Accused Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo (Lorenza hereinafter) and victim Nelson Madeloso (Nelson hereinafter) are spouses with five children. Sometime in 1994, accused Lorenza met accused Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva (Cleofe hereinafter) [as they were both employees of the Abalos family in Kolambugan; TSN, March 5, 2002, p. 27]. [Their membership in the] congregation of a religious group, the Couple's (sic) for Christ, x x x nurtured a special friendship that culminated to an amorous relationship.
Sometime in October 2000, accused Lorenza disclosed to her kumare Ellen Dajao (Ellen hereinafter), her intimacy with accused Cleofe. Accused Lorenza even introduced accused Cleofe to Ellen as her second husband. In one of their conversations, Lorenza told Ellen how much she loves accused Cleofe. Ellen also recounted that accused Lorenza and accused Cleofe had a furious argument over the surname of accused Lorenza's fourth child, suspected to be of accused Cleofe's. Apparently, the latter wanted said child to carry his surname but accused Lorenza refused out of respect [for] her husband Nelson. Accused Lorenza further intimated to Ellen that she wanted her husband killed because he no longer gives her money.
On 5 January 2001, accused Lorenza went to her father-in-law Gregorio Madeloso (Gregorio hereinafter), in Cotabato City to get the twenty[-]three thousand pesos (P23,000.00) which the latter promised as financial assistance for her intended trip abroad. On the same day, accused Lorenza went back to Iligan City with the money. On her way to their house, she spotted her husband Nelson, sitting by the store of Vicky Ababa, approached him and angrily shouted: "Wala ko makadala ug cuarta kay wala ang imong papa mohatag." She also threatened Nelson saying: "Dili ka magdugay [Nel]son; pipila na lang ka adlaw, ipapatay ta ka."
On 10 January 2001, at around twelve o'clock noon, accused Lorenza met and had lunch with accused Cleofe and accused Leonardo Mahilum (Leonardo hereinafter) at Dado's Lechon House in Tibanga, Iligan City. Meanwhile, at around eight o'clock in the evening, Nelson went out of their house and asked Promelito Jimenez (Promelito hereinafter), their neighbor who was then sitting outside their house, for the time. Promelito answered and asked him where he was going. Nelson replied, "Mamang called for me," and then hurriedly left. Nelson fondly called his wife mamang or mama.
At around 8:15 p.m., Lorenza, with one of her children, arrived home. Meantime, Nelson chanced upon Meneleo Tumampil (Meneleo hereinafter), another neighbor driving his motorcycle bound for Villaverde, Iligan City. Nelson flagged down Meneleo. When the latter asked where he was headed, Nelson responded, "Mamang called for me." Nelson then requested Meneleo if he could drop him off at the crossing of St. Mary and Bagong Silang. Menelo acceded and the two rode off together. When Nelson reached the place, he alighted and left Meneleo on his way.
At around nine o'clock in the evening, in Bagong Silang, Nelson was shot dead by accused Leonardo. The prosecution witness, Ricky Ramos (Ricky hereinafter), saw the gruesome incident while walking on his way home from the house of a friend. He vividly recounted that he saw Nelson sitting by the gutter of the road when two (2) men, identified later on as accused Cleofe and Leonardo, crossed the street and approached Nelson. Accused Cleofe pulled Nelson up towards him and held him, while Leonardo pulled out a gun from his side and shot Nelson in the head several times.
Soon after, the Iligan City police received a report that there had been a shooting incident in Bagong Silang. Several members of the Iligan police went to the crime scene to investigate and found the victim, Nelson, prostrate on the ground drenched with his own blood.
[Promelito Jimenez, another neighbor of the Madelosos, overheard] Major Celso Regencia inform accused Lorenza about the shooting incident x x x. [He added that] accused Lorenza's reaction [to hearing about Nelson's death] was strangely opposed to ordinary human experience - she did not really look surprised, as if she was expecting the news.
Promelito, and a few other neighbors, then accompanied accused Lorenza to Bagong Silang. When accused Lorenza saw her husband's lifeless body, she embraced him and cried but her cry allegedly x x x appeared feigned and insincere [to Promelito] Nelson's bloody corpse was then taken to Mansueto Funeral homes.
At Mansueto Funeral Homes, SPO2 Genaro Enchavez asked Lorenza a few questions. When the police received the information of accused Lorenza and accused Cleofe's extra-marital affair, Lorenza was invited to the police station for further questioning where she confessed her illicit relation with accused Cleofe. Thereupon, the police proceeded to accused Cleofe's house at Riverside, Kolambogan by patrol car. The police met accused Cleofe's wife and asked her what time accused Cleofe arrived home. She replied that her husband came home between eleven and twelve o'clock midnight. When the police invited accused Cleofe to the station for questioning, his wife exhorted them to incarcerate her husband because of his alleged love affair with the wife of Nelson.
In the morning of 11 January 2001, while at the police station, Lorenza received a phone call from Leonardo. With the permission of the police, Lorenza answered the call. Leonardo instructed her to meet him at around twelve o'clock noon at Dado's Lechon House to which she agreed with the approval of the police. At around eleven-thirty o'clock in the morning, accused Lorenza, together with the police, arrived at Dado's Lechon House. After thirty minutes, more or less, accused Leonardo arrived and sat at the table occupied by accused Lorenza. The police, who were sitting nearby, approached the two accused persons and invited accused Leonardo to the police station for questioning. After investigation, the accused-appellants, Cleofe, Leonardo and Lorenza were charged with murder.2
That on or about January 10, 2001, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring with and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, [shoot,] and wound one Nelson Madeloso, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:-Cranicerebral injuryand as a result thereof, the said Nelson Madeloso died.
