though that the delay in the implementation of the subject writ was apparently consented to by both parties. The defendants (herein complainants) refused several times to vacate the premises despite notices sent to them; while plaintiffs did not protest the defendants' actuations. This, on top of the fact that the writ was actually implemented on 30 June 1997 or a delay of only seven days. Hence, the submission that the penalty should be accordingly tempered is well taken.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Deputy Sheriff be REPRIMANDED for failure to observe the rules and regulations regarding the enforcement of writs of execution with a STERN WARNING that the same or similar transgression in the future shall be dealt with more severely.8
. . . the primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile.13Indeed, as an officer of the court, respondent is expected to discharge his duties with great care and diligence and perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon him and show at all times a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties.14 Any method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and shall not be countenanced.15
NOW THEREFORE, we command you to enforce the Decision of this Court dated March 17, 1997, the pertinent portion of which is quoted above in strict observance of the provisions of the New Rules of Court and return this writ within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof together with your proceeding duly endorsed therein.Thus, for failure to implement the writ on time, respondent should be held administratively liable.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2 Entitled "Thomas Dagala, et al., plaintiffs vs. Sps. Billy and Aurora Travilla, Ambrosio Abaigar, Delia Ebriega, Sps. Jaime and Betty Buenviaje, Anthony Lalinde, Myrna San Juan and Blesilda Recuenco, defendants."
3 Rollo, pp. 26-29.
4Id., p. 77.
5 Rollo, p. 80.
6Id., pp. 112-113.
7Id., p. 113.
8 Rollo, p. 166.
9 Trinidad vs. Paclibar, A.M. No. P-03-1673, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 434, 436-437.
10Ibid.
11 Zarate vs. Untalan, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1584, March 31, 2005.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14 Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 440, 452.
15Ibid.
16 Rule 39, Sec. 11. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution may be made returnable, to the clerk or judge of the court issuing it, at any time not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the officer who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof, and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. A certified copy of the record, in the execution book kept by the clerk, of an execution by virtue of which real property has been sold, or of the officer's return thereon, shall be evidence of the contents of the originals whenever they, or any part thereof, have been lost or destroyed.
17 Bajet vs. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002, 385 SCRA 343, 348.
18 Sarmiento vs. Salamat, A.M.-P-No. 01-1501, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 301, 308.
19Ibid.