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G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 171821 : October 9, 2006]

DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA LAZARO, Respondents.


D E C I S I O N


YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the March 9, 2006 En Banc Resolution1 of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPC No. 04-105, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the April 12, 2005 Resolution2 of COMELEC's First Division (First Division) dismissing the petition to annul private respondent Teresita Lazaro's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Laguna.

In the May 10, 2004 national and local elections, petitioner and private respondent ran for governor of Laguna. During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), petitioner moved to suspend the proceedings claiming tampering of election returns for San Pablo City and Biñan, Laguna, which allegedly increased private respondent's votes. The PBOC denied the motion ruling that the issues raised should be ventilated before the City and Municipal Board of Canvassers. On May 16, 2004, the PBOC proclaimed private respondent as governor.

On May 19, 2004, petitioner sought to nullify the proclamation of private respondent with the First Division of the COMELEC, docketed as SPC No. 04-105, alleging that the PBOC proceedings was flawed and irregular. Private respondent moved to dismiss the petition, alleging that petitioner did not file written and formal objections with the appropriate Board of Canvassers and that he failed to produce evidence of fraud in relation to the certificates of canvass of San Pablo City and Biñan.

Meanwhile, the First Division suspended private respondent's proclamation and directed the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to examine whether the photocopied election returns submitted by petitioner were prepared in sets or groups by only one person. The suspension was later lifted upon private respondent's motion and the order for examination of the election returns stayed.

More than a month after, however, the First Division again directed the ERSD to cause the examination of the election returns from the disputed cities and municipalities. It also ordered the concerned Boards of Canvassers to deliver copies of the election returns used in the canvassing. Private respondent questioned these orders arguing that she never knew of election returns being presented during any of the hearings on the petition and that petitioner never prayed for the examination thereof.

On April 12, 2005, the First Division dismissed the petition to annul private respondent's proclamation. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the COMELEC En Banc on March 9, 2006, hence, this petition3 alleging grave abuse of discretion of public respondent for deliberately failing to mention the outcome of the examination of the election returns as ordered by the First Division.

The petition lacks merit.

Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of law.4 In a certiorari proceeding, as in the instant case, it is imperative for petitioner to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the court or agency whose exercise of discretion is being assailed.

No grave abuse of discretion attended public respondent's decision to affirm the actions taken by the PBOC and the First Division because it only applied Section 17 of Republic Act No. 71665 mandating that matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code on the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.

In the instant case, it was incumbent for petitioner to raise his oral objections to the chairman of the city and municipal board of canvassers of San Pablo and Biñan, respectively, at the time the questioned returns or certificates of canvass is presented for inclusion in the canvass. However, petitioner questioned the election returns for San Pablo City and Biñan on the ground of fraud only before the provincial, and not before the appropriate city and municipal, boards of canvassers. In fact, petitioner belatedly questioned the election returns for Calamba City and four other municipalities, to wit: Cabuyao, San Pedro, Sta. Rosa and Nagcarlan, in his petition with the First Division when he attached the contested election returns in his memorandum.

Petitioner cannot justify raising belatedly the issue of tampering before the PBOC for allegedly discovering the fraud only a few hours from the start of the proceedings as this would run counter to the mandatory rule requiring protestants to present objections to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns at the time the questioned returns are presented for inclusion in the canvass. Thus '

The Court finds that the charge of grave abuse of discretion is more apparent than real. Section 20 of R.A 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 requires that an oral objection to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns in the canvassing shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. It is not denied by petitioner that the objections interposed were made after the election returns in certain precincts were included in the canvass. Such belated objections are fatal to petitioner's cause. Compliance with the period set for objections on exclusion and inclusion of election returns is mandatory. Otherwise, to allow objections after the canvassing would be to open the floodgates to schemes designed to delay the proclamation and frustrate the electorate's will by some candidates who feels that the only way to fight for a lost cause is to delay the proclamation of the winner. It should be noted that proceedings before the Board of Canvassers is summary in nature which is why the law grants the parties a short period to submit objections and the Board a short period to rule on matters brought to them. Petitioner's plea for a liberal interpretation of technical rules and allow his untimely objections cannot be granted in this case. Liberal construction of election laws applies only when it becomes necessary to uphold the people's voice.6 (Emphasis added)

The fact that COMELEC's First Division ordered the examination of election returns notwithstanding petitioner's belated objections thereto would not change the outcome of this case. For one, it eventually dismissed the petition to annul private respondent's proclamation after the parties submitted their pleadings and participated in hearings on the matter. For another, public respondent upheld the validity of the First Division's dismissal of the petition and expressly ruled that there was no need to resort to the technical examination of the returns.

We have ruled in Ocampo v. Commission on Elections7 that:

[F]indings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. We do not find the instant case an exception to this avowed rule.

We agree with public respondent's findings, thus '

For one, the irregularity in the preparation of the election returns should have been brought before the Boards of Canvassers of San Pablo City and Biñan, respectively, at the time the said returns were being canvassed by the said boards. This is required under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166, to wit:

Section 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. - Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission. However, matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.

