Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
(a) P3,077,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P400,000.00 as and for reasonable attorneys fees
(e) legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum on the above-stated amounts from the filing of the complaint on January 16, 1991 until fully paid; and
(f)costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
Third party defendant Manuel M. Ong is ordered to indemnify third party plaintiff [Orix] for the amounts adjudged against the latter in this case.
SO ORDERED.27
The evidence leaves no doubt that both truck drivers were at fault and should be held liable. Lucilo, who was driving the Fuso truck, was reckless when he caused the swerving of his vehicle directly on the lane of the Pathfinder to his left. The Pathfinder had no way to avoid a collision because it was about to pass the truck when suddenly blocked. On the other hand, the Isuzu truck was practically tailgating the Pathfinder on the dark slippery highway such that when the Pathfinder collided with the Fuso truck, it became inevitable for the Isuzu truck to crash into the Pathfinder. So, de los Santos, the driver of the Isuzu truck was likewise reckless.28
It may be true that it was the Nissan Pathfinder which first hit and bumped and eventually crashed into the Fuso truck. However, this would not have happened if the truck did not swerve into the lane of the Nissan Pathfinder. As afore-mentioned [sic], the latter had no way then to avoid a collision because it was about to overtake the former.
As a motorist, Lucilo [Loreto] should have operated his truck with reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather. He should have carefully and cautiously driven his vehicle so as not to have endangered the property or the safety or rights of other persons. By failing to drive with reasonable caution, Lucilo is, hence, liable for the resultant vehicle collision.
Neither do [we] find credence in delos Santos claim that he is without liability for the vehicular collision. We cannot overemphasize the primacy in probative value of physical evidence, that mute but eloquent manifestation of the truth. An examination of the destroyed front part of the Isuzu truck, as shown by photographic evidence, clearly indicates strong bumping of the rear of the Pathfinder. The photographs belie delos Santos claim that he was driving at a safe speed and even slowed down when he noticed the [erratic] traveling of the Fuso truck. In fact, by his own admission, it was a matter of seconds before his Isuzu truck hit the Nissan Pathfinder - a clear indication that he did not actually [slow] down considering the weather and road condition at that time. Had he been actually prudent in driving, the impact on the Nissan Pathfinder would not have been that great or he might have even taken evasive action to avoid hitting it. Sadly, that was not the case as shown by the evidence on record.32
(a) P150,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao and their daughter Marianne Mangalinao;
(b) P2,000,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;
(c) P64,200.00 for funeral expenses;
(d) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(e) P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(f) P400,000.00 as attorneys fees.
If the amounts adjudged remain unpaid upon the finality of this decision, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment bec[a]me final and executory until fully satisfied.
The six percent (6%) interest per annum from the filing of the complaint indicated in the assailed decision is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.33
T: Pakisalaysay mo nga ang mga pangyayari? S: Nuon nga pong oras at petsang nabanggit habang ako ay sakay ng isang truck patungo Pampanga at sa lugar ng pinangyarihan ay namireno ang aking driver dahil sa madulas at nagawi kami sa gawing kaliwa (inner lane) na isang mabilis na pajero (Nissan 4x4) ang bumangga sa gawing unahan hanggang sa tagiliran gawing kaliwa, na ang nasabing pajero ay papalusot (overtake) na pagkatapos nuon ay may isa (1) pang truck na bumangga sa hulihan.39
