Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.
2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.
Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal ownership of petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right to possession.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.13
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 19
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases--forcible entry and unlawful detainer--are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents' possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]
Endnotes:
* Designated as acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by then Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
2 Rollo, p. 43.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-38.
4 Rollo, p. 36.
5 CA rollo, p. 40.
6 Id.
7 Rollo, p. 88.
8 Rollo, p. 40.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 41.
12 Id.
13 Rollo, pp. 15-16.
14 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium I (7th rev. ed. 2007).
15 David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
16Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003) as cited in Urieta vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, 05 July 2010, 623 SCRA 130.
17 Vicente v. Avera, G.R. no. 169970, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 634.
18 G..R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
19 Supra, citing Estrellita S.J. vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and Lina F. vda. de Santiago, G.R. No. 117971, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 12; citing Noblejas and Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, 210 (1992); citing Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 (1990). (Ching v. Court of Appeals was erroneously cited as G.R. Nos. 59568-76 in the original Decision in Co v. Militar).
20 G.R. No. 159292, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA 474.
21 G.R. No. 166941, 14 December 2009, 608 SCRA 169.
22 Id.
23 G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
24 G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147.
25 414 Phil. 311, 323 (2001).
26 Rollo, p. 291.
27 Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, 15 December 2010.
28 Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 315.
29Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Magay v. Estiandan, G.R. No. L-28975, 27 February 1976; 69 SCRA 456 as cited in Pena, Pena, Jr. & Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (2008).