A
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF “TAKING” IS NOVEMBER 21, 1989, WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs SDP [STOCK DISPTRIBUTION PLAN] “IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE FWBs WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA LUISITA” BECAUSE:
(1) THE SDP IS PRECISELY A MODALITY WHICH THE AGRARIAN LAW GIVES THE LANDOWNER AS ALTERNATIVE TO COMPULSORY COVERAGE IN WHICH CASE, THEREFORE, THE FWBs CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OWNERS AND POSSESSORS OF THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS AT THE TIME THE SDP WAS APPROVED BY PARC;
(2) THE APPROVAL OF THE SDP CANNOT BE AKIN TO A NOTICE OF COVERAGE IN COMPULSORY COVERAGE OR ACQUISITION BECAUSE SDP AND COMPULSORY COVERAGE ARE TWO DIFFERENT MODALITIES WITH INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE RULES AND MECHANISMS;
(3) THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE OF JANUARY 02, 2006 MAY, AT THE VERY LEAST, BE CONSIDERED AS THE TIME WHEN THE FWBs CAN BE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF HACIENDA LUISITA BECAUSE THAT IS THE ONLY TIME WHEN HACIENDA LUISITA WAS PLACED UNDER COMPULSORY ACQUISITION IN VIEW OF FAILURE OF HLI TO PERFORM CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS OF THE SDP, OR SDOA [STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT];
(4) INDEED, THE IMMUTABLE RULE AND THE UNBENDING JURISPRUDENCE IS THAT “TAKING” TAKES PLACE WHEN THE OWNER IS ACTUALLY DEPRIVED OR DISPOSSESSED OF HIS PROPERTY;
(5) TO INSIST THAT THE “TAKING” IS WHEN THE SDP WAS APPROVED BY PARC ON NOVEMBER 21, 1989 AND THAT THE SAME BE CONSIDERED AS THE RECKONING PERIOD TO DETERMINE THE JUST COMPENSATION IS DEPRIVATION OF LANDOWNER’S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
(6) HLI SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON THE JUST COMPENSATION.B
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS DECISION GIVING THE FWBs THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS HLI STOCKHOLDERS OR NOT, BECAUSE:
(1) IT IS AN EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OF THE FWB WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT HAS DECLARED IN ITS DECISION AND EVEN IN ITS RESOLUTION AND THAT HAS TO BE RESPECTED AND IMPLEMENTED;
(2) NEITHER THE CONSTITUTION NOR THE CARL [COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW] REQUIRES THAT THE FWBs SHOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
(3) THE OPTION HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE DETRIMENTAL BUT INSTEAD BENEFICIAL TO THE FWBs AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE COURT.C
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALES OF THE 500-HECTARE CONVERTED LOT AND THE 80.51-HECTARE SCTEX CANNOT BE RETAINED BY HLI BUT RETURNED TO THE FWBs AS BY SUCH MANNER; HLI IS USING THE CORPORATION CODE TO AVOID ITS LIABILITY TO THE FWBs FOR THE PRICE IT RECEIVED FROM THE SALES, BECAUSE:
(1) THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALES BELONG TO THE CORPORATION AND NOT TO EITHER HLI/TADECO OR THE FWBs, BOTH OF WHICH ARE STOCKHOLDERS ENTITLED TO THE EARNINGS OF THE CORPORATION AND TO THE NET ASSETS UPON LIQUIDATION;
(2) TO ALLOW THE RETURN OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALES TO FWBs IS TO IMPOSE ALL LIABILITIES OF THE CORPORATION ON HLI/TADECO WHICH IS UNFAIR AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CORPORATION CODE.
I
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 [RA 6657] OR THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW [CARL] DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT THE FWBs WHO OPT FOR STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION SHOULD RETAIN MAJORITY SHAREHOLDING OF THE COMPANY TO WHICH THE AGRICULTURAL LAND WAS GIVEN.II
IF THE NOVEMBER 22, 2011 DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT ORDERING LAND DISTRIBUTION WOULD BE FOLLOWED, THIS WOULD CAUSE MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO THE LIVES OF THOSE PEOPLE LIVING IN THE HACIENDA, AND MORE PARTICULARLY TO THE WELFARE OF THE FWBs.III
ON THE CONCLUSION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR, THEN FWBs WHO MERELY RELIED ON THE PARC APPROVAL SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY ITS SUBSEQUENT NULLIFICATION.IV
THOSE WHO CHOOSE LAND SHOULD RETURN WHATEVER THEY GOT FROM THE SDOA [STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT] AND TURN OVER THE SAME TO HLI FOR USE IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY, WHICH IN TURN WILL REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THOSE WHO WILL OPT TO STAY WITH THE SDO.V
FOR THOSE WHO CHOOSE LAND, THE TIME OF TAKING FOR PURPOSES OF JUST COMPENSATION SHOULD BE AT THE TIME HLI WAS DISPOSSESSED OF CONTROL OVER THE PROPERTY, AND THAT PAYMENT BY [THE GOVERNMENT] OF THE LAND SHOULD BE TURNED OVER TO HLI FOR THE BENEFIT AND USE OF THE COMPANY’S OPERATIONS THAT WILL, IN TURN, REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF FWBs WHO WILL OPT TO STAY WITH THE COMPANY.
In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that “HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs.” We also ruled that the date of the “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.
