EN BANC
G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, Petitioner, v. AURORA A. SALVAÑA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
SECTION 49. Appeals.—(1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days….(Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Based on [Sections 37 (a) and 39 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807], appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary.48 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
. . . .
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.50 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
. . . .
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” or “when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.” In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.59 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law declares as “final” are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.60 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its rights in appealing the CA’s exoneration of the respondent public official therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country.62 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. –
. . . .
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
That the CSC may appeal from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals reversing or modifying its resolutions which may seriously prejudice the civil service system is beyond doubt. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy[,] this Court held that the CSC may become the party adversely affected by such ruling and the aggrieved party who may appeal the decision to this Court.
The situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and indispensable often involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and the like, where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court to protect the integrity of the civil service system.
The CSC may also seek a review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision does not preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for review.64cralawlawlibrary
At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for reconsideration.66cralawlawlibrary
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryTo be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.”
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies,” not to litigate.73 (Emphasis supplied)
More than ten years have passed since the Court first recognized in Dacoycoy the CSC’s standing to appeal the CA’s decisions reversing or modifying its resolutions seriously prejudicial to the civil service system. Since then, the ruling in Dacoycoy has been subjected to clarifications and qualifications but the doctrine has remained the same: the CSC has standing as a real party in interest and can appeal the CA’s decisions modifying or reversing the CSC’s rulings, when the CA action would have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service. As the government’s central personnel agency, the CSC is tasked to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; it has a stake in ensuring that the proper disciplinary action is imposed on an erring public employee, and this stake would be adversely affected by a ruling absolving or lightening the CSC-imposed penalty. Further, a decision that declares a public employee not guilty of the charge against him would have no other appellant than the CSC. To be sure, it would not be appealed by the public employee who has been absolved of the charge against him; neither would the complainant appeal the decision, as he acted merely as a witness for the government. We thus find no reason to disturb the settled Dacoycoy doctrine.78 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.81cralawlawlibrary
Section 4. Definition of Terms. –
. . . .
k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIt is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
. . . .
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.85 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Dishonesty - 1st Offense - Dismissal
. . . .
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.90 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the medical certificate submitted by Salvaña was spurious or not genuine as the physician-signatory therein, Dr. Blanco[,] testified that she did not examine/treat the appellant nor did she issue a medical certificate on May 15, 2006 since she was on sick leave of absence on that particular day. Worthy [of] mention is that the appellant never bothered to submit any evidence, documentary or otherwise, to rebut the testimony of Blanco.
Thus, the Commission rules and so holds that the appellant is liable for Dishonesty but applying the aforementioned CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, her dishonest act would be classified only as Simple Dishonesty as the same did not cause damage or prejudice to the government and had no direct relation to or did not involve the duties and responsibilities of the appellant. The same is true with the falsification she committed, where the information falsified was not related to her employment.97 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
. . . . we reaffirmed the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order . . . are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings of facts must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.100cralawlawlibrary
Section 3. Serious Dishonesty. – The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.
- The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.
- Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption.
- The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
- The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act related to his/her employment.
- The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
- The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
- Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
- Section 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Simple Dishonesty:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
- The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the respondent.
- In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her employment.
- That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
- Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 16. All applications for sick leaves of absence for one full day or more shall be on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.
Section 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify under the immediately preceding classification.
- The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
- Other analogous circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
[I]n the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there was no unconditional acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her resignation is “without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure[.”] There can [sic] be no other conclusion from the above that her resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any charge/s appropriate under the circumstances.105 (Emphasis in the original)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper government authority. In Republic v. Singun,106 this court stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
. . . .
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.107 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for record purposes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the appointing authority that he is relinquishing his position and the efffectivity date of said resignation; and,
b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or appointing authority which shall indicate the date of effectivity of the resignation.
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 8-35.
2 Id. at 61.
3 Id. at 13.
4 Id. at 14.
5 Id. at 13-14.
6 Id. at 63.
7 Id. at 65.
8 Id. at 67.
9 Id. at 66-67.
10 Id. at 68-71.
11 Id. at 68.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 74-75.
14 Id. at 17.
15 Id.
16 Id., citing manifestation, rollo, pp. 72-73.
17 Id., citing resolution, rollo, pp. 76-88.
18 Id. at 90.
19 Id. at 17.
20 Id. at 91-100.
21 Id. at 101-129.
22 Id. at 130-137.
23 Id. at 138-152.
24 Per Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok.
25Rollo, pp. 37-57.
26 Id. at 227-234.
27 Id. at 58-59.
28 Id. at 21-23.
29 437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
30Rollo, pp. 21-23.
