SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 39298. December 1, 1933. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO RAMOS and SANTIAGO JACINTO, Defendants. SANTIAGO RAMOS, Appellant.
R. Gonzalez Lloret for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; CRIMINAL LAW; SELF-DEFENSE. — In a prosecution for felony, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the acts constituting self-defense.
2. ID.; CONFESSION IN CRIMINAL ACTION; VOLUNTARY CHARACTER. — For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is sufficient that its voluntary character be established by prima facie proof.
3. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF OBJECTION. — Appellant confessed his guilt. When his written confession was offered in evidence, he reserved his right to object to its admission, whereupon the court reserved its ruling thereon. After attempting to prove the character of the confession, appellant rested his case without obtaining any ruling on the confession. Held, his failure to take advantage of his reserved right to object, was tantamount to an abandonment of his objection.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — A confession offered in evidence and not objected to by the defendant is regarded as prima facie voluntary.
2. ID.; CONFESSION IN CRIMINAL ACTION; VOLUNTARY CHARACTER. — For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is sufficient that its voluntary character be established by prima facie proof.
3. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF OBJECTION. — Appellant confessed his guilt. When his written confession was offered in evidence, he reserved his right to object to its admission, whereupon the court reserved its ruling thereon. After attempting to prove the character of the confession, appellant rested his case without obtaining any ruling on the confession. Held, his failure to take advantage of his reserved right to object, was tantamount to an abandonment of his objection.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — A confession offered in evidence and not objected to by the defendant is regarded as prima facie voluntary.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant Santiago Ramos and Santiago Jacinto were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the crime of murder. After due trial, Santiago Jacinto was acquitted, but Santiago Ramos was convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay one-half of the costs.
The crime here involved took place at night and in an uninhabited place. It was discovered because Faustino Ramos happened to pass by the place where the crime was committed and saw the deceased in a dying condition. Faustino Ramos tried to find out from the deceased who his aggressor was, but the deceased could not utter any more words. He immediately notified the authorities of the matter. Laying suspicion on the herein appellant, the Constabulary authorities began searching for him the same night, but he could be found nowhere. For this reason, guards were posted near appellant’s house. Early in the morning of the next day appellant came accompanied by his co-accused. On seeing the guards they trembled. In view of this attitude, and seeing blood stains in appellant’s undershirt, the two were arrested. An investigation conducted by the Constabulary authorities resulted in two written declarations, one subscribed and sworn to by the appellant, another by his co-accused brother-in-law. The two declarations pointed to the guilt of the appellant. A post-modern examination of the body of the deceased disclosed four open lacerated wounds in the back of the head at the occipital region, and four other big wounds which fractured the skull and caused the death.
At the trial the written declarations were offered in evidence, after the clerk of the trial court, before whom the defendants signed declarations, testified that he read said declarations to them and questioned them as to the circumstances in which they were made. The defendants reserved their right to object to the admission of the declarations in evidence, and the trial court reserved its ruling thereon. The defense, through the testimony of the defendants, attempted to prove that said confessions were not read to them, thus contradicting the testimony of the clerk. On the other hand, both the appellant and his co-defendant testified that the former killed the deceased in self-defense. Both parties rested their case without any ruling on the written declarations. In his decision, the trial judge relied on said declarations ad rejected the theory of self-defense advanced by the defendants.
On this appeal, two questions are raised: one relates to the admissibility of the written declaration or confession of the appellant, while the other to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction.
As to the first question, counsel contends that the testimony of the clerk of court alone was insufficient to prove that the appellant’s confession was made freely and voluntarily. No doubt the question thus raised is predicated on former rulings of this court based on section 4 of Act No. 619, to the effect that no written confession should be admitted in evidence without positive proof that it was made freely and voluntarily. In United States v. Zara (42 Phil., 308), this court held that said section has been expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1917, and that, in view of such repeal, the burden of proof has shifted to the accused to establish that a written confession or admission attributed to him was not voluntarily given by him or that it was obtained by undue pressure. This decision was followed in People v. Singh (45 Phil., 676). Moreover, upon the authority of the latter case, in relation to United States v. Agatea (40 Phil., 596), the appellant’s confession must be held to have been admitted without objection. In the Singh case, counsel for the defendant moved that certain testimony relating to an alleged confession be stricken from the record, on the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement. Counsel for the defendant contended that the failure of the trial court to rule the motion, deprived the defendant of an opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession. This court held: "The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal, the matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion." In the instant case, there was no need for such a motion inasmuch as the defense had an opportunity to rebut the confession in question. And in United States v. Agatea, supra, this court held that a confession offered in evidence and not objected to by the defendant is regarded as prima facie voluntary.
Of course this court has declared time and again that it would not stand on mere technicality when human liberty is involved. Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions and do so only after a most painstaking scrutiny of their merit. The general rule is that the admissibility of such confessions is necessarily addressed, in the first instance, to the trial judge. Thus we come squarely to the second question raised as to whether the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to sustain the findings of the trial judge.
