G.R. No. 180499 - The People of the Phil. v. Conrado Cacayan
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 180499 : July 9, 2008]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CONRADO CACAYAN, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Four (4) informations1 for rape accusing appellant Conrado Cacayan of raping his eighteen (18)-year old daughter, AAA,2 were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. The informations were similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of the crime. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him during the arraignment.3
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
AAA4 was born on 19 August 1979.5 Due to familial problems, AAA was reared by a sister of appellant in Saguday, Quirino, Isabela. On 10 January 1997, AAA started living with appellant in Barangay Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora. Her father was living in with another woman and the latter's 13-year old niece, BBB.6 AAA helped out in appellant's sari-sari store.7
In the afternoon of 13 May 1997, AAA and BBB went out with appellant to gather rattan in the mountain. Earlier that day, appellant had a drinking session with a friend who was elected as barangay councilor. At around 7:00 p.m., the three passed by the seashore on the way to the mountain. As they were about to set up camp for the night, appellant asked BBB to fetch a cauldron (casserole) from Dipasaleng, Diniog, which, from where they were, would take around 15 minutes to reach. After BBB left, appellant approached AAA, who was then spreading a blanket on the seashore, and blamed her for his defeat in the 12 May 1997 barangay election. Appellant told her to undress and lie down. When she did not comply, appellant unsheathed his bolo, pointed it to her neck, and threatened to kill her if she refused to lie down. Despite AAA's vehement refusal, appellant started pulling down her pants and panties. After undressing AAA, appellant removed his pants. AAA's pleas for mercy fell on deaf ears. Appellant laid her on the blanket, held her left hand, and rested the bolo on the right side of her neck. Appellant then inserted his penis into her vagina. After appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, he told her to get dressed. Appellant called back BBB. They all spent the night by the seashore. AAA was not permitted by appellant to leave the place.8
The following morning, 14 May 1997, the three of them went to the mountain to gather rattan. At around 10:00 a.m., appellant told BBB to go down the mountain ahead of them. When BBB left, appellant asked AAA if he could repeat what he did to her the night before. AAA pleaded and reminded him that she is his daughter. When AAA did not comply with his wishes, appellant again threatened her with a bolo, then held her hand and laid her down. Appellant rested his bolo on her neck and held her hand as he inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA cried and shouted for help to no avail. After the sexual intercourse, they went down the mountain.9
On 7 June 1997, the three of them went to appellant's banana plantation in Dicasiw, Dilasag, Aurora to gather bananas. After the task, AAA went home ahead of them. Appellant followed her and told her to stop. She refused and told him that she still had to wash some clothes. Appellant scolded her with expletives for not following his order. She retorted, "What kind of father are you? You are doing bad things to your daughter!" Appellant pulled AAA, causing her to stumble. He laid AAA down and undressed her. Appellant held her hand and rested his bolo on AAA's neck. He inserted his penis into her vagina. The penetration caused her extreme pain because she was then suffering from vaginal infection caused by appellant's previous sexual assaults. AAA described it as, "Masakit po dahil hindi pa po magaling iyong mga butlig-butlig dahil doon po sa ginawa niya sa akin."10 AAA did not report the rape for fear that appellant would make good his threat that he would kill her and her mother.11
Sometime in June 1997, AAA started living in the house of CCC,12 who used to be her teacher in school. Because AAA had financial difficulties when she was still CCC's student, the latter invited her to stay in her house. Appellant gave his permission to this arrangement; however, he told CCC not to allow AAA to go out.13
On 21 June 1997, appellant went to CCC's house and confronted AAA about the rumors that she had gone out with many male companions during the town fiesta. She went with appellant to his house to verify the gossips and there, she denied the rumors. Then, she proceeded to leave for CCC's house but appellant persisted in accompanying her. Together, they boarded a tricycle which, on the way to their destination, ran out of fuel. The driver advised them to just walk the rest of the way. However, before they could reach CCC's house, appellant dragged AAA into a coconut plantation and told her to undress. Appellant persisted in undressing AAA despite her pleas for mercy. AAA resisted appellant's actions but the latter drew a knife and pointed it at her neck. Appellant undressed himself and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina while she was lying down. Appellant made push-and-pull movements which AAA described as, "kinayopan po nya ako. Labas[-] pasok po ang ari nya sa ari ko." After satisfying his bestial desires, appellant told AAA to stand up and get dressed.14
As soon as AAA reached the house of CCC, she confided to the latter that appellant had raped her. CCC advised her to report the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). AAA did not follow CCC's advice for she was afraid that appellant could easily kill her.15 Instead, AAA escaped to Barangay Calabuanan, Baler, Aurora to seek her friend. She was told by the residents, however, that her friend was working in Bulacan. A certain Baby Lucie Bitong (Baby), a resident of the locality, invited AAA to her house. There, AAA related her ordeal to Baby. Baby accompanied AAA to a barangay councilor who, in turn, referred them to the barangay captain. The barangay captain was then in a meeting so a tanod took her statement. AAA and Baby proceeded to the DSWD office in the municipal building. As advised by the DSWD, they proceeded to the police station where AAA's statement was taken.16
