Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
x x x x
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 147-148.
2 See Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 319.
3 149 Phil. 547 (1971).
4 158-A Phil. 1 (1974).
5 Sec. Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 426 (1998).
6 97 Phil. 806, 811 (1955), citing Rice v. Sioux City, U.S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1955, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.
7 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1207 (1996), citing Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent.
The Cases
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1959, which declared a state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
The Antecedents
In the morning of 23 November 2009, fifty-seven (57) innocent civilians met their tragic and untimely death in a gruesome massacre unequaled in recent history,1 considered to be the Philippines worst case of election-related violence. Brutally killed were female family members of then Buluan Vice Mayor Esmael “Toto” Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), including his wife and sisters, and members of the press who were part of a convoy on the way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Mangudadatus wife was bringing with her Mangudadatus certificate of candidacy for Governor of Maguindanao for filing with the Provincial Office of the Commission on Elections in Shariff Aguak. Five of the victims were not part of the convoy but happened to be traveling on the same highway.2
In its Consolidated Comment dated 14 December 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondents, narrated the harrowing events which unfolded on that fateful day of 23 November 2009, to wit:
x x x x
3. Vice Mayor Mangudadatu confirmed having received reports that his political rivals (Ampatuans) were planning to kill him upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy (COC) for the gubernatorial seat in Maguindanao. Believing that the presence of women and media personalities would deter any violent assault, he asked his wife and female relatives to file his COC and invited several media reporters to cover the event.
4. At around 10 a.m., the convoy stopped at a designated PNP checkpoint along the highway of Ampatuan, Maguindanao manned by the Maguindanao 1508th Provincial Mobile Group, particularly, Eshmail Canapia and Takpan Dilon. While at a stop, they were approached by about one hundred (100) armed men. The armed men pointed their weapons at the members of the 1508th Provincial Mobile Group manning the check point, and threatened them to refrain from interfering. The members of the convoy were then ordered to alight from their vehicles and to lie face down on the ground, as the armed men forcibly took their personal belongings. Subsequently, all members of the convoy were ordered to board their vehicles. They were eventually brought by the armed men to the hills in Barangay Masalay, Ampatuan, about 2.5 kilometers from the checkpoint.
5. At about the same time, Vice Mayor Mangudadatu received a call from his wife Genelyn who, in a trembling voice, told him that a group of more or less 100 armed men stopped their convoy, and that Datu Unsay Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr. was walking towards her, and was about to slap her face. After those last words were uttered, the phone line went dead and her cellphone could not be contacted any longer. Alarmed that his wife and relatives, as well as the media personalities were in grave danger, Vice Mayor Mangudadatu immediately reported the incident to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
6. In the afternoon of the same day, soldiers - aboard two army trucks led by Lt. Col. Rolando Nerona, Head of the Philippine Armys 64th Infantry Battalion - went to the town of Ampatuan to confirm the report. At around 3 p.m., they passed by the checkpoint along the highway in Ampatuan manned by the 1508th Provincial Mobile Group and asked whether they were aware of the reported abduction. Members of the 1508th Provincial Mobile Group denied having knowledge of what they have witnessed at around 10 in the morning purportedly out of fear of retaliation from the powerful Ampatuan clan. Nevertheless, P/CI Sukarno Adil Dicay, the head of the Mobile Group, instructed P/INSP Diongon to accompany the military on foot patrol as they conduct their operation relative to the reported abduction.
7. Upon reaching Barangay Masalay, Ampatuan, the soldiers on foot patrol found dead bodies, bloodied and scattered on the ground and inside the four (4) vehicles used by the convoy. Three (3) newly covered graves and a back hoe belonging to the Maguindanao Provincial Government parked nearby with its engine still running were found at the site. When the graves were dug up by the soldiers, twenty four (24) dead bodies were found in the first grave; six (6) dead bodies with three (3) vehicles, particularly a Toyota Vios with the seal of the Tacurong City Government, a Tamaraw FX and an L300 owned by the media outfit UNTV were found in the second grave; and five (5) more dead bodies were recovered from the third grave, yielding 35 buried dead bodies and, together with other cadavers, resulted in a total of fifty seven (57) fatalities.
8. x x x
9. Examination of the bodies revealed that most, if not all, of the female victims pants were found unzipped, and their sexual organs mutilated and mangled. Five (5) of them were tested positive for traces of semen, indicative of sexual abuse while some of the victims were shot in the genital area. The genitalia of Genelyn Mangudadatu was lacerated four (4) times, and blown off by a gun fire, and her body horrifyingly mutilated. Two of the women killed were pregnant, while another two were lawyers. Twenty-nine (29) of the casualties were media personnel. Almost all gun shot injuries were on the heads of the victims, rendering them unrecognizable albeit two (2) bodies remain unidentified. Those found in the graves were coarsely lumped like trash, and some of the victims were found hogtied. All the dead bodies bear marks of despicable torture, contempt and outrageous torment.3
DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN CENTRAL MINDANAO
WHEREAS, on November 23, 2009, several persons, including women and members of media were killed in a violent incident which took place in Central Mindanao;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to prevent and suppress the occurrence of similar other incidents of lawless violence in Central Mindanao;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim, as follows:
SECTION 1. The Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato are hereby placed under a state of emergency for the purpose of preventing and suppressing lawless violence in the aforesaid jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) are hereby ordered to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said jurisdiction.
SECTION 3. The state of emergency covering the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato shall remain in force and effect until lifted or withdrawn by the President.4
PROCLAMATION NO. 1959
PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN AREAS
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1946 was issued on 24 November 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato for the purpose of preventing and suppressing lawless violence in the aforesaid areas;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Art.VII of the Constitution provides that “x x x In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x”
WHEREAS, R.A. No. 69865 provides that the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of x x x depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”
WHEREAS, heavily armed groups in the province of Maguindanao have established positions to resist government troops, thereby depriving the Executive of its powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety;
WHEREAS, the condition of peace and order in the province of Maguindanao has deteriorated to the extent that the local judicial system and other government mechanisms in the province are not functioning, thus endangering public safety;
WHEREAS, the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities dated 14 November 1997 provides that the following is considered a prohibited hostile act: “x x x establishment of checkpoints except those necessary for the GRPs enforcement and maintenance of peace and order; and, for the defense and security of the MILF in their identified areas, as jointly determined by the GRP and MILF. x x x”
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim, as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the province of Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as referred to in the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities.
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.6
Pursuant to the provision of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President of the Republic of the Philippines is submitting the hereunder Report relative to Proclamation No. 1959 “Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, except for Certain Areas,” which she issued on 04 December 2009, as required by public safety, after finding that lawless elements have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people of Maguindanao, for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government or its laws, the Province of Maguindanao, and likewise depriving the Chief Executive of her powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety, to the great damage, prejudice and detriment of the people in Maguindanao and the nation as a whole.
x x x
The capture of identified leader Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr. would have resulted in the expeditious apprehension and prosecution of all others involved in the gruesome massacre, but the situation proved the contrary. The Ampatuan group backed by formidable group of armed followers, have since used their strength and political position to deprive the Chief Executive of her power to enforce the law and to maintain public order and safety. More importantly, a separatist group based in Maguindanao has joined forces with the Ampatuans for this purpose. These are the facts:
1. Local government offices in the province of Maguindanao were closed and ranking local government officials refused to discharge their functions, which hindered the investigation and prosecution team from performing their tasks;
2. The Local Civil Registrar of Maguindanao refused to accept the registration of the death certificates of the victims purportedly upon the orders of Andal Ampatuan Sr.;
3. The local judicial system has been crippled by the absence or non-appearance of judges of local courts, thereby depriving the government of legal remedies in their prosecutorial responsibilities (i.e. issuance of warrants of searches, seizure and arrest). While the Supreme Court has designated an Acting Presiding Judge from another province, the normal judicial proceedings could not be carried out in view of threats to their lives or safety, prompting government to seek a change of venue of the criminal cases after informations have been filed.
Duly verified information disclosed that the Ampatuan group is behind the closing down of government offices, the refusal of local officials to discharge their functions and the simultaneous absence or non-appearance of judges in local courts.
Detailed accounts pertaining to the rebel armed groups and their active movements in Maguindanao have been confirmed:
I. As of November 29, 2009, it is estimated that there are about 2,413 armed combatants coming from the municipalities of Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Datu Salibo, Mamasapano, Datu Saudi Ampatuan (Dikalungan), Sultan Sa Barungis, Datu Piang, Guindulungan, and Talayan, who are in possession of around 2,000 firearms/armaments.
II. The Ampatuan group has consolidated a group of rebels consisting of 2,413 heavily armed men, with 1,160 of them having been strategically deployed in Maguindanao. Validated information on the deployment of rebels are as follows:
I. Around five hundred (500) armed rebels with 2 “Sanguko” armored vehicles are in offensive position in the vicinity of Kakal, Ampatuan, Dimampao, Mamasapano and Sampao Ampatuan.
II. A group with more or less 200 armed rebels has moved from Old Maganoy into an offensive position.
III. More or less 80 fully armed rebels remain in Tuka, Mamasapano.
IV. More or less 50 fully armed rebels led by a former MNLF Commander are in offensive position in Barangay Baital, Rajah Buayan.
V. More or less 70 fully armed rebels with two (2) M60 LMG remain in offensive position in the vicinity of Barangay Kagwaran, Barangay Iginampong, Datu Unsay (right side of Salvo-General Santos City national highway).
VI. More or less 60 fully armed rebels with four (4) M60 LMG remain in offensive position in the vicinity of Kinugitan, the upper portion of Barangay Maitumaig, Datu Unsay.
VII. Kagui Akmad Ampatuan was sighted in Sultan Sa Barongis with 400 armed rebels. Locals heard him uttered “PATAYAN NA KUNG PATAYAN.”
VIII. More or less 100 armed rebels led by one of the identified leaders in the massacre have been sighted at the quarry of Barangay Lagpan, boundary of Rajah Buayan and Sultan Sa Barongis. The group is armed with one (1) 90RR, one (1) cal 50 LMG, two (2) cal 30 LMG, two (2) 60 mm mortar and assorted rifles.
The strength of the rebels is itself estimated to be around 800 with about 2,000 firearms (Fas). These forces are concentrated in the following areas in Maguindanao which are apparently also their political stronghold:
x x x
The existence of this armed rebellion is further highlighted by the recent recovery of high powered firearms and ammunitions from the 400 security escorts of Datu Andal Ampatuan Sr.
x x x
Indeed, the nature, quantity and quality of their weaponry, the movement of heavily armed rebels in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and fourteen other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks and patrol cars with unauthorized “PNP/Police” markings, all together confirm the existence of armed public uprising for the political purpose of:
1. removing allegiance from the national government of the Province of Maguindanao; and,
2. depriving the Chief Executive of her powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety.
While the government is at present conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, public safety still requires the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao until the time that such rebellion is completely quelled.7 (Emphasis supplied)
PROCLAMATION NO. 1963
PROCLAIMING THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE RESTORATION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1946 was issued on 24 November 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato for the purpose of preventing and suppressing lawless violence in the aforesaid areas;
WHEREAS, by virtue of the powers granted under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President of the Philippines promulgated Proclamation No. 1959 on December 4, 2009, proclaiming a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus in the province of Maguindanao, except for certain areas;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have reported that over six hundred (600) persons who allegedly rose publicly and took up arms against the Government have surrendered or have been arrested or detained;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have reported that the areas where heavily armed groups in the province of Maguindanao established positions to resist government troops have been cleared;
WHEREAS, the court and prosecutors offices of Cotabato City have resumed normal working hours, paving the way for the criminal justice system in Maguindanao to be restored to normalcy;
WHEREAS, the Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao has assumed as Acting Governor, paving the way for the restoration of the functioning of government mechanisms in the province of Maguindanao;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1959 and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law and the restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Maguindanao; provided that Proclamation No. 1946 shall continue to be in force and effect.8
That on or about 27th day of November, 2009, and continuously thereafter, until the present time, in Maguindanao Province and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr., Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Datu Akmad Tato Ampatuan, Datu Anwar Ampatuan and Datu Sajid Islam Uy Ampatuan as heads of the rebellion, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the other accused as participants or executing the commands of others in the rebellion and also with other John Does whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused, who are heads of the rebellion, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command their co-accused who are their followers to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof or depriving the Chief Executive of any of her powers or prerogatives as in fact they have been massing up armed men and organizing assemblies, as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts preventing public prosecutors from being available to conduct inquest and preliminary investigations. There were massive formations of numerous armed civilians supported by armored vehicles and under the command of the Ampatuans who have formed a private army to resist government troops; that the local provincial government of Maguindanao could not function with their employees going on mass leave and their respective offices were closed and not functioning. The Regional Trial Courts of the area are not functioning, refused to accept the application for search warrants for violation of PD 1866 to authorize the search of the properties of the heads of the rebellion; and that there was undue delay in the issuance of court processes despite the exigency of the situation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the evidence forming part of the records and those adduced by the prosecution during the hearing on the motion for judicial determination of probable cause, the Court is convinced that there exist[s] no probable cause to hold under detention and to indict the accused for rebellion.
x x x x
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed -
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either -(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
x x x x
The essential element of public armed uprising against the government is lacking. There were no masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. So, even assuming that there was uprising, there is no showing that the purpose of the uprising is political, that is, to overthrow the duly constituted government in order to establish another form of government. In other words, the second element is also absent.
x x x x
x x x It is quite interesting that the prosecution failed to present any particular instance where the accused had directly or indirectly prevented government prosecutors from performing their job relative to the prosecution of the suspects in the infamous Maguindanao massacre.
On the contrary, documentary evidence on record shows that the alleged principal suspect in the mass killings, Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., was made to undergo inquest proceedings at General Santos City, immediately after he was taken into custody by law enforcement authorities. This alone belies the prosecutions theory that the prosecutors were not available to conduct inquest and preliminary investigations relative to the mass killings in the Municipality of Ampatuan, Province of Maguindanao.
x x x x
x x x [T]he intelligence reports presented by the military and police are unfounded. The reports do not suggest that the alleged armed groups loyal to the accused are initiating violent and hostile actions, whether directly or indirectly, against government security forces. Even the discovery and confiscation of large cache of firearm and ammunitions, allegedly belonging to the Ampatuans, cannot be considered as an act of rebellion. In fact, the firearms and ammunitions were subsequently unearthed, recovered and confiscated from different places. The government security forces should have been able to engage and neutralize the reported armed groups on the basis of its intelligence reports confirming their size, strength and whereabouts.
x x x x
The statements of prosecution witnesses Mangacop and Dingcong are general allegations. Their statements do not show that the accused were responsible for the mass leave of officials and employees of the local government units. There is no evidence to show that the accused actually prevented the local officials and employees from reporting to their offices.
The evidence will show that the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Philippine National Police closed down these offices, without any justifiable reasons. In fact, there were news footages which showed that many employees were caught by surprise on the unexpected closure of their offices.
x x x x
It is alleged in the Information that the courts were no longer functioning in Cotabato City and in Maguindanao province, which have jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the massacre. The factual circumstances, however, belie said allegation. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that no less than the Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines had denied the allegation that civilian courts were or are no longer functioning in Maguindanao.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that there exists no probable cause to indict and hold under detention the accused for rebellion. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby dismissed and the accused-movants are hereby ordered released from further detention, unless they are held by a court of law for other lawful cause/s.
Let this Order be served personally upon the accused-movants, through the responsible officers of the law having custody over them, who are hereby directed to release the accused from detention immediately upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.13
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule:
‘x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they [involved] only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied)
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence”. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.42
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied)
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Martial law has precisely been provided in both the 1935 Charter and the present Constitution to assure that the State is not powerless to cope with invasion, insurrection or rebellion or any imminent danger of its occurrence. When resort to it is therefore justified, it is precisely in accordance with and not in defiance of the fundamental law. There is all the more reason then for the rule of law to be followed. For as was so eloquently proclaimed in Ex parte Milligan: “The Constitution is a “law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances.” It is true, of course, as admitted by Willoughby, who would limit the scope of martial law power, that the military personnel are called upon to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of legal norms. They can therefore act like ordinary peace officers. In effecting arrests, however, they are not free to ignore, but are precisely bound by, the applicable Rules of Court and doctrinal pronouncements. (Emphasis supplied)
At the heart of petitioners complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
x x x x
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. x x x
x x x x
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
x x x x
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. x x x
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A declaration of martial law by the President alone is complete by itself and does not require for its validity the approval or concurrence of Congress. It is a power placed solely in the keeping of the President to enable him to secure the people from harm and restore the public order so that they can enjoy their freedoms. Because it is liable to abuse, it is made subject to check by Congress and/or the [Supreme Court].
The power of Congress is to revoke - not to confirm or ratify, much less to approve, - the Presidents action declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is a veto power, just as the power of the judiciary to review the Presidents action is a veto power on the Executives action.
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 10(2), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
2. The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law.
Section 12, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution
SEC. 12. The Prime Minister shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial Law.
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action.54
1. Local government offices in the province of Maguindanao were closed and ranking local government officials refused to discharge their functions, which hindered the investigation and prosecution team from performing their tasks;
2. The Local Civil Registrar of Maguindanao refused to accept the registration of the death certificates of the victims purportedly upon the orders of Andal Ampatuan Sr.;
3. The local judicial system has been crippled by the absence or non-appearance of judges of local courts, thereby depriving the government of legal remedies in their prosecutorial responsibilities (i.e. issuance of warrants of searches, seizure and arrest). While the Supreme Court has designated an Acting Presiding Judge from another province, the normal judicial proceedings could not be carried out in view of threats to their lives or safety, prompting government to seek a change of venue of the criminal cases after informations have been filed.
x x x x
Indeed, the nature, quantity and quality of their weaponry, the movement of heavily armed rebels in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and fourteen other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks and patrol cars with unauthorized “PNP/Police” markings, all together confirm the existence of armed public uprising for the political purpose of:
(1) removing allegiance from the national government of the Province of Maguindanao; and,
(2) depriving the Chief Executive of her powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety.
While the government is at present conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, public safety still requires the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao until the time that such rebellion is completely quelled.56 (Emphasis supplied)
REP. LAGMAN. Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, a perusal of the text of Proclamation No. 1959 would show the absence of a clear and categorical finding or determination that actual rebellion is occurring in Maguindanao. Would that be an accurate observation of a reading of the text of Proclamation No. 1959?
MR. ERMITA. Your Honor, you may be correct that there was no actual rebellion going on. However, all the indicators that rebellion is, indeed, being committed and happening on the ground is because of the presence of the armed groups that prevent authorities from being able to do its duty of even effecting the arrest of those who should be arrested in spite of the testimonies of witnesses.
REP. LAGMAN. Well, we are happy to note that there is an admission that there was no actual rebellion in Maguindanao. But the presence of armed groups would be indicative of lawless violence which is not synonymous to rebellion. As a matter of fact, the Maguindanao situationer which was made by Police Director Andres Caro was premised on a statement that this was the worst election-related violence - an act of gross lawlessness but definitely not related to rebellion.
x x x x57 (Emphasis supplied)
THE SENATE PRESIDENT. With the indulgence of the Chamber and the Speaker, may we request now to allow the distinguished Gentleman from Tarlac, Senator Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III the floor.
SEN. AQUINO. Thank you, Mr. President. May I direct my first question to Secretary Puno. And this is to lay the proper predicate for our first question. The newspaper has been quoting Secretary Puno as not having recommended the imposition of martial law prior to its imposition in Maguindanao. May we know if this was a correct attribution to the Honorable Secretary.
MR. PUNO. Until, Your Honor, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Senate President, until the situation developed where police officers went absent on leave and joined the rebel forces, and a significant segment of the civilian armed volunteers of the local governments constituted themselves into a rebel group, until that time I did not believe that it was necessary that martial law be declared. But upon receipt of a report from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the briefing conducted with the National Security Council, where it was made clear that a separate rebel armed group had already been organized, we concurred, Your Honor, with the recommendation on martial law.
SEN. AQUINO. For the record, Mr. Senate President and Mr. Speaker, the AFP, we understand, through the spokesperson, Lt. Col. Romeo Brawner, declared on 13 November 2009 that there is no need for the declaration of martial law in Maguindanao or elsewhere in the country because the AFP and PNP are on top of the situation. He was quoted as saying, and we quote: “We now have a level of normalcy in the Province of Maguindanao, primarily because of the occupation by our government forces and our law enforcement agencies of the seats of government.” Secretary Norberto Gonzales, who unfortunately is not present, declared on December 1, 2009 that the governments effort to contain the tension in the province is holding ground. We also have now the admission by the honorable Secretary Puno that prior to the undated national security briefing, he was also of the opinion that martial law was not necessary in Maguindanao. x x x58
We’ll have to get the report from the field from the AFP and PNP that the conditions that prompted the President to issue the proclamation, have improved, and therefore, the threat of further lawlessness and probability of rebellion is already down.59 (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Presidential Adviser for Mindanao Jesus Durezas statement reported in Philippine Daily Inquirer on 23 November 2009 (http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091123-237934/Wife-of-gubernatorial-bet-35-killed-in-Maguindanao [accessed on 4 November 2011], Wife of gubernatorial bet, 35 killed in Maguindanao Palace adviser calls for state of emergency) and in Philippine Star on 24 November 2009 (http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=526314 [accessed on 4 November 2011];Maguindanaomassacre).
The mass murder of the journalists was tagged “as the darkest point of democracy and free press in this recent time.” (Statement of NUJP Cebu Chapter President Rico Lucena reported in philstar.com with title Maguindanao death toll now 46: Emergency rule in two provinces (http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=526616 [accessed on 4 November 2011]).
The massacre was considered “one of the deadliest single events for the press in memory" and the Philippines the worlds worst place to be a journalist, according to international press freedom watchdog Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). (http://www.gmanews.tv/story/177821/the-ampatuan-massacre-a-map-and-timeline [accessed on 4 November 2011])
2 Fifty-five of the casualties were identified as follows:
1. | Bai Genelyn T. Mangudadatu | Wife of Mangudadatu |
2. | Bai Eden Mangudadatu | Sister/Vice Mayor, Mangudadatu, Maguindanao |
3. | Pinky Balaiman | Cousin of Mangudadatu |
4. | Mamotavia Mangudadatu | Aunt |
5. | Bai Farida Mangudadatu | Youngest sister |
6. | Rowena Ante Mangudadatu | Relative |
7. | Faridah Sabdula | Sister |
8. | Soraida Vernan | Cousin |
9. | Raida Sapalon Abdul | Cousin |
10. | Rahima Puto Palawan | Relative |
11. | Lailan “Ella” Balayman | Relative |
12. | Walida Ali Kalim | Relative |
13. | Atty. Concepcion Brizuela | Lawyer |
14. | Atty. Cynthia Oquendo Ogano | Lawyer |
15. | Cataleno Oquendo | Father of Atty. Cynthia Oquendo |
16. | Marife Montano | Saksi News, Gensan |
17. | Alejandro Bong Reblando | Manila Bulletin, Gensan |
18. | Mc Delbert “Mac Mac” Areola | UNTV Gensan |
19. | Rey Marisco | Periodico Ini, Koronadal City |
20. | Bienvenido Jun Lagarta | Prontierra News, Koronadal City |
21. | Napoleon Salaysay | Mindanao Gazette |
22. | Eugene Depillano | UNTV Gen San |
23. | Rosell Morales | News Focus |
24. | Arturo Betia | Periodico Ini, Gen San |
25. | Noel Decena | Periodico Ini |
26. | John Caniba | Periodico Ini |
27. | Junpee Gatchalian | DXGO, Davao City |
28. | Victor Nunez | UNTV Gen San |
29. | Andres Teodoro | Central Mindanao Inquirer |
30. | Romeo Capelo | Midland Review, Tacurong City |
31. | Joy Duhay | Gold Star Daily |
32. | Ronnie Perante | Gold Star Daily, Koronadal City |
33. | Benjie Adolfo | Gold Star Daily, Koronadal City |
34. | Ian Subang | Socsargen Today, Gen San |
35. | Joel Parcon | Prontiera News, Koronadal City |
36. | Robello Bataluna | Gold Star Daily, Koronadal City |
37. | Lindo Lipugan Mindanao | Daily Gazette, Davao City |
38. | Ernesto Maravilla | Bombo Radyo, Koronadal City |
39. | Henry Araneta | Radio DZRH, Gen San |
40. | Fernando Razon | Periodico Ini, Gen San |
41. | Hannibal Cachuela | Punto News, Koronadal City |
42. | Lea Dalmacio | Socsargen News, Gensan |
43. | Marites Cablitas | News Focus, Gensan |
44. | Gina Dela Cruz | Saksi News, Gensan |
45. | Anthony Ridao | Government employee |
46. | Mariam Calimbol | Civilian |
47. | Norton “Sidic” Edza | Driver |
48. | Jephon C. Cadagdagon | Civilian |
49. | Abdillah Ayada | Driver |
50. | Joselito Evardo | Civilian |
51. | Cecille Lechonsito | Civilian |
52. | Wilhelm Palabrica | Government Employee |
53. | Mercy Palabrica | Government Employee |
54. | Daryll Vincent Delos Reyes | Government Employee |
55. | Eduardo “Nonie” Lechonsito | Government Employee |
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 105-109.
