EN BANC
[G.R. No. 15620. July 10, 1919. ]
JOSE M. VELOSO, applicant, v. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE PROVINCE OF LEYTE, composed of the provincial fiscal et. al., and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF THE PROVINCE OF SAMAR, composed of the provincial fiscal et. al., Respondents.
The applicant in his own behalf.
No appearance for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHlLIPPINE ISLANDS; SEPARATION OF POWERS; EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND PHILIPPINE SENATE. — The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in its Section 18, provides "That the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members." The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives, respectively, is full, clear, and complete. The Judiciary, with its traditional regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed it.
2 ID.; ID.; ID. — A writ of prohibition asked for in the Supreme Court by a candidate for senator against provincial boards of canvassers, relating to the failure of another candidate to register his certificate of candidacy with the provincial board of the province in which he resided, within the time provided by law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts. The question is one for the Philippine Senate to decide.
2 ID.; ID.; ID. — A writ of prohibition asked for in the Supreme Court by a candidate for senator against provincial boards of canvassers, relating to the failure of another candidate to register his certificate of candidacy with the provincial board of the province in which he resided, within the time provided by law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts. The question is one for the Philippine Senate to decide.
D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
A writ of prohibition is asked for in this court by Jose M. Veloso, a candidate for senator from the ninth senatorial district, against the provincial boards of canvassers of Leyte and Samar, with the object of having the court declare that the boards of canvassers in question have exceeded their jurisdiction in certifying the number of votes obtained for the position of senator by Francisco Enaje, with the result that all action taken by these boards is null. The fundamental of the petition is that Francisco Enaje omitted to register his certificate of candidacy with the provincial board of the province in which he resided within the time provided by law. Without ordering the respondents to answer, and without awaiting oral argument, it is apparent on the face of the petition that the court is without jurisdiction.
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in its section eighteen, provides "that the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members." This provision had its origin in the United States Constitution which, in turn, had its inception in the early state constitutions. The only difference is that the Jones Law is even more emphatic in phraseology than the Constitution of the United States because of the insertion of the world "sole" before the word "judges." The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives, respectively is full, clear, and complete.
The point raised by petitioner is one for the Philippine Senate to decide. While there may arise proper cases relating to the election of Senators and Representatives which would require cognizance by the courts, this certainly is not one, for the question involved pertains either to the election, the return, or the qualification, as precision of classification may dictate, of an elective senator. The judiciary, with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed it.
Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.
Petition dismissed with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street and Moir, JJ., concur.
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in its section eighteen, provides "that the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members." This provision had its origin in the United States Constitution which, in turn, had its inception in the early state constitutions. The only difference is that the Jones Law is even more emphatic in phraseology than the Constitution of the United States because of the insertion of the world "sole" before the word "judges." The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives, respectively is full, clear, and complete.
The point raised by petitioner is one for the Philippine Senate to decide. While there may arise proper cases relating to the election of Senators and Representatives which would require cognizance by the courts, this certainly is not one, for the question involved pertains either to the election, the return, or the qualification, as precision of classification may dictate, of an elective senator. The judiciary, with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed it.
Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.
Petition dismissed with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street and Moir, JJ., concur.
