That on or about the 29th day of May, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation suddenly entered the bedroom of private complainant,3 a minor, 12 yrs of age, located at xxx Brgy. Talayan, this City, and once inside, pushed said complainant to lie down, forcibly inserted his finger to her private part, removed her panty and thereafter had sexual intercourse with said offended party, all against her will, and without her consent, which acts further debase, degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said private complainant as a human being, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Dr. Jerico Angelito Q. Cordero, 28 years old, physician and a medico-legal officer assigned as Deputy Chief of DNA Analysis Center conducted medical and physical examination upon the victim on May 29, 2002 at 7:50 in the evening. His findings, marked as Exhibit “E” show that under genital category, the hymen is annular with deep healed laceration at 4 and 9 o’clock positions. Under labia minora, it is light brown slightly hypertrophied (increased in size) labia minora; that the fourchette (part of the sex organ located just below the hymen), was abraded, meaning “nagasgas or nalagusan” (TSN, September 20, 2002, p. 6). He found out that AAA is in a non-virgin state physically and there are no signs of application of any form of physical trauma. He said that deep-healed laceration means that the injury has healed 5 to 10 days from the time of the injury.7
The Court finds that AAA was actually violated in her own room. The act was already consummated when her father entered her room, looking for her. The accused was putting and zipping up his pant inside the room of the victim who was crying on her bed, hair and dress disheveled, shaken and visibly afraid of the accused. Her panty was on, but “wala sa ayos,” as explained by her father who was shocked to see his daughter on bed with the accused in the act of zipping up his pants. Whipping up a young girl with two sticks of walis tingting would perhaps make her cry but would not certainly make her lie on bed, shaking in fear and uttering words inaudibly. This condition of AAA is a manifestation that she was threatened and forced sexually. Her testimony was firm - she was abused and raped. The accused even used his finger on her vagina before he slipped his penis inside her vagina. The accused also “pinataob” her and did anal sex (TSN, Feb. 7, 2003, pp. 4-7). When asked how many times the accused raped her, she said outrightly, “Ten (10) times” (Ibid).
The testimony of AAA was honest, straightforward and clear. She answered all questions of her ordeal in clearcut language. She mentioned the word “pinataob” to describe the next position the accused assumed to penetrate her anus. Young as she is, her purpose was to unearth the truth - that she was raped by the accused not only on that fateful day of May 29, 2002, but several times before.xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused JULIUS TAGUILID Y BACOLOD is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) as civil indemnity in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence (People v. Obejaso, 299 SCRA 549; People v. Ibay, 233 SCRA 15); the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) as moral damages; and the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 02-109810 finding accused-appellant Julius Taguilid y Bacolod GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.10
In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of private complainant should be accorded full faith and credit as it amply supports a finding of guilt on the part of accused-appellant for the commission of the said offense. Indeed, the narration of her ordeal was honest, straightforward and clear and all through her entire testimony she remained firm and steadfast in identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.
On the other hand, accused-appellant can only set up the defense of denial. Denial, although a legitimate defense, is an inherently weak defense that crumbles in the face of positive and categorical identification of the private complainant. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evident, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witness and the negative statement of the accused, the former deserves more credence.
Incidentally, we cannot also help but observe that the weakness of accused-appellants defense becomes all the more apparent in this appeal considering as to how he is now trying to change his theory as to what had transpired on May 29, 2002. For instance, during the trial of the case, accused-appellant contended that there was no rape but a serious case of misunderstanding between him and the father of the private complainant as his shorts fell as a result of private complainants retaliation for beating her with walis tingting. On appeal however, a reading of the arguments of the accused-appellant shows that while he still maintains that there was no rape, he avers that the sexual congress was consensual as there was absence of physical struggle or resistance on the part of the private complainant.
Lastly, the absence of fresh lacerations on private complainants genitalia is not a factor that is conclusively relied upon to establish the non-existence of rape. Indeed, the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not cancel out the commission of rape, since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime. In fact, even the absence of fresh lacerations does not preclude the finding of rape.
This holds true in the instant case considering that coupled with the testimony of private complainant on the rape and her identification of the accused-appellant as the culprit therein, the medico-legal report and the medico-legal, Dr. Cordero testified that private complainant is in a non-virgin state . To repeat, proof of injuries is not essential to the crime itself.
Significantly, let it also be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense is [sexual intercourse without consent].
That having been said, we find no reversible error committed by the trial court in convicting accused-appellant of the offense of rape. The records of the case show that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her will through the use of force and intimidation. Such being the case, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for absent any circumstance that would qualify the rape under the instances enumerated under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.11
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE.II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.III.
THE FINDINGS/PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AS CONTAINED IN THE MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT DOES NOT SHOW AND/OR IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE OFFENSE OF RAPE.12
Endnotes:
1 CA Rollo, pp. 8-11.
2 Rollo pp. 2-13; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired), Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok (retired) and Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag (retired) concurring.
3 The real names of the victim and the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004). Instead, fictitious names shall be used to designate them. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
4 Rollo, pp. 2-3.
5 CA Rollo, p. 9.
6 CA Rollo, p. 9.
7 Id., (bold underscoring is part of the original text).
8 Id., p. 10.
9 Id., pp. 40-41 (bold underscoring is part of the original text).
10 Rollo, p. 13.
11 Id., pp. 11-12.
12 CA Rollo, p. 22.
13 Id., pp. 32-33.
14 Id., p. 34.
15 Id., p. 35.
16 Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 532, 541.
17 People v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 616, 622; People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 271.
18 People v. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011; see also People v. Masalihit, G.R. No. 124329, December 14, 1998, 300 SCRA 147, 155; People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No.128823-24, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 325, 333.
19]Blacks Law Dictionary 193 (5th ed., 1979).
20 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102, 115.
21 People v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No. 176633, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 411, 428; citing People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 626.
22 People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 809, 820.
23 People v. Llagas, G.R. No. 178873, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 707, 717.
24 People v. Rapisora, G.R. No. 147855, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 237, 256.