-Multiple Gunshot Wounds
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva, Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete and Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and there being no other aggravating circumstance (superior strength is absorbed in treachery) attending the offense, hereby sentences each of them to the single and indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory penalties prescribed by law. The accused are further ordered to indemnify solidarily the heirs of the deceased Nelson Madeloso the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as nominal damages and P1,655,640.00 as loss of earning capacity and/or support without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused Lorenza Madeloso is further disqualified from receiving any inheritance from the deceased Nelson Madeloso as well as the proceeds of any life insurance of the latter even if said accused has been named beneficiary therein.
The three accused have been under preventive detention since January 11, 2001 until the present. The period of such preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in favor of each of the accused in the service of their respective sentences.33
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 7 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Iligan City is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it found accused Cleof[e] Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete GUILTY of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The award of P10,000.00 as nominal damages is, however, DELETED. Instead, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the deceased Nelson Madeloso the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,655,640.00 as loss of earning capacity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Considering that the accused Cleof[e] Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete are detention prisoners, let the period of their detention be credited to the service of their sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of her release, or the reasons for her continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.43
Indubitably, the prosecution presented none of the percepto (command) or pacto (consideration) required to establish the liability of accused Lorenza. It bears stressing that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that accused Lorenza had an influence over accused Cleofe and Leonardo so great that such inducement would be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. We can only surmise, at the very least, the motive of the other accused, Cleofe and Leonardo, in killing Nelson. But, our surmises and conjectures, no matter how strong, are no substitute to proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, the circumstances proffered by the prosecution and relied upon by the trial court, albeit taken to be established and credible, only go [so] far as to create a suspicion of guilt or innocence. The hornbook principle is that "x x x when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction". No court, when confronted with issues that affect the life and liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the latter's constitutional guarantees and supply deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution with its own bias, suspicion or speculation.44
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
- With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
- In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
- By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
- On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity;
- With evident premeditation;
- With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
This Court has ruled consistently that alibi is an inherently weak defense and should be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution. Moreover, for alibi to overcome the prosecution's evidence, the defense must successfully prove the element of physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Physical impossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accused maintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between these points. x x x.51
Jurisprudence teaches us that the findings of the trial court judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. The trial judge's evaluation of the witness' credibility deserves utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness. Furthermore, conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying on the case.56
The credibility of evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses but by the quality of the testimony. (People v. pascual, Jr. 127 SCRA 179). The court notes that Mr. Ramos is a complete stranger to the deceased Nelson madeloso or to his father Gregorio and all of the accused. Immediately after his arrival home, he told his wife who advised him not to get involved. Nonetheless in the afternoon of the [f]ollowing day, he saw SPO2 Rodney Diez to inform him of his knowledge of the incident. There is no evidence or any other indication in record that his motive was tainted by any cause or reason other than the call of conscience. His relationship by affinity to Officer Diez is immaterial since the latter himself does not [have] an evil motive other than to do his duty as a police officer. His testimony was clear, coherent and responsive. Although he is a lone witness, "it is well-settled that the testimony of a single witness which satisfies the court in a given case is sufficient to convict." (People v. Oquiño, supra.)57
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.62
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 5-23; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring.
2 Id. at 5-9.
3 Records, pp. 11-12.
4 Id. at 24.
5 Id. at 36-38, 22, 48-49.
6 Id. at 138-141.
7 Id. at 31-32.
8 TSN, February 28, 2001.
9 TSN, February 22, 2001.
10 TSN, March 2, 2001
11 TSN, April 6, 2001.
12 TSN, April 20, 2001.
13 TSN, May 21, 2001.
14 TSN, May 28, 2001.
15 TSN, June 1, 2001.
16 TSN, August 17, 2001.
17 TSN, June 5, 2001.
18 Records, p. 14.
19 Id. at 13.
20 TSN, February 21, 2001, p. 11.
21 Id. at 18; a diagnostic cerebral injury.
22 Id. at 38.
23 Id. at 20.
24 Id. at 11-22.
25 Id. at 24.
26 TSN, October 17, 2001, pp. 7-22.
27 TSN, September 19, 2001, pp. 2-12.
28 TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 2-9.
29 TSN, January 15, 2002, pp. 3-16.
30 TSN, October 18, 2001, pp. 25-27.
31 TSN, March 5, 2002, pp. 2-12.
32 CA rollo, pp. 50-65.
33 Id. at 65.
34 Id. at 58-59.
35 Id. at 61.
36 207 Phil. 676 (1983).
37 Id. at 684.
38 CA rollo, p. 61.
39 Id. at 62.
40 Id. at 63.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 168.
43 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
44 Id. at 21.
45 Id. at 36-39.
46 CA rollo, p. 143.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 144.
49 People v. Juan, 379 Phil. 645, 665 (2000).
50 396 Phil. 289 (2000).
51 Id. at 298-299.
52 People v. Visperas, Jr., 443 Phil. 164, 175 (2003).
53 G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 562.
54 Id. at 579.
55 People v. Sion, 342 Phil. 806, 829 (1997).
56 People v. Doepante, 331 Phil. 998, 1015-1016 (1996).
57 CA rollo, p. 61.
58 TSN, June 5, 2001, p. 9.
59 People v. Piandiong, 335 Phil. 1028, 1036 (1997).
60 People v. Dinglasan, 334 Phil. 691, 711 (1997).
61 336 Phil. 475 (1997).
62 Id. at 488-489.
63 People v. Asis, G.R. No. 177573, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 509, 530.
64 Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
65 People v. Asis, supra note 63 at 531.