EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 168056 : September 01, 2005]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (FORMERLY AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA AND ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; AND HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 168207]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 168461]
ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ROSARIO ANTONIO; PETRON DEALERS' ASSOCIATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX DEALERS' OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO ANTONIO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "ANB NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATIONâ€; LOURDES MARTINEZ DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "SHELL GATE - N. DOMINGOâ€; BETHZAIDA TAN DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "ADVANCE SHELL STATIONâ€; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATIONâ€; EFREN SOTTO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATIONâ€; DONICA CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DESI TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "R&R PETRON STATIONâ€; PETER M. UNGSON DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE STATIONâ€; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE STATIONâ€; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "STARCARGA ENTERPRISESâ€; ADORACION MAÑEBO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "CMA MOTORISTS CENTERâ€; SUSAN M. ENTRATA DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "LEONA'S GASOLINE STATION AND SERVICE CENTERâ€; CARMELITA BALDONADO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTERâ€; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "LORPED SERVICE CENTERâ€; RHEAMAR A. RAMOS DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "RJRAM PTT GAS STATIONâ€; MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "VIOLAGO-PTT SERVICE CENTERâ€; MOTORISTS' HEART CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS' HARVARD CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS' HERITAGE CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE STANDARD OIL CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "ROMMAN GASOLINE STATIONâ€; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF "TRUE SERVICE STATIONâ€, Petitioners, v. CESAR V. PURISIMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 168463]
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C. AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI AND TEODORO A. CASIÑO, Petitioners, v. CESAR V. PURISIMA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, AND EDUARDO R. ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 168730]
BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; HON. JOSE MARIO BUNAG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE OIC COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; AND HON. ALEXANDER AREVALO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE OIC COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
. . . Better, far better, that a provision should occasionally find its way into the statute through mistake, or even fraud, than, that every Act, state and national, should at any and all times be liable to put in issue and impeached by the journals, loose papers of the Legislature, and parol evidence. Such a state of uncertainty in the statute laws of the land would lead to mischiefs absolutely intolerable. . . .5Moreover, this Court must attribute good faith and accord utmost respect to the acts of a co-equal branch of government. While it is true that its jurisdiction has been expanded by the Constitution, the exercise thereof should not violate the basic principle of separation of powers. The expanded jurisdiction does not contemplate judicial supremacy over the other branches of government. Thus, in resolving the procedural issues raised by the petitioners, this Court should limit itself to a determination of compliance with, or conversely, the violation of a specified procedure in the Constitution for the passage of laws by Congress, and not of a mere internal rule of proceedings of its Houses.
It would be unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the house has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find remedy in that department. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. . . .Present jurisprudence allows the Bicameral Conference Committee to amend, add, and delete provisions of the Bill under consideration, even in the absence of conflict thereon between the Senate and House versions, but only so far as said provisions are germane to the purpose of the Bill.8 Now, there is a question as to whether the Bicameral Conference Committee, which produced Rep. Act No. 9337, exceeded its authority when it included therein amendments of provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 not related to VAT.
VAT will continue to evolve from its pioneering original structure. Dynamically, it will be subjected to reforms that will make it conform to many factors, among which are: the changing requirements of government revenue; the social, economic and political vicissitudes of the times; and the conflicting interests in our society. In the course of its evolution, it will be injected with some oddities and inevitably transformed into a structure which its revisionists believe will be an improvement overtime.14Second, assuming for the sake of argument, that the input VAT credit is indeed a property, the petroleum dealers' right thereto has not vested. A right is deemed vested and subject to constitutional protection when -
". . . [T]he right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. So, inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested." (16 C. J. S. 214-215)15Under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, before it was amended by Rep. Act No. 9337, the sale or importation of petroleum products were exempt from VAT, and instead, were subject to excise tax.16 Petroleum dealers did not impose any output VAT on their sales to consumers. Since they had no output VAT against which they could credit their input VAT, they shouldered the costs of the input VAT that they paid on their purchases of goods, properties, and services. Their sales not being subject to VAT, the petroleum dealers had no input VAT credits to speak of.
It will thus be seen that the contention that the rates charged for advertising cannot be raised is purely hypothetical, based entirely upon the opinion of the plaintiffs, unsupported by actual test, and that the plaintiffs themselves admit that a number of other persons have voluntarily and without protest paid the tax herein complained of. Under these circumstances, can it be held as a matter of fact that the tax is confiscatory or that, as a matter of law, the tax is unconstitutional? Is the exercise of the taxing power of the Legislature dependent upon and restricted by the opinion of two interested witnesses? There can be but one answer to these questions, especially in view of the fact that others are paying the tax and presumably making reasonable profit from their business.As a final observation, I perceive that what truly underlies the opposition to Rep. Act No. 9337 is not the question of its constitutionality, but rather the wisdom of its enactment. Would it truly raise national revenue and benefit the entire country, or would it only increase the burden of the Filipino people? Would it contribute to a revival of our economy or only contribute to the difficulties and eventual closure of businesses? These are issues that we cannot resolve as the Supreme Court. As this Court explained in Agustin v. Edu,20 to wit -
It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, ‘does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: ‘It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: ‘As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.' For they, according to Justice Labrador, ‘are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own…â€21To reiterate, we cannot substitute our discretion for Congress, and even though there are provisions in Rep. Act No. 9337 which we may believe as unwise or iniquitous, but not unconstitutional, we cannot strike them off by invoking our power of judicial review. In such a situation, the recourse of the people is not judicial, but rather political. If they severely doubt the wisdom of the present Congress for passing a statute such as Rep. Act No. 9337, then they have the power to hold the members of said Congress accountable by using their voting power in the next elections.
Endnotes:
1 Presidential Decree No. 1158, as amended up to Rep. Act No. 8424.
2 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue, Inc., G.R. No. L-28896, 17 February 1988, 158 SCRA 9.
3 Paragraph 3.3 of the Verification and Affidavit of Merit, executed by the then Secretary of the Department of Finance, Cesar V. Purisima, dated 04 July 2005, attached as Annex A of the Very Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on 04 July 2005.
4 Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 529.
5 Justice Sawyer, in Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 256, as quoted in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 294, 304.
6 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115544, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
7 G.R. No. 127255, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 299.
8Supra, note 6.
9Supra, note 3.
10 Petition for Prohibition (Under Rule 65 with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No. 168461 entitled, Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Purisima, et al., p. 17, paragraph 52.
11 Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-19937, 19 February 1979, 88 SCRA 294; Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36 (1915).
12 Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254, as quoted in Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., Id., p. 452.
13 Section 110(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 9337.
14 VICTORIO A. DEOFERIO, JR. AND VICTORINO C. MAMALATEO, THE VALUE ADDED TAX IN THE PHILIPPINES 48 (2000).
15 Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98 Phil 711, 722 (1956).
16 Section 109(e) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.
17 TSN, 18 April 2005, IV-2, p. 5.
18 Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9337.
19 34 Phil. 969, 973 (1916).
20 G.R. No. L-49112, 02 February 1979, 88 SCRA 195.
21Id., pp. 210-211.