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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 36078. March 11, 1933. ]

VALERIANA VELAYO BERNARDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MIGUEL SIOJO, Defendant-Appellee.

Feria & La O, for Appellant.

Ambrosio Santos and Eusebio Orense, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS


1. RESERVABLE PROPERTY; TRANSFER DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE RESERVER. — The appellant, aunt of the appellee, was not a party to the action for partition of property between P. A. and the appellee nor to the compromise agreement entered into between these two; and even taking it for granted that she had voluntarily given her consent to said agreement, it was null and void or without effect inasmuch as it anticipated the transfer or waiver of reservable property during the lifetime of the reserver thereof.

2. ID.; ID. — Even if the appellee obtained the certificate of title and the transfer certificate of title corresponding to parcels A and B, respectively, he is, nevertheless, bound to transfer to the herein appellant the portions to which she is entitled in view of the fact that he obtained said certificates of title thereto knowing that such properties did not belong to him but to the reservee, the appellant herein.


D E C I S I O N


IMPERIAL, J.:


Valeriana Velayo Bernardo brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan to compel her nephew, Miguel Siojo, to partition the seven parcels of land described in the complaint; to have her declared entitled to a share consisting in five-sixths (5/6) thereof; to have the above-mentioned appellee render an accounting of all the fruits derived by him therefrom since the death of his father- in-law, Pablo Aguirre, on May 20, 1928, and to deliver to her the amount corresponding to her said share, with costs against the appellee.

This is an appeal taken by her from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint, without costs.

In addition to other evidence presented therein, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The parties agree and stipulate to ask that judgment be rendered in this case as well as in special proceedings No. 2425 of this court, In re estate of Maximina Aguirre, deceased, the following basis:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That the defendant, Miguel Siojo, shall remain in possession of all the lands described in the complaint in this case with the exception of Lot G which shall remain in the possession and ownership of the defendant Cristino Hilario. The defendant, Miguel Siojo, shall, likewise, remain in possession of all the property and succeed to all rights and actions left by the deceased, Maximina Aguirre, which are now the subject matter of the proceedings in said civil case No. 2425, and that the plaintiff herein, Pablo Aguirre, renounces all his rights, interests or participation in said property as heir to both Roman Aguirre and Maximina Aguirre.

"2. On the other hand, the defendant herein, Miguel Siojo, in return for all that has been stated in the first paragraph, binds himself to pay to the plaintiff herein, Pablo Aguirre, the sum of three thousand two hundred and fifty pesos (P3,250) and at the same time renounces in favor of Valeriana Velayo all the interests and participation which his late wife, Maximina Aguirre, has or might have in the ’camarin’ of strong materials built on said Valeriana Velayo’s lot in San Miguel, Bulacan.

"3. That the defendant herein, Miguel Siojo, likewise, states that by virtue of an amicable agreement reached between him and Valeriana Velayo, he binds himself to execute with the consent of said Valeriana Velayo, another document amending a former one executed by them on March 28, 1927, before the notary public Javier Pabalan, which document forms part of the proceedings in the abovementioned case No. 2425 in the matter of the estate of the late Maximina Aguirre, to the effect that Miguel Siojo and Valeriana Velayo will exchange between themselves the lands described therein so that lot A which appears therein as belonging to Valeriana Velayo shall become the property of Miguel Siojo and lot B shall become the property of Valeriana Velayo; provided however, that the portion of lot A claimed in a cadastral case by Ismael Velayo shall henceforth be exclusively contested by the present owner thereof, Miguel Siojo, and that the claim thereto presented by Attorney Tengco in the name of Valeriana Velayo shall be withdrawn.

