(1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
x x x x
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.29 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
The management of MARINA is vested in the Maritime Administrator, who shall be directly assisted by the Deputy Administrator for Planning and a Deputy Administrator for Operations, who shall be appointed by the President for a term of six (6) years. The law likewise prescribes the qualifications for the office, including such "adequate training and experience in economics, technology, finance, law, management, public utility, or in other phases or aspects of the maritime industry," and he or she is entitled to receive a fixed annual salary.32 The Administrator shall be directly responsible to the Maritime Industry Board, MARINA's governing body, and shall have powers, functions and duties as provided in P.D. No. 474, which provides, under Sections 11 and 12, for his or her general and specific functions, respectively, as follows:
(a) Adopt and implement a practicable and coordinated Maritime Industry Development Program which shall include, among others, the early replacement of obsolescent and uneconomic vessels; modernization and expansion of the Philippine merchant fleet, enhancement of domestic capability for shipbuilding, repair and maintenance; and the development of reservoir of trained manpower; (b) Provide and help provide the necessary; (i) financial assistance to the industry through public and private financing institutions and instrumentalities; (ii) technological assistance; and (iii) in general, a favorable climate for expansion of domestic and foreign investments in shipping enterprises; and (c) Provide for the effective supervision, regulation and rationalization of the organizational management, ownership and operations of all water transport utilities, and other maritime enterprises.31
Sec. 11. General Powers and Functions of the Administrator. -- Subject to the general supervision and control of the Board, the Administrators shall have the following general powers, functions and duties;
- To implement, enforce and apply the policies, programs, standards, guidelines, procedures, decisions and rules and regulations issued, prescribed or adopted by the Board pursuant to this Decree;
- To undertake researches, studies, investigations and other activities and projects, on his own initiative or upon instructions of the Board, and to submit comprehensive reports and appropriate recommendations to the Board for its information and action;
- To undertake studies to determine present and future requirements for port development including navigational aids, and improvement of waterways and navigable waters in consultation with appropriate agencies;
- To pursue continuing research and developmental programs on expansion and modernization of the merchant fleet and supporting facilities taking into consideration the needs of the domestic trade and the need of regional economic cooperation schemes; and
- To manage the affairs of the Authority subject to the provisions of this Decree and applicable laws, orders, rules and regulations of other appropriate government entities.
Sec. 12. Specific Powers and Functions of the Administrator. -- In addition to his general powers and functions, the Administrator shall;
- Issue Certificate of Philippine Registry for all vessels being used in Philippine waters, including fishing vessels covered by Presidential Decree No. 43 except transient civilian vessels of foreign registry, vessels owned and/or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines or by foreign governments for military purposes, and bancas, sailboats and other watercraft which are not motorized, of less than three gross tons;
- Provide a system of assisting various officers, professionals, technicians, skilled workers and seamen to be gainfully employed in shipping enterprises, priority being given to domestic needs;
- In collaboration and coordination with the Department of Labor, to look into, and promote improvements in the working conditions and terms of employment of the officers and crew of vessels of Philippine registry, and of such officers and crew members who are Philippine citizens and employed by foreign flag vessels, as well as of personnel of other shipping enterprises, and to assist in the settlement of disputes between the shipowners and ship operators and such officers and crew members and between the owner or manager of other shipping enterprises and their personnel;
- To require any public water transport utility or Philippine flag vessels to provide shipping services to any coastal areas in the country where such services are necessary for the development of the area, to meet emergency sealift requirements, or when public interest so requires;
- Investigate by itself or with the assistance of other appropriate government agencies or officials, or experts from the private sector, any matter within its jurisdiction, except marine casualties or accidents which shall be undertaken by the Philippine Coast Guard;
- Impose, fix, collect and receive in accordance with the schedules approved by the Board, from any shipping enterprise or other persons concerned, such fees and other charges for the payment of its services;
- Inspect, at least annually, the facilities of port and cargo operators and recommend measures for adherence to prescribed standards of safety, quality and operations;
- Approve the sale, lease or transfer of management of vessels owned by Philippine Nationals to foreign owned or controlled enterprises;
- Prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for the prevention of marine pollution in bays, harbors and other navigable waters of the Philippines, in coordination with the government authorities concerned;
- Establish and maintain, in coordination with the appropriate government offices and agencies, a system of regularly and promptly producing, collating, analyzing and disseminating traffic flows, port operations, marine insurance services and other information on maritime matters;
- Recommend such measures as may be necessary for the regulation of the importation into and exportation from the Philippines of vessels, their equipment and spare parts;
- Implement the rules and regulations issued by the Board of Transportation;
- Compile and codify all maritime laws, orders, rules and regulations, decisions in leasing cases of courts and the Authority's procedures and other requirements relative to shipping and other shipping enterprises, make them available to the public, and, whenever practicable to publish such materials;
- Delegate his powers in writing to either of the Deputy Administrators or any other ranking officials of the Authority; Provided, That he informs the Board of such delegation promptly; and
- Perform such other duties as the Board may assign, and such acts as may be necessary and proper to implement this Decree.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.36 [emphasis supplied.]