On 14 July 1997, Dr. Nenita Hernandez, the municipal health officer of Baler, Aurora, examined AAA and issued a medico-legal examination report.17 She testified that the healed hymenal lacerations were consistent with the fact that the last rape occurred on 21 June 1997, and that these also indicate several forcible copulations.18
Appellant denied the charges against him. He testified that AAA merely concocted the charges against him for he scolded and mauled her on 20 June 1997 when he learned from his brother that she was having an affair with a certain "Alias Pogi" near the seashore the day before. Appellant disavowed that AAA was with him gathering rattan on 13 and 14 May 1997 and that she was with him gathering bananas on 7 June 1997 as in fact on those dates, she was managing their sari-sari store.19 He testified that AAA was not in his house on 21 June 1997, the date of the fourth rape.20
Appellant's brothers'Arman Cacayan (Arman), Mariano Cacayan (Mariano) and Guillermo Cacayan (Guillermo) tried to corroborate appellant's defense. Arman and Mariano both testified that appellant could not have raped AAA on 13 and 14 May and on 7 June 1997 since on said dates, they saw AAA tending the sari-sari store, and that appellant was at home in the evening of 13 May. Mariano testified that he even saw AAA having a picnic with her friends by the beach in Dilasag on 14 May. Mariano further testified that he saw AAA kissing a man near the seashore in the evening of 19 June 1997, and told appellant about it. He revealed that AAA was beaten up by appellant because of said incident.21 Arman testified that AAA was alone when she boarded the tricycle bound to CCC's house in the evening of 21 June 1997, and that appellant was then in his house. He further testified that AAA was a flirt.22 Guillermo also tried to show through his testimony that AAA was a flirt. He testified that AAA was no longer a virgin and that the latter had previously suffered a miscarriage as he once saw her bleeding when they were still living in the same house.23
In its Decision24 dated 23 July 2002, the RTC found appellant guilty of four (4) counts of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and attended by the aggravating circumstance of relationship and sentenced him to death. Since the rapes were committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on 22 October 1997, the RTC applied Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.25 The records of the case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review. On 7 February 2006, the Court issued a Resolution26 transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
The Court of Appeals27 affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all four (4) counts of simple and not qualified rape. It held that although appellant admitted that AAA is his daughter, her minority at the time she was raped was not alleged in the informations nor was it proven in court. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 19 July 2007 before the Court of Appeals.28
The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant assigns two (2) errors which have already been passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all four (4) counts of rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and assuming arguendo that he is guilty, whether the RTC erred in imposing the death penalty.29
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The issues raised by the appellant involve weighing of evidence already passed upon by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in the stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.30 The denial and alibi of appellant fail in light of AAA's positive identification that he raped her on the alleged dates which is corroborated by physical evidence showing forced coitus.
It is true that alibi is not always false and without merit. It may serve as basis for an acquittal if it can really be shown by clear and convincing evidence that it was indeed physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene at the time.31 In this regard, appellant failed to prove convincingly that he was not at the crime scene at the time the four rapes occurred because he merely denied that AAA was with him on the alleged dates. Moreover, the distance of appellant's house, where AAA was alleged to be during the four rapes, from the crime scene does not evince belief that it was impossible for him to be there when the rapes were committed. Further, jurisprudence has shown that alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relative or relatives.32 Appellant's alibi is patently self-serving even though his brothers tried to corroborate it.
The use of a bolo at the time of the rapes and the threat of death posed by appellant constituted sufficient force and intimidation to cow AAA into obedience.33 Moreover, appellant, who is AAA's father, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over her. His moral ascendancy and influence over AAA may even substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.34
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important issue. If a complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis.35 We have thoroughly examined AAA's testimony and find nothing that would cast doubt as to her credibility. All said, there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely charge appellant with rape and to testify against him; hence, the logical conclusion is that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will, through force and intimidation, and with the use of a bolo.