In its Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration, HLI disagrees with the foregoing ruling and contends that the “taking” should be reckoned from finality of the Decision of this Court, or at the very least, the reckoning period may be tacked to January 2, 2006, the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the SDP.
For their part, Mallari, et al. argue that the valuation of the land cannot be based on November 21, 1989, the date of approval of the SDP. Instead, they aver that the date of “taking” for valuation purposes is a factual issue best left to the determination of the trial courts.
At the other end of the spectrum, AMBALA alleges that HLI should no longer be paid just compensation for the agricultural land that will be distributed to the FWBs, since the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) already rendered a decision ordering the Cojuangcos to transfer the control of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which will distribute the land to small farmers after compensating the landowners P3.988 million. In the event, however, that this Court will rule that HLI is indeed entitled to compensation, AMBALA contends that it should be pegged at forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) per hectare, since this was the same value that Tadeco declared in 1989 to make sure that the farmers will not own the majority of its stocks.
Despite the above propositions, We maintain that the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the FWBs. As this Court held in Perez-Rosario v. CA:It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political disturbances that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people as well as the continuity of the national order. To subdue these acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of the nation passed a series of laws calculated to accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material standards of living and eliminate discontent. Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of social justice found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing national consciousness, all command the great departments of government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the law. But annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on her side. In the occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony, the considerations of social advantage must be weighed, an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social interdependence of these interests, recognized. (Emphasis and citations omitted.)
SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DARs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. However, this will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in it may already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary, where We held:
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.22 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
After having discussed and considered the different contentions raised by the parties in their respective motions, We are now left to contend with one crucial issue in the case at bar, that is, control over the agricultural lands by the qualified FWBs.
Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have control over these agricultural lands for as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, this Court made the following observations:There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers.
In line with Our finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
A revisit of HLIs Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is PhP 590,554,220, while the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is PhP 196,630,000. Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries. Control, of course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one 1 HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI. Hence, control can NEVER be attained by the FWBs. There is even no assurance that 100% of the 118,391,976.85 shares issued to the FWBs will all be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into account the previous referendum among the farmers where said shares were not voted unanimously in favor of retaining the SDP. In light of the foregoing consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted to the individual FWBs will have to be recalled and revoked.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657. (Emphasis in the original.)
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. - It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farm workers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation towards sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.
To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the right of small landowners and shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farm workers and landowners, as well as cooperatives and other independent farmers organization, to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing and other support services.
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable, in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain, under lease or concession, suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own agricultural estates, which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
By means of appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance of economic-sized family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small landowners.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services, The State shall also protect, develop and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land ownership has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural land have the obligation to cultivate directly or through labor administration the lands they own and thereby make the land productive.
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for lands shall contain features that shall enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace.
The State may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the development of capital-intensive farms, traditional and pioneering crops especially those for exports subject to the prior rights of the beneficiaries under this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
The wording of the provision is unequivocal -- the farmers and regular farmworkers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. The word collective is defined as indicating a number of persons or things considered as constituting one group or aggregate, while collectively is defined as in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or body. By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.
Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows workers cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members. Said provisions read:SEC. 29. Farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations.—In the case of farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations, the following rules shall be observed by the PARC.
In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.
In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned collectively by the worker beneficiaries who shall form a workers cooperative or association which will deal with the corporation or business association. x x x
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners.— x x x
x x x x
Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands may give their qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by them. In no case shall the compensation received by the workers at the time the shares of stocks are distributed be reduced. The same principle shall be applied to associations, with respect to their equity or participation. x x x
Clearly, workers cooperatives or associations under Sec. 29 of RA 6657 and corporations or associations under the succeeding Sec. 31, as differentiated from individual farmers, are authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land. Cooperatives can be registered with the Cooperative Development Authority and acquire legal personality of their own, while corporations are juridical persons under the Corporation Code. Thus, Sec. 31 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. Even the framers of the l987 Constitution are in unison with respect to the two (2) modes of ownership of agricultural lands tilled by farmers--DIRECT and COLLECTIVE, thus:MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of the phrase to own directly, we mean the principle of direct ownership by the tiller?
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of collectively, we mean communal ownership, stewardship or State ownership?
MS. NIEVA. In this section, we conceive of cooperatives; that is farmers cooperatives owning the land, not the State.
MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of collectively, referring to farmers cooperatives, do the farmers own specific areas of land where they only unite in their efforts?
MS. NIEVA. That is one way.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because I understand that there are two basic systems involved: the moshave type of agriculture and the kibbutz. So are both contemplated in the report?
MR. TADEO. Ang dalawa kasing pamamaraan ng pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa ay ang pagmamay-ari ng lupa na hahatiin sa individual na pagmamay-ari - directly - at ang tinatawag na sama-samang gagawin ng mga magbubukid. Tulad sa Negros, ang gusto ng mga magbubukid ay gawin nila itong cooperative or collective farm. Ang ibig sabihin ay sama-sama nilang sasakahin.
x x x x
MR. TINGSON. x x x When we speak here of to own directly or collectively the lands they till, is this land for the tillers rather than land for the landless? Before, we used to hear land for the landless, but now the slogan is land for the tillers. Is that right?
MR. TADEO. Ang prinsipyong umiiral dito ay iyong land for the tillers. Ang ibig sabihin ng directly ay tulad sa implementasyon sa rice and corn lands kung saan inaari na ng mga magsasaka ang lupang binubungkal nila. Ang ibig sabihin naman ng collectively ay sama-samang paggawa sa isang lupain o isang bukid, katulad ng sitwasyon sa Negros.