"4. That all the lands which are the subject matter of this transaction, together with those mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof, are reservable property and the only person who would be entitled to such reservation is Valeriana Velayo who, being present here, declares in open court that she renounces all her rights over said reservation to the effect that said property shall definitely pass to the defendant herein, Miguel Siojo, and his heirs, without prejudice to any particular arrangement said Valeriana Velayo may make with the plaintiff herein, Pablo Aguirre, anent the sum of three thousand two hundred and fifty pesos (P3,250) to be paid within the month of September by the defendant herein, Miguel Siojo, to said Pablo Aguirre, said amount to be deposited with the clerk of this court, provided however, that no matter what may be the result of such arrangement between Valeriana Velayo and the plaintiff herein, Pablo Aguirre, as to the said sum of three thousand two hundred and fifty pesos (P3,250), it shall in no way affect the already vested rights of Miguel Siojo in the property in question.

"A copy of this stipulation together with the decision to be rendered herein shall be attached to the proceedings in case No. 2425 in the matter of the Estate of Maximina Aguirre, pending in this court, the same to be considered as final thereon."cralaw virtua1aw library

The facts which may be deduced from the evidence presented are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The spouses, Marcelo Velayo Bernardo and Florentina de los Santos, had two daughters named Valeriana, the appellant herein, and Maria Trinidad. The latter was married to Pablo Aguirre who died on May 20, 1929, with whom she had two children, Roman and Maximina. The first died on August 30, 1906, without any descendant and the latter, who was married to Miguel Siojo, the defendant herein, likewise died without leaving any children.

The lands which are the subject matter of this suit proceeded from the Velayo spouses and were inherited by Maximina Aguirre in the following manner: parcels A, B, C, D and F, from her grandfather and G and H, from her grandmother.

In her will which was allowed to probate, Maximina Aguirre bequeathed two-thirds (2/3) of said property to her father, Pablo Aguirre, and the remaining one-third (1/3) to her husband, Miguel Siojo. The latter was appointed executor of the said Maximina Aguirre’s will, administered said property and reaped the benefits derived therefrom with Pablo Aguirre.

Sometime later, Pablo Aguirre brought an action against the appellee herein for partition of the lands in question which action was withdrawn through a compromise agreement between the parties by virtue of which Siojo was to remain in possession of all the lands which belonged to his wife in lieu of payment by him to Pablo Aguirre of the sum of P3,250.

The appellant herein was not a party to either the action for partition or the compromise agreement between the appellee and Pablo Aguirre, yet, in spite of the fact that these two understood the reservable nature of all the lands in question; they made it appear in their written agreement that the appellant herein was present in the court when said agreement was made and that she had given her consent thereto, renouncing whatever right she might have in said lands. It was likewise stated in the compromise agreement that Pablo Aguirre would deliver a certain portion of the sum of P3,250 to the appellant herein. This compromise agreement was approved by the then presiding judge and was made a part of the decision rendered therein which terminated the litigation.

After Miguel Siojo became the owner of the property in question, it appeared that her wife’s estate, of which he was administrator, was indebted to various creditors and in order to pay such indebtedness he sold half of the parcels B, C and F to his father-in-law, Pablo Aguirre, who, in turn, sold them at a profit to the appellant herein. This is how the appellant herein came into possession of half of the three parcels mentioned above.

Subsequently, cadastral proceedings were held in San Miguel, Bulacan, where the lands in question are situated, and all of them were included in said proceedings in the following manner: parcel A was surveyed as lot No. 156; parcels B and C as lot No. 2324; parcel D as lot No. 2311; parcel E as part of lot No. 2306; parcel F as lot No. 2326; parcel G as part of lot No. 2863, and parcel H as part of lot No. 2323.

In the proceedings, lot No. 156 was contested by the appellee herein, Pablo Aguirre and the appellant, but the last two later abandoned their claim and the land was adjudicated to the above-mentioned appellee who obtained certificate of title No. 10700 on February 27, 1929.

Lot No. 2324 is disputed by the appellant and appellee herein and is pending trial awaiting the result of this litigation. Lot No. 2311 was adjudicated to the estate of the deceased Maximina Aguirre and subsequently the appellee obtained transfer certificate of title No. 5845.

Lots Nos. 2326 and 2863 are still pending trial while lots Nos. 2306 and 2323 are pending adjudication.