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.39 [emphasis supplied.]
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 99 and 101.
2Id. at 100.
3 Id. at 102.
4Id. at 103-104.
5 G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
6 G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53.
7PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF MARITIME FUNCTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, CREATING THE MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on June 1, 1974.
8 Approved on April 13, 1987.
9 Rollo, pp. 14-27.
10 G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 235.
11 Rollo, pp. 34-37.
12 Id. at 38-40.
13 Id. at 40-42.
14 Id. at 86-87.
15 Id. at 88-89.
16 Id. at 90-93.
17 13 Sickels 295, 58 N.Y. 295, 1874 WL 11282 (N.Y.).
18 Id. at 93-95.
19 Id. at 127-128.
20 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. Nos. 160261-160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160365, 160370, 160376, 160392, 160397, 160403 and 160405, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133 citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
21 Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
22 Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
23 G.R. No. 171396 and six (6) other cases, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 220-221.
24 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra at 213-214, citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 129, Vda. de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91; Paloma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145431, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 590, Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 21 and Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
25 G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53.
26 Id. at 58, citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra at 757 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 522 (2002).
27 Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587, 593, citing Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 438, Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, June 26, 2001 (Unsigned Resolution), Chief Supt. Acop v. Secretary Guingona, Jr., 433 Phil. 62 (2002), Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997) and Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
28 Id. at 593.
29 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra at 328-329, 331.
30 Id. at 331-332.
31 P.D. No. 474, Sec. 2.
32 Id., Secs. 8 and 9.
33 AN ACT PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE DOMESTIC SHIPPING, SHIPBUILDING, SHIP REPAIR AND SHIP BREAKING, ORDAINING REFORMS IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS SHIPPING IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on May 3, 2004.
34 Reference: 2006 MARINA Annual Report, sourced from the Internet at http://www.marina.gov.ph/services/results.aspx?k=MARINA%20annual%20report&start1=1>.
35 G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154.
36 Id. at 158-159.
37 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Eighth Edition, p. 749.
38 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra at 326-327.
39 Id. at 327.
40 Supra note 6.
41 Id. at 62.
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. in hisponencia declaring unconstitutional the designationof respondent Maria Elena Bautista (Bautista) as Officer-in-Charge(OIC) of the Office of the Administrator of the Maritime IndustryAuthority (MARINA) in a concurrent capacity with her position asUndersecretary for Maritime Transport of the Department ofTransportation and Communications (DOTC).
A quick rundown of the facts shows that Bautista was appointed as DOTCUndersecretary in October 2006 and was designated as OICAdministrator of MARINA on September 1, 2008. On January 5,2009, she was appointed as Administrator of MARINA, the duties andresponsibilities of which position she assumed on February 2, 2009following her relinquishment of the position of DOTC Undersecretary.
Bautista thus now claims mootness of the case. A moot and academiccase is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtueof supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of nopractical use or value. Aside from the formulationof controlling principles, the grave violation of the Constitution, andthe susceptibility of recurrence as pointed out by Justice Villarama,there is the presence of practical use or value to impel the Court totake cognizance of this case.
Its mootness notwithstanding, the present petition which involves theissue of holding dual positions still calls for a resolution, for thereremains the practical use or value of identifying whether onewas a de facto or de jure officerin terms of the legal signification of the public officer's acts,remuneration and accountability.