As Commissioner Tadeo explained, the farmers will work on the agricultural land sama-sama or collectively. Thus, the main requisite for collective ownership of land is collective or group work by farmers of the agricultural land. Irrespective of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers, as long as concerted group work by the farmers on the land is present, then it falls within the ambit of collective ownership scheme. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied.)
There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 30. Homelots and Farmlots for Members of Cooperatives. — The individual members of the cooperatives or corporations mentioned in the preceding section shall be provided with homelots and small farmlots for their family use, to be taken from the land owned by the cooperative or corporation. (Italics supplied.)
SEC. 29. Farms Owned or Operated by Corporations or Other Business Associations.&mdashIn the case of farms owned or operated by corporations or other business associations, the following rules shall be observed by the PARC.
In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.
In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned collectively by the worker-beneficiaries who shall form a workers cooperative or association which will deal with the corporation or business association. Until a new agreement is entered into by and between the workers cooperative or association and the corporation or business association, any agreement existing at the time this Act takes effect between the former and the previous landowner shall be respected by both the workers cooperative or association and the corporation or business association.
Endnotes:
1 “Jose Julio Zuniga” in some parts of the records.
2 G.R. No. 171101, 653 SCRA 154; hereinafter referred to as “July 5, 2011 Decision.”
3 G.R. No. 171101; hereinafter referred to as “November 22, 2011 Resolution.”
4 HLI MR, pp. 10-11.
5 Id. at 11.
6 Mallari, et al. MR, p. 15.
7 AMBALA MR, p. 4.
8 As a backgrounder, and as stated in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, the government filed a suit on May 7, 1980 before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Tadeco et al. for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR, now the Department of Agrarian Reform [DAR]) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. For its part, Tadeco alleged that aside from the fact that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, the sugar lands, of which the hacienda consisted, are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations.
Eventually, the Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Aggrieved, Tadeco appealed to the CA. On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed the case, subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been secured.
9 AMBALA MR, p. 6.
10 Id. at 17.
11 See Lao v. Co, G.R. No. 168198, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 139, 143; citing Balindong v. CA, G.R. No. 159962, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 200, 210.
12 National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, G.R. No. 180979, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 660, 669.
13 Id.
14 Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 57, 70.
15 G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 86, 112-113.
16 RA 6657, Sec. 2.
17 Emphasis supplied.
18 Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 436, 453; citing 2 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 45 (1992).
19 Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 674.
20 HLI MR, pp. 21-23.
21 RA 6657, Sec. 57.
22 G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 352, 374-375.
23 HLI MR, p. 25.
24 Id. at 30; Mallari, et al. MR, p. 8.
25 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 352.
26 HLI MR, pp. 38-40.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencias ruling that the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) of the petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), made pursuant to the agrarian reform law, Republic Act (RA) No. 66751 which took effect on June 15, 1988, is illegal so that an actual compulsory transfer of the HLIs agricultural lands should have taken place. I likewise agree that the date of “taking” for purposes of determining just compensation should be deemed to be November 21, 1989 - the date when the respondent Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) erroneously approved the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) of the petitioner HLI and its 6,596 farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) through Resolution No. 89-12-2.
Despite my overall concurrence, I still differ with some of the ponencias rulings, particularly on the legal basis of the consequences of PARCs revocation of its previous SDP approval. These consequences should be determined on the basis of clear applicable statutory provisions and the legal principles discussed below.
The illegality of the SDP rendered it null and void from the beginning
On December 22, 2005, PARC revoked its approval of the SDP through Resolution No. 2005-31-01. Although this revocation was made only in 2005, the effects should date back to 1989, considering that the basis for the revocation was primarily the illegality of the SDPs terms; the illegality rendered the SDP null and void from the very beginning and was not cured by PARCs erroneous approval. Indeed, the illegality of the terms of the SDP was apparent from its face so that PARCs approval should not have been given from the start.
Specifically, the man-days scheme — the SDPs method in determining the number of shares of stock to which each FWB was entitled — ran counter to Section 4 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 10, Series of 1988 of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); this AO required the distribution of an equal number of shares of stock to each qualified beneficiary. Section 11 of the same AO mandated that the stock distribution should also be implemented within three months from receipt of the PARCs approval of the SDP, and that the transfer of the shares of stock in the name of the qualified beneficiaries should be recorded in the stock and transfer books within 60 days from the implementation of the SDP. HLIs SDP clearly and illegally provided for a 30-year distribution period.
Consequences of Illegality
A. Compulsory coverage of HLI agricultural land
In the absence of any valid stock distribution plan, HLIs agricultural land became subject to compulsory coverage by 1989 — the time HLI chose as its option in complying with RA No. 6657. Section 31 of RA No. 6657 states without any ambiguity that:
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners. - x x x
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act. [emphasis supplied]
[November 21, 1989] is the point in time when HLI complied with its obligation under the CARL as a corporate landowner, through the stock distribution mode of compliance. This is the point, too, when the parties themselves determined - albeit under a contract that is null and void, but within the period of coverage that the CARL required and pursuant to the terms of what this law allowed - that compliance with the CARL should take place. From the eminent domain perspective, this is the point when the deemed “taking” of the land, for agrarian reform purposes, should have taken place if the compulsory coverage and direct distribution of lands had been the compliance route taken. As the chosen mode of compliance was declared a nullity, the alternative compulsory coverage (that the SDOA was intended to replace) and the accompanying “taking” should thus be reckoned from [November 21, 1989.]2 [emphasis supplied]
[T]he Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner of the governments intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
SECTION 1. The Lank Bank of the Philippines shall be primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA) arrangement as governed by Republic Act No. 6657. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines, in the performance of functions
After effecting the transfer of titles from the landowner to the Republic of the Philippines, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform of such fact in order that the latter may proceed with the distribution of the lands to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries within the time specified by law.
x x x primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.7
x x x the just compensation is made available to the property owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. If full compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholding without the corresponding full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the income the landholding would have earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners.