Appellant claims that he acted in self-defense. The burden of proof is upon him to establish the acts constituting self-defense. (People v. Pabellan, G.R. No. 39324 1; People v. Baguio, 43 Phil., 683.) In the instant case, the only evidence adduced the theory of self-defense was the testimony of the appellant and that of his co- accused brother-in-law, to the affect that the deceased was the first to strike him with a piece of wood, which he was unable to repel, after which a fair fight ensued between appellant and the deceased. It is striking that appellant suffered no injury whatever, and his claim that he suffered some contusions is not borne out by the evidence of record. We are satisfied, after a careful review of the record of the case, that appellant has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that he acted in self-defense.
We are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the trial court as to the existence of mitigating circumstance No. 4 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
The crime here involved took place at night and in an uninhabited place. It was discovered because Faustino Ramos happened to pass by the place where the crime was committed and saw the deceased in a dying condition. Faustino Ramos tried to find out from the deceased who his aggressor was, but the deceased could not utter any more words. He immediately notified the authorities of the matter. Laying suspicion on the herein appellant, the Constabulary authorities began searching for him the same night, but he could be found nowhere. For this reason, guards were posted near appellant’s house. Early in the morning of the next day appellant came accompanied by his co-accused. On seeing the guards they trembled. In view of this attitude, and seeing blood stains in appellant’s undershirt, the two were arrested. An investigation conducted by the Constabulary authorities resulted in two written declarations, one subscribed and sworn to by the appellant, another by his co-accused brother-in-law. The two declarations pointed to the guilt of the appellant. A post-modern examination of the body of the deceased disclosed four open lacerated wounds in the back of the head at the occipital region, and four other big wounds which fractured the skull and caused the death.
At the trial the written declarations were offered in evidence, after the clerk of the trial court, before whom the defendants signed declarations, testified that he read said declarations to them and questioned them as to the circumstances in which they were made. The defendants reserved their right to object to the admission of the declarations in evidence, and the trial court reserved its ruling thereon. The defense, through the testimony of the defendants, attempted to prove that said confessions were not read to them, thus contradicting the testimony of the clerk. On the other hand, both the appellant and his co-defendant testified that the former killed the deceased in self-defense. Both parties rested their case without any ruling on the written declarations. In his decision, the trial judge relied on said declarations ad rejected the theory of self-defense advanced by the defendants.
On this appeal, two questions are raised: one relates to the admissibility of the written declaration or confession of the appellant, while the other to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conviction.
As to the first question, counsel contends that the testimony of the clerk of court alone was insufficient to prove that the appellant’s confession was made freely and voluntarily. No doubt the question thus raised is predicated on former rulings of this court based on section 4 of Act No. 619, to the effect that no written confession should be admitted in evidence without positive proof that it was made freely and voluntarily. In United States v. Zara (42 Phil., 308), this court held that said section has been expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1917, and that, in view of such repeal, the burden of proof has shifted to the accused to establish that a written confession or admission attributed to him was not voluntarily given by him or that it was obtained by undue pressure. This decision was followed in People v. Singh (45 Phil., 676). Moreover, upon the authority of the latter case, in relation to United States v. Agatea (40 Phil., 596), the appellant’s confession must be held to have been admitted without objection. In the Singh case, counsel for the defendant moved that certain testimony relating to an alleged confession be stricken from the record, on the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement. Counsel for the defendant contended that the failure of the trial court to rule the motion, deprived the defendant of an opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession. This court held: "The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal, the matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion." In the instant case, there was no need for such a motion inasmuch as the defense had an opportunity to rebut the confession in question. And in United States v. Agatea, supra, this court held that a confession offered in evidence and not objected to by the defendant is regarded as prima facie voluntary.
Of course this court has declared time and again that it would not stand on mere technicality when human liberty is involved. Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions and do so only after a most painstaking scrutiny of their merit. The general rule is that the admissibility of such confessions is necessarily addressed, in the first instance, to the trial judge. Thus we come squarely to the second question raised as to whether the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to sustain the findings of the trial judge.
Appellant claims that he acted in self-defense. The burden of proof is upon him to establish the acts constituting self-defense. (People v. Pabellan, G.R. No. 39324 1; People v. Baguio, 43 Phil., 683.) In the instant case, the only evidence adduced the theory of self-defense was the testimony of the appellant and that of his co- accused brother-in-law, to the affect that the deceased was the first to strike him with a piece of wood, which he was unable to repel, after which a fair fight ensued between appellant and the deceased. It is striking that appellant suffered no injury whatever, and his claim that he suffered some contusions is not borne out by the evidence of record. We are satisfied, after a careful review of the record of the case, that appellant has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that he acted in self-defense.
We are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the trial court as to the existence of mitigating circumstance No. 4 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. 58 Phil., 964.