31 Id. at 23-31.
32 Id. at 253-255.
33 Id. at 255-258.
34 Id. at 265-270.
35 Id. at 265, citing secretary’s certificate, rollo, p. 60.
36 Id. at 265-266.
37 Id. at 272-294.
38 Id. at 313-340.
39Bello v. Fernando, 114 Phil. 101, 103 (1962) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc], citing Aguilar v. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898 (1931) [Per J. Villamor, En Banc]; Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397 (1947) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
40Spouses De la Cruz v. Ramiscal, 491 Phil. 62, 74 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]. See also United States v. Yu Ten, 33 Phil. 122 (1916) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc]; Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 69, 76 [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 259 (1999) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
41 See also mandate of Civil Service Commission in Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, promulgated on October 6, 1975.
42 Pres. Dec. No. 807 (1975), art. II, sec. 2.
43 Pres. Dec. No. 807 (1975), art. IX, sec. 36.
44 Rep. Act No. 2260 (1959), sec. 36.
45 Rep. Act No. 2260 (1959), sec. 36.
46Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. Nos. 88177 and 89530, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84, 98 [Per J. Paras, En Banc]; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95575, December 23, 1991, 204 SCRA 965 [Per J. Paras, En Banc]; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97381, November 5, 1992, 215 SCRA 398 [Per J. Melo, En Banc]; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 107370-71, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 522 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc]; University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 108740, December 1, 1993, 228 SCRA 207 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc]; Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, 311 Phil. 340 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
47 G.R. Nos. 88177 and 89530, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84 [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
48 Id. at 98.
49 G.R. No. 95575, December 23, 1991, 204 SCRA 965 [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
50 Id. at 965-968.
51 G.R. No. 97381, November 5, 1992, 215 SCRA 398 [Per J. Melo, En Banc].
52 G.R. Nos. 107370-71, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 522 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
53 G.R. No. 108740, December 1, 1993, 228 SCRA 207 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
54 311 Phil. 340 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
55 See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc] on its discussion of incidental powers by government instrumentalities that are necessarily implied even in the absence of a constitutional provision.
56 See People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 554 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc] wherein this court stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary“. . . . as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.”
57 366 Phil. 86 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, En Banc].
58 Id.
59 Id. at 104-105.
60 Id. at 116-117.
61 437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
62 Id. at 295-296, citing Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
63 456 Phil. 273 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
64 Id. at 291-292, citing Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 437 Phil. 289 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
65 497 Phil. 594 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
66 Id. at 600-601, citing Civil Service Commission v. Tinaya, 491 Phil. 729, 735 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]; Lazo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 108824, September 14, 1994, 236 SCRA 469, 472 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]; See also Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 485 Phil. 182, 195-196 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
67 431 Phil. 843 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
68 570 Phil. 39 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
69 Id. at 49.
70 594 Phil. 451 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
71 Id. at 459.
72 504 Phil. 186 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
73 Id. at 200.
74 595 Phil. 507 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
75 563 Phil. 842 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
76 G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 134 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
77 G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 441 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
78 Id. at 465-466.
79 G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 39 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
80 G.R. No. 152093, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 492 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
81Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 214, 234 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
82Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 437 Phil. 289, 296 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
83 Const. (1987), Art. XI, Sec. 1.
84 406 Phil. 543 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
85 Id. at 551, citing Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 754-755 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927) [Per J. Villa-Real, En Banc]; Guevarra v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144 (1937) [Per J. Villa-Real, En Banc]; China Insurance & Surety Co. v. Far Eastern Surety & Insurance. Co., 63 Phil. 320 (1936) [Per J. Recto, En Banc]; Sevilla v. Tolentino, 66 Phil. 196 (1938) [Per J. Abad Santos, En Banc]; Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781 (1956) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc]; Gregorio v. CA, 135 Phil. 224 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 589 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 832 (1989) [Per J. Grino-Aquino, First Division]; People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
86 G.R. Nos. 194645 and 194665, March 6, 2012, 667 SCRA 556 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
87 G.R. No. 202914, September 26, 2012, 682 SCRA 118 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
88 Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 567 Phil. 46, 57 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990).
89 414 Phil. 590 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
90 Id. at 600-601.
91 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Third Whereas Clause.
92 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Fourth Whereas Clause.
93 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006).
94 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(a).
95 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(b).
96 Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 06-0538 (2006), Sec. 2(c).
97Rollo, p. 99, Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 071364 (2007).
98 248 Phil. 886 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].
99 Id. at 891.
100 Id.
101Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 567 Phil. 46, 58 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 991936 (1999), Rule IV, Sec. 52 (A) (1) and (6).
102Rollo, p. 318.
103 Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 9, Sec. 60.
104 Rollo, p. 78.
105 Id. at 84.
106 572 Phil. 140 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
107 Id. at 150-151, citing Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 624 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, First Division]; Reyes v. Atienza, 507 Phil. 653 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Martin and Martin, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW 200 (1987); Re: Administrative Case for Falsification of Official Documents and Dishonesty against Randy S. Villanueva, 556 Phil. 512 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
108Rollo, p. 84.