[T]he undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their lands on December 9, 1996 (when the titles to their landholdings were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due them only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because these landholdings had been taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from what should replace the income potential of their landholdings because the LBP refused to pay interest while withholding the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due by claiming a grossly low valuation.
V. GENERAL GUIDELINES
- As a general rule, land awarded pursuant to x x x R.A. 6657 shall be repaid by the Agrarian Reform Beneficiary (ARB) to LANDBANK in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six (6%) percent interest per annum. The annual amortization shall start one year from date of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) registration.
- The payments by the ARBs for the first three (3) years shall be two and a half percent (2.5%) of AGP [Annual Gross Production] and five percent (5.0%) of AGP for the fourth and fifth years. To further make the payments affordable, the ARBs shall pay ten percent (10.0%) of AGP or the regular amortization [refers to the annuity based on the cost of the land16 and permanent improvements at six percent (6%) interest rate per annum payable in 30 years], whichever is lower, from the sixth (6th) to the thirtieth (30th) year.
the payments made by the farmers-beneficiaries to the LBP are primarily based on a fixed percentage of their annual gross production or the value of the annual yield/produce of the land awarded to them. The cost of the land will only be considered as the basis for the payments made by the farmers-beneficiaries when this amount is lower than the amount based on the annual gross production.
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.x x x x
Article 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Amount Accruing = Purchase Price - the amounts due to HLIto FWBs by 3rd Parties (the amount of just
compensation FWBs should
pay HLI + the indemnity due
to HLI under Articles 546
and 548, etc.)
- the 59 million shares of stock of HLI;
- the P150 million representing the 3% gross sales of the production of the agricultural lands; and
- the P37.5 million representing the 3% proceeds from the sale of the 500 hectares of agricultural land (including the amount received as just compensation for the expropriation by the government of the land used for SCTEX).
a. the 300 hectares of converted land acquired by LIPCO/RCBC; and
b. the 80 hectares of land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX.
a. 300 hectares of converted land conveyed to LIPCO/RCBC;
b. 80 hectares of land taken over by government; and
c. if DAR finds that there was a valid transfer, 200 hectares of converted land conveyed to LRC.
a. the P37.5 million, representing the 3% share in the sale of portions of the land; and
b. the P150 million, representing the 3% production share;
Endnotes:
1 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
2 J. Brion, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated November 22, 2011.
3 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000.
4 Ibid.
5 Entitled Vesting in the Land Bank of the Philippines the Primary Responsibility to Determine the Land Valuation and Compensation for All Lands Covered Under Republic Act No. 6657, Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
6 Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
7 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra note 3.
8 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(5).
9 See RA No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, which recognized the authority of the Supreme Court to adopt “any Alternative Dispute Resolution system, such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or any combination thereof as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines which shall be governed by such rules as the Supreme Court may approve from time to time.”
In this line, the Supreme Court has promulgated various rules on mediation and conciliation including: Amended Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation/Conciliation Proceedings in the Pilot Areas of Mandaluyong City and Valenzuela City (November 16. 1999); A.O. No. 21-2001 re: Participation in the Amicable Settlement Weeks; A.O. No. 24-2001 re: Inclusion of Additional Participants in the Amicable Settlement Weeks (March 5, 2001); A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA and OCA Circular No. 82-2001 re: Designating the Philippine Judicial Academy as the Component Unit of the Supreme Court of the Court-Referred, Court-Related Mediation Cases and Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, and Establishing the Philippine Mediation Center for the Purpose; OCA Circular No. 2-2002 re Memorandum on Policy Guidelines between OCA and IBP; Administrative Circular No. 20-2002 re Monthly Inventory and Referral of Cases for Mediation; and A.M. No. 11-1-16-SC-PHILJA re: Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage.
10 See Apo Fruits Corporation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010. Also, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 180772 and 180776, May 6, 2010, where the Court declared that
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
11 Ibid.
12 J. Brion, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated November 22, 2011.
13 J. Sereno, Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated November 22, 2011.
14 Revised Implementing Guidelines and Procedures Governing Payment of Land Amortization by Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries.
15 SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. - Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the firs three (3) years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC : Provided, That the first five (5) annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production is paid as established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10) of the annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the payment affordable.
The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to beneficiary and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land as provided herein has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.
16 Defined in the same AO as “the amount paid or approved for payment to the landowner for the specific parcel of land and permanent crops including improvements thereon acquired and awarded to ARBs.”
17 G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011.
18 CIVIL CODE, Article 526.
19 Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume Two (1992 ed.), p. 111, citing Floreza v. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130.
20 A. Tolentino, supra note 18, at 292, citing 4 Manresa 270-271; Case, et al. v. Cruz, (S.C.), 50 Official Gazette 618, Calang, et al. v. Santos, et al. (C.A.), 50 Official Gazette 1446.
