G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013 - RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 “Caterpillar” Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was “free from all liens and encumbrances” will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: “In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with “grave abuse of discretion.”In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that “Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.” In view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16cralaw virtualaw library
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
x x x x
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 34-35; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (retired/deceased), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (later Presiding Justice, but already retired and now deceased) and Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased).
2 Id. at 57-58.
3 Id. at 58.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 77-88.
8 Id. at 58-59.nadcralawlibrary
9 Id. at 59.redcralaw
10 Id.
11 Id. at 57-63.
12 Id. at 61-62.
13 Raffled to Branch 12.
14People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 370-372.
15 The ruling in G.R. No. 148193 became final and executory.
16Rollo, pp. 34-35.
17 Id. at 39-55.
18 Id. at 37-38.
19 Id. at 104-117.
20 Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
x x x x
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever state it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
21Rollo, pp. 120-126.
22 Rollo, p. 83.
23Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, 620-621; Rojas v. People, No. L-22237, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 243, 246.
24 Supra note 14, at 371-372.red cralawlibrary
25 Id. at 370-371.