G.R. Nos. 197942–43, 199528, March 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., EASTBAY RESORTS, INC., AND HON. CICERO JURADO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 11, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:On June 20, 2007, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9487 amended P.D. No. 1869 by extending PAGCOR’S franchise by 25 years after July 11, 2008, renewable for another 25 years, while also expanding and circumscribing its corporate powers.6
x x x x
b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.
x x x x
TITLE IV – GRANT OF FRANCHISE
SEC. 10. Nature and Term of Franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty–five (25) years, renewable for another twenty–five (25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
• PAGCOR is given a new franchise or its present franchise is extended beyond July 11, 2008;On April 11, 2006, PAGCOR and respondent Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotel and Resorts, Inc. (Thunderbird Pilipinas), a newly–formed local affiliate of ERI now representing their foreign principal, Thunderbird, executed another MOA13 whereby Thunderbird Pilipinas committed to invest a total of US$100 Million, or P5.2 Billion, in Fiesta Casino and Resort (FCR), a gaming and leisure complex in Poro Point Special Economic and Freeport Zone (PPSEFZ), San Fernando City, La Union. For Phase 1 of FCR, Thunderbird Pilipinas would deposit in escrow the initial amount of P162.3 Million, while PAGCOR would grant it a six–month provisional ATO a casino. And since Phases 2–5 of FCR to complete the US$100 Million investment would extend beyond July 11, 2008, it was also agreed that Thunderbird Pilipinas’ subsequent additional investments in FCR would be made contingent upon the following conditions happening:
• The authority of PAGCOR to grant license to operate a private casino within special economic zones falls within the scope of the new franchise or the extended franchise, whichever is applicable; and
• PAGCOR grants unto [ERI] and THUNDERBIRD extension of the authority to operate the [FHC].12
• PAGCOR is given a new franchise or its present franchise is extended beyond July 11, 2008;On October 31, 2006, the parties executed an Amendment to the Memorandum of Agreement,15 whereby Thunderbird Pilipinas also agreed to issue a Corporate Guarantee to fund, develop and complete the FCR, failing which, it would cede and transfer over to PAGCOR its entire shares of stock in FCR, as well as lose its license to operate a casino in FCR. PAGCOR for its part granted Thunderbird Pilipinas an ATO for FCR of up to July 11, 2008, but extendible beyond the said date, under the following new provision:
• The authority of PAGCOR to grant license to operate a private casino within special economic zones falls within the scope of the new franchise or the extended franchise, whichever is applicable; and
• PAGCOR grants unto THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS extension of the authority to operate the [FCR].14
This Agreement shall be effective from the date of the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement [dated April 11, 2006] and shall be co–terminus with the present charter of PAGCOR or until July 11, 2008. The Memorandum of Agreement shall be extended for such period and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties in the event that PAGCOR is given a new franchise or its present franchise is extended by law beyond July 11, 2008, and that the authority of PAGCOR to grant license to operate a private casino within special economic zones falls within the scope of the new franchise or the extended franchise, whichever is applicable.16In an accompanying document called License,17 also dated October 31, 2006, Thunderbird Pilipinas’ casino franchise in FCR was also stated to be co–terminus with PAGCOR, or until July 11, 2008, but extendible if and when PAGCOR’s authority to issue licenses is extended. In the License, the terms and conditions for the operation of a gambling casino at PPSEFZ were specified, much like the earlier Agreement dated May 19, 2005 between PAGCOR, ERI and Thunderbird – the said Agreement also stated that the “grant of authority” to Thunderbird would be “co–terminus with the present charter of PAGCOR, or until July 11, 2008,” but extendible if and when PAGCOR is given a new or extended franchise beyond July 11, 2008.
