EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 174153 : October 25, 2006]
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
[G.R. NO. 174299 : October 25, 2006]
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.
Sec. 4 x x xI vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. `If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.17That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.18Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x `is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) A Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2: The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters. This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. xxx xxx xxx MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions? MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President. MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?" MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision" MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.21Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its amendment."24
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
Section 4. (1) x x xThe above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.28Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."29
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.30]
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32 (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;33 (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;34 (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;35 and (e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.
- Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
- A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;
- The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;
- The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;
- Signature stations to be provided for;
- Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;
- Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
- It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the Constitution;
- The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters;" and
- The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or 4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or 5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Endnotes:
1 Works, Letter 164.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_%28P%E2%80%93Z%29#endnote_ODoQ.
2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
3 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.
5 Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System."
6 Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osme III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
7 "Grounds for contempt
3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29, 2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics' turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. [Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]x x x x x x x x x
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).x x x x x x x x x
4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.
8Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246.
9Supra.
10Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
11 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.
12Supra.
13 Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
14 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
15Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).
16Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.
17 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.
18 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.
19Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.
20 July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.
21 Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.
22 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.
23State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.
24City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.
25Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.
26 196 P.2d 787.
27Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.
28Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.
29Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).
30 Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.
31 See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.
32 Section 2. Statement of Policy. - The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
33 Section 3. Definition of terms.-
x x x
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
x x x
34 See Section 3(e).
35 Section 5 (b) - A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.x x x
36 Section 9 (b) - The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
37 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).
38 328 US 549 (1946).
39 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
40 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).
41 G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.
42 369 US 186 (1962).
43 G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
44 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.
45 Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.