The alleged minor inconsistencies in AAA's testimony pertain only to collateral or minor incidents of the case and they do not affect the real issue, which is whether or not appellant indeed raped his daughter, AAA. As long as the witness has been found credible by the trial court, especially after undergoing a rigid cross-examination, any apparent inconsistency may be overlooked. This is especially true if the lapses concern trivial matters.36
AAA's failure to report the previous incidents of rape to her mother does not dent her credibility, there being no standard form of behavior expected of rape victims who react differently to emotional stress.37 Appellant's threats had intimidated AAA and kept her from immediately reporting the rapes. As this Court held, it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the violation of their honor because of the threats on their lives.38
Appellant's contention that AAA filed the rape charges because he had scolded and mauled her for seeing a man could not be believed. As held by the Court in People v. Rosario,39 "[i]t would take the most senseless kind of depravity for a young daughter to fabricate a story which would send her father to death only because he disciplined her. Verily, no child in her right mind would concoct a story of defloration against her own father and expose her whole family to the stigma and disgrace associated with incestuous rape, if only to free herself from an overweening and strict parent who only happens to enforce parental guidance and discipline."
Significantly, AAA's claim of sexual violations was corroborated by Dr. Hernandez's medical findings which were presented to the RTC at the trial. AAA's hymen showed multiple healed lacerations at 11, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 o'clock positions.40 As Dr. Hernandez testified, these lacerations could only have resulted from the forcible insertion into the vagina of an erect penis.41
Lastly, just as in other rape cases, appellant raises the argument that the rapes could not have happened because BBB was with them when the alleged crime was committed. However, as is common judicial experience, rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby. As revealed in our review of rape cases, rape can be committed in a house where there are other occupants.42
All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the RTC and the Court of Appeals insofar as the crime was committed. What remains to be determined is the propriety of the penalty imposed on appellant in relation to the second issue raised.
The RTC is correct when it imposed the penalty of death for the four rapes.chanrobles virtual law library Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the use by appellant of a bolo to consummate the crime is a special aggravating circumstance which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. A similar provision can also be found in Article 266-B,43 when the law on rape was amended by Republic Act No. 8353 which also reclassified rape to a crime against persons. With the existence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the imposable penalty is death conformably with Article 6344 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no question that appellant is the father of AAA.45 Such relationship of father-daughter in rape cases is considered an aggravating circumstance under Article 1546 of the RPC.47 However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,48 the Court can only impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of the death penalty.
Article 335 also provides for the death penalty if the rape victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. The Court notes that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied this qualifying circumstance and reduced appellant's sentence to reclusion perpetua. It also erred when it held that the age of AAA has not been adequately established during the trial. It must be emphasized that the RTC imposed the death penalty on appellant, but not on the basis of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, the concurrence of which would have warranted a mandatory death sentence under the law. Instead, the RTC based its judgment on the finding that appellant committed the rape with the use of a deadly weapon which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Moreover, the alternative circumstance of relationship was appreciated by the RTC as an aggravating circumstance that justified the imposition of death. Thus, even if the qualifying circumstance of minority had not been sufficiently established by the prosecution, still it would not matter because the death sentence was imposed without reference to and independently of the minority of AAA.
As to damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.49 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was correctly granted pursuant to the ruling in People v. Catubig50 that the award of exemplary damages is justified pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.51 Since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon attended the commission of the rape, the offended party is entitled to exemplary damages.
However, the Court finds that the civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00 for each of the four (4) counts of rape. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less than Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),52 and P50,000.00 for simple rape.53
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 2282-85 ordering appellant to pay AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02039 reducing the sentence of appellant from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, likewise for each of the four (4) counts of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 for each of the four (4) counts of rape. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1 CA rollo, pp. 13-20. Criminal Case No. 2282 reads:
That at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening on May 13, 1997 at Sitio Dipasalin, Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wi[ll]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her [sic] 18 year old daughter [AAA] by pressing a small pointed bolo (kampit) at her neck and threatening to kill her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2 Criminal Case No. 2283 reads:
That at about May 14, 1997 at Sitio Dipasalin, Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wi[ll]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her [sic] 18 year old daughter [AAA] by pressing a small pointed bolo (kampit) at her neck and threatening to kill her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 2284 reads:
That on or about June 7, 1997 at Dicasiw, Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wi[ll]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her [sic] 18 year old daughter [AAA] by pressing a small pointed bolo (kampit) at her neck and threatening to kill her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 2285 reads:
That on or about June 21, 1997 at Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wi[ll]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her [sic] 18 year old daughter [AAA] by pressing a small pointed bolo (kampit) at her neck and threatening to kill her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The real name of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426.