The exact positions of the vehicles upon a perusal of the sketch45 (drawn only after the Fuso was moved to the shoulder to decongest traffic) would show that both the Pathfinder and the Isuzu rested on the highway diagonally. The left part of the former occupied the right portion of the inner lane while the rest of its body was already on the outer lane, indicating that it was about to change lane, i.e., to the inner lane to overtake. Meanwhile, the point of collision between the Pathfinder and the Isuzu occurred on the right portion of the outer lane, with the Isuzus front part ramming the Pathfinders rear, while the rest of the 10-wheelers body lay on the shoulder of the road.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. DOMINGO: Q And what was this if you noticed anything before the incident happened? A The Fu[s]o Cargo Truck was swerving from left to right, Sir. Q How long before this collision did you notice this kind of travelling on the part of the Fu[s]o Cargo Truck? A About 15 to 20 minutes, Sir. Q When you noticed this, what if anything, did you do? A I slow[ed] down, Sir. Q When you said you slow[ed] down, at what speed do you mean you were travelling? A More or less 50 kph., Sir. Q So prior to that, you were travelling faster than 50 to 60 kph. Is that correct? A Yes, Sir. Q And [in spite] of that, you testified that you hit the Nissan Pathfinder after it hit the Fu[s]o Cargo Truck? A Despite the fact that it slow[ed] down, I also hit the Nissan Pathfinder when I skidded because of the slippery condition of the road at that time. Q And it was precisely this slippery condition of the road that you are talking about that caused you to hit the Nissan Pathfinder? A Yes, Sir.41 x x x x Q I will just go back to the incident on the collision. At what particular point in the vehicle you were driving hit the Nissan Pathfinder? At what portion of the Nissan Pathfinder was it hit by the vehicle that you were driving? A At the rear portion of the Nissan Pathfinder, Sir. Q What portion, the right o[r] the left portion of the rear? A I hit the right side of the rear portion of the Nissan Pathfinder, Sir. Q And what happened to the Nissan Pathfinder after you hit it on the right rear portion? A The back portion of the Nissan Pathfinder was damaged, Sir. Q And what was the extent of the [damage] on the back portion? A The rear portion was extensively damaged, Sir. Q After you hit the rear portion of the Nissan Pathfinder, did your vehicle hit any other portion of that Nissan Pathfinder? A None, Sir. Q After you hit the Nissan Pathfinder at the rear, in what manner did it move, if it moved? A After I hit the rear portion of the Nissan Pathfinder, it did not move anymore, but I also hit the right side of the Fu[s]o Cargo Truck, Sir. COURT: For a while, what part of the Fu[s]o Cargo Truck did you hit? WITNESS: A I hit the sidings of the Fu[s]o Cargo Truck, Your Honor.42 x x x x CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. GUERRERO: Q When the Pathfinder hit the Fu[s]o Truck, were you still behind the Pathfinder? A Yes, Sir. Q [Were you] still in the same lane that you were travelling 30 minutes before the impact? A Yes, Sir. Q You did not move from your lane [in spite] of the collision between the Pathfinder and the Fu[s]o Truck? A No, Sir. I did not move. I stayed on my lane.43x x x x
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. NATIVIDAD: Q You stated a while ago, during the cross-examination by counsel that the moment you saw the Nissan Pathfinder [smash] against the side of the Fu[s]o, you did not move your Truck anymore. Why did you not swerve to the left or to the right? A Because there was an [oncoming] bus signalling [sic] to me, Sir. Q How about to the right, why did you not abruptly maneuver your truck to the right to avoid hitting the Nissan Pathfinder? A I cannot move my truck to the right side because my truck will not pass thorugh [sic] the lane because it is very narrow and if I will do that, I might fall on the other side of the highway where houses were standing. Q You said that you were unable to pass through the right side of the road. Why [were you] not able to pass [through] to the right side[?] You said it was too narrow. Why is it too narrow? A Because the Fu[s]o Truck cut across the highway and my truck cannot pass through that space. It is only in the fast lane where I can pass through, Sir. Q All the while this bumping or the impact between the Nissan Pathfinder and the Fu[s]o Truck and your bumping against the Nissan Pathfinder happened in a few seconds only. Is that correct? A Yes, Sir.44
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.46
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. x x x48cralaw
Endnotes:
* Per raffle dated January 10, 2012.
1 Consolidated pursuant to our Resolution dated October 4, 2006, rollo (G.R. No. 174266 p. 31 and G.R. No. 174089, p. 133).
2 Docketed as G.R. No. 174089. Orix is formerly known as the Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation. See Manifestation and Motion, records, pp. 533-536.
3 Docketed as G.R. No. 174266.
4 CA rollo, pp. 164-181; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador.
5 Id. at 202-203.
6 Records, pp. 401-402; TSN-SPO2 Emmanuel Banag, p. 35, February 1, 1996; TSN-Antonio delos Santos, May 16, 1997, pp. 11, 25-26.
