That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him several times with a gun, hitting him on his face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrellas other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrellas family and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mothers warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10, TSN, February 6, 2001).6
xxx [A]t about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on (a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street when Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwins) way. Jun Sayson poked a gun at accused Edwin, shouting, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita . The latter raised both his hands and said Wag kuya Jun, maawa ka.
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was walking when his way was likewise blocked but this time, by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather. Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardos) hands at his back while his (Joseltios) stepfather held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped firing. Accused Eduardos son approached him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his service firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice. He was told to take a rest and go back on (sic) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN dated 05 February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp. 2-18, 1 September 2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4; 18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25).7
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the testimonies of witnesses Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that a perusal of Estrellas testimony would cast doubt on her statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants claimed that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being incredible. They said that Susan testified that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not speak; yet she was still able to give her statement on the same day the incident allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said that Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away from them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but that, “interestingly,” she only learned from her husband Joselito that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported failure to see who between the accused-appellants threatened Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?” and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was preventing him from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms. Estrella categorically stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellants for the simple reason that they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants) father is her “cumpadre.” When the incident happened, the accused-appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where she and her son Moises were standing. She also saw with her own eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately 9 shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.11
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, “Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not “Did you commit a crime named murder.” If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (retired), with Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (retired) concurring.
2 Id., p. 57.
3 Id., p. 3.
4 Id., p. 3.
5 Id.
6 Id., p. 5.
7 Id., pp. 6-7.
8 Id., pp. 7-8.
9 Id., p. 17.
10 Id., p. 11.
11 Rollo, pp. 13-14 (bold emphases are in the original text).
12 People v. Darilay, G.R. Nos. 139751-752, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45, 54.
13 People v. Santiago, G.R. Nos. 137542-43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256; People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260; People v. Pacheco, G.R. No. 142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164, 174; People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349; People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-154; Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150433, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 219-220; Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 154804, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 489, 495; People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306.
14 People v. Ebrada, G.R. No. 122774, September 26, 1998, 296 SCRA 353, 365.
15 People v. Gailo, G.R. No. 116233, October. 13, 1999, 316 SCRA 733, 748.
16 Rollo, pp. 6-7.
17 Garcia v. People , G.R. No. 144699, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 221, 228.
18 Exhibits K and L.
19 Exhibit D.
20 Exhibits Q and R.
21 TSN, May 23, 2000, pp. 3-13; September 12, 2000, pp. 2-7.
22 People v. Bardaje, No. L-29271, August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 388, 399; People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 127818, November 11, 1998, 298 SCRA 450, 463.
23 Art. 8, 2nd Par., Revised Penal Code; Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 514, 527; People v. Ogapay, No. L-28566, August 21, 1975, 66 SCRA 209, 214.
24 People v. Cabrera,G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 28, 34.
25 People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 404; People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 572, 580.
26 People v. Natipravat, No. L-69876, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 483, 492; People v. Bausing, G.R. No. 64965, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 355, 364; People v. Merabueno, G.R. No. 87179, December 14, 1994, 239 SCRA 197, 203-204.
27 Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.
28 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298, 327.
29 G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-667.
30 United States v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).
31 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
32 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
33 Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.