G.R. No. 175540, April 14, 2014
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, Petitioner, v. ZENAIDA MAGUD–LOGMAO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
Plaintiff–appellee Zenaida Magud–Logmao is the mother of deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendant–appellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney Institute (NKI).
At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers’ Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patient’s data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on–duty at the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao]. Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the skull x–ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning of March 2, 1988, [Logmao] developed generalized seizures and was managed by the neuro–surgery resident on–duty; that the condition of [Logmao] progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and ambu–bagging support was provided; that admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilator units were being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at EAMC, suggested that [Logmao] be transferred to NKI; and that after arrangements were made, [Logmao] was transferred to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.
At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that the severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested the Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross–matching examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite the necessary medical care and management and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible beneficiary.
Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and, upon her request, she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patient’s date sheet which bears the name Angelito Lugmoso, with address at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted several radio and television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI for severe head injury after allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass, as well as Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, whose area of jurisdiction includes Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, for assistance in locating the relatives of Angelito Lugmoso. Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS–CBN and GMA attesting that the request made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal to locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated. A Certification was likewise issued by Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact that on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to immediately locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up her request until March 9, 1988.
On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced brain dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by Dr. Antonio Rafael, a neurosurgeon and attending physician of Lugmoso, and that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG) was in progress to confirm the diagnosis of brain death. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed that the EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead. Upon learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer Misa whether the relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that the necessary consent for organ donation could be obtained. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete–Liquete to secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the Medico–Legal Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the incident which lead to the brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum, which reads as follows:This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any portion or portions of the human body of the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the National Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East Avenue Medical Center.A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr. Maximo Reyes, Medico–Legal Officer of the NBI, stating that he received a telephone call from Dr. Liquete on March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m. regarding the case of Lugmoso, who was declared brain dead; that despite efforts to locate the latter’s relatives, no one responded; that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second opinion for organ retrieval for donation purposes even in the absence of consent from the family of the deceased; and that he verbally agreed to organ retrieval.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios and television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico–Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.
At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team, composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as principal surgeon, Drs. Manuel Chua–Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie Rosete–Liquete, Aurea Ambrosio, Ludivino de Guzman, Mary Litonjua, Jaime Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza, removed the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted a kidney and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other kidney of Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan. The transplant operation was completed at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of March 3, 1988.
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE) program of NKI, made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the embalmment of the cadaver of Lugmoso good for a period of fifteen (15) days to afford NKI more time to continue searching for the relatives of the latter. On the same day, Roberto Ortega, Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria Oro, sent a request for autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report and Certification of Post–Mortem Examination issued by the NBI stated that the cause of death of Lugmoso was intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double organ transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television that the donor was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City. As the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.
It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a brother of Arnelito, who was then a resident of 17–C San Pedro Street, Mandaluyong, reported to Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong that the latter did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by a Certification issued by said Station; and that the relatives of Arnelito were likewise informed that the latter was missing. Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a complaint for damages against Dr. Emmanuel Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor, Celso Santiago, National Kidney Institute, represented by its Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua–Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete–Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z. Ambrosio, Dr. Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez, Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by its President, German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the
organs of Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they concealed his true identity.
On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered judgment finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for damages to plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against the other defendants for lack of legal basis.3
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION by DELETING the award of P188,740.90 as actual damages and REDUCING the award of moral damages to P250,000.00, the award of exemplary damages to P200,000.00 and the award of attorney’s fees to P100,000.00.
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN HOLDING PETITIONER DR. FILOTEO ALANO LIABLE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE NOR IS THERE ANY FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY OR DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD–LOGMAO.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED THE AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND RETRIEVE THE ORGANS OF ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER IDENTIFIED TO BE IN FACT ARNELITO LOGMAO) CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY LAW.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD–LOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.5
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next–of–kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios and television, as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico–Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.7
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Aurora Santiago–Lagman and Arcangelita Romilla–Lontok, concurring; rollo, pp. 71–96 .
2 Id. at 98–101.
3 Id. at 73–79. (Citations omitted)
4 Id. at 95. (Emphasis in the original)
5 Id. at 408–409.
6E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. vs. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 363.