3 Records, p. 19.
4 Supra note 2.
5 TSN, 8 May 1998, p. 2.
6 Supra note 2.
7 TSN, 11 February 2002, pp. 4-11.
8 TSN, 4 February 1998, pp. 11-15.
9 Id. at 15-17. See also TSN, 17 June 1998, pp. 3-4.
10 Id. at 17-18.
11 Id. at 19.
12 Supra note 2.
13 TSN, 29 January 1999, pp. 2-4.
14 TSN, 6 May 1998, pp. 1-4.
15 Id. at 4-5.
16 TSN, 6 May 1998, pp. 5-7.
17 Records, pp. 8-9. The pertinent portion of the report reads:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
On optical inspection, there were multiple hymenal lacerations which were already healed at the following positions: 11 o'clock position, 3 o'clock position, 4 o'clock position, 6 o'clock position, 7 o'clock position, 8 o'clock position.
The vulva opening was nulliparous but admits the speculum with ease. There was a mild erosion noted at the posterior forchet. A whitish discharge was also noted.
Gramstaining result indicates the presence of non-gonococcal infection in the cervical and vaginal canal.
18 TSN, 4 February 1998, pp. 4-8.
19 TSN, 11 February 2002, pp. 2-4, 13.
20 Id. at 9-12.
21 TSN, 23 April 2002, pp. 3-8.
22 TSN, 7 October 1999, pp. 4-6, 14.
23 TSN, 6 October 1999, pp. 2-6.
24 CA rollo, pp. 31-36. The decision was penned by Judge Armando A. Yanga. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Conrado Cacayan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Multiple Rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon against her daughter [AAA] and hereby sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH on four (4) counts; to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 civil indemnity,P50,000.00 moral damages, andP25,000.00 exemplary damages for each of the four counts of rape or altogether, a grand sum ofP500,000.00; and to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.
25 Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.' Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation.
x x x
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. x x x x (As amended by Sec. 11, R.A. No. 7659.)
26 CA rollo, pp. 123-124. Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren Mateo, G.R. NOS. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 656.
27 Rollo, pp. 7-21; Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated July 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora, finding accused-appellant Conrado Cacayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape on four counts, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
28 CA rollo, pp. 148-149.
29 Id. at 58-72.
30 People v. Sarabia, 334 Phil. 432, 446 (1997).
31 People v. Villapando, G.R. No. 73656, 5 October 1989, 178 SCRA 341, 347; People v. Manzanares, G.R. No. 82696, 8 September 1989, 177 SCRA 427, 433-434. See also People v. Castañeda, 322 Phil. 267, 279 (1996); People v. Abaya, G.R. No. 77980, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 691, 698.
32 People v. Danao, 313 Phil. 178, 188 (1996), citing People v. Retuta, et al., G.R. No. 95758, 2 August 1994, 234 SCRA 645, 656.
33 TSN, 4 February 1998, pp. 13-14, 16, 18-19; 6 May 1998, p. 3.
34 See People v. Casil, 311 Phil. 300, 309 (1995); and People v. Burce, 336 Phil. 283, 302 (1997).
35 People v. De Guzman y Pascual, 388 Phil. 943, 953 (2000), citing People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246 (1997).
36 People v. Dela Cuesta, 396 Phil. 330, 340 (2000).
37 See People v. Quezada, 425 Phil. 877, 895 (2002); People v. Dy, 425 Phil. 609, 644 (2002); People v. Silvano, 368 Phil. 676, 707 (1999).
38 People v. Manzana, 320 Phil. 200, 211 (1995). See also People v. Calamlam, 451 Phil. 283, 295 (2003), citing People v. Melivo, 253 SCRA 347, 356-358 (1996).
39 455 Phil. 876, 888 (2003). See also People v. Cabanela, 359 Phil. 481, 491 (1998); People v. Managaytay, 364 Phil. 800, 808 (1999).
40 Supra note 17.
41 TSN, 4 February 1998, pp. 4-8.
42 People v. Quinevista, Jr., 314 Phil. 540, 548 (1995). See also People v. Devilleres, 336 Phil. 688, 700 (1997); People v. Manuel, G.R. NOS. 107732-33, 19 September 1994, 236 SCRA 545, 554; People v. Tan, Jr., 332 Phil. 465, 476-477 (1996).
43 Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. x x x
44 Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x x In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x x
2. Where there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. x x x x
45 TSN, 11 February 2002, pp. 3, 6.
46 Chapter Five, Alternative Circumstances. Art. 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. x x x x
47 See People v. Padao, 437 Phil. 405, 423 (2002); People v. Silvano, 368 Phil. 677, 711 (1999). Citing People v. Busohan, 227 SCRA 87; People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316; People v. Porras, 58 Phil. 578.
48 SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
49 People v. Manallo, 448 Phil. 149, 168-169 (2003).
50 416 Phil. 102, 120 (2001).
51 Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended part.
52 People v. Perez, 357 Phil. 17, 35 (1998); People v. Bernaldez, 355 Phil. 740, 758 (1998); People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 210 (1998).
53 See People v. Mendoza, 432 Phil. 666, 684 (2002).
