We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This Court is not unaware of the legal tactics and maneuvers employed by the petitioner in delaying the disposition of the subject case (Civil Case No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the final resolution by the Supreme Court affirming the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. We construe the actuation of the petitioner in resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the Rules of Court, through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions in litigating this case, as running counter to the intendment of the Rules to be utilized in promoting the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The issues raised in the present controversy have already been settled in our existing jurisprudence on the subject. In the case of De Jesus vs. Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that "generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has already become final."
The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has established the principle of law, as enunciated in Buaya vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that "once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court."
The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya case that "the effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments."
As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court is emphatic in saying that "the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party."
We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the court below. Thus, we sustain the assailed Orders of the court a quo since no abuse of discretion has been found to have been committed by the latter in their issuance. Moreover, this Court finds this petition to be part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.23
- THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX-PARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION AND/OR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS;
- THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 21, 1999 GRANTING THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GSIS;
- THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30, 2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS; and
- THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2002, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO THE COURT ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.24
- The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);25
- The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in favor of GSIS);26
- The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);27 and
- The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001).28
Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. -- The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.
Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a) (Emphasis supplied).
Section 4. How proceedings commenced. -- Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n) (Emphasis supplied).
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of unregulated motions for contempt, said incidents sometimes remain pending for resolution although the main case has already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects but, at any rate, the same may now be eliminated by this amendatory procedure.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. (Emphasis supplied)./blockquote>
Clearly, the petitioner's charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions was not permitted by the Rules of Court.
And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived from the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil action. Yet, the petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the omission to tender filing fees would have also warranted the dismissal of the charges.
It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without regard to the requisites of the Rules of Court simply to vex the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse of procedures.IV
Petitioner Was Guilty of
Misconduct As A Lawyer
The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA was "part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land."46
The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence.
Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the duly-issued writ of possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyer's Oath, particularly:47xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients xxx
We stress that the petitioner's being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to resort to dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."48 His true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court processes.49 Consequently, he must be made to account for his misconduct as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 17, 2003, with the costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-De Castro, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 42-43.
2 Id., p. 148.
3 Id., p. 44.
4 Id., pp. 169-179.
5 Id., p. 45.
6 Id., p. 45, 180.
7 Id., p. 45.
8 Id., pp. 51-54.
9 Id., p. 55.
10 Id., p. 56.
11 Id., pp. 45-46.
12 Id., pp. 57-62.
13 Id., p. 46.
14 The other respondents were designated as Tony Dimatulac, Allan Doe, John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, Romy Doe, Roland Doe, and Juan Doe.
15 Rollo, pp. 64-66.
16 Id., pp. 75-78.
17 Id., pp. 107-108.
18 Id., pp. 120-121.
20 Id., pp. 139-144.
21 Id., pp. 47-48.
22 Id., pp. 42-50.
23 Id., pp. 48-49.
24 Id., pp. 12-13.
25 Id., p. 55.
26 Id., p. 56.
27 Id., pp. 120-121.
28 Id., pp. 139-141.
29 A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Re: Amendment To Section 4, Rule 65 of The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) took effect September 1, 2000. This amendment, being a curative one, is applied retroactively (Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142803, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 643; Dela Cruz v. Golar Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 141277, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 173; Ramatek Philippines, Inc. v. De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 139526, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 129; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Go Ko, G.R. No. 148641, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 586).
30 People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 147832, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 197; Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137264, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 85.
31 Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing, Inc., G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287, 301; Autocorp. Group and Autographics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 678, 689.
32 Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
33 An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed To Real Estate Mortgages (Approved on March 6, 1924).
34 Section 6, Act No. 3135, as amended, provides:
Sec. 6. Redemption. - In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
35 Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. - The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.
36 Garcia v. Ocampo,105 Phil. 1102, 1108 (1959).
37 Section 50, Act No. 496, states:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and effect the land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made in the office of register of deeds for the province or provinces or city where the land lies.
Section 51, Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides:Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.-- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
See also State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99308, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 734; Agbulos v. Albert, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 790; Tuason v. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635 (1914); Sikatuna v. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371 (1922); Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646 (1916).
38 Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141365, November 27, 2002, 393 SCRA 143.
39 Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759, 771.
40 Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 250, 253.
41 De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 203, 213-314.
42 Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273, 277.
43 Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc., G.R. No. 147820, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 756, 763-764.
44 Penson v. Maranan, G.R. No. 148630, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 396, 407.
45 Remedial Law Compendium, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 808; see also Land Bank of the Philipines v. Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611, August 5, 2003, 408 SCRA 328.
46 Rollo, p. 49.
47 Rules of Court, Rule 138. Sec. 3.
48 Lawyer's Oath.
49 Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility, states:
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
49 Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility, states:
A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.