The appellant herein assigns the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. The trial court erred in declaring that the plaintiff had renounced her rights to the reservation of the lands in question through the compromise agreement entered into between the parties in civil case No. 2954 which agreement was made a part of the decision presented by the defendant as Exhibit 1.

"II. The trial court erred in giving credit to Judge Anastacio R. Teodoro’s testimony which had not been duly admitted, over and above the latter’s final decision marked as the defendant’s Exhibit 1.

"III. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff’s acts during and subsequent to the compromise agreement in civil case No. 2954 justify the plaintiff’s acceptance and consent to the contents of said agreement.

"IV. The trial court erred in not holding that the decision (Exhibit 1) which approves the said compromise agreement in civil case No. 2954 is not effective against or binding on the plaintiff who is not a party to the aforementioned case.

"V. The trial court erred in not holding that the alleged waiver or transfer of the plaintiff’s reservable right in the lands in question is null and void it having been made during the lifetime of the reserver.

"VI. The trial court erred in not holding that the alleged transfer or waiver of the plaintiff’s reservable rights in the lands in question is likewise null and void for lack of consideration.

"VII. The trial court erred in not ordering the partition of the lands in question and the adjudication of five-sixths (5/6) thereof to the plaintiff herein, and an accounting of the fruits thereof from May 20, 1928, and in dismissing the amended complaint in this case."cralaw virtua1aw library

We believe it unnecessary to discuss separately the assignments of error in this decision. In our opinion, there are only three points raised by the appeal which must be decided separately. The first is whether this is reservable property the second is whether the alleged compromise agreement constituted a transfer or waiver by the appellant of her right to the reservable property and the third is whether the proceedings followed in the cadastral case in San Miguel had the effect of depriving said appellant of every right to claim participation in said lands.

The reservable nature of the property is not discussed in the briefs filed by the attorneys. The parties admit that all the lands partake of the character of reservable property having been inherited by an ascendant who was found to reserve them for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.

The question really originated with the compromise agreement entered into between Pablo Aguirre and the appellee, Miguel Siojo, in civil case No. 2954. The latter contends that the appellant herein waived her right to the reservable property inasmuch as it appears in the stipulation that she had given her consent thereto in open court.

In order to prove that there is no ground for the claim suffice it to say that the appellant herein, Valeriana Velayo had not been made a party to the aforementioned case as well as to the stipulation. We do not believe that the statement appearing in the stipulation and inserted in the decision, to the effect that she had given her consent thereto, had made her an interested or contracting party. With respect to the alleged consideration of P3,250, we do not find sufficient evidence to justify the appellee’s contention that the appellant received any part thereof from Pablo Aguirre; and even granting that she did, such fact would not justify the transfer or waiver of reservable property on the ground that it is an act or contract expressly prohibited by law, as will be shown later.

Referring to the appellant’s intervention in the aforementioned compromise agreement it appears that if she actually took part therein, she transferred during the lifetime of the reserver Pablo Aguirre, reservable property to which she was entitled, which act is prohibited by article 1271 of the Civil Code forbidding the execution of contracts with respect to future inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate, in accordance with article 1056. In this case, we do not see the essential difference between the transfer and waiver of rights to reservable property mentioned in the decision appealed from. Call it what you may, the fact remains that, according to the appellee herein, the appellant lost all of her rights to claim the reservable property by virtue of the compromise agreement in which she did not take part.

"All rights to voluntary conveyance, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, granted to relatives of the third degree before actually acquiring ownership of the property subject to reservation, are in conflict with the nature of the reservation created by article 811. It is sufficient to note that this provision, in definitely specifying the persons entitled to the reservable property, admits of no other solution than that of the tendency to keep the property within the family to which such property belongs. In fact the voluntary transfer, in the hope of receiving the property in due time would, after all, infer the liberty to dispose of it. Reservation made in favor of strangers or relatives of a different line or degree or, briefly, in favor of persons to whom the law does not grant such right, is impossible, because in such case the ascendant would be making the reservation of no avail and the property would pass to a strange family, a thing which the law tries to avoid. Made in favor of relatives of the same line and within the third degree, it is entirely superfluous and useless because these relatives, by operation of law, already have the right or hope that it might be transmitted to them, so that in reality there is nothing new or useful received by them." (Vol. VI Manresa, pp. 252, 253, 1898 edition.)