21 Id. at 293, citing 4 Manresa 271-272.
22 Id. at 294, citing 2 Oyuelos 298.
23 A. Tolentino, supra note 18, at 632, citing Perez Gonzales & Alguer; 1-II Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolf 364-366; 3 Von Tuhr 311; 3 Fabres 231.
24 Ibid.
25 TADECO is the owner of the 6,443 hectare land; 4,916 hectares of this constitutes the agricultural land that TADECO turned over to HLI, the spin-off corporation it created to comply with Section 31 of RA No. 6657. In return, TADECO received shares of stock of HLI. The Stock Distribution Agreement (which became the basis of the SDP) executed by TADEO, HLI and the FWBs provided that the FWBs are entitled to residential or homelots of not more than 240 sqm. each, see Decision of July 5, 2011, pp. 9-14.
BERSAMIN, J.:
For resolution are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 of petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 of respondents Noel Mallari, et al.
HLI contends in its Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 as follows:
A
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF “TAKING” IS NOVEMBER 21, 1989, WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs SDP “IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE FWBs WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA LUISITA” because:
1. The SDP is precisely a modality which the agrarian law gives the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage in which case, therefore, the FWBs cannot be considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands at the time the SDP was approved by PARC;
2. The approval of the SDP cannot be akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage or acquisition because SDP and compulsory coverage are two different modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms;
3. The Notice of Coverage of January 02, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the time when the FWBs can be considered to own and possess the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita because that is only the time when Hacienda Luisita was placed under compulsory acquisition in view of failure of HLI to perform certain obligations of the SDP, or SDOA;
4. Indeed, the immutable rule and the unbending jurisprudence is that “taking” takes place when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
5. To insist that the “taking” is when the SDP was approved by PARC on November 21, 1989 and that the same be considered as the reckoning period to determine the just compensation is deprivation of landowners property without due process of law;
6. HLI should be entitled to payment of interest on the just compensation.B
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS DECISION GIVING THE FWBs THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS HLI STOCKHOLDERS OR NOT, because:
1. It is an exercise of a right of the FWB which the Honorable Court has declared in its Decision and even in its Resolution and that has to be respected and implemented;
2. Neither the Constitution nor the CARL require[s] that the FWBs should have control over the agricultural lands;
3. The option has not been shown to be detrimental but instead beneficial to the FWBs as found by the Honorable Court.C
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALES OF THE 500-HECTARE CONVERTED LOT AND THE 80.51-HECTARE SCTEX CANNOT BE RETAINED BY HLI BUT RETURNED TO THE FWBs AS BY SUCH MANNER; HLI IS USING THE CORPORATION CODE TO AVOID ITS LIABILITY TO THE FWBs FOR THE PRICE IT RECEIVED FROM THE SALES, because -
1. The proceeds of the sales belong to the corporation and not to either HLI/Tadeco or the FWBs, both of which are stockholders entitled to the earnings of the corporation and to the net assets upon liquidation;
2. To allow the return of the proceeds of the sales to FWBs is to impose all liabilities of the corporation on HLI/Tadeco which is unfair and violative of the Corporation Code.
1. Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law does not provide that the FWBs who opt for stock distribution option should retain majority shareholding of the company to which the agricultural land was given.
2. If the November 22, 2011 decision of this Honorable Court ordering land distribution would be followed, this would cause more harm than good to the lives of those people living in the hacienda, and more particularly to the welfare of the FWBs.
3. On the conclusion by this Honorable Court that the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the case at bar, then FWBs who merely relied on the PARC approval should not be prejudiced by its subsequent nullification.
4. Those who choose land should return whatever they got from the SDOA and turn over the same to HLI for use in the operations of the company, which in turn will redound to the benefit of those who will opt to stay with the SDO.
5. For those who choose land, the time of taking for purposes of just compensation should be at the time HLI was dispossessed of control over the property, and that payment by of the land should be turned over to HLI for the benefit and use of the companys operations that will, in turn, redound to the benefit of FWBs who will opt to stay with the company.
(a) The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), initially, and the Regional Trial Court as Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), ultimately, should determine the reckoning date of taking as an integral component of their statutory responsibility to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6675 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, or CARL); and
(b) HLI should be compensated as the landowner for the fair market value of the homelots granted to the farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) under the discredited SDP.
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” xxx
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” xxx.2
xxx [W]e do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands wherever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for “a just distribution” among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at last to their deliverance.
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
As earlier observed, the requirement of public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures “to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till.” That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.
The determination of when the taking occurred is an integral and vital part of the determination and computation of just compensation. The nature and character of land at the time of its taking are the principal criteria to determine just compensation to the landowner. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized the importance of the time of taking in fixing the amount of just compensation, thus:xxx [T]he Court xxx invariably held that the time of taking is the critical date in determining lawful or just compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of La Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, “xxx the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness.”
It is my humble submission, therefore, that the factual issue of when the taking had taken place as to the affected agricultural lands should not be separated from the determination of just compensation by DAR, Land Bank and SAC. Accordingly, I urge that the Court should leave the matter of the reckoning date to be hereafter determined by the DAR and Land Bank pursuant to Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6657.10 Should the parties disagree thereon, the proper SAC will then resolve their disagreement as an integral part of a petition for determination of just compensation made pursuant to Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 xxx.
