SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, v. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny” Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites included the “Indian Run,” which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
- Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
- Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
- Efren de Leon (De Leon)
- Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
- Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
- Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
- Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
- Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
- Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
- Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
- Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
- Michael Musngi (Musngi)
- Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
- Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
- Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
- Antonio General (General)
- Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
- Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
- Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
- Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
- Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
- Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
- Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
- Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
- Adel Abas (Abas)
- Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
- Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
- Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
- Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
- Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
- Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
- Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
- Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
- Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
- Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
- Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
- Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
- Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
- Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies
- Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
x x x x
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or “malice.”
The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. While motive is the “moving power” that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the “purpose” of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term “felonious” means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus – that the act or omission be done “willfully,” “maliciously,” “with deliberate evil intent,” and “with malice aforethought.” The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
x x x x
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
x x x x
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. x x x.
x x x x
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, “from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.” The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
- By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
- By service of the sentence.
- By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
- By absolute pardon.
- By prescription of the crime.
- By prescription of the penalty.
- By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
An order placing defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence” but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an “interlocutory judgment” in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
x x x x
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, “By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation.” The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
x x x x
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
x x x x
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
Endnotes:
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per S.O. No. 1888 dated 28 November 2014.
1 Villareal v. People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080, 1 February 2012, 664 SCRA 519.
2 CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 10 January 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 221-249; CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 30 August 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 209-218. Both the Decision and the Resolution of the CA were penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).
3 RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340[91], 8 November 1993), rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 273-340. The Decision of the RTC was penned by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
4 CA Decision (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court, CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153, 25 October 2006), rollo (G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp. 12-51. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
5Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 598-599.
6 Id. at 530-535.
7 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa (posted on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp. 1607-1660.
8 CA Decision dated 25 October 2006 (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court), supra note 4; CA Resolution (Escalona v. Regional Trial Court, CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153, 17 May 2007), rollo (G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080), pp. 53-58.
9 Motion for Reconsideration of OSG (posted on 7 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 2085-2117.
10 Manifestation and Motion for Clarification of Almeda (filed on 2 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1843-1860; Motion for Reconsideration of Ama (filed on 5 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1883-1896; Motion for Clarification of Bantug (filed on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1953-1966; and Motion for Clarification of Tecson (filed on 6 March 2012), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1930-1941.
11Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861, 1897, 1942, & 1967.
12 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.
13 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 29 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1875; RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 10 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1906, 1952; RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 3 April 2003), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1979.
14Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1875, 1897-1906, 1942-1952, 1967-1979.
15Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 545 (citing People v. Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289 [2006]; People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 [1995]; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, 508 Phil. 96 [2005]; People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 [1994]; People v. Declaro, 252 Phil. 139 [1989]; and People v. Quizada, 243 Phil. 658 [1988]).
16 See: People v. Hernandez, supra.
17Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 550 (citing People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, 545 Phil. 278 <[2007]; People v. Serrano, 374 Phil. 302 [1999]; and People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550).
18Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 551 (citing People v. De Grano, supra note 17; and People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 [1999]).
19Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 552 (citing People v. Maquiling, supra; and Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 339 Phil. 218 [1997]).
20 Villareal v. People, supra note 1, at 556-593.
21 Supra note 10.
22 In the annulled CA Decision (supra note 2), Tecson et al. were sentenced to suffer the penalty of 20 days of arresto menor. On the other hand, in the Decision of this Court (supra note 1), they were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
23 430 Phil. 685 (2002). The accused was found guilty of bigamy by the trial court, and was sentenced to suffer a prison term of prisión correccional. He thereafter applied for probation, as the sentence imposed on him was probationable. Subsequently however, the trial court withheld the order of release from probation in view of the filing by the prosecution of a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence on the accused, as the legally imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code was prisión mayor, which is non-probationable. The trial court reconsidered its order and amended the sentence from a maximum period of 4 years and 2 months to the maximum period of 8 years and 1 day, which had the effect of disqualifying accused from applying for probation. This Court set aside the amendatory judgment of the trial court and reinstated its original decision, and ruled that the trial court judgment can no longer be reversed, annulled, reconsidered, or amended, as it has already lapsed into finality. It was then reiterated that the accused’s waiver of appeal brought about by his application for probation amounted to a voluntary compliance with the decision and wrote finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment.
24 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarySEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)26 Rules of Court, Rule 122, provides as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarySECTION 1. Who may appeal. — Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. (2a) (Emphases supplied)27 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.
28 G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438, 450.
29People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 17 (citing People v. Serrano, supra note 17, at 306; and People v. De Grano, supra note 17).
30 Supra note 28, at 451.
31People v. Mariano, 163 Phil. 625 (1976).
32 Id.; and Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 378 Phil. 1166 (1999).
33See: Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law, Sec. 4.
34 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
35See: RTC Decision (People v. Dizon), supra note 3.
36Concepcion v. Judge Angeles, CA-G.R. SP No. 32793 (CA, decided on 15 June 1994), slip. op., at 16.
37 See Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), Sec. 20, for the applicable law on which court has subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal cases; and Rule 110, Sec. 15, for the applicable rule on where the criminal action must be instituted.