The Authority to Operate is renewed commencing from the Effective Date and shall be valid for a period of five (5) years or until and including August 5, 2014. This Authority to Operate shall be automatically extended to be co–terminus with PAGCOR Charter which is until July 11, 2033 upon full compliance of THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS of its Investment Commitment to the satisfaction of PAGCOR.22Also on June 2, 2010, PAGCOR advised ERI that its revised ATO would incorporate a provision stipulating the new period, viz:
“Period” refers to the five (5)[–]year period until and including August 5, 2014. This Authority to Operate shall be automatically extended to be co–terminus with the PAGCOR Charter which is until July 11, 2033 upon full compliance by [ERI] of its Investment Commitment, to the satisfaction of PAGCOR.23On July 8, 2010, the respondents again wrote to ask for their renewal of ATOs;24 but on November 2, 2010, now under a new Board of Directors appointed by newly–elected President Benigno S. Aquino III, PAGCOR instructed them to submit updated investment plans because they allegedly missed their previous investment timetables.25 The respondents wrote back on November 30, 2010 to assure PAGCOR that they were fully compliant with their investment commitments, and again pleaded for a longer ATO, which they said they needed to attract investors.26 On February 16, 2011, PAGCOR wrote for clarifications while pointing out discrepancies in the capitalization and timetables of the respondents, noting in particular that their clients had been mostly local, not foreign, players.27
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, let a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be issued in favor of Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc. and Eastbay Resorts, Inc. ordering defendant Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, its agents, assigns, representatives, and other persons acting for or on its behalf or under its direction, to refrain from initiating and completing cessation proceedings or other similar proceedings against plaintiff Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc.’s business operations in the Fiesta Casino Resort in Poro Point, La Union and plaintiff Eastbay Resorts, Inc.’s business operations in Fiesta Hotel and Casino in EARTZ, Binangonan, Rizal.Without seeking a reconsideration of the said order, on August 19, 2011, PAGCOR filed directly with this Court two certiorari petitions, G.R. Nos. 197942 and 197943. Pleading transcendental importance of the issues involved, as well as claiming to raise only pure questions of law, PAGCOR argued that the respondents’ casino franchise is not a contractual and demandable right in esse but a mere privilege that it can revoke any time, and that this privilege had ceased since August 6, 2009 and the respondents have been operating by mere tolerance of PAGCOR. It then sought to provisionally stop Judge Jurado from hearing the complaints or granting temporary remedies to the respondents, such as ordering the consignment of the participating fees due to it. It also sought to bar them from filing a supplemental complaint and application for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the closure order, lest it render moot the instant petitions.
Let the bond for the issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be set at [P]1,000,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued in favor of Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc. and Eastbay Resorts, Inc., ordering defendant Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, its agents, assigns, representatives and other persons acting for or on its behalf, or under its direction, to:PAGCOR received the said order on October 18, 2011, and on October 21, 2011, it filed with this Court a supplement to its urgent motion38 reiterating its prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the RTC Orders dated June 23, 2011 and October 13, 2011. On December 17, 2011, PAGCOR filed its third petition, G.R. No. 199528,39 to set aside the aforesaid amended order. The Court again declined to issue a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction but ordered the respondents to file a comment. The new petition was later consolidated with G.R. No. 197942–43. After several extensions, on April 3, 2012, the respondents filed their joint comment.
a) Reinstate the monitoring teams in plaintiffs’ casinos; b) Reasonably act upon and approve plaintiffs’ pending requests on matters relative to their normal casino operations including but not limited to those contained in plaintiffs’ letters dated 12 April 2011 (Exhibits “A–7–PMI” to “A–8–PMI”[)], 29 June 2011 (Exhibits “A–1–PMI” and “A–2–PMI”)[,] and 12 July 2011 (Exhibits “A–3–PMI” and “A–4–PMI”); and c) Reasonably act upon and approve all similar requests that plaintiffs may file during the pendency of this suit.
Let the bond for the issuance of Writs of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be set at P1,000,000.00.
The rule [requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration] is, however, circumscribed by well–defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex–parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.48 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)PAGCOR interposed two exceptions in Domdom: first, the prejudice against the government is clear, since it would lose millions in revenues from the respondents’ casino operations under the parties’ earlier terms of reference; and second, whether Judge Jurado gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed orders involves purely questions of law.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunction relief is improper.52 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.With the parties agreeing to end their differences before trial proper, the instant petitions have ceased to present a justiciable controversy for us to resolve.56 However, as PAGCOR itself has importuned, there are procedural as well as substantive issues of such importance which it hopes this Court would help clarify for the guidance of future litigants. So shall We proceed.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.55 (Citations omitted)
SEC. 4. x x xPAGCOR invoked as authority the case of Lago v. Abul, Jr.60 to argue that Judge Jurado could not extend the 72–hour TRO granted by Judge Reyes. There, a case for injunction with TRO was filed on July 2, 2009 in the multi–sala RTC of Gingoog City, but allegedly without notice to the adverse party and without raffle, Judge Godofredo Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul) assumed the case, and on July 7, 2009 (a Tuesday) issued a 72–hour TRO. It was only on July 14, 2009, or after seven days, that he issued the order extending the TRO, “for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty (20) days.” But by then the 72–hour TRO had long expired.