Bautista, during her tenure as OIC Administrator of MARINA, cannot beconsidered as a de jure officer due to theunconstitutionality of the designation. At best, she can be regarded asa de facto officer in such capacity from September1, 2008 until she assumed her subsequent appointment as MARINAAdministrator on February 2, 2009.
National Amnesty Commission v. Commission onAudit1 espouses the view that one who was notappointed but merely designated to act as such cannot be considered asa de facto officer. To sustain this view, however,would place in limbo the legal effects of a designated officer's actsand would negate the raison d'etre of thede facto doctrine which is basically to protect thesanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose ostensibleauthority emanates from the State.2 To deduce that Bautista, as a designated OICAdministrator, was not a de facto officer wouldeffectively categorize her as an intruder or a mere volunteer, whichshe was not because she had a color of right or authority.
A de facto officer need not show that she waselected or "appointed in its strict sense," for a showing of a color ofright to the office suffices.
Designation may be loosely defined as an appointment because itlikewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specifiedpublic office.3 In fact, even without a known appointment orelection, the de facto doctrine comes into play ifthe duties of the office were exercised under such circumstances ofreputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people,without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to bethe officer he assumed to be.4
I submit that the pronouncement in National Amnesty Commissioncomes in the form of an obiterdictum5 since it was not necessary to the dispositionof that case where the Court disallowed the payment of honoraria to therepresentatives of the ex-officio members of theNational Amnesty Commission and ruled that the restrictions6 covering theex-officio members apply with equal force to theirrepresentatives since the representative cannot have a better rightthan his or her principal.
Civil Liberties Unionvis-á -vis Public Interest Center
With respect to the legal complexion of Bautista's position as DOTCUndersecretary, there is a need to explore the implication ofnullifying the holding of a second position.
Where a person is prohibited from holding two offices at the same time,his appointment or election to a second office may operate to vacatethe first or he may be ineligiblefor the second.7
The proposition that a person shall be declared ineligible forthe second position was followed in Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary8 where the Court ordered certain cabinetmembers, except those who were no longer occupying the positionscomplained of, "to immediately relinquish their other officesor employment, as herein defined, in the government,including government-owned and controlled corporations and theirsubsidiaries."9
Under this principle, Bautista would only be directed torelinquish the post of MARINA Administrator, if still being occupied,and concentrate on her functions as DOTC Undersecretary.
The other proposition - that a person who assumes a second andincompatible office is deemed to have resigned from the firstoffice - was applied in Public Interest Center, Inc.v. Elma10 where the Court, by Resolution of March 5,2007, clarified that the ruling did not render both appointments void. It held that "[f]ollowing the common-law rule on incompatibility ofoffices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his firstoffice as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the secondoffice"11 as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
Under this rule, Bautista would be deemed to have vacated herfirst office as DOTC Undersecretary when she accepted the post of OICAdministrator of MARINA.
The Implications of the Two Propositions
Upon a closer examination of Public Interest Center,Inc. which espouses the ipso factovacancy rule, there appears a vacuity in such a situationwhere the Court nullifies the appointment to a second office for beingunconstitutional and likewise deems the first office as having beenvacated. In the end, the public officer is left without an office.
In the present case, Bautista eventually voluntarily gave upher first post when she was subsequentlyappointed as MARINA Administrator, afterfive months of concurrently discharging the functions of an appointedDOTC Undersecretary and a designated MARINA Officer-in-Charge. Itbears noting that what is being nullified is her designation and notthe subsequent appointment as Administrator. Her current position asMARINA Administrator was conferred not by virtue of the assaileddesignation but by the subsequent appointment whicheffectively stands. Thus, notwithstanding the implication ofPublic Interest Center, the scenario of vacancy willnot occur in this peculiar case.
With respect to the proposition under Civil Liberties Union- ineligibility for the second positiononly - the only peculiarity of the present case is that the reversething transpired in the meantime, with Bautista giving up theUndersecretary position and accepting the subsequent regularappointment as MARINA Administrator. The supposed continued validityof her position as DOTC Undersecretary has been rendered nugatory byher voluntary relinquishment of said position.