38 Rule 122, Sec. 1; Rule 121, Sec. 7.
39 Rule 122, Sec. 11(c).
40 Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Sec. 6.
41 Rule 41, Sec. 9 in relation to Rule 122, Secs. 8 and 11(c).
42 Rule 120, Sec. 7; Rule 122, Sec. 12.
43 Rule 120, Sec. 8 in relation to Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 124, Sec. 17.
44 Rule 124, Sec. 17.
45 Revised Penal Code, Arts. 78 to 88 (in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 17; Rule 121, Sec. 8; Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 39, Sec. 1)
46 Probation Law, Sec. 4.
47 Tecson et al. filed their applications on various dates in January 2002. See: rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1863, 1897-1901, 1942-1944, & 1967-1969.
48See: CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at 6, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
49 See: CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 14 February 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1972. In the Resolution, the CA stated that “the records of this case cannot be remanded at this stage considering the motions for reconsideration filed hereto.” See also: Letter of Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, CA rollo Vol. II, pp. 2686-2688; Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 918.
50 CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at 6, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
51 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002), rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.
52 CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, 29 October 2002), CA rollo Volume II, pp. 2724-2725.
53 Supreme Court Resolution dated 25 November 2002, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 10-A.
54 The Supreme Court granted the Motion for Extension filed by the OSG. See: Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
55 Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 675.
56 Supreme Court Resolution dated 21 October 2009, rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1156-1160.
57 Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 918; See also Letter of Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Caloocan City RTC Branch 121, CA rollo Vol. II, pp. 2686-2688. Judge Angeles informed the CA that the records of the case had not yet been remanded to Branch 121, thus preventing her from complying with the CA Resolution to release the cash bond posted by one of the accused. The CA Third Division received the letter on 22 October 2002 – or 11 days after RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications.
58 Probation Law; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 241 (1995); and Baclayon v. Mutia, 214 Phil. 126 (1984). See: Del Rosario v. Rosero, 211 Phil. 406 (1983).
59 Id. at 254-255.
60 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 1098-1132.
61Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 270 (2003); and Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
62 Supra. See also: Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
63 256 Phil. 328 (1989).
64 228 Phil. 42, 90 (1986). E.g., People v. Jardin, 209 Phil. 134, 140 (1983) (citing Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 [1925]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil. 661 [1968]; Paredes v. Moya, 158 Phil. 1150, [1974]).
65 Motion for Clarification of Bantug, supra note 10.
66 Probation Law, Sec. 4.
67 Supra note 58, at 132.
68 G.R. No. 182748, 13 December 2011, 662 SCRA 266.
69 Id. at 279-282.
70 See, e.g.: People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258; People v. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242 (1997); and People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
71 Revised Penal Code, Art. 73. People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636, 644 (1935). According to Silvallana: “It is therefore unnecessary to express the accessory penalties in the sentence.”
72See, e.g.: Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 530 Phil. 279 (2006); Baclayon v. Mutia, supra note 58.
73 Article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties. — Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.”
74 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides: “Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.”
75 The law should not apply if its application would be unfavorable to the accused. See generally RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – Vol. 1, 720-721 (1987).
76See ISL, Sec. 5; RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – Vol. 1, 718-720 (1987).
77 Article 365 provides: “In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-four.”
78People v. Temporada, supra note 70; People v. Ducosin, supra. See, e.g.: Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, 20 March 2013, 694 SCRA 12; Guinhawa v. People, 505 Phil. 383 (2005); People v. Dy, 425 Phil 608 (2002); People v. Darilay, 465 Phil. 747 (2004); People v. Bustamante, 445 Phil. 345 (2003); People v. Catuiran, 397 Phil. 325 (2000); People v. Barro, 392 Phil. 857 (2000); Austria v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 408 (2000); Ladino v. People, 333 Phil. 254 (1996); People v. Parohinog, 185 Phil. 266 (1980); People v. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952).
79 People v. Temporada, supra note 70. The case explained the difference between a “prescribed penalty,” “imposable penalty,” and “penalty actually imposed.”
80 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 1; Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105; and People v. Silvallana, supra note 71.
81 See Art. 27 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: “Prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of prisión correccional, suspensión, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty” and Art. 33, which states: “Effects of the Penalties of Suspension from Any Public Office, Profession or Calling, or the Right of Suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension.” (Emphases supplied). Cf: Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770 (1968). The Court En Banc explained therein that then Mayor-elect Benjamin Abes was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine. It then clarified that without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on 13 October 1961. Accordingly, the Court said that the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification would have barred him for seeking public office and for exercising his right to vote until 13 October 1961.
82Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
83 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80 (citing Lacuna v. Abes, supra); Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80; People v. Silvallana, supra note 71.
84Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
85 Revised Penal Code, Art. 36. See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013, 698 SCRA 742; Monsanto v. Factoran, 252 Phil. 192 (1989); Lacuna v. Abes, supra note 81.
86 Supra note 58.
87 Supra note 72.
88 Supra note 68.