7 Exhibits “19” and “33,” records, p. 1019. (Emphasis supplied)
8 G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583.
9 Id. at 598.
This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any portion or portions of the human body of the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the National Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios and television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI Medicolegal Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.30 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x. In the natural course of things, a search or inquiry of anything requires at least two days of probing and seeking to be actually considered as having made said earnest efforts. But a one–day campaign, especially with regard to a subject matter as important as a person’s disposal into the afterlife certainly warrants a longer time for investigation. Indeed, what is “reasonable” is a relative term, dependent on the attendant circumstances of the case (Philippine Law Dictionary, citing Katague vs. Lagana, CV 70164, March 7, 1986). Here, what was involved was the detachment of the vital organs of plaintiff’s 18–year[–]old son from his body without her knowledge and consent, and which act was upon the authority issued by defendant Dr. Alano as head of the hospital. The matter at hand was of a very sensitive nature that an inquiry of less than one day cannot be deemed as sufficient and reasonable to exculpate him from liability. x x x.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre–existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi–delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi–delicts. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
x x x. Quasi–delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo–American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo–American law on torts.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 “lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.” The Court said:One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of “some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.” [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were “designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience” and which were also meant to serve as “guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice.” (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:Corollarily, Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.” It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.56 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights, but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician–patient relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital which involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s oft–quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical procedure or treatment: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
Subsequently, in Canterbury v. Spence[,] the court observed that the duty to disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Thus, respect for the patient’s right of self–determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. x x x.60
SEC. 2. The authorization referred to in section one of this Act must: be in writing; specify the person or institution granted the authorization; the organ, part or parts to be detached, the specific use or uses to which the organ, part or parts are to be employed; and, signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses.
If the grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization may be executed by his guardian with the approval of the court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother, in the order, named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in section one of this Act, without the consent of the husband.
After the death of the person, authority to use human organs or any portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical or scientific purposes may also be granted by his nearest relative or guardian at the time of his death or in the absence thereof, by the person or head of the hospital, or institution having custody of the body of the deceased: Provided, however, That the said person or head of the hospital or institution has exerted reasonable efforts to locate the aforesaid guardian or relative.
A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the Secretary of Health. (Emphasis supplied)
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.63 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: After the retrieval of the organs from the patient and the transplantation of the organs to Mr. Ambustan and Tan [K]oc Lee, did the hospital stop in its effort to locate the family of the patient, Mr. Witness?
A: Since this patient is a John Doe and even after we had retrieved the organs and transplanted it to the 2 recipients, I was also made aware that no relatives could still be located. Specific instruction were [sic] given to the transplant coordinator to continue looking for the relatives.65 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: Does the time have any factor also with respect to the viability of these organs, Mr. Witness[?] A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you please explain this, Mr. Witness? A When we remove the organs say, the kidney from the cadaver we put that into [a] special solution for preservation and ideally we would like to transplant that kidney within 24 hours although oftentimes we extend it to 48 hours and even stretching it to 72 hours, sir. Court : I just want to clarify this issue. Q:
Is there any particular reason why the retrieval of the organs have to be done even when the patient is not yet dead, as what we know heart beating [sic] stops but even at that stage when classified as brain dead, why the rush to open it up, is there any particular reason or could it refer perhaps to the successful operation maybe for the organs to fit well to the rec[i]pient?
A: Yes, Your Honor. The viability of the organ as I mentioned earlier the kidney is viable for several hours, as I mentioned 24 hours, 48 hours up to 72 hours but for the liver, Your [Honor], during that time in 1988 the liver can be preserved only for about 6 to 8 hours and for the heart it should be connected for 4 hours, Your Honor. Q: So, in this particular case, the kidney, how many hours more or less? A: At that time it was stretched into 24 hours, Your Honor and the pa[n]creas maybe 4 hours so that it is the leng[th] of time when the organs most likely to be viable after that most likely did not function anymore [sic]. Q: But you do retrieval also to those dead on arrival, is that not? A: In this particular case, Your Honor, it is possible for example the dead on arrival is brought to the emergency room, the preparation of the operating room and the getting of [sic] the consent it will take time, Your Honor, so in this particular case, Your Honor there is no more heart beat that cannot be viable anymore[.]66 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi–delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. x x x.
