As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
- 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija
- 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan
- Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
- Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
- The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
- 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
- Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
- Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a caretaker;
x x x x
59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.
x x x x
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si 'Allan Alvin' (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na 'master' o 'commander' ng kanyang mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeño at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni 'Allan[.]' Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
x x x x
62. x x x x
Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siya'y ginahasa.
x x x x
63. x x x x
x x x x
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x
x x x x
66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNP's unfinished investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.x x x x
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp's use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted.x x x x
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino," the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)
I
...THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO.II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.III
PETITIONERS' DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.V
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.29
- The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;
- The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;
- The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved parties...
- The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties...
- The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this case;
- The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties...
- The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties...30
[1] Whether... the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]
[2] Whether...there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo decision[.]
[3] Whether...an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.]31
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x 42
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)44
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance...for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance...49 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.50 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SHERLYN T. CADAPAN, KAREN E. EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO, represented by SPS. ERLINDA T. AND ASHER P. CADAPAN, and CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO.
2 Per Memorandum dated January 5, 2011 by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal; Vide: rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62) p. 685.
3 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), pp. 130-137.
4 Per findings of facts of the Court of Appeals; Vide: rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 79.
5 Id. at 80.
6 Id. at 84.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), p. 231-234; Return of the Writ, p. 15.
8 Per findings of fact of the CA; Vide: rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 81 citing Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), August 15, 2006, pp. 22-23.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), p. 40.
10 Per findings of the CA; rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62) pp. 81-82).
11 As earlier stated, Lt. Col. Boac denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to this effect.
12 Id. at 83.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), pp. 188-209. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of the Court) with Associate Justices Monina Arevalo Zenarosa and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 163-171.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 172-206.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Per findings of the CA; Vide: rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62) p. 90 citing TSN, November 21, 2007, p. 33.
20 Id. at 89-90.
21 Id. at 99-102.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 251-252.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 77-109. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of the Court) with Associate Justices Monina Arevalo Zenarosa and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 533.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 187109), pp. 12-15.
26 Per Certification from the Philippine Army dated August 13, 2009, respondents Generals Hermogenes Esperon Jr., Romeo Tolentino, Jovito Palparan and Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac have retired from the service. Likewise, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that PNP Director General Avelino Razon has retired from the service as well. Vide: Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 417.
27 Per Certification dated August 13, 2009 issued by Col. Eduardo Andes, Adjutant General of the Philippine Army. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 683.
28 Notices sent by the Court to the stated address of Donald Caigas have been returned. No other address has been furnished to the Court.
29 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), pp. 25-26.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), pp. 7-8.
31 Rollo (G.R. No. 187109), p.6.
32 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 27-37.
33 G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
34 Id. at 21-23.
35 In Baguio v. Teofila L. Vda. De Jalagat, et al., [149 Phil. 436, 440 (1971)], the Court ruled that... "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine...whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration."
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 60-64.
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 164.
38 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which took effect on October 24, 2007.
39 Annotation to the Writ of Amparo, p. 51. Visit also http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/Annotation_amparo.pdf .
40 Section 3 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Application for the writ [of habeas corpus] shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth x x x."
41 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 489 SCRA 160 (2006).
42 Id. at 224-225.
43 G.R. No. 183871, 613 SCRA 233 (2010).
44 Id. at 251.
45 Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, supra at 251, citing Bernas, Command Responsibility, February 5, 2007
46 Annotation to the Writ of Amparo, p. 65.
47 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
48 G.R. No. 182498, 606 SCRA 598 (2009).
49 Id. at 253.
50 Supra note 48 at 620-621.
51 In Rubrico, the Court ruled that "x x x. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these [amparo] proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility...as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents' criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. x x x." Vide also Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010.
52 Id. at 254.
53 In Rubrico, J. Morales, in her Separate Opinion, initially expounded on this limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases, to wit: That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. It further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. (emphasis and underscoring in the original)
54 An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts, and for Related Purposes. Approved on July 27, 2009.
55 Section 10 of RA 9851 states that: Responsibility of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
56 Section 13 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that: "[t]he hearing on the petition shall be summary. x x x."
57 In Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, it is provided that: "x x x. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed."