That Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case, are going to vacate the premises in question and transfer the old house subject of this ejectment case [to] the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, located at 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from today, but not later than April 30, 1990;
That in transferring the old house subject of this suit to the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462 of plaintiff, plaintiff shall shoulder all expenses in dismantling said house and in the reconstruction of said house, plaintiff binds herself to pay fifty (50%) percent of the costs of labor and expenses in transferring the said house;
That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2) meter wide exit alley on the eastern portion of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462 and on the southern portion of said lot as roadright-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the west of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462;
That defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements introduced fronting the residence of the plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same area;
That the parties are waiving their respective claims for moral damages, as well as attorney's fees as appearing in the Complaint and Counter-Claim appearing in their Answer in order to totally have this case amicably settled.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that Judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court base[d] on the terms and conditions of this Compromise Agreement.
Midsayap, Cotabato, August 10, 1989.
WHEREFORE, finding the Compromise Agreement to be in accordance with law and equity, the same is hereby approved and judgment is rendered pursuant to, and in accordance with the terms and conditions therein stipulated.8
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Court, Municipal Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato the herein attached original copy of the writ of Execution issued in the above-entitled case with the information that:
- Defendants Jesse and Bema is (sic) found to be out of the real estate property of the plaintiff;
- The boundary of the defendants and the plaintiff is distinct; and
- The improvements introduced by the defendants fronting the residence of the plaintiff is already outside the lot of the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned had nothing to do except to return the said Writ of Execution for whatever the Honorable Court may deem necessary and appropriate for both parties.9
That on May 30, 1990, the undersigned met one of the defendants at the premises of the subject area and three days after, the same met the plaintiff in the same area; the same informations were obtained which are top confidential except that their boundary is distinct;
That the defendants are no longer within the metes and bounds of the plaintiffs property;
That Lot No. 25[8]6-[GJ-28 is the only base (sic) of this case and no other lots more; and,
That the defendants had complied [with] the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully submit, that he has fully complied with the Writ of Execution issued by the Honorable Court in this case.11
Mandamus does not lie where there was no right of petitioner which was excluded from exercising and there is no duty on the part of respondent Judge to perform (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Bello, 10 SCRA 238).
The law concedes to judges and courts the right to decide questions according to their judgment and their understanding of the law and if their decision in that regard is not correct or contrary to law, appeal, not Mandamus, is the remedy. (Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabique, 17 SCRA 286.)17
1. Can the Honorable Regional Trial Court set a condition - other than that provided in the Judgment itself —for the implementation and execution of the said judgment in Civil Case No. 711?
2. Was it legal, lawful and proper and did the Honorable Regional Trial Court act without or in excess and/or grave abuse of discretion when it ordered and directed the execution of the Judgment in Civil Case No. 711, subject to the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which is never a condition in the said judgment sought to be executed in full? or
3. Did the Honorable Regional Trial Court, act without and in excess or abuse of discretion and against the law and jurisprudence, in dismissing the petition for Mandamus and making the issuance of a Writ of Execution subjected to the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which is never a condition made in said Judgment sought to be executed?23
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution in Special Civil Case No. 051 dated February 3, 1999 is hereby set aside. As prayed for by petitioner, respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue an alias Writ of Execution in Ejectment Case No. 711 ordering the full and complete implementation of the judicially approved compromise judgment.24
What is involved in Ejectment Case No. 711 is only the material possession of the lot litigated therein. In Special Civil Case No. 070, what is involved is the issue of who between the parties therein has a better right to purchase the lot of the public domain the pendency of which may not abate the execution of the compromise judgment in Ejectment Case No. 711.25
Movants may not be allowed to renege from their express undertaking "to vacate the premises and transfer the old house at the back of lot 2586-[G]-28" and/or "to remove all of their improvements" from the premises in dispute embodied in the judicially approved compromise in Ejectment Case No. 111. Reiterated here, for emphasis, is the Court's previous holding that the pendency of Civil Case No. 070 (on appeal in the Supreme Court) which calls for the determination of who between the litigants possesses as superior right to purchase the land of the public domain will not bar the execution of the executory compromise judgment.26
1. Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue an alias Writ of Execution to execute a compromise agreement which the Provincial Sheriff, the Municipal Trial Court, and the Regional Trial Court ruled to have been properly executed?
2. Will Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to eject Petitioners from the land they occupy and applied for under MSA XII-6-1669 after demolition of the contested house by virtue of a compromise agreement in an ejectment case?30
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
In order that a writ of mandamus may issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for the same has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties and is never issued in doubtful cases. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.34
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
[W]e have time and again ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties. It is a contract perfected by mere consent, whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law arid is conclusive between the parties, and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise, x x x.37
Prevailing case law provides that "a compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, 'a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory.' Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive on the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it." Hence, compromise
agreements duly approved by the courts are considered the decisions in the particular cases they involve.39
COURT: Q This house here which is now remain standing in the lot enclosed with bamboo fence, was it existing at the time of the filing of the complaint between you and defendants at the time the decision was rendered? JESSE CACHOPERO: A Yes, your Honor. x x x x ATTY. AGDEPPA: That the roofing is a part of the old house that was brought down when the second story was destroyed, your Honor. x x x x COURT: There is a structure which has been destroyed and above the remaining structure of which a shade of galvanized iron was made. Yes... JESSE CACHOPERO: A part of the second floor which was lowered down. COURT: Another questions - This structure here was already existing during the time of the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court? JESSE CACHOPERO: Yes, your Honor. ATTY. AMPARO: When the two story building was demolished, how did the remaining portion looks like? JESSE CACHOPERO: It looks like a bahay kubo, sir. ATTY. AMPARO: When the building was demolished, what improvement did you introduce? JESSE CACHOPERO: The walling made of rough wood, sir. ATTY. AMPARO: How about this wall on the other side of the remaining structure? JESSE CACHOPERO: It is part of the old building, sir. x x x x COURT: In other words it has already been paid for the expenses of the demolition. Why was the other parts of the building not included in the demolition which was made at the instance of the plaintiff? RACHEL CELESTIAL: Because he objected and according to him (Jesse Cachopero) it is beyond my property, your Honor.40
To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a direct effect on the matter already litigated and settled. Or, the supervening events must create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice.43cralaw
Endnotes:
* Per Special Order No. 1207 dated February 23, 2012.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Rollo, pp. 20-26; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Godardo
3 A. Jacinto and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
4 Id. at 27.
4 Id. at 37.
5 Celestial v. Cachopero, 459 Phil. 903, 911 (2003).
6 Rollo, pp. 28-31.
7 Id. at 35-36.
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id. at 41.
10 Id. at 42.
11 Id. at 51.
12 Id. at 32-33.
13 CA rollo, p. 50.
14 Rollo, p. 49.
15 Id. at 88-96.
16 Id. at 52-53.
17 Id. at 53.
18 Id. at 101.
19 Celestial v. Cachopero, supra note 5 at 916.
20 Rollo, pp. 97-100.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 99.
23 CA rollo, p. 29.
24 Rollo, p. 26.
25 Id. at 25.
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id. at 275-281.
28 Celestial v. Cachopero, supra nole 5 at 915-916.
29 Id. at 931.
30 Rollo, p. 8.
31 Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Hon. Amante, Jr., 501 Phil. 86, 102 (2005).
32 Albay Accredited Constructors Association v. Honorable Ombudsman Desierto, 516 Phil. 308, 325 (2006).
33 355 Phil. 381(1998).
34 Id. at 397.
35 Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, 493 Phil. 854, 860 (2005).
36 501 Phil. 228(2005).
37 Id. at 239.
38 G.R. No. 153904, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 549.
39 Id. at 565-566.
40 Rollo, pp. 151-155.
41 Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150, 161-162 (2005).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 162.