ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz' registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. x x x
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
x x x
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the 'kaingin' system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
x x x
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.38
x x x
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
x x x
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play - for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors' sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion - as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.
x x x
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia's successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied).
Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 818 dated January 18, 2010.
1 The subject property has an area of around 16,800 hectares.
2 It was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 853 (LRC No. 853).
3 Proclamation Reserving for Military Purposes A Portion of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipalities of Papaya, Sta. Rosa, and Laur, Province of Nueva Ecija and Portion of Quezon Province.
4 G.R. Nos. L-27594 and 28144, 28 November 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
5 Penned by Judge Virgilio D. Pobre Yñigo. Dated July 1, 1981, rollo, pp. 218-241.
6 Concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera (retired) and Alicia V. Sempio-Diy (retired) of the Former Fourth Division of the CA. Id., pp. 167-186.
7 He later on became an Associate Justice of this Court.
8 When the CA handed down its decision, petitioner's co-heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, entitled Flora L. Garcia v. CA, et. al., docketed as G.R. No. 104561. It was denied for their failure to show that the CA committed reversible error in the assailed decision warranting the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. The motion for reconsideration they filed suffered the same fate.
9 Concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera (retired) and Alfredo M. Marigomen (retired) of the Former Fourth Division of the CA. Rollo, pp. 313-319.
10 Id., pp. 351-355.
11 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna (retired) and Conchita Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Justice) of the Former Second Division of the CA. Id., pp. 361-368.
12 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Justice) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Supreme Court Justice) of the Former Second Division of the CA. Id., pp. 373-374.
13 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos, Marina L. Buzon (retired), Renato C. Dacudao (retired) and Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired), forming a Special Division of Five of the CA. Id., pp. 104-118.
14 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos, Marina L. Buzon (retired), Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired) and Ramon A. Garcia forming a Division of Five of the CA. Rollo, pp. 10-24.
15 Id., pp. 27-79.
16 Resolution dated 16 June 2008, id., p. 411.
17 Id., pp. 412-426.
18 Resolution dated 27 August 2008, id., p. 427. Eventually, in a resolution dated 19 August 2009, the Court certified that its 16 June 2008 resolution, which denied the petition for review, had become final and executory and, as such, was recorded in the book of entries of judgment.
19 Id., pp. 428-433.
20 Resolution dated 2 February 2009, id., p. 434.
21 Under Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.
22 Per SC Circular 2-89, dated 7 February 1989, as amended by the Resolution dated 18 November 1993.
23 Rollo, pp. 435-439 and 450-451, respectively.
24 PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124772, 14 August 2007, 530 SCRA 13, 21.
25 Rollo, p. 65.
26 39 Phil 851 (1919).
27 Id., See also Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589 (1926).
28 Id., p. 861.
29 Republic v. COCOFED, G.R. Nos. 147062-64, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 462, 493, citing Cuison v. CA, G.R. No. 128540, 15 April 1998, 289 SCRA 161, 171, which, in turn, cited People v. CA, No. L-54641, 28 November 1980, 101 SCRA 450, 465.
In Republic, we held that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied).
30 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA 449, 460.
31 CHED v. Dasig, G.R. No. 172776, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 227.
32 Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra note 4, p. 192.
33 Id., pp. 194-195.
34 Gordula v. CA, G.R. No. 127296, 22 January 1998, 284 SCRA 617, 633.
35 C. A. No. 141, as amended, prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession. (Gordula v. CA, supra at 631. Although this case deals with an application for free patent, it is applicable to this case as it also involves forest land.)
36 G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480.
37 Republic v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 137887, 28 February 2000, 326 SCRA 574, 580 and Ituralde v. Falcasantos, G.R. No. 128017, 20 January 1999, 301 SCRA 293, 296 which cited Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 50464, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 443, 448.
38 Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra note 4, pp. 192-193.
39 We stated therein:
The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla (Exh. "T," pp.62-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in the circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when said informacion posesoria was issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895 (Exhibit "T"), while the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5, 1883 (Exhibit "2").
In this case, we likewise noted that petitioner's possessory information title is also a mere photocopy as per the trial court's decision enumerating petitioner's evidence. (Rollo, p. 229.) In the Opposition filed by the OSG, it averred that petitioner moved to reopen the case and asked that she be allowed to present the original of the document as her counsel was not able to establish the existence thereof at the trial due to oversight. The OSG, however, pointed out that said failure to present this pertinent piece of evidence was not due to oversight. Rather, the original of the said title could not be presented. This can be gleaned from the transcript relevant to the matter:ATTY. BRINGAS:
In any case, Your Honor, we have a typewritten copy which is legible which we will request also to be marked in evidence.
COURT:
If that appears to be a faithful reproduction of the original upon comparison, then why not make the proper manifestation for the record[?]
FISCAL VILORIA:
But, Your Honor, according to the counsel for the applicant, he has only in his possession the xerox copy or photostat copy and the typewritten copy of the said document. We have to see the original, Your Honor.
COURT:
Yes.
ATTY. BRINGAS.
We respectfully request, Your Honor, that the photostat copy of the said document be marked in evidence as Exh. Q.
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
Your Honor, we have the typewritten original copies of this photostat copy which we respectfully request to be marked in evidence as Exh. R, the second page of Exh. R to be marked as Exh. R-1 and page 3 of said Exh. R to be marked as Exh. R-2.
COURT:
Mark them.
(Transcript of Stenographic Notes, 15 December 1978, pp.23-25)
A perusal of the enumerated evidence presented by petitioner to the CFI would readily reveal that the aforementioned photocopies were marked as such. See rollo, pp. 229-230.
40 CA resolution, id., pp. 14-15.
41 Anacleto v. Twest, G.R. No. 131411, 29 August 2000, 339 SCRA 211, pp. 216-217.
42 Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda Against SC Justices Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, et. al., A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 1, 13-14.
43 G.R. Nos. 166309-10, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 537, 540.
44 Rollo, p. 30.