For another, assuming that such objections could be legally brought before the PBOC, Fernandez's objections could still not prosper on the following grounds:

First, the grounds relied upon by Fernandez, i.e., dagdag-bawas on the election returns and returns written by one person, compel this Commission to pierce the election returns, an act anathema to the essence of a pre-proclamation controversy since the process would necessarily entail recount of ballots and technical examination of election returns, fingerprints and signatures appearing thereon. To require the Commission to examine the circumstances surrounding the preparation of election returns would run counter to the rule that a pre-proclamation controversy should be summarily decided. Thus, there was no need for the First Division to resort to the technical examination of the returns.

Second, the other ground relied upon by Fernandez, i.e., tampering of election returns, is not a province of the PBOC since it is not furnished with a copy of the election returns sought to be re-canvassed. To stress, it canvasses only a copy of COCV with supporting Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP). To require the PBOC to re-examine the election returns from the city or municipal level is an unlawful encroachment upon the jurisdiction or function of the city or municipal board of canvassers specifically and distinctly assigned to it by law. Again, such issue should have been brought before the proper Board of Canvassers for the latter to appreciate whether or not such returns are indeed tampered. Relatively, in Anni v. Rasul, the Supreme Court made it clear that the question of whether certain returns are falsified or have been tampered with and should not be included in the canvass, must first be raised before the board of canvassers, subject to appeal from its decision to the COMELEC. In Guiao v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court explained this rule, to wit:

The law envisions that while the board is doing its work in canvassing the returns and tallying the result, its attention should be called to any question which could affect its work, so as to enable the said board to decide whether "to defer the canvass or to continue with it."

Considering that in the case at bar, petitioner presented his Written (sic) objections only after the canvass of all the election returns or after the votes reflected in all returns had been tallied, the belatedness of the submission of petitioner's written objection renders futile its challenge to the canvass already accomplished by the Board. The Board has its legal obligation, after canvass of the returns, to proclaim the elected candidates.

Third, as correctly held by the First Division, Fernandez did not comply with the mandatory requirements set forth under Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669, implementing Section 17 of RA 7166, viz:

Sec. 36. Procedure in disposition of contested election returns/certificate of canvass. - The following procedure is mandatory and shall be strictly observed by the board of canvassers:

(a) Any candidate, political or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election return/certificate of canvass on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX (Pre-Proclamation Controversies) or Sections 234, 235, and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objections to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return/certificate is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.

(b) Upon receipt of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested return/certificate and proceed to canvass those which are not contested. However, before setting aside the contested return/certificate, the board shall canvass the votes and prepare the Certificate of Canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Party List.

With respect to the provincial/municipal offices, the votes shall be tallied temporarily in a separate tally sheet, which shall be signed by the board and watchers present.

(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall submit his objections in writing in the form prescribed by the Commission.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support thereof, which shall be attached to the written objections. Within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours, after the presentation of the objection(s), any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection in the form prescribed by the Commission attaching thereto supporting evidence, if any. The board of canvassers shall not entertain any objection or opposition unless reduced in writing in the prescribed form.

x x x

Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall take up the contested returns/certificates, consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily and immediately rule thereon. The board shall enter its ruling in the prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of all the members thereof.

x x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

The above procedure is mandatory. It requires that a party contesting a certificate of canvass of votes or election return has to simultaneously make an oral and written objection to the inclusion thereof during the canvass proceedings. Verbal objection alone is not sufficient. A party has also to present evidence within twenty-four hours (24) from such objection. This is exactly the instruction of the Supreme Court in the case of Cordero v. COMELEC, thus:

Clearly, not only must the objecting party reduce his objections to writing in the form prescribed by the Comelec; he must also present within 24 hours evidence in support thereof. Under Subsection h, noncompliance with the mandatory procedure shall result in the summary dismissal of the appeal, as in this case. In the petitioner lies the burden of proving that he has a prima facie case and of presenting, at the same time, evidence that the exclusion he seeks will change the results of the election. A party's mere allegation that an election return is spurious, altered or manufactured does not automatically operate to exclude it from the canvassing. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

In sum, We find nothing illegal or unlawful in PBOC's denial to the oral and unsubstantiated objections of Fernandez to the COCV of San Pablo City and Biñan since Fernandez neither made simultaneous written objections at the time the COCVs of San Pablo City and Biñan were being canvassed nor did he present evidence within twenty-four (24) hours from making such objections.

Another issue that needs to be clarified is the alleged manifest errors in the COCV and SOVP, which was belatedly raised by Fernandez in his Memorandum after hearing and submission of responsive pleading, involving not only San Pablo City and Biñan but also Calamba City and the municipalities of Nagcarlan, Cabuyao, San Pedro and Sta. Rosa. This gives Us the impression that Fernandez is now adopting a different story which amounts to substantial amendment of his pleading. This is not allowed since it violates the other parties' right to due process and will only unduly prolong the disposition of the instant pre-proclamation controversy. x x x.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The March 9, 2006 En Banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPC No. 04-105, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the April 12, 2005 Resolution of the First Division dismissing petitioner's petition to annul private respondent Teresita Lazaro's proclamation, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:


1 Rollo, pp. 56-65. Penned by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Romeo A. Brawner.

2 Id. at 27-44.

3 Id. at 3-26.

4 Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416.

5 An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

6 Siquian, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 378 Phil. 182, 185-186 (1999).

7 382 Phil. 522, 532 (2000).

8 Rollo, pp. 61-64.

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