x x x x
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple–sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a non–resident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty–four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex–parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty–day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The Court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple–sala court or the presiding judge of a single–sala court may issue ex–parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy–two (72) hours from issuance, but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy–two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy–two (72) hours provided herein.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Under the circumstances, Judge Abul should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not, however, be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties’ addresses. The importance of notice to all parties concerned is so basic that it could not be dispensed with. The trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without giving all parties the opportunity to be heard.As in Lago, the Court does not now find that Judge Jurado acted in bad faith or with ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO extension and later the preliminary injunction. It would have been irregular and unreasonable for him to act on the extension of the 72–hour TRO on June 6, 2011 when the cases were first raffled to him, and besides, under Rule 58 he had 24 hours to act thereon. On the other hand, PAGCOR should have refrained, but deliberately did not, from serving its closure orders on the respondents on June 7, 2011, knowing very well that a summary hearing was to be held that same morning on their TRO application. Indeed, seen in light of the preceding acts of PAGCOR, it can hardly be said that it acted with fairness toward the respondents so as to be permitted now to blithely take issue with the extension of the 72–hour TRO. For truly, what is of compelling consideration here is that PAGCOR was accorded notice and a chance to be heard, and when the trial court later resolved to grant the writ of preliminary injunction, it did so after hearing it out, within the 20–day TRO.
It is a settled doctrine that judges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
In this case, complainants failed to show that Judge Abul was motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. Complainants did not adduce any proof to show that impropriety and bias attended the actions of the respondent judge.62 (Citations omitted)
The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re–examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.As will become more evident in our latter discussion, there is no justification for PAGCOR dispensing with a motion for reconsideration, since an earlier case, PAGCOR v. Fontana Development Corporation,67 has delved into the same points it raised here.
This rule admits well–defined exceptions as follows:Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re–examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well–defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex–parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.66 (Citations omitted)
Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.4. The MOAs of the parties are not concerned solely with the matter of the grant, renewal or extension of a franchise to operate a casino, but they require as a concomitant condition that the proponents commit to make long–term, multi–billion investments in two resort complexes where they are to operate their casinos.
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.69 (Citations omitted)
Lastly, the Court has to point out that the issuance of the 10–year SAO by PAGCOR in lieu of the MOA with FDC is a breach of the MOA. The MOA in question was validly entered into by PAGCOR and FDC on December 23, 1999. It embodied the license and authority to operate a casino, the nature and extent of PAGCOR’s regulatory powers over the casino, and the rights and obligations of FDC. Thus, the MOA is a valid contract with all the essential elements required under the Civil Code. The parties are then bound by the stipulations of the MOA subject to the regulatory powers of PAGCOR. Well–settled is the rule that a contract voluntarily entered into by the parties is the law between them and all issues or controversies shall be resolved mainly by the provisions thereof.77 (Citation omitted)In stressing that PAGCOR is contractually bound by its MOA with FDC, the Court said:
As parties to the MOA, FDC and PAGCOR bound themselves to all its provisions. After all, the terms of a contract have the force of law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public policy. A stipulation for the term or period for the effectivity of the MOA to be co–terminus with term of the franchise of PAGCOR including any extension is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public policy.In conclusion, PAGCOR’s sole and exclusive authority to restrict and control the operation of gambling casinos in the country cannot be said to be absolute, but must be exercised with due regard to the terms of its agreement with the licensee. This is specially so when the grant of a particular franchise to operate a casino is hinged on an entire investment agreement to establish a resort complex requiring a significant infusion of capital, wherein the investor must invest not just in a casino operation but in a complete hotel/resort complex which would house it.
It is beyond doubt that PAGCOR did not revoke or terminate the MOA based on any of the grounds enumerated in No. 1 of Title VI, nor did it terminate it based on the period of effectivity of the MOA specified in Title I and Title II, No. 4 of the MOA. Without explicitly terminating the MOA, PAGCOR simply informed FDC on July 18, 2008 that it is giving the latter an extension of the MOA on a month–to–month basis in gross contravention of the MOA. Worse, PAGCOR informed FDC only on October 6, 2008 that the MOA is deemed expired on July 11, 2008 without an automatic renewal and is replaced with a 10–year SAO. Clearly it is in breach of the MOA’s stipulated effectivity period which is co–terminus with that of the franchise granted to PAGCOR in accordance with Sec. 10 of PD 1869 including any extension. Hence, PAGCOR’s disregard of the MOA is without legal basis and must be nullified. PAGCOR has to respect the December 23, 1999 MOA it entered into with FDC, especially considering the huge investment poured into the project by the latter in reliance and pursuant to the MOA in question.78 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
1 Issued by Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr., rollo (G.R. Nos. 197942–43), pp. 50–55.
2 Id. at 56–57.
3 Id. at 452–458. See also rollo (G.R. No. 199528), pp. 58–64.
4Rollo (G.R. No. 199528), pp. 65–66.
