DIAGNOSIS:
Hypertension
Transient ischemic attack
MEDICATIONS:
Diovan 80mg/capsule once daily
Sulodexide one tablet two times daily
Aspilet one tablet once daily
RECOMMENDATION:
Cranial CT scan
Carotid Doppler
He is advised to come back on June 14, 2001.7
The patient has no nuchal pain, headache, chest pain and dizziness noted. His blood pressure is normal at 130/87. There is no motor or sensory deficit noted. Triglycerides and routine urinalysis were within normal limits. He was evaluated by our cardiologist and neurologist who allowed him to resume his previous activities.
DIAGNOSIS:
Hypertension
Cerebrovascular disease, right internal capsule probably ischemic or infarct
He is fit to work effective today, November 16, 2001.8 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since x x x the Labor Arbiter based his decision on the opinion of the company-designated physician that appellant was declared "fit to work" to resume sea duty, We have no reason to disturb his finding, x x x.
But complainant should be allowed to resume sea duty considering the fit to work findings of the company-designated physician.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered affirming the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter with slight modification by ordering the respondents to allow complainant to resume sea duty.
SO ORDERED.16 (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects" (Art. 1700).
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x.
x x x x
There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows:Sec. 2. Disability.- (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.
In Vicente v. ECC (G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195):x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from 'permanent total disability' is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from 'permanent total disability' regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom (Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, Aug. 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221). On the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad (G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 268, 270-271), we held:Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. x x x.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Endnotes:
1 The Court, MCTC, has deleted the name "National Labor Relations Commission (2nd Division)" as the main party impleaded in the present Petition, in light of Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
* Additional member per Special Order No. 811-A in view of the inhibition of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the case.
2 Petitioner alleged that this was actually his re-deployment; Petition, rollo, p. 9.
3 Id. at 47.
4 Court of Appeals Decision dated March 8, 2007, id. at 39; Medical report dated June 6, 2001, id. at 123.
5 Labor Arbiter's Decision dated July 5, 2004, which was affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals; id. at 160.
6 Medical report dated June 6, 2001, id. at 123.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. at 59-60.
9 Medical Certificate dated February 22, 2002, id. at 63.
10 Id. at 64-65.
11 Labor Arbiter's Decision dated July 5, 2004, id. at 158-167.
12 Respondents' Position Paper, id. at 99-120.
13 Petitioner's Reply, id. at 124-128, 145-146.
14 Id. at 164, 167.
15 Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.
16 Rollo, pp. 212-213.
17 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme Court), id. at 38-44.
18 Id. at 46.
19 Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159887, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 190, 206-211; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 926, 933 (2002)
20 Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, G.R. No. 168753, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 438, 448.
21 Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19 at 207, 209-211.
22 See Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, supra note 20 at 448.
23 Rollo, p. 52 (underscoring supplied); cited also in the Labor Arbiter's Decision, rollo, p. 165.
24 Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19 at 215.