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and assessments made by the government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
A number of circumstances must be present in “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.17
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. To the extent courts have approved departures from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigants rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381-383 (2003). But as a general rule, “[o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief." Id., at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As cogently explained:
“[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties. Counsel almost always know a great deal more about their cases than we do, and this must be particularly true of counsel for the United States, the richest, most powerful, and best represented litigant to appear before us.” United States v. Samuels, 808 F. 2d 1298, 1301 (CA8 1987) (R. Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc).
Courts do not decline to decide questions which are not before them because they are not willing to assume responsibility for the decision. When a court decides a question not before it, its decision may and very probably will affect the rights of parties who have never had their day in court. The question may, as Chief Justice Winslow said, arise under circumstances that cannot be foreseen which may throw much additional light upon the question. Long experience has demonstrated that questions which affect the rights of citizens should not be determined upon hypothetical and suppositious cases.
xxx a court has no reason to raise issues that are tangential to or distinct from the claims that the parties have asked the court to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not mislead other or create flawed precedent. xxx Moreover, questions that are truly independent from those that the parties have already briefed and argued would likely require the development of facts not already in the record, which is unfair to litigants who are beyond the discovery stage — thus providing good reason for courts to ignore those issues as well.27
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.
2 Id., pp. 583-584.
3 Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 320, 330.
4 G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 385-386.
5 Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.
6 Section 54. Certiorari. — Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.
7 DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series of 2003 (Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases).
8 Supra, note 4, at p. 378.
9 No. L-59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305, 316.
10 Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as just compensation for the land.
11 National Power Corporation v. Maruhom, G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 198, 210.
12 State By and Through Dept. of Highways of State of Mont. v. McGuckin, 242 Mont. 81, 788 P.2d 926 (1990).
13 National Power Corporation v. Maruhom, G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 198, 210.
14 South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Faulkenberry, 522 S.E.2d 822 (1999). 15 National Power Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 234, 240.
16 National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56378, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 665, 673.
17 National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113194, March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 577, 590.
18 Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 166833, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 410, 416.
19 State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).
20 554 U.S. 237, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399, 76 BNA USLW 4533 (June 23, 2008).
21 People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill.App.3d 1, 782 N.E.2d 718, 270 Ill. Dec. 159 (2003).
22 227 Wis. 569, 279 N.W. 37, 2 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 883, 1 Lab. Cas. P 18, 132 (1938).
23 See People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 43, which held that the absence of specific assignments of error does not inhibit the sua sponte rectification of the omission to grant civil liability and damages to the victim, “for the grant of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim or his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or controlled by an assignment of error”; Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006,495 SCRA 301, which declared that courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it; People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, wherein the Court held that courts may apply the precept of retroactivity of penal laws that is favorable to the accused even if the accused has not invoked it; Republic v. Feliciano, No. L-70853, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 424, which declared that the defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
24 Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211.
25 Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 201, 209.
26 Frost, A., Limits of Advocacy, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 59:44, pp. 509-511 (2009).
27 Id., pp. 509-510.
28 Land Bank v. Chico, G.R. No. 168453, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 226, 245.
29 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149, 161.
SERENO, J.:
There is never any acceptable reason to be unjust. While this Court must be just and fully sympathetic to the farmers, it cannot also be unjust to the landowner. When the ponente first circulated the draft that became the 05 July 2011 Decision, I was the first to counter that the lands of petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc., (HLI) should be immediately distributed to the farmers. One of the theories of my Dissent of even date - namely, that the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) cannot be upheld because, as designed, the farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) would forever be the minority stockholders of petitioner HLI - was the same theory used to justify the majoritys reversal in its 22 November 2011 Resolution. Little did I suspect that my position in November, that the reckoning of the time of the taking should follow the uniform jurisprudence of this Court, would be stretched to such wild accusations, with some claiming that I had moved that petitioner HLI be paid P10 Billion, and that the FWBs had prayed that I be inhibited from participating in this case for unduly advocating the cause of petitioner HLI. Neither of the two claims is true nor has any basis on the record. This Court has never discussed any monetary values for the land for purposes of just compensation, and none of the justices has even attempted to peg any such value.
In my Separate Opinion to the 22 November 2011 Resolution, I lament the fact that Congress did not choose a revolutionary form of taking for agrarian reform by allowing effective partial confiscation by not requiring payment to the landowners at fair market value.1 I also advocated the immediate freedom of the land and the FWBs by construing that the 10-year prohibition against transfers of land should not be considered as effective in this case.2 The FWBs of Hacienda Luisita deserve the full benefits of agrarian reform. But with the Supreme Court consistently requiring that payment to landowners be pegged at fair market value for all kinds of expropriation, and in the case of agrarian reform, pegging it at the time of the notice of coverage, this same Court is required to be fair and observe the same rule by not unduly discriminating against petitioner HLI. Thus, I maintain the position I have earlier expounded in my Opinions in the 05 July 2011 Decision and the 22 November 2011 Resolution, specifically, that petitioner HLI, as any other landowner, is entitled to just compensation for their farmlands to be reckoned at the time of the actual taking of the expropriated property.
