EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 30012-15. March 7, 1929. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, v. JOSEPH L. WILSON and ALFREDO DOLORES, Defendants-Appellants.
Gregorio Perfecto, for appellant Wilson.
Vicente Sotto, for appellant Dolores.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE; PROCEEDING ON APPEAL. — In the absence of a statute regulating the practice, it is within the sound discretion of the appellate court to determine whether the case shall be postponed to await the recapture of the accused fugitive from justice or whether the appeal shall be dismissed, and this rule applies whether the accused escapes from custody in jail or is constructively in custody be being admitted to bail.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; — The principle upon which this rule rests is that the party appealing, who flees the jurisdiction pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law, and places himself in position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option.
3. JUDGMENTS; PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS. — The presumption is that the judgments of the court below are in accordance with the law and the facts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; — The principle upon which this rule rests is that the party appealing, who flees the jurisdiction pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law, and places himself in position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option.
3. JUDGMENTS; PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS. — The presumption is that the judgments of the court below are in accordance with the law and the facts.
D E C I S I O N
OSTRAND, J.:
In criminal cases Nos. 35408, 35426, 35447, and 35473 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the defendant Joseph Wilson was convicted of the crimes of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch, estafa through falsification of a mercantile document, falsification of a mercantile document, and estafa, respectively. He appealed to this court from the judgments in all four cases. After the cases were submitted, but before the decisions had been rendered, the appellant, who was submitted to bail, fled the jurisdiction of the court and left the Philippine Islands under an assumed name.
Upon reliable information as to the defendant Wilson’s action, the Attorney-General moved that the appeal taken by said defendant from the judgments of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance in the aforesaid four cases be declared withdrawn and that said judgments be declared final. Counsel for the defendant opposes the motion, and, in substance, argues in substance, argues that inasmuch as his client has duly perfected the appeal and has presented his brief in due time, it is the duty of the court to decide the case on the merits.
The law upon the subject is well settled, and the authorities are practically unanimous that in the absence of a statute regulating the practise , it is within the sound discretion of the appellate court to determine whether the case shall be postponed to await the recapture of the accused, or the appeal shall be dismissed. And this rule or is constructively in custody by being admitted to bail,. (Warwick v. State, 73 Ala., 486; People v. Redinger, 55 Cal., 290; Bronk v. Bronk, 46 Fla., 474; McGowan v. People, 104 III., 100; State v. Scott, 70 Kan., 692; Wilson v. Com., 10 Bush [Ky. ], 526; State v. Wright, 32 La. Ann., 1017; People v. Genet, 59 N. Y., 80; State v. Jacobs, 107 N. C., 772; Tyler v. State, 3 Okla. Crim., 179; U. S. v. Ravidas, 4 Phil., 271. See also note in 3 Ann. Cas., 512.) The principle upon which this rule rests is that a party appealing who flees the jurisdiction, pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law and places himself in position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
The defendant has fled to a foreign country, is now a fugitive from justice, and there is a presumption that the judgments of the court below are in accordance with the law and the facts. Said judgments against Joseph L. Wilson are therefore declared final, and his appeal is dismissed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Upon reliable information as to the defendant Wilson’s action, the Attorney-General moved that the appeal taken by said defendant from the judgments of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance in the aforesaid four cases be declared withdrawn and that said judgments be declared final. Counsel for the defendant opposes the motion, and, in substance, argues in substance, argues that inasmuch as his client has duly perfected the appeal and has presented his brief in due time, it is the duty of the court to decide the case on the merits.
The law upon the subject is well settled, and the authorities are practically unanimous that in the absence of a statute regulating the practise , it is within the sound discretion of the appellate court to determine whether the case shall be postponed to await the recapture of the accused, or the appeal shall be dismissed. And this rule or is constructively in custody by being admitted to bail,. (Warwick v. State, 73 Ala., 486; People v. Redinger, 55 Cal., 290; Bronk v. Bronk, 46 Fla., 474; McGowan v. People, 104 III., 100; State v. Scott, 70 Kan., 692; Wilson v. Com., 10 Bush [Ky. ], 526; State v. Wright, 32 La. Ann., 1017; People v. Genet, 59 N. Y., 80; State v. Jacobs, 107 N. C., 772; Tyler v. State, 3 Okla. Crim., 179; U. S. v. Ravidas, 4 Phil., 271. See also note in 3 Ann. Cas., 512.) The principle upon which this rule rests is that a party appealing who flees the jurisdiction, pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law and places himself in position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
The defendant has fled to a foreign country, is now a fugitive from justice, and there is a presumption that the judgments of the court below are in accordance with the law and the facts. Said judgments against Joseph L. Wilson are therefore declared final, and his appeal is dismissed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