Further quandary lies in the five-month interregnum.
On the one hand, following the Public InterestCenter rule that deems her first office vacated upon herholding of a second position, Bautista had become a defacto DOTC Undersecretary from September 1, 2008 (when sheassumed the position of MARINA OIC Administrator) until she resignedtherefrom. On the other hand, following the Civil LibertiesUnion rule that merely deems her ineligible for the secondposition, Bautista remained a de jure DOTCUndersecretary during her entire tenure as such.
IN FINE, I submit that the two cases provide sound formulations for twodistinct situations. The Civil LibertiesUnion rule applies to cases involving dual ormultiple positions under Section 13 of Article VII of theConstitution12 while the Public InterestCenter rule covers those under .13
The Civil Liberties Union formulation rendering thepublic officer ineligible for the second position comes into play,since Bautista was a department undersecretary, a position covered bythe prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. This principle underscores the primacy of the "President,Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistants" as a class by itself, necessitating the disallowance of anyimplied vacancy in such offices.
The Pubic Interest Center rule of impliedresignation does not apply since it speaks of "incompatibility ofoffice" which is irrelevant in determining a violation of Section 13,Article VII of the Constitution.
It has also been observed that the rule of ipsofacto vacancy of a public office by acceptance of a secondpublic office does not apply where, under applicable constitutional orstatutory provisions, the holder of a public office is renderedineligible for a specified time for a second public office; under suchcircumstances it is the second office which is considered vacant ratherthan the first office.14
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petition and further declarethat Bautista was a de facto officer during herbrief stint as MARINA OIC Administrator and a dejure DOTC Undersecretary during her entire tenureas such.
Concluding Words
The present case, in which the constitutional question posed is nolonger an unchartered sea, should once again remind all civil servantsof the rationale behind the general rule against the holding ofmultiple positions.
One manifest purpose of a restriction on multiple holdings is toprevent offices of public trust from accumulating in a singleperson.15 Indeed, no one can claim a monopoly of skills.Being head of an executive department is no meanjob. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits areto be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he shouldbe allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without thedistraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should beprecluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among toomany positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness andinefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from thisconcentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly atthis stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh thebenefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreadinghimself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.16
The same norm holds true to that of a DOTC Undersecretary for MaritimeTransport. Now as always, the country cannot afford to have a publicofficial who cannot devote full time on the crucial problems,contemporary or longstanding, not to mention the perennial seatragedies, that have beleaguered the maritime industry, an industrythat is "indubitably imbued with national interest."17
1 G.R. No. 156982,September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 655, 670.
2Vide Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No.179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817, 830.
3Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., G.R. No. 92008, July 30,1990, 188 SCRA 154, 159, where the person is merely designated and notappointed, the implication is that he shall be hold the office only ina temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointingauthority.
4Vide Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De losAngeles, 37 Phil. 186, 192 (1917).
5 Anobiter dictum has been defined as an opinionexpressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessaryto the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinionexpressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by theway," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directlyupon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involvedin the determination of the cause, or introduced by way ofillustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding asprecedent. (Delta Motors Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 212, 223).
6 With respectto the exception enunciated in the Civil LibertiesUnion case allowing posts occupied by the Executive officialsspecified therein without additional compensation in anex-officio capacity as provided by law and asrequired by the primary functions of said officials'office.
7 HECTOR DELEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR., THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS ANDELECTION LAW. 45 (2000).
8 G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
9 Id. at 339.
10 G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53.
11 G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 336, 339.
12 SECTION13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, andtheir deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided inthis Constitution, hold any other office or employment during theirtenure. x x x.
13 SECTION7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment ordesignation in any capacity to any public office or position during histenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of hisposition, no appointive official shall hold any other office oremployment in the Government or any subdivision, agency orinstrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlledcorporations or their subsidiaries.
14 63C Am.Jur. 2d §61 p. 504, that is, not merely on the ground of theincompatibility of office.
15 Supra note 7 at 45.
16 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supranote 8 at 339.
17 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews EmployeesUnion - Assisted Labor Unions (Tasli-Alu) v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 145428, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 610,621.