There is absolutely no basis on the record to claim that my position will render the lands beyond the FWBs capability to pay. In my Opinion in the 22 November 2011 Resolution, the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution were cited to conclude that there is no strict and absolute correspondence between the fair market value to be awarded to the landowners as just compensation and the amortization payments to be paid by the FWBs to the Land Bank of the Philippines for the awarded agricultural lands.3 Although the State is obliged to pay the fair market value of the agricultural lands in accordance with the law, rules and jurisprudence, the State does not shift that burden to the FWBs that would receive the expropriated properties. It shall subsidize the repayment schemes for the distributed agricultural lands and offer terms that are affordable to the farmers and allow them to simultaneously pursue their chosen agricultural enterprises on the lands. In fact, under the CARL, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council or the Land Bank of the Philippines may even reduce the principal obligation or the interest rates on amortization payments to make them more affordable to the FWBs.4 Hence, a totally different regime of social justice applies when it is the FWBs that will pay the amortization to the State through the Land Bank of the Philippines under the CARL.
Nevertheless, I have listened to the reasoning recently expounded in full by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin and join his position for the most judicious and equitable recourse of remanding the issue of determining just compensation, initially, to the Department of Agrarian Reform, and ultimately, to the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Considering that the parties had not fully substantiated or argued the determination of the award of just compensation, factual circumstances are clearly lacking for this Court to make a substantial and definitive ruling on significant, yet insufficiently factually-litigated facets of the case. As Justice Bersamin explains, the matter of the time when the taking of the Hacienda Luisita farmlands is to be pegged for purposes of valuation of the property has not been properly raised as an issue by the parties and that factual issue is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court.5
In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion approximates, to some extent, the proper value of the expropriated lands for purposes of just compensation by characterizing petitioner HLI as a builder in good faith and allowing it reimbursement for its improvements on the expropriated lands.6 As I mentioned in my previous Opinion, I would have been persuaded by Justice Brions reasoning to reckon the period to the 1989 value of the lands, if petitioner HLI would be compensated for the time difference with interest in the interim period when payment was not made by the government.7 The payment of interest is a superior solution to identifying and assessing each building or improvement attributable to petitioner HLI, as previous corporate landowner since it acquires less factual determination and accounting, which is open again to prolonged dispute and further adjudication. In any case, it seems incongruent to declare petitioner HLI a good faith builder of improvements on the land and yet, expropriate the same land under confiscatory, and hence, punitive values. The nullification of the SDOA and distribution of the lands to the FWBs should not come at the expense of depriving petitioner HLI what is due to it under the Constitution, the law and existing jurisprudence. If petitioner HLI has to be penalized for some historical infraction, then the factual and legal basis for such penalty has to be clearly articulated by the Court.
For the Court to impose the reckoning period for the valuation of the expropriated Hacienda Luisita farmlands to its 1989 levels is an unwarranted departure from what the Philippine legal system has come to understand and accept8 (and continues to do so, as recently as last month) 9 as the meaning of just compensation in agrarian reform cases since the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).10 The decision taken by the Court today (albeit pro hac vice) to pay petitioner HLI an amount based on outdated values of the expropriated lands is too confiscatory considering the years of jurisprudence built by this Court. No reasonable explanation has been offered in this case to justify such deviation from our past decisions that would lead to a virtual non-compensation for petitioner HLIs lands. The majoritys and Justice Brions legal fiction that the “taking” is to be reckoned from the time of the approval of the SDOA is unjust for two reasons. First, the uniform jurisprudence on this matter is that taking is actual taking. Second, no clever restatement of the law is acceptable if it will result in injustice, and in this case, to a landowner who is differently treated from every other landowner.
Although I continue to believe that the application of the ordinary reckoning period for the time of the taking of the expropriated property as enunciated in existing agrarian reform jurisprudence is applicable to this case, the resolution of this case, as explained by Justice Bersamin, requires further reception of documentary evidence, administrative investigation and judicial analysis to arrive at the approximate value of the expropriated lands and the amount of just compensation to be paid to petitioner HLI. The records of the case as it now stands sorely lack factual certainty for this Court to make a proper determination of the exact award of just compensation. It has only been in the media that a purported numerical value has been argued; no argument over such amount has ever taken place before this Court. Although this Court can provide guidelines for the concerned judicial authorities, the dearth in evidence to substantiate the value of the lands (regardless of whether it is reckoned from 1989 or 2006) requires that the parties be allowed to present before an impartial authority with jurisdiction to receive evidence, hear their cases and finally decide the matter. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual matters such as the scope of the farmlands in the name of Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO) or petitioner HLI that should be subject to CARP coverage, the number and value of the homelots given, the improvements introduced, the type of lands subject to coverage, and the amounts actually received by both the corporate landowner and the farmworker beneficiaries during the operation of the SDOA have yet to be convincingly determined to arrive at the amount of just compensation. The more equitable solution would be to allow reception of evidence on these factual matters and to relegate the adjudication of the same to the proper trial court with exclusive and original jurisdiction over the controversy.
In the midst of these reasoned disagreements in our separate Opinions as to the period when to determine just compensation, the parties must not lose sight of our near unanimity of the substantial merits of the case - that the SDOA is nullified and that the lands should be immediately and without delay be distributed to the farmworker beneficiaries. Hence, the remand of the determination of the just compensation due to petitioner HLI should not in any way hinder the immediate distribution of the farmlands in Hacienda Luisita. Legal processes regarding the determination of the amount to be awarded to the corporate landowner in case of non-acceptance, must not be used to deny the farmworker beneficiaries the legal victory they have long fought for and successfully obtained.