4 Id. at 185.
5 Should be Republic Act No. 6968, which is “An Act Punishing the Crime of Coup D état by Amending Articles 134, 135 and 136 of Chapter One, Title Three of Act Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Fifteen, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal Code, and for Other Purposes.” Republic Act No. 6986 is titled “An Act Establishing a High School in Barangay Dulop, Municipality of Dumingag, Province of Zamboanga Del Sur, to be Known as the Dulop High School, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 186-187.
7 Id. at 163-164, 173-177, 182.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 190-191.
9 Rollo (G..R. No. 190293), pp. 83-84; rollo (G.R. No. 190356), p. 55.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), p. 407.
11 The accused are: Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr., Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Datu Akmad Tato Ampatuan, Datu Anwar Ampatuan, and Datu Sajid Islam Uy Ampatuan, as persons who allegedly promoted, maintained or headed the rebellion; and Kusain Akmad Sakilan, Jovel Vista Lopez, Rommy Gimba Mamay, Sammy Duyo Villanueva, Ibrahim Tukya Abdulkadir, Samil Manalo Mindo, Goldo B. Ampatuan, Amaikugao Obab Dalgan, Billy Cabaya Gabriel, Jr., Abdulla Kaliangat Ampatuan, Moneb Smair Ibrahim, Umpa Ugka Yarka, Manding Abdulkadir, Dekay Idra Ulama, Kapid Gabriel Cabay, Koka Batong Managilid, Sammy Ganda Macabuat, Duca Lendungan Amban, Akmad Abdullah Ulilisen and several John Does, as participants or the persons executing the commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection. (RTC-Quezon City Order dated 26 March 2010, pp. 3-4).
12 RTC-Quezon City Order dated 26 March 2010, p. 4.
13 RTC-Quezon City Order dated 26 March 2010, pp. 10-13, 15-16, 18. Penned by Presiding Judge Vivencio S. Baclig.
14 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 115168.
15 Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta.
16 SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 507 (2004), citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
17 Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 Edition, p. 474.
18 David v. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 757-759 (2006). See Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623 (2000).
19 Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555, 570-571 (2002) citing Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, supra.
20 David v. Arroyo, supra note 18 at 753.
21 Id. at 753.
22 Id. at 754.
23 Id., citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806 (2004).
24 Id., citing Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001).
25 Id., citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.
26 Id., citing Albaña v. Commission on Elections, 478 Phil. 941 (2004); Acop v. Guingona, Jr., 433 Phil. 62 (2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, supra note 16.
27 G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
28 Id.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), p. 508; Brief of Amicus Curiae Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
30 Retired Chief Justice Panganiban called this a historic moment and reminded the Court of its duty to uphold the Constitution. He writes:
The Court faces a historic moment. It cannot cower or cop-out or hide behind legalisms. Worse, in a false sense of gratitude, it should not invent legal excuses to justify or cover plainly unconstitutional acts. Rare is the opportunity for greatness. Let the Court not squander the moment. Let it perform its duty forthrightly and uphold the Constitution.
(http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20091220-243027/Uphold-the-Constitution [accessed on 4 November 2011], With Due Respect: Uphold the Constitution)
31 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), p. 509; Brief of Amicus Curiae Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
32 An Act Punishing the Crime of Coup D état by Amending Articles 134, 135 And 136 of Chapter One, Title Three of Act Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Fifteen, Otherwise Known as The Revised Penal Code, and for Other Purposes.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), p. 138.
34 Id. at 493, Amicus Memorandum of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza.
35 See retired Chief Justice Punos separate concurring opinion in United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Judge Laguesma, 351 Phil. 244, 292 (1998), citing Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, pp. 142-143 [1927]; also cited in Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, Sec. 32, pp. 54-55, Vol. 1 [1929].
36 Supra note 16.
37 Id. at 520. The Court stated that “[a] declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.”
38 See Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 1 June 2007, 523 SCRA 318, 336.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), p. 512, Brief of Amicus Curiae Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
40 Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992, 215 SCRA 808, 819. The Court held therein:
Clear and convincing proof is “x x x more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases x x x” while substantial evidence “x x x consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance x x x” Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order. (Citations omitted)
41 Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
42 Raymundo v. Lunaria, G.R. No. 171036, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 526.
43 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 5. Substantial evidence. - In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
44 Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 189402, 6 May 2010, 620 SCRA 375, 384.
