WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 20, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72404 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. The actual area occupied by respondent ATO covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling 215,737 square meters[,] is declared expropriated in favor of the ATO.
2. The ATO is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P304.39 per square meter for the area expropriated, or a total of P65,668,185.43 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from February 1, 2001, until the same is fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion For the Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by the plaintiffs is hereby DENIED. However, the plaintiffs are implored to file and pursue their monetary claims against the government with the Commission on Audit pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1445 vis-á-vis Rule VIII of [the] 1997 COA Revised Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.12
- W[H]ETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE IS ALREADY IN LEGAL ESTOPPEL TO OPPOSE PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR EXECUTION BECAUSE IT HAS LITIGATED AND OPPOSED THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONERS FROM THE RTC OF SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND ALL THE WAY UP TO THIS HONORABLE COURT[;]
- WHETHER OR NOT THE FINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CANNOT BE EXECUTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 6 OF P.D. NO. 1445 VIS-A-VIS RULE VIII OF THE 1997 COA REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000, DATED OCTOBER 25, 2000[; AND]
- IN THE LIGHT OF THE FINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT[,] IS IT NOT THAT RESPONDENT AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE IS THE ONE WHO IS LEGALLY BOUND TO PURSUE AND GET THE MONETARY CLAIM OF THE PETITIONERS AS DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICES[?]14
This is in connection with your claim for compensation over the portion of lot occupied by San Jose Airport subject of the case named Heirs of Mateo Pidacan, et. al. (Petitioners) v. Air Transportation Office (Respondent), docketed as G.R. No. 162779, covered by TCT No. 7160 affecting 215,737 square meters ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs just compensation with legal interest.
In this regard, we are pleased to inform you that the funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of the above-described lot encroached by San Jose Airport was earmarked in the 2007 General Appropriation[s] Act for ATO-DOTC Infrastructure Program. However, its release was held by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with the advice to file the individual claims directly with the Commission for Adjudication by the Commission Proper, Commission on Audit, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City on a quantum meruit basis.17
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.
Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
Respondent's argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the case before us.
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State's immunity from suit vis-á-vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State's immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court -- as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare -- cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated -- on the basis of quantum meruit -- for construction done on the public works housing project.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 9-21.
2 Id. at 51-54 and 60-61.
3 Penned by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (retired), with Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga (retired) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., concurring; G.R. No. 162779, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 679.
4 Now known as Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP).
5 Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo v. Air Transportation Office (ATO), supra note 3, at 688-689.
6 Rollo, p. 35.
7Id. at 36-38.
8 Id. at 39-41.
9 Id. at 45-50.
10 An Act Fixing the Time Within Which the Auditor General Shall Render His Decisions and Prescribing the Manner of Appeal Therefrom.
11 The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
12 Rollo, p. 54.
13 Id. at 55-57.
14 Supra note 1, at 13.
15 Id.
16 Reply; rollo, pp. 94-97.
17 Annex "A" of Reply.
18 Rollo, pp. 77-84.
19 SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
20 Ortega v. City of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and 181583-84, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 601, 607-608; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 167809, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 108, 122; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495, 505.
21 233 Phil. 313, 326 (1987).
22 407 Phil. 53, 64-66 (2001).
23 150 Phil. 422 (1972).
24 148-B Phil. 474 (1971).
25 National Power Corporation v. Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim, Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim, and Lucman Ibrahim, represented by his heirs Adora B. Ibrahim, Nasser B. Ibrahim, Jamalodin B. Ibrahim, Rajid Nabbel B. Ibrahim, Ameer B. Ibrahim, and Sarah Aizah B. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009, citing La Campana Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 146157, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 137, 159.
26 Supra note 3.