For the foregoing reasons, I join the Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
Endnotes:
1 “After the fall of the martial law regime and at the start of the new democratic society, a window of opportunity was presented to the State to determine and adopt the type of land and agrarian reform to be implemented. The newly formed administration enjoyed a strong mandate from the people, who desired change and would support a sweeping agrarian reform measure to distribute lands. In this scenario, the State could have chosen a more revolutionary approach, introducing into its agrarian reform program a more confiscatory element. Following the examples of other revolutionary governments, the State could have resorted to simply confiscating agricultural lands under the claim of social justice and the social function of lands, with little need of payment of full just compensation.” (Separate Opinion of Justice Sereno in the 22 November 2011 Resolution)
2 “Similarly, qualified FWBs should be afforded the same freedom to have the lands awarded to them transferred, disposed of, or sold, if found to have substantially greater economic value as reclassified lands. The proceeds from the sale of reclassified lands in a free, competitive market may give the qualified FWBs greater options to improve their lives. The funds sourced from the sale may open up greater and more diverse entrepreneurial opportunities for them as opposed to simply tying them to the awarded lands. Severely restricting the options available to them with respect to the use or disposition of the awarded lands will only prolong their bondage to the land instead of freeing them from economic want. Hence, in the interest of equity, the ten-year prohibitive period for the transfer of the Hacienda Luisita lands covered under the CARL shall be deemed to have been lifted, and nothing shall prevent qualified FWBs from negotiating the sale of the lands transferred to them.” (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno in the 05 July 2011 Decision)
3 “The approximation of fair value of the expropriated lands as just compensation is not meant to increase the burdens of payment by the qualified FWBs. When the framers of the Constitution originally determined that just compensation, as understood in prevailing jurisprudence, was to be given to landowners in agrarian reform expropriation, the point was clarified that the amounts to be awarded to the landowners were not the exact figures that would in turn be paid by the farmers, in other words it should be subsidized: xxx
Thus, the original intention was that there should be no strict correspondence between the just compensation due to the landowner and the amounts to be paid by the farmworkers: xxx” (Separate Opinion of Justice Sereno in the 22 November 2011 Resolution)
4 “SECTION 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. — Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first five (5) annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10%) of the annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiarys fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the repayment affordable. xxx”
5 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Bersamin, p. 4.
6 Separate Opinion (Concurring and Dissenting) of Justice Brion, pp. 11-14.
7 “Although Justice Brion reckoned the period for the valuation of the land to 21 November 1989, he recognized petitioner HLIs entitlement to the value of the improvements that it has introduced into the agricultural lands for the past twenty years. The proposition is akin to the Civil Code situation where a landowner opts to acquire the improvements introduced by a builder in good faith and must necessarily pay their value. Hence, although the land of petitioner HLI is expropriated by the government, there is a need for compensation for the introduction of the improvements actually installed by petitioner HLI, such as roads and other infrastructure, which have evidently improved the value of the property, aside from its appreciation over time. In recognizing the necessity for compensating petitioner HLI for their improvements, pegging the values to its 1989 levels will not be as severely confiscatory, if the value will be included as part of the just compensation to be paid. I would even be willing to accept the formulation proposed by Justice Brion since it would, to a lesser amount, approximates a fair market value of the property. But to simply evaluate the propertys worth to outdated levels and exclude entirely the improvements made and the market appreciation of the lands in all the 17 years that petitioner HLI invested in the lands is not even supportable by the Civil Code.” (Separate Opinion of Justice Sereno in the 22 November 2011 Resolution)
8 LBP v. Spouses Banal, G. R. No. 143276, 20 July 2004, 434 SCRA 543; LBP v. Celada, G. R. No. 164876, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 495; Lubrica v. LBP, G. R. No. 170220, 20 November 2006, 507 SCRA 415; LBP v. Lim, G. R. No. 171941, 02 August 2007, 529 SCRA 129; LBP v. Suntay, G. R. No. 157903, 11 October 2007, 535 SCRA 605; Spouses Lee v. LBP, G. R. No. 170422, 07 March 2008, 548 SCRA 52; LBP v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G. R. No. 175175, 29 September 2008, 567 SCRA 31; LBP v. Dumlao, G. R. No. 167809, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 108; LBP v. Gallego, Jr., G. R. No. 173226, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 680; LBP v. Kumassie Plantation, G. R. No. 177404 and 178097, 25 June 2009, 591 SCRA 1; LBP v. Rufino, G. R. No. 175644 and 175702, 02 October 2009, 602 SCRA 399; LBP v. Luciano, G. R. No. 165428, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 426; LBP v. Dizon, G. R. No. 160394, 27 November 2009, 606 SCRA 66; Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. LBP, G. R. No. 166461, 30 April 2010, 619 SCRA 609; LBP v. Soriano, G. R. No. 180772 and 180776, 06 May 2010, 620 SCRA 347; LBP v. Barrido, G. R. No. 183688, 18 August 2010, 628 SCRA 454; LBP v. Colarina, G. R. No. 176410, 01 September 2010, 629 SCRA 614; LBP v. Livioco, G. R. No. 170685, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 86; LBP v. Escandor, G. R. No. 171685, 11 October 2010, 632 SCRA 504; LBP v. Rivera, G. R. No. 182431, 17 November 2010, 635 SCRA 285; LBP v. DAR, G. R. No. 171840, 04 April 2011.
9 LBP v. Honey Comb Farms Corp., G.R. No. 169903, 29 February 2012; LBP v. Heirs of Jesus Yujuico, G.R. No. 184719, 21 March 2012.
10 Republic Act No. 6657.