45 Viudez II v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152889, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 345, 357.
46 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
In addition, jurisprudence tells us that in the following instances, a warrantless search and seizure is valid.
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
(2) search of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
See Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632, 645-646 (1997), citing People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100 (1997).
Stop-and-frisk is also another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant (Posadas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, 2 August 1990, 188 SCRA 288, 292-293, cited in Manalili).
47 160 Phil. 906, 909 (1975); citations omitted.
48 243 Phil. 735 (1988).
49 Id. at 743-745, 748-749.
50 Id. at 497, Brief of Amicus Curiae Retired Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza.
51 Id. at 523, Brief of Amicus Curiae Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
52 Id. at 524, Brief of Amicus Curiae Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
53 See Senate P.S. Resolution No. 1522.
54 Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 Edition, p. 456.
55 SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, supra note 16. See Section 15, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 757 (1995), the Court declared that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
56 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 163-164, 173-177, 182.
57 Transcript of Plenary Proceedings, Joint Session of the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, 9 December 2009. See also “Ermita: ML proclaimed without actual rebellion,” The Philippine Star, 11 December 2009 (http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=531416&publicationSubCategoryId=63 [accessed on 4 November 2011], where the following report appeared:
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita admitted Wednesday night that President Arroyo proclaimed martial law in Maguindanao without an “actual” rebellion taking place in the province as required by the Constitution.
But in response to questions raised by Albay Rep. Edcel Lagman, Ermita pointed to the presence of armed groups supporting the Ampatuan family that were preventing the authorities from enforcing the law, which, he added, was frustrating the ends of justice.
Ermita said the government considered the “presence” or “massing” of the Ampatuans armed followers as “rebellion,” one of only two grounds under the Constitution, aside from invasion, for the imposition of martial law.
Ermita though conceded there was no actual rebellion taking place, in the sense of people taking up arms to withdraw allegiance from the central government or prevent it from enforcing the law.
Lagman said that Ermitas answers to his questions and Justice Secretary Agnes Devanaderas statement that there was rebellion in Maguindanao was only “looming” prove that Mrs. Arroyo received “bad legal advice” in imposing martial rule in the province.
“The President has enough powers under the commander-in-chief provision of the Constitution to quell a looming rebellion or neutralize the presence or massing of armed loyalists of the Ampatuans. She is authorized to call on the Armed Forces to accomplish that objective,” Lagman said.
Lagman pointed out the absence of rebellion in Maguindanao as defined under the Revised Penal Code.
“What happened there was lawlessness. It was just a partisan conflict that did not require the imposition of martial law,” he said.
58 Transcript of Plenary Proceedings, Joint Session of the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, 9 December 2009.
59 Quoted in the Petition in G.R. No. 190307, p. 15, citing http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/04/09/arroyo-orders-martial-law-maguindanao [accessed on 10 November 2011], Arroyo proclaims martial law in Maguindanao.
60 http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=529869 [accessed on 4 November 2011], DOJ: Rebellion was looming.
61 Mantawil Petition (G.R. No. 190356), pp. 8-9.
62 http://www.mb.com.ph/node/231907/martial-law-idea-need [accessed on 4 November 2011], Martial law idea needs study — Gonzales.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20091205-240273/A-rebellion-was-in-the-offingjustice-chief [accessed on 4 November 2011], A rebellion was in the offing —justice chief.
67 Proclamation No. 1081 (PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES), 21 September 1972.
68 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943191,00.html [accessed on 4 November 2011], Behind the Philippines Maguindanao Massacre, by Alastair McIndoe.
DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
The martial law era has left the country with harrowing memories of a dark past, thus invoking passionate sentiments from the people and bringing forth remarkable vigilance as a lesson learned, and only rightfully so. Nonetheless, legal discourse must be made within bounds, as must always be the case in a civilized society governed by the rule of law and not of men. It is on the basis of the foregoing precept that I am constrained to register my dissent in the instant case.
As can be gathered from the ponencia, the controversy in the instant case revolves around the issuance by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) of Proclamation No. 1959,1 which declared a state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Maguindanao, except for certain identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
To recall, the issuance of Proclamation No. 1959 was precipitated by the chilling and loathsome killing, on November 23, 2009, of 57 innocent civilians, including the wife of then Buluan Vice-Mayor Esmail “Toto” Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), who was supposed to file the latters certificate of candidacy for Governor of Maguindanao with the Provincial Office of the Commission on Elections in Shariff Aguak, accompanied by Mangudadatus relatives, lawyers and members of the press, among others. The victims included five others who only happened to be travelling on the same highway traversed by the Mangudadatu convoy.
As a consequence of the detestable killings tagged by media as the “Maguindanao massacre,” President Arroyo immediately issued Proclamation No. 19462 on the following day, November 24, 2009, by which a state of emergency was declared in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat, and in the City of Cotabato, “to prevent and suppress the occurrence of similar other incidents of lawless violence in Central Mindanao.” This was followed with the issuance of the assailed Proclamation No. 1959 on December 4, 2009.
Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her Report3 to Congress in compliance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Meanwhile, the instant petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959.
Also consonant with Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress convened in joint session on December 9, 2009.
Eventually, on December 12, 2009, President Arroyo lifted martial law and restored the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao with the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963.4
Justiciability of the instant petitions
In the majority opinion, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959, racionating that “given the prompt lifting of the proclamation before Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.”
It is my view that, despite the lifting of the martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ, the Court must take the bull by the horn to guide, explain and elucidate to the executive branch, the legislative branch, the bar, and more importantly the public on the parameters of a declaration of martial law.
Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that this Court may only adjudicate actual and current controversies.5 This is because the Court is “not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.”6 Nonetheless, this “moot and academic” rule admits of exceptions. As We wrote in David v. Arroyo:
First, the Presidents martial law declaration or suspension of the writ is questioned in the Supreme Court without Congress acting on the same. Such a situation generates no conflict between the Supreme Court and Congress. There is no question that the Supreme Court can annul such declaration or suspension if it lacks factual basis. Congress, whose only power under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is to revoke the initial declaration or suspension on any ground, is left with nothing to revoke if the Court has already annulled the declaration.
Second, Congress decides first to revoke the martial law declaration or suspension of the writ. Since the Constitution does not limit the grounds for congressional revocation, Congress can revoke the declaration or suspension for policy reasons, or plainly for being insignificant, as for instance it involves only one barangay rebelling, or if it finds no actual rebellion. In this case, the Supreme Court is left with nothing to act on as the revocation by Congress takes effect immediately. The Supreme Court must respect the revocation by Congress even if the Court believes a rebellion exists because Congress has the unlimited power to revoke the declaration or suspension.
Third, the Supreme Court decides first and rules that there is factual basis for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. In such a situation, Congress can still revoke the declaration or suspension as its power under the Constitution is broader insofar as the declaration or suspension is concerned. “Congress cannot be prevented by the Court from revoking the Presidents decision because it is not for the Court to determine what to do with an existing factual situation. x x x Congress has been given unlimited power to revoke the Presidents decision.” In short, even if there is an actual rebellion, whether affirmed or not by the Supreme Court, Congress has the power to revoke the Presidents declaration or suspension. (Italics in the original; citations omitted.)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government x x x.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them.” To him, “[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.”
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by “any branch or instrumentalities of government,” the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called “expanded certiorari jurisdiction” of this Court x x x.
x x x x
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.12 (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted.)
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as defined in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the Presidents capacity to safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose of the Constitution.
What all these point to are that the twin requirements of “actual rebellion or invasion” and the demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But whether there exists a need to take action in favour of public safety is a factual issue different in nature from trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of existing armed movements. Thus, in deciding whether the President acted rightly or wrongly in finding that public safety called for the imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such decision involves the verification of factors not as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the necessity of imposing martial law to ensure public safety even in the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated. This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were reluctant to override the executives judgment.
In sum, since the President should not be bound to search for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a prudential matter, the function of the President is far from different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not. Put differently, looking for rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking for rebellion under the Constitution.15
Endnotes:
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 186-187.
2 Id. at 185.
3 Id. at 163-182.
4 Id. at 190-191.
5 Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, 629 SCRA 530, 533; citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
6 Id.
7 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 192-194. Resolution dated December 15, 2009.
9 G.R. No. 132540, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 103, 118-119; citing Jaafar v. Commission on Elections, 364 Phil 322, 327-328 (1999); emphasis supplied.
10 Separate Opinion of Justice Nachura in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. Nos. 191149, 191342 & 191420, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666, 780; citing Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 570, 858 A. 2d 709 (2004).
11 Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990, 187 SCRA 377, 383.
12 G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 123-124, 132-133.
13 See Coseteng v. Mitra, supra note 11.
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed., 2010).
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 190293), pp. 516-518.
SEPARATE OPINION
PEREZ, J.,
I concur in the resulting dismissal of these petitions, more than by reason of their mootness but because I find our action overdue, it being my well-thought-out position that the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 1959 has expired and is no more.
Proclamation No. 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao was issued by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 4 December 2009. In compliance with the mandate of Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, she submitted her Report to Congress on 6 December 2009 or “within forty-eight hours from the proclamation.”
Seven petitions, now before the Court, were filed disputing the constitutionality of the Proclamation. In the Resolutions of 8 and 15 December 2009, the Court consolidated the petitions and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petitions. By that time, 15 December 2009, President Arroyo has, on 12 December 2009, already issued Proclamation No. 1963 lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.1
The authority of this Court to act on the petitions is embodied in the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which states:
The Supreme Court may review in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
Endnotes:
1 This and the immediately preceding paragraph were taken from the ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
2 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), 568 SCRA 402, cited by Justice Antonio T. Carpio, p. 27 of ponencia.
3 Term used by Bernas, SJ., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and Commentary, 2003 Ed., p. 865.