7 Exhibit “S-3,” records, p. 411; Exhibit “7,” id. at 446.
8 TSN-Antonio delos Santos, March 18, 1997, p. 8.
9 Exhibit “S-4,” records, p. 411; Exhibit “6,” id. at 446.
10 Exhibits “S-1” and “S-2,” id. at 411.
11 Id. at 403.
12 Id. at 392-393.
13 Id. at 395-400, 401-402, 419-421.
14 Id. at 409-410.
15 N.B. Pedro Dizon was then the legal guardian at the time the damages suit was filed. He was replaced by the childrens grandfather, Raymundo Mangalinao, id. at 386 and 388. Upon Raymundo Mangalinao death, the childrens aunt, Zenaida Mercado, was appointed to replace him, id. at 351-352.
16 Id. at 1-6.
17 Raffled to Branch 133.
18 Id. at 408.
19 Id. at 12-17.
20 Id. at 99.
21 Id. at 143-152.
22 Id. at 463-472.
23 Id. at 115-124.
24 Id. at 61-65.
25 Id. at 243 and 289.
26 Id. at 526-529; penned by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.
27 Id. at 529.
28 Id. at 528.
29 See Notice of Appeal, id. at 530-531.
30 See Notice of Appeal, id. at 539-540.
31 Supra note 4.
32 CA rollo, pp. 174-175.
33 Id. at 180-181.
34 See Orixs Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 182-193, and Sonny and Antonios Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 227-237.
35 Supra note 5.
36 Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 414, 423 (1997).
37 OMC Carriers, Inc. v. Nabua, G.R. No. 148974, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 624, 631.
38 “The exceptions are when: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.” Sealoader Shipping Corporation v. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167363 & 177466, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 488, 510 citing Spouses Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., 511 Phil. 115, 123-124 (2005).
39 Records, p. 392.
40 TSN-Antonio delos Santos, March 18, 1997, pp. 6-9.
41 TSN-Antonio delos Santos, May 16, 1997, pp. 11-12.
42 Id. at 15-16.
43 Id. at 19.
44 Id. at 26-27.
45 Supra note 11.
46 Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460, 465 (1988).
47 Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
48 Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 109 (1957) as reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 162267, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 141, 147 and Cadiente v. Macas, G.R. No. 161946, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 105, 111.
49 Erezo v. Jepte, id. at 110.
50 Civil Code, Article 2199.
51 Records, p. 414, Exhibit “X”. While there is another receipt issued by San Roque dated June 28, 1990, id. at 413, Exhibit “X” certifies that P57,000.00 have been paid by the Mangalinaos all in all for the services the funeral homes rendered in 1990.
52 Id. at 412.
53 Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; x x x x
54 Records, pp. 415-417. The net income of Roberto was computed at P1,300,634.47.
55 Under established jurisprudence, the formula for net earning capacity is computed at:
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at the time of death) x (Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses, e.g. 50% of the Gross Annual Income).
56 Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
57 Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, 399 Phil. 243, 255 (2000).
58 Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 190521, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 471, 484.
59 Id., citing Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 591, 596 (2004).
60 Predicated on Articles 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code which provide:
Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
- A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
- Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
- Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
- Adultery or concubinage;
- Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
- Illegal search;
- Liberal, slander or any other form of defamation;
- Malicious prosecution;
- Acts mentioned in Article 309;
- Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
61 OMC Carriers, Inc., v. Nabua, supra note 37 at 639, citing Spouses Hernandez v. Spouses Dolor, 479 Phil. 593, 605 (2004).
62 Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc., supra note 58 at 488; Heirs of Redentor Completo v. Albayda, Jr., G.R. No. 172200, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 97, 115.
63 Civil Code, Article 2231.
64 Civil Code, Article 2229.
65 Civil Code, Article 2234.
66 Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc., supra note 58 at 488; Go v. Cordero, G.R. Nos. 164703 and 164747, May 4, 2010, 620 SCRA 1, 32.
67 Civil Code, Article 2208(1) and (11).
68 Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific Airways Corp., G.R. Nos. 170414, 170418 and 170460, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 219, 237; Philippine National Railways v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006, 506 SCRA 685, 704.