5 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
6 Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 would now read:
SEC. 10. Nature and Term of Franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted from the expiration of its original term on July 11, 2008, another period of twenty–five (25) years, renewable for another twenty–five (25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to operate and license gambling casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement places, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, bingo, etc. except jai–alai, whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the corporation shall obtain the consent of the local government unit that has territorial jurisdiction over the area chosen as the site for any of its operations.
The operation of slot machines and other gambling paraphernalia and equipment, shall not be allowed in establishments open or accessible to the general public unless the site of these operations are three–star hotels and resorts accredited by the Department of Tourism authorized by the corporation and by the local government unit concerned.
The authority and power of the PAGCOR to authorize, license and regulate games of chance, games of cards and games of numbers shall not extend to: (1) games of chance authorized, licensed and regulated or to be authorized, licensed and regulated by, in, and under existing franchises or other regulatory bodies; (2) games of chance, games of cards and games of numbers authorized, licensed, regulated by, in, and under special laws such as Republic Act No. 7922; and (3) games of chance, games of cards and games of numbers like cockfighting, authorized, licensed and regulated by local government units. The conduct of such games of chance, games of cards and games of numbers covered by existing franchises, regulatory bodies or special laws, to the extent of the jurisdiction and powers granted under such franchises and special laws, shall be outside the licensing authority and regulatory powers of the PAGCOR.
7 SEC. 3. Corporate Powers. –
x x x x
(h) to enter into, make, conclude, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and nature and for any lawful purpose which are necessary, appropriate, proper or incidental to any business or purpose of the PAGCOR, including but not limited to investment agreements, joint venture agreements, management agreements, agency agreements, whether as principal or as an agent, manpower supply agreements, or any other similar agreements or arrangements with any person, firm, association or corporation.
8Rollo (G.R. Nos. 197942–43), pp. 190–197.
10 Id. at 200–210.
11 Id. at 211–219.
12 Id. at 212.
13 Id. at 82–94.
14 Id. at 83.
15 Id. at 96–98.
16 Id. at 97.
17 Id. at 99–108.
18 Id. at 109–110, 221–222.
19 Id. at 111–115, 223–235.
20 Id. at 116–119, 236–239.
21 Id. at 120.
23 Id. at 240.
24 Id. at 121, 241.
25 Id. at 122–123, 242–243.
26 Id. at 124–126, 244–246.
27 Id. at 152–154, 272–274.
28 Id. at 155–156, 275–276.
30 Id. at 157–160, 277–280.
31 Id. at 59–81, 166–189.
32 Id. at 409.
33 Id. at 55.
34 Id. at 375–392.
35 Id. at 386.
36 Id. at 416–426.
37 Id. at 458.
38 Id. at 446–450.
39Rollo (G.R. No. 199528), pp. 3–56.
40 Id. at 571–574.
41 Id. at 575–578.
42 Id. at 581.
43 Id. at 593–604.
44 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
45Rollo (G.R. No. 199528), p. 595.
46 G.R. No. 182382–83, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 528.
47Rollo (G.R. No. 199528), p. 599.
48 Supra note 46, at 533.
49 567 Phil. 255 (2008).
50 Id. at 272.
51 587 Phil. 380 (2008).
52 Id. at 386–387.
53Didipio Earth Savers’ Multi–Purpose Association, Incorporated v. Sec. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457 (2006).
54 589 Phil. 387 (2008).
55 Id. at 480–481.
56Madriaga, Jr. v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560, 568–569, citing Suplico v. National Economic and Development Authority, et al., 580 Phil. 301, 323 (2008) and Osmeña III v. Social Security System of the Philippines, 559 Phil. 723, 735 (2007).
57Rollo (G.R. No. 199528), pp. 450–451.
58 Id. at 452–455.
59 Id. at 606–611.
60 A.M. No. RTJ–10–2255, January 17, 2011, 639 SCRA 509.
61Lago v. Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ–10–2255, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 247.
62 Id. at 250–251.
63Chong v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184948, July 21, 2009, 593 SCRA 311, 313–314.
64Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 603, 611 (2001).
65 G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013.
67 G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 461.
68 G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013.
70 Below also referred to as a “franchise” or “authority to operate.”
71Secretary Boncodin v. National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU), 534 Phil. 741, 754 (2006).
72Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534, 560; Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 811–812.
73Chavez v. Romulo, id.
74 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
75 Supra note 67.
76 Id. at 480.
77 Id. at 481.
78 Id. at 483–484