1. CERTIORARI; JURISDICTION. — In this jurisdiction the statutory provisions on the subject of certiorari are taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure and strictly confine the use of the writ to cases where an inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction.

2. ID.; ID. — The provision of section 220 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the court shall "determine whether the inferior tribunal . . . has not regularly pursued its authority" has reference only to irregularities affecting the jurisdiction of the court. The California statute uses practically the same language, and in that state it has been uniformly held that jurisdiction must have been exceeded before the court can interfere by writs of certiorari and that mere errors in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction are not sufficient.

3. APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER; DISCRETION. — In the appointment of receivers, the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure gives the judges of the Courts of First Instance an unusually wide discretion, and subsection 4 of section 174 of the Code has no direct counterpart in any American or English statute. But the discretion thus conferred must not be exercised arbitrarily, and sound reasons for the appointment of a receiver should appear in the record of the case.

4. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; CERTIORARI. — The present case involves a large tract of land held in common by the parties. The relations between them were strained, and no satisfactory arrangement as to the administration of the property had been accomplished. Inconvenient and expensive litigation was threatening, and eventually the majority of the owners in common expressed their conformity with the appointment of a receiver for the administration of the property. In these circumstances, the respondent judge cannot be said to have exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing such receiver, and certiorari will not lie.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to set aside the appointment of a receiver. In a memorandum in support of the petition, counsel for the petitioners makes the following clear and accurate preliminary statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On February 25, 1794, Don Antonio Tuason founded mayorazgo in Manila and vicinity by an instrument duly executed by him and approved by the King of Spain. He provided, among other things, that the revenues of the mayorazgo properties should be distributed in the proportion of four-fifths to his first-born child and his successors and one-fifth to the other eight children of the founder and their successors. The said mayorazgo properties consist what is known as ’Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman’ and ’Hacienda de Mariquina’ and two ’fincas’ on Calle Rosario, Manila. The tax assessment values of the said properties are as follows:

Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman P 3,550,640.00

Hacienda de Mariquina 1,507,140.00

Two ’fincas’ in Calle Rosario 542,382.00

"On August 22, 1923, Antonio Ma. Barretto y Rocha and twenty-one other individuals filed suit against Augusto Humberto Tuason y de la Paz and fourteen other defendants, civil case No. 24803, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that plaintiffs are the descendants of the second born children of the founder of said mayorazgo, and further alleging, among other things, that the said mayorazgo constitutes a family trust, and that the defendants had fraudulently obtained a Torrens title in their favor upon the entailed real estate. The plaintiffs prayed for an accounting of receipts, expenses, and profits of the mayorazgo properties from and after February 4, 1874.

"The defendants in that case interposed several defenses — among others, that they possessed a Torrens title to the properties in question, free from charges or encumbrances, and prescription of the action, and alleged a counterclaim for the pensions received by the plaintiffs after the year 1917.

"The Court of First Instance (Judge Pedro Concepcion), after trial, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim, without costs.

"Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. On March 23, 1926, this Honorable Court reversed the said decision and declared that the plaintiffs are entitled to participate in a fifth of the properties of said mayorazgo and its revenues in certain proportions, and that the registration of the properties under Act No. 496 is not an impediment to its division and the transfer of said portions to the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries, in accordance with said decision.

"This Honorable Court, in its decision, further discussed the Disentailing Law of October 11, 1820, which became effective in the Philippines on March 1, 1864, and held that among the effects produced upon this mayorazgo by said Disentailing Law, on the one hand, and the conduct of the interested parties, on the other, there is, in the first place, the abolishment of the trust of the naked ownership in favor of the descendants of the founder in an indefinite succession, and, in the second, the conversion of the family trust on one-fifth of the revenues into a trust of the ownership of one-fifth of all the properties in favor of the younger children and other relatives of the founder. (Barretto v. Tuason, 50 Phil., 888, 890, 928-938.)

"A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants in the Supreme Court, and certain parties filed complaints in intervention in the Supreme Court, claiming an interest as beneficiaries in the one- fifth of said mayorazgo.

"On October 5, 1926, this Honorable Court denied the motion for reconsideration, but set aside the dispositive part of its decision of March 23, 1926, and ordered the case returned to the Court of First Instance, with the complaints in intervention, to the end that the new parties may intervene, and in order that the original plaintiffs may, if they so desire, amend their complaint; and this Honorable Court further ordered that the plaintiffs take the necessary steps toward the inclusion as parties of all who may claim the right to participate in the fifth part of said properties, requiring them to appear and establish their rights, and ordered that the Court of First Instance proceed to the trial of the case as to the amount of the participation which the original parties and the intervenors may have in the fifth part of the properties of said mayorazgo.

"In this state of the case in the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs, on May 18, 1928, filed therein a petition for the appointment of a receiver. The petition was verified by the oath of Antonio Ma. Barretto, one of the plaintiffs, and it alleged certain grounds for the appointment of a receiver. The petition was set for hearing. The attorneys for defendants appeared and argued orally and in writing as to the insufficiency of the petition, but did not file any answer thereto or offer any evidence or affidavits to prove that the allegations of the petition were not true. The court (vacation judge) held that the verified allegations of the petition were sufficient to justify the appointment of a receiver and on June 26, 1928, made an order appointing a receiver. On the same date the attorneys for the defendants indicated to the court their intention to file a motion for reconsideration of said order, and the court thereupon ordered the receiver to postpone taking possession of said properties until July 2, 1928, or until further orders of the court. On June 28, 1928, the defendants filed a verified motion for reconsideration, making certain denials of the allegations of the petition and making certain allegations tending to show why the appointment of a receiver should be set aside, and prayed that upon the presentation of evidence upon the allegations of the parties the court set aside its order of June 26, 1928, appointing a receiver. Upon the hearing of said motion for reconsideration the court made an order which, among other things, recited as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘In view of the fact that in the motion for reconsideration the defendants have made allegations under oath in contradiction to the verified allegations of the plaintiffs’ petition and supplementary petition, it is incumbent upon the court to grant a hearing for the purpose of taking evidence to enable the court to determine under the evidence whether a receiver should be appointed under the prayer of the plaintiffs’ petition.’

"The record shows that, with the consent of the parties, a referee was appointed by Judge Concepcion on July 26, 1928, to take evidence; that depositions were taken; that on December 14, 1928, the court (Judge Concepcion) made an order denying the petition for the appointment of a receiver upon the ground that the new petition, like the preceding ones, was based upon mere conclusions without specification of any concrete facts to sustain them, and because the lack of means for controlling and intervening in the management of the properties of the mayorazgo to protect their rights and interests is not a sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver; but the court ordered the defendants to set aside every months one-fifth of the income of the mayorazgo after deducting expenses, and to deposit it in a bank subject to the orders of the court; and thereafter, on January 5, 1929, in passing upon a petition of the attorneys for the plaintiffs, the court ordered the defendants to submit to the court an account of the administration of the mayorazgo properties, such account to cover each and every month, and that the said accounting be submitted on or before the 10th day of each month for the preceding month, commencing with February, 1929, for the month of January, 1929.

"On or about December 7, 1928, the majority in interest of the co