This same question had already been discussed by this court in the decision of Edroso v. Sablan (25 Phil., 295). Speaking of the reservee’s rights, it said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part ’that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute should that person die.’"

We conclude that, strictly speaking, the appellant did not intervene in civil case No. 2954 or in the compromise agreement entered into by the parties to that suit, and even in the supposition that she had voluntarily given her consent thereto, the contract thus executed was null and void or without effect for the reason that it anticipated the transfer or waiver of reservable property during the lifetime of the reserver thereof.

With respect to the last question, we hold that even if the appellee obtained the certificates of title Nos. 10700 and 5845 corresponding to parcels A and B, respectively, he is, nevertheless, bound to transfer to the herein appellant the portions to which she is entitled in view of the fact that he obtained said certificate of title thereto knowing that such properties did not belong to him but to the reservee, the appellant herein.) Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil., 343; Government of the Philippine Islands v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 49 Phil., 433.)

In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed; the appellant herein is declared entitled to five-sixths (5/6) of parcels A, D, G and H described in the complaint and to five-sixths (5/6) of half of the parcels B, C and F as well as to the same proportion in the fruits realized and derived by the appellee from said lands from May 20, 1928, for which purpose the said appellee shall render an accounting thereof, and the trial court shall, in accordance with law, proceed to the partition of the aforementioned lands in question adjudicating to the herein appellant, after the proper proceedings therein, her share hereinbefore fixed, with costs against the appellee. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Butte, JJ., concur.

DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

December 21, 1933 - IMPERIAL, J.:


The defendant-appellee herein filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered in this case, promulgated on March 11, 1933.

Before passing upon the grounds in support thereof enumerated in the said motion for reconsideration, we would like to state that the stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties in case No. 2954 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan was deliberately quoted in the decision, not only because the greater portion of the facts stated therein constitutes the stipulation of facts in the instant case, but also because the former gives a clearer and more concise statement of the origin of the properties in litigation, and of the relation between the parties and the other persons who intervened in the distribution of the said properties.

After the foregoing explanation, we shall now proceed to pass upon the merits of the motion for reconsideration. The defendant’s contention, in brief, is as follows: (1) That the properties in litigation are not reservable in character; (2) that even under the theory that they are reservable, one-fourth thereof would correspond to the defendant and only three-fourths, instead of the five-sixths stated in the decision, would correspond to the plaintiff and (3) that the parcels of land now registered in the name of the defendant cannot be adjudicated to the plaintiff because to do so would be tantamount to revising the final decrees issued in the registration proceedings and annulling the certificates of title issued therein.

The first contention is obviously untenable on the ground that even in the very answer of the defendant, page 11 of the bill of exceptions, he admitted the reservable character of all the properties in question. His contention and defense then consisted in that the plaintiff could not enforce her claim to the reservable properties because she had ceded and waived her right therein in his favor.

The second contention has caused no little embarrassment to the members of this court due to the fact that in the briefs submitted, none of the parties, particularly the defendant, has ever made any mention of the claim now made by the latter party. In deciding the instant case, we were guided by the theory then sustained by the plaintiff that in the event the properties in litigation were reservable, her participation would consist in five-sixths while that of the defendant would be one-sixth thereof. The defendant, then, contrary to what he should have stated in his brief, neither intimated nor claimed therein that he was entitled to one-fourth of all the property in question.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are of the opinion that, strictly applying the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, the defendant herein is really entitled to one-fourth of all the property in question instead of one-sixth thereof as stated in the decision. The reason for this is that only those properties acquired by the reserver by operation of law are reservable, as claimed in the motion for reconsideration.

With respect to the last contention, we are convinced that the law has been applied correctly. The defendant cannot invoke the irrevocability of titles issued under the Torrens system on the ground that, technically speaking, he committed fraud by deliberately omitting in his application the fact that the plaintiff herein was a co
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