1 PH beat world record for most number of organ donors in one hour, February 28, 2014, Philippine Daily Inquirer, (visited April 3, 2014).
2Rollo, pp. 71–96, penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Justice Aurora Santiago–Lagman and Justice Arcangelita Romilla–Lontok.
3 Id. at 103–111, penned by Hon. Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, then the Presiding Judge of the Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
4 This hospital is now known as the National Kidney and Transplant Institute or NKTI.
5Rollo, p. 73; CA decision, p. 3.
6 Id. at 103; RTC decision, p. 1.
9 Id. at 73; CA decision, p.3.
15 Id. at 74.
24 Id. at 75; CA decision, p. 5.
30 Id. at 76; CA decision, p. 6.
31 Id. at 76–77; CA decision, pp. 6–7.
32 Id. at 77; CA decision, p. 7.
37 Id. at 78; CA decision, p. 8.
41 Id. at 78–79.
42 Id. at 79; CA decision, p. 9.
43 Id. at 103–111.
44 Id. at 106; RTC decision, p. 4.
45 Id. at 112–144.
46 Id. at 71–96.
47 Id. at 92; CA decision, p. 22.
49 Id. at 93–95; CA decision, pp. 23–25.
50 Id. at 401–459, memorandum for the petitioner.
51Spouses Alcazar v. Evelyn Arante, G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 507, 516 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 294 [Per J. Leonardo–De Castro, First Division].
52Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador, 547 Phil. 463, 470 (2007) [Per J. Ynares–Santiago, Third Division]; Lucas v. Tuaño, 604 Phil. 98, 121 (2009) [Per J. Chico–Nazario, Third Division].
53 G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, 219 SCRA 115 [Per J. Davide, Third Division].
54 Id. at p. 127–128, citing Report of the Code Commission, 161–162, and A. M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 72 (vol. 1, 1985).
55 G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 392 [Per J. Peralta, Special Third Division].
56 Id. at 402–403, citing GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, 501 Phil. 153, 164 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 783 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, Third Division]; Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 847 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
57 Entitled “AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,” approved on May 17, 1949. This law has since been superseded by Republic Act No. 7170 or “The Organ Donation Act of 1991,” approved on January 7, 1992. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7170 now specifically provides that the search for the donor’s relatives must be done within 48 hours.
58 Entitled “AN ACT TO AMEND REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY–NINE, ENTITLED “AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,” ” approved on June 12, 1954.
59 G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 32 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc, CJ Corona, JJ. Perez and Abad, concurring; JJ. Brion, Nachura, Leonardo–De Castro, Bersamin, and Mendoza, concurring in the result; JJ. Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Peralta, and Sereno, dissenting].
60 Id. at 56–57, citing Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 701, citing Ze Barth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 12, 499 P.2d 1, 8; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 C.A.D.C., 1972.
61 United States v. Barias, 23 Phil. 434, 437 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc], citing Judge Cooley in his work on Torts, 3rd ed., 1324.
62 37 Phil. 809 (1918) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
63 Id. at 813.
64Rollo, p. 106; RTC decision, p. 4.
65 Id. at 323–324; TSN, October 2, 1995, pp. 35–36.
66 Id. at 375–379; TSN, October 2, 1995, pp. 87–91.
67 D. W. McKeown, R. S. Bonser, and J. A. Kellum, Management of the heartbeating brain–dead organ donor, British Journal of Anaesthesia 108 (S1): i96–i107 (2012).
68 S. Ramjug, N. Hussain, and N. Yonan, Prolonged time between donor brain death and organ retrieval results in an increased risk of mortality in cardiac transplant recipients, Interactive CardioVascular and Thoracic Surgery 12, 938–942 (2011).
69 Id. at 939.
70 K. Kunert, S. Weiß, K. Kotsch, and J. Pratschke, Prolonged brain death duration – does it improve graft quality?, Transplant International 2010 European Society for Organ Transplantation 24, 12–13 (2011).
71 Id. at 13.
72Rollo, p. 107; RTC decision, p. 5.
75 Id. at 93–94.
76 Id